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Audit firm size, public ownership, and firms' discretionary
accruals management
Heidi Vander Bauwhede, Marleen Willekens*, Ann Gaeremynck
Department ofApplied Economics, Catholic University of Leiiven, Naamsestraat 69,
3000 Leiiven, Belgium
Abstract
In this study, we developed and tested three hypotheses concerning earnings management in
Belgium (i.e., a continental European environment). The three hypotheses are about: (1) income
smoothing, (2) Bix Six auditors, and (3) public ownership. The study is motivated by the finding by
Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam [Contemp. Account. Res. 15 (1998) 1] and Francis,
Maydew, & Sparks [Audit. J. Pract. Theory 18 (1999) 17] that Big Six audit firms act as a constraint
on both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management. The finding raises questions
as to the determinants of earnings management in other institutional settings such as that of Belgium.
Accordingly, we study publicly available financial statements of a matched sample of publicly and
privately held Belgian firms. Following Francis et al. [Audit. J. Pract. Theory 18 (1999) 17], DeFond
and Subramanyam [J. Account. Econ. 25 (1998) 35], and Becker et al. [Contemp. Account. Res. 15
(1998) 1], we use discrefionary accruals as a measure of earnings management. We find that Belgian
companies—both private and public—engage in income smoothing and manage earnings
opportunistically to meet the benchmark target of prior-year earnings. The evidence is also supportive
of the other two hypotheses, but only when companies have eamings that are above target and have
incentives to smooth eamings downwards. The fact that our results on the impact of Big Six auditors
and ownership type are different for above and below target firms in Belgium, and differ with findings
on U.S. samples, can be explained by the Belgian institutional environment.
© 2003 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Accounting numbers are an important summary statistic of the financial performance of
firms, and therefore are of interest to stakeholders. Because the magnitude of earnings is
affected by accounting decisions, two interesting questions are whether firms "manage"
earnings through such decisions and what determines earnings management. The vast
majority of studies on earnings management focuses on incentives for and constraints on
eamings management by listed firms. Prior evidence supports the following incentives for
earnings management: for both explicit (such as bonus plans and debt covenants) and
implicit contracts,' capital markets and need for external financing," the political and
regulatory process,^ and some specific circumstances (such as labor union contract
negotiations, proxy contests, and eamings decreases or losses)."^ In regard to constraints
on eamings management, the evidence supports: managerial and institutional ownership,
audit committees, auditor size, and intemal govemance mechanisms such as the size of
the board of directors.^
Although prior studies have focused on publicly held companies, little is known about the
impact of public ownership on eamings management. Even less is known about the
incentives for and constraints on eamings management in privately held companies. In this
study, we investigate these issues in a continental European institutional setting, characterized
by the predominant privately held companies. Our paper develops and tests three hypotheses
on the impact of income smoothing, auditor size, and public ownership on eamings
management.
We used Belgian data because financial statement data are publicly available for privately
held firms in Belgium.^ Since Belgium has different institutional, accounting, and auditing
characteristics from the United States, we have been careful to consider these differences
when formulating the eamings management hypotheses and developing the research design.
As various stakeholders use financial reporting in the Belgian institutional context, we follow
Trueman and Titman (1988) and argue that firms, both publicly and privately held, avoid
' See for example Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995), Healy (1985),
Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) for bonus plans; DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1994), DeFond and
Jiambalvo (1994), Sweeney (1994) for debt covenants; Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995) and Kasanen,
Kinnunen, and Niskanen (1996) for implicit contracts.
^ See Aharony, Lin, and Loeb (1993), Friedlan (1994), Neill, Pourciau, and Schaefer (1995), Rangan (1998),
Shivakumar (1998), Subramanyam (1996), Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998).
^ Evidence is reported, for example, in the following studies: Guenther (1994), Han and Wang (1998), Hunt,
Moyer, and Shevlin (1996), Jones (1991), Key (1997).
^ Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), DeAngelo (1986, 1988), Liberty and Zimmerman (1986).
^ Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) and Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1998) for the impact of managerial
ownership and institutional ownership, respectively. Beasley (1996), Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and
Subramanyam (1998), Dechow et al. (1996), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991, 1993), Francis, Maydew, and
Sparks (1999), Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2000), for the impact of intemal and external govemance mechanisms.
'' In Belgium, all firms that meet certain legal form and size criteria are mandated to file financial statements
with the Belgian National Bank.
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deviations in reported earnings to influence stakeholders' perceptions of the stability of
economic earnings. Therefore, we first hypothesize and then find that income-increasing
earnings management occurs when firms have premanaged earnings that are lower than prior-
year reported earnings, and income-decreasing earnings management occurs in the opposite
case.
Conditional on the direction of the earnings management incentive, we then formulate two
more hypotheses: one on the constraining impact of auditor size and one on the positive
impact of public ownership on earnings management. Discretionary accruals are used as a
measure for earnings management in this study.
Our study contributes to the earnings management and auditing literatures as follows. First,
we provide evidence on the differences in earnings management between publicly and
privately held firms. Prior studies use the results of an experiment (Cloyd, Pratt, & Stock,
1996) or a questionnaire (Penno & Simon, 1986) and are confined to testing differences in
accounting procedure choices. As earnings management through accrual decisions is less
visible, it might well be that it is used more extensively than earnings management through
accounting procedure choices. We use discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings
management. The results indicate that listed firms engage less in income-decreasing earnings
management than nonlisted firms. Second, our study discusses the impact of the appointment
of a Big Six auditor^ on earnings management in privately held firms. We report evidence of
audit-quality differentiation between Big Six and non-Big Six auditors when they are
confronted with income-decreasing eamings management. However, we do not find evidence
of audit-quality differentiation between both types of auditors when they are confronted with
income-increasing eamings management, not even for publicly held firms.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss differences between
the American and Belgian institutional environments that are relevant to this study. In Section
3, we discuss the hypotheses that are tested in this paper. In Section 4, we discuss how the
variables are measured in this paper and specify our empirical model. We present our sample
selection and some univariate results in Section 5. Our main (muhivariate) results are
discussed in Section 6, together with some sensitivity analyses. In the final section we
conclude the paper.
2. Some institutional differences between Belgium and the United States
The evidence supports the existence of institutional differences between countries (Ball,
Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Joos & Lang, 1994, 1997; Paisey, 1991; Nobes, 1984). These
include differences, for example, in providers of finance (in particular, the importance of
capital markets), in ownership and corporate governance, and in legal systems. Such factors
may then lead to differences that can be observed in international accounting. Some
differences at the accounting level are sources of demand for accounting and auditing (that
^ Note that the data in this study relate to the period 1991-1997, which is before the PWC merger and the
collapse of Andersen. We therefore continue to use Big Six instead of Big 4.
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is, different goals for financial reporting and different key users of financial statements),
conceptual frameworks and accounting systems, and sources of accounting rules and degree
of detail in which they are specified. The Belgian accounting system is representative of the
accounting systems of Latin countries (Gray, 1988) and Belgian law is representative of the
French family of law systems (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). We
believe, therefore, that the hypotheses we derive can be tested in other continental European
countries that belong to the same class of accounting and family of law systems, such as
Spain, France, Portugal, Turkey, Italy, etc.
Stock markets are far less developed in Belgium than in the United States. The vast
majority of Belgian companies are privately held, often family-owned, and typically
ownership is concentrated. Fewer than 150 companies are listed although about a quarter
of a million Belgian companies file financial statements with the Belgian National Bank. The
number of Belgian listed companies per one million inhabitants amounts to 15.5 as compared
to 35.6 in the United Kingdom and 30.1 in the United States, and the ratio of market
capitalization to GDP is only 38% in Belgium as compared to 123% in the United Kingdom
and 82% in the United States. Further, listed companies are often holding companies. Banks
are a major source of business finance in Belgium and bankers often have better access to
private information about the firms than public financiers. Agency problems other than
between management and shareholders, are relevant in Belgian companies, namely, between
bankers and shareholders, and bankers and management.
Unlike the system in the United States, publicly as well as privately held companies that
meet certain legal form and size criteria are mandated to file financial statements with the
Belgian National Bank. Financial reporting and corporate govemance requirements are not
very different for listed and unlisted firms in Belgium. The major exception is that listed firms
are also required to provide some limited semi-annual (unaudited) financial information.
Thus, the Belgian environment is an ideal laboratory to examine the impact of mere stock
market effects on earnings management.
Belgian companies (privately and publicly held) only submit one set of individual
accounts for both financial reporting and tax purposes. As taxes are raised at the individual
company level, but no separate set of (nonconsolidated) financial statements are issued for
tax purposes in Belgium, the accounting choices in individual company accounts are
typically tax-driven. However, as far as the group accounts are concemed, the Belgian
consolidation law requires that all tax-driven accounting choices in individual financial
statements be reversed in consolidated financial statements. Since a major objective of this
study is to focus on differences between publicly and privately held firms, we only
included group accounts in our sample. This was done to eliminate potendal direct^ tax
effects on earnings management.
Unlike the case in the United States, the desire to monitor management was historically not
a major source of voluntary demand for external auditing in Belgium. External auditing is
^ There may, however, be indirect tax effects on earnings management. See also Section 6.2 on results for
below target firms.
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mandatory for all large (publicly and privately held) companies in Belgium.^ The regulator's
motivation for such a widespread mandatory audit requirement is the protection of all
stakeholders of a company (such as employees, suppliers, banks, and the govemment). In
regard to the audit environment, a notable difference between the United States and Belgium
is the lack of auditor litigation in Belgium. There have only been eight court cases against
auditors since the foundation of the Belgian Kingdom in 1831 (Aerts, 2002). In litigious
environments, the threat of litigation works as a deterrent against below-standard audit
quality. When such a threat is absent, the auditor may feel tempted to keep a friendly
relationship with his client in order to safeguard the appointment, and thus be tempted not to
constrain earnings management. However, various altemative quality enforcement mecha-
nisms exist, including the 3-year auditor tenure rule,'^^ disciplinary sanctions imposed by the
Belgian Institute of Auditors after violation of the Ethical Code," directed investigations, and
peer reviews organized by the Belgian Institute of Auditors.
Finally, the Big Six (now Big Four) market concentration ratio is about 50% in Belgium,
which is lower than the ratio in Anglo-Saxon and most other European countries (Schaen &
Maijoor, 1997; Weets & Jegers, 1997; Willekens & Achmadi, in press). Note that Big Six
market concentration in the public client segment of the Belgian audit market is comparable
to Anglo-Saxon environments. However, in the private client segment of the Belgian audit
market. Big Six concentration is much lower, only about 35% (Sercu, VanderBauwhede, &
Willekens, 2002).
3. Research hypotheses
We first hypothesize that Belgian firms avoid large variability in reported income numbers
and engage in income smoothing irrespective of whether they are publicly or privately held.
Then, we develop our two major hypotheses, on the impact of public ownership and auditor
size on earnings management behavior
3.1. Income Smoothing Hypothesis
It is widely assumed that earnings management opportunism is applicable to companies
where there is separation between ownership and control (Francis et al., 1999). There is
empirical evidence of income smoothing by publicly held firms (DeFond & Park, 1997;
Large companies are companies which meet at least two of the following criteria: total assets > 3, 125,000
Euro; turnover >6,250,000 Euro; number of employees >50. Companies with more than 100 employees are
always classified as a large company irrespective of their total assets or turnover and hence always have to appoint
an independent auditor.
In Belgium, auditors are tenured for periods of 3 years; this requirement is set to promote auditor
independence as the opportunity for firms to dismiss their auditor after a nonclean audit opinion is reduced. The
same auditor can be reappointed for another 3 years; there is no mandatory auditor rotation.
" During the period 1990-1999, 126 disciplinary cases against auditors were initiated relative to an average
number of certified auditors of 800 in that period. In about 66% of those cases, auditors were indeed sanctioned.
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Gaver et al., 1995; Healy, 1985; Young, 1998). We believe that stability in reported income
numbers is also a valid incentive for earnings management in privately held firms. Our belief
is based on Trueman and Titman's (1988) argument that firms may avoid deviations in
reported earnings to influence stakeholders' perception of the stability of the underlying
economic earnings, and thus their assessment of the probability of bankruptcy of a firm. This
might then influence the terms of trade of a firm with its various stakeholder groups such as
customers, suppliers, short-term creditors, and employees. As these various stakeholder
groups are important users of financial reporting in Belgium, we expect that both publicly and
privately held Belgian firms have incentives to manage earnings opportunistically to avoid
variability in reported earnings. If firms indeed have incentives to smooth income, they will
engage in income-increasing earnings management when premanaged earnings are below
target, whereas the opposite will occur when premanaged earnings are above target. This
leads to our first hypothesis:
Income Smoothing Hypothesis: Belgian companies (both private and public) engage in
income smoothing and manage earnings opportunistically to meet the benchmark target of
prior-year earnings.
The Income Smoothing Hypothesis implies that more income-increasing (income-decreas-
ing) discretionary accruals are expected for below (above) target firms. Whereas prior studies
mainly focused on the analysis of determinants of income-increasing earnings management,
determinants of income-decreasing earnings management are equally important in our study.
The reason is that our study analyzes a sample of continental European, viz. Belgian, firms,
and includes both privately and publicly held firms.
3.2. Monitoring Effect ofAuditor Size Hypothesis
Monitoring mechanisms typically work as restraining factors on earnings management.
Prior studies (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999) show that auditor size constrains
earnings management, as a lower level of discretionary accruals can be observed for firms
that appoint Big Six auditors. The underlying rationale is that larger (Big Six) auditors are
more competent and/or independent (and so provide higher-quality services) than smaller
(non-Big Six) auditors,'" and they have more to lose when an audit failure occurs. Such
losses are, for example, quasi rents (DeAngelo, 1981) or brand name reputation (Klein &
Leffler, 1981). Larger (Big Six) auditors may therefore be less tolerant vis-a-vis the level of
discretionary accruals adopted by firms than smaller (non-Big Six) auditors. As all prior
studies are based on samples of publicly listed firms, it is unknown whether auditor size also
Competence and independence are generally considered as two key dimensions of audit quality. As they are
not directly observable, various proxy measures for audit quality exist and tolerance vis-a-vis earnings
management is one of these. The Big Six/non-Big Six dichotomy has been widely used in empirical audit
research, such as in audit-fee studies (Francis, 1984; Francis & Simon, 1987; Palmrose, 1986; Simon & Francis,
1988; Simunic, 1980) and auditor demand and switching studies (Carpenter & Strawser, 1971; DeFond, 1992;
Francis et al., 1999; Francis & Wilson, 1988; Palmrose, 1988; Simunic & Stein, 1987).
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works as a constraint on earnings management in continental European, viz. Belgian, firms or
in privately held firms.
One could argue that an audit failure is less likely to be detected for privately held
companies. The rationale is that they are not subject to the scrutiny of market regulators
(such as the SEC in the United States and the Commission for Banking and Finance in
Belgium) and financial analysts. Also, potential damage to an audit firm's reputation after
audit failure is likely to be smaller for privately than for publicly held client firms. Another
rationale is that the Belgian audit environment is far less litigious than the American.
However, litigation and potential damage awards are unlikely to be the sole determinants of
high-quality audit services. The Belgian Institute of Auditors installed various mechanisms to
monitor members' compliance with professional and ethical standards. These include
mandatory peer reviews, special investigations, and sanctioning procedures. Also, Big Six
firms are international and claim they offer uniform quality worldwide. Finally, prior
evidence about the Belgian audit market indicates that there are some differences between
Big Six and other audit firms in regard to audit fees charged and audit reports issued.
Willekens and Achmadi (in press) report evidence of fee premia for Big Six auditors. This
could point in the direction of quality differences. Gaeremynck and Willekens (in press) find
more stringent reporting by Big Six auditors when the problems in client firms are subtle, but
find that there are no differences in audit reporting between Big Six and non-Big Six audit
firms when problems in client firms are very obvious. The above reasoning results in the
following hypothesis regarding the impact of auditor size on earnings management in
Belgium:
Monitoring Effect of Auditor Size Hypotiiesis: Big Six auditors restrain (reduce) earnings
management and hence the use of discretionary accruals to meet earnings targets in Belgium.
Given that companies engage in income smoothing, "restraining eamings management"
implies that smaller income-decreasing (income-increasing) discretionary accruals are
expected for above (below) target firms that are audited by a Big Six auditor.
3.3. Ownership Incentive Hypothesis
There is empirical evidence on the impact of capital markets on eamings management by
listed companies. The results show that listed firms manage eamings to communicate
private information to stock markets (Subramanyam, 1996), to meet or beat analyst's
eamings expectations (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 1999; Burgstahler & Fames, 1999; Degeorge,
Patel, & Zeckhauser, 1999; Payne & Robb, 2000), to raise additional funds on more
favorable terms, or to sell their stockholdings at a higher price (Aharony et al., 1993;
Dechow et al., 1996; Friedlan, 1994; Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998). Given this
evidence, it is reasonable to expect that public ownership provides an incentive to manage
eamings upward, such that stock market expectations about eamings are fulfilled. Not
meeting stock market expectations may have a negative impact on market value through
declines in stock prices, which may in tum increase a firm's cost of capital. The above
8 H. Vander Bauwhede et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 1-22
reasoning results in the following hypothesis on the impact of public ownership on earnings
management:
Ownership Incentive Hypothesis: Public ownership works as an incentive to manage
earnings upward and has a positive impact on discretionary accruals.
Given that firms also engage in income smoothing, the Ownership Incentive Hypothesis is
to be interpreted as follows. For below target firms, we expect publicly held firms to adopt
even more pronounced positive discretionary accruals strategies compared to privately held
firms, because of additional expectations from the stock market. For above target firms, we
expect that privately held firms will engage in more aggressive income-decreasing earnings
management than publicly held firms. In both cases, the impact of public ownership on
earnings is positive, ceteris paribus.
4. Model specification and variable measurement
4.1. Earnings management measure
We focus on earnings management through unexpected or discretionary accruals. The total
accruals are computed as the change in noncash working capital, minus depreciation,
amortization (of accrued setup costs, intangible and tangible assets), write-offs, and losses
on asset disposals minus (plus) increases (decreases) in provisions. There are various models
that separate total accruals in discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals (Dechow, Sloan, &
Sweeney, 1995). The more refined models—such as the time-series, cross-sectional Jones
(Jones, 1991), and modified Jones model (Dechow et al, 1995)—control for changes in
accruals that are due to changes in the firm's economic condition. However, data limitations
prevented us from using these techniques. In particular, time-series models could not be used
because time-series data are too limited for Belgian firms, which were only mandated to
submit consolidated financial statements from 1991 onwards. Likewise, cross-sectional
models, which are estimated by industry and year, could not be used because the number
of observations per industry is too small. (Only about 370 Belgian firms are required to
submit consolidated financial statements.) Therefore, we calculate unexpected or discretion-
ary accruals as changes in total accruals between the current and the previous year scaled by
lagged total assets (DeAngelo, 1986; DeAngelo et al., 1994). That is,
DAC„ = TAG,, - TAG„-i (1)
where DAG,, = discretionary accruals for firm / in year t scaled by lagged total assets;
TAG/, = total accruals for firm / in year t scaled by lagged total assets.
We recognize that this model does not allow for changes in total accruals due to changes in
the firms' economic condition. However, we control for any potential measurement error by
including a measure of firm performance and a measure of investments in depreciable fixed
assets in the multiple regression analysis.
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4.2. Definition ofpremanaged earnings and the income smoothing target
The Income Smoothing Hypothesis implies that firms manage earnings towards an
earnings target. Following prior studies (DeFond & Park, 1997; Gaver et al, 1995; Guay,
Kothari, & Watts, 1996; Subramanyam, 1996; Young, 1998), we define premanaged earnings
as this year's reported earnings minus discretionary accruals. We use last year's earnings as
the target income as it fulfills the condition that firms try to meet a simple benchmark
(Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Payne & Robb, 2000). Further, the use of alternative targets is
not possible for the following reasons. First, earnings targets that proxy for market expect-
ations, such as analyst forecasts, are not available for privately held companies. Second,
internal budget targets are not available for either publicly or privately held companies.
Finally, consolidated data are not long enough to estimate time-series models (consolidated
data on Belgian groups are only available since 1991).
We need the above measures to test our Income Smoothing Hypothesis. In particular, we
will separate firms that have premanaged earnings that are larger than prior-year earnings
(above target firms, or Sample 1) fi*om those firms that have premanaged earnings that are
smaller than prior-year earnings (below target firms, or Sample 2). Then we will analyze
whether discretionary accruals of above target firms are significantly different from those of
below target firms.
4.3. Multivariate model
To test our major hypotheses on auditor size and ownership, we developed the following
multivariate model:
DAG,, = po + 3i AUDIT,, + (3. TYPE,-, + (33AUDIT,, x TYPE,, + (34FIN,,
+ 35SIZE,, + pgLEV,, + P7CF,, + PglNVEST,, + £„ (2)
Table 1 reports the test and control variables of our model as well as the expected sign of
the parameters, both for the above and below target subsamples (Samples 1 and 2,
respectively). Note that incentives of earnings management are unidirectional in sign for
both samples. Restraining factors tend to work towards zero rather than being unidirectional
(a good auditor is expected to curb both upward and downward earnings management).
To capture the impact of auditor size on earnings management and thus test for the validity
of our Monitoring Effect of Auditor Size Hypothesis, we introduce an indicator variable,
AUDIT, which is equal to one if the firm is audited by a Big Six auditor, and zero otherwise.
Prior studies (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999) report that Big Six auditors (which are
considered to deliver a higher level of audit quality than non-Big Six auditors) constrain
earnings management through discretionary accruals. We argued that having a Big Six auditor
constrains a firm's attempt to increase as well as decrease earnings. Therefore, we expect a
significant positive coefficient on the AUDIT variable in the above target subsample (Sample
1), while we expect a significant negative coefficient in the below target subsample (Sample 2).
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Table 1
Specification of our multiple regression model, variable measurement and predictions as to the sign of the
explanatory variables for Model 1 and Model 2
Variable Defmition Predicted
sign of
coefficients
in Sample 1
(above target
subsample)
Predicted
sign of
coefficients
in Sample 2
(below target
subsample)
Dependent variable
DAC„
Independent variables
Test variables
AUDIT,,
TYPE,,
AUDIT,, X TYPE,,
Control variables
FIN,,
SIZE,,
LEV,,
CF„
INVEST,,
Discretionary accruals for firm / in year t scaled
by lagged total assets = TAC/ , — TAC/ , _
i
Dummy, 1 if firm i has a Big Six auditor,
zero otherwise
Dummy, I if firm i is listed, zero otherwise
The interaction of the dummies TYPE,, and
AUDIT,,. Takes the value 1 if a firm-year
observation is of a listed company that is
audited by a Big Six auditor, zero otherwise
Dummy, 1 if for firm / in year t the sum of
financial debt and paid-in capital increased in
the year after the event year, zero otherwise
Natural logarithm of total assets for firm / in
year /
Ratio of debt over equity for firm /' in year /
Operating cash flow for firm / in year t scaled
by lagged total assets
The amount of the increase or decrease in
tangible fixed assets for firm / fi-om year t—\
to year t, scaled by lagged total assets.
+/-
+
9
+/-
Next, we introduce an indicator variable (TYPE) to assess the impact of ownership type on
earnings management, and thus to test our Ownership Incentives Hypothesis. TYPE equals one
if a firm is listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise. We expect a positive
coefficient on TYPE for both subsamples.
Note that we also include the interaction between the variables AUDIT and TYPE
(AUDIT X TYPE) in the model. We do this because it is likely that audit-firm behavior is also
dependent on market segment. That is, auditor size may cause a different reaction in publicly
and privately held firms. By including the interaction term, we control for this and assess
whether there is indeed differential behavior depending on the market segment. If the
coefficients on AUDIT and TYPE as well as the interaction term (AUDIT x TYPE) are
significant, then the coefficient on the variable AUDIT gives the impact of auditor size for
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privately held companies, and the coefficient on TYPE gives the effect of public ownership for
firms audited by non-Big Six auditors. The sum of the coefficients on AUDIT and AUDI-
T X TYPE gives the impact of auditor size for publicly held companies, and the sum of the
coefficients on TYPE and AUDIT x TYPE gives the impact of ownership on eamings
management for Big Six audited companies. Finally, the sum of the coefficients on AUDIT,
TYPE, and AUDIT x TYPE gives the Joint impact of being audited by a Big Six auditor and
being listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange. Further, a positive (negative) coefficient on the
interaction term in the below target (above target) subsample would mean that the constraining
effect of auditor size is more pronounced in the publicly held client segment than in privately
held client segment. A positive (negative) coefficient in the below target (above target)
subsample also indicates that the incentive effect of public ownership is stronger in companies
audited by Big Six auditors than in companies audited by non-Big Six auditors. A negative
(positive) coefficient on the interaction term in the below target (above target) subsample would
by contrast suggest that the constraining effect of auditor size is less pronounced in the publicly
held client segment of the audit market, and, alternatively, that the incentive effect of public
ownership is less pronounced in firms audited by Big Six auditors.
Several control variables are also introduced in the model. Prior studies suggest that income-
increasing eamings management is induced by the need for additional extemal financing
(Dechow et al., 1996) or extemal funds from stock markets (Aharony et al, 1993; Friedlan,
1994; Rangan, 1998; Shivakumar, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998). Information asymmetries and
agency problems in the relationship between firms and nonpublic extemal financiers, such as
bankers, imply that the need for additional debt financing may be an important incentive for
eamings management as well. To control for the (potential) impact of extemal financing, we
include an indicator variable, FIN. Since private debt finance is an important source of finance
for Belgian firms, we examine the impact of increases in both debt and equity financing. FIN
takes a value equal to one ifthere is an increase in extemal finance (equity and/or debt) the year
subsequent to the year in which eamings are reported (and potentially manipulated); it takes the
value zero otherwise. We expect a positive sign on this coefficient in both subsamples.
The political cost (SIZE) hypothesis suggests that larger firms (that is, firms with more
political visibility) prefer incom.e-decreasing accounting choices. The variable SIZE is included
to control for this effect. This variable is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets.
Theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) suggests that the coefficient on this variable will be
negative.
The next control variable we introduce is the leverage of the firm. We include leverage
(LEV) to control for discretionary accmals management in highly levered firms and motivate
this as follows. First, Becker et al. (1998) suggest that leverage can be a proxy for potential
income-decreasing accruals management in firms suffering from financial distress. Second,
the debt-equity hypothesis (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) suggests that high leverage works as
an incentive for income-increasing eamings management. Since these two references stipulate
a different relationship between discretionary accruals and leverage, we do not propose an
expected sign on the coefficient of leverage.
Dechow et al. (1995) and Young (1999) report that the existing accmal expectation models
may yield measurement error in the discretionary accmals proxy, and hence, misspecified
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tests of earnings management for firms with extreme financial performance. We include cash
flow from operations (CF) to control for this potential misspecification. As in the above-
mentioned studies, we expect to find a negative coefficient on this variable.
Investments can result in smaller total accruals due to the associated increase in
depreciation expense. To control for this impact we included a variable, INVEST, that is
measured by the level of investment in tangible fixed assets in the year under study (year i)
scaled by total assets at the beginning of that year (or, alternative t — \). We predict a negative
coefficient on this variable.
We scaled all continuous variables in our model by lagged total assets to allow for any size
effects.
5. Sample selection and univariate analysis
5.1. Sample selection
From the Belfirst,'^ we selected all industrial and commercial firms that were listed
on the Brussels Stock Exchange and published consolidated financial statements {n = 52)
(see Table 2). We needed consolidated financial statements because accounting choices in
individual financial statements are motivated by taxes. The reason is that Belgian
companies only submit one set of individual accounts for both financial reporting and
tax purposes. However, the Belgian consolidation law requires that all tax-driven
accounting choices in individual financial statements be reversed in consolidated financial
statements. Therefore, we do not expect taxes to have a direct impact on accounting and,
in particular, earnings management in consolidated financial statements.'"*
The sample was matched on industry (at least two-digit NACE) and size (total assets) with
a sample of nonlisted firms. Thirteen companies were deleted, as we could not find a
matching firm with consolidated financial statements. For the remaining 39 companies, data
of consolidated financial statements were obtained for as many years as possible between
1991 and 1997. For each year included, consolidated financial data had to be available for the
listed as well as its matching company. This resulted in a sample of 352 firm-year
observations. The number of firm-observations used in the tests was reduced to 136 (and
62 companies), because 3 years of observations are needed to compute (1) discretionary
'^ The Belfirst is a database that contains the financial statement data of all Belgian companies that are legally
required to file financial statements with the Belgian National Bank. The total number of listed firms in 1997 was
about 130. One hundred two of them published consolidated financial statements. Holding, financial, and
insurance companies (50 in total) were deleted as their financial statements differ from those of industrial and
commercial companies. Classification into industrial and commercial versus other companies is based on their
NACE-code. The NACE-code is an industry classification chart, which is comparable to the US SIC.
'"* Note that this is confirmed by our sensitivity check on the impact of taxes on discretionary accruals (see
Section 6.3).
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Table 2
Sample selection procedure
Total number of quoted companies with consolidated financial statements
Less
Holding, financial, and insurance companies
Total number of industrial and commercial companies
Less
Firms for which there was no match on industry and size with consolidated financial statements
Total number of industrial and commercial companies in sample matching companies
Less
Firms for which the listed or its matching one have only one or two
consecutive year(s) of consolidated data
Firms for which the listed or its matching one have only three consecutive years of
consolidated data
Total number of companies in sample used in main analysis
Number of firm-year observations per industry used in main analysis
102
50
52
13
39
12
4
62
136
accruals and (2) a proxy for the need for external finance in the multiple regression analysis.
Table 3 gives an overview of the number of firm-year observations and companies per
industry.
Table 3
Number of companies or firm-year observations (used in main analysis) per industry
One-digit Two-digit
NACE NACE
code code
2 22
24
25
3 31
32
34
4 41
43
47
48
5 50
6 61
63
8 83
84
9 97
Total
NACE Companies Firm-year
observations
production and preliminary processing of metals
manufacture of nonmetallic mineral products
chemical industry
manufacture of metal articles
mechanical engineering
electrical engineering
food, drink and tobacco industry
textile industry
manufacture of paper and paper products, printing
and publishing
processing of rubber and plastics
general building and civil engineering without
specialty
wholesale distribution
agents
activities to banking, financial and insurance
renting, leasing and hiring of movables
recreational services and other cultural services
10 22
4 12
8 22
2 2
2 4
2 4
4 8
2 4
2 6
2 4
2 4
10 20
2 6
6 12
2 4
2 2
62 136
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics on the test and control variables for the full sample and the above (sample 1) and below
(sample 2) target subsamples'^
Panel A: Categorica variables (proportion of dummy = )
Full sample Sample 1 Sample 2
(«=136) («,=60) («2 = 60)
Audit 66.42 70 60
TYPE 50.00 46.7 53
FIN*' 78.03 75 78.33
CAP^'-" 18.94 71.66 71.66
DEBT^'^ 71.64 15 20
DEBTCAP"'-" 12.78 11.67 13.33
Panel B: Continuous variables
Mean S.D. First quartile Median Third quartile
DAC""
Full sample 0.0138 0.1526 - 0.0494 0.0156 0.0673
Sample 1 - 0.070 0.1261 -0.1184 -0.0486 -0.01169
Sample 2 0.1064 0.1169 0.0325 0.0673 0.1459
CF
Full sample 0.0892 0.0667 0.0434 0.0816 0.1281
Sample 1 0.0945 0.0704 0.0477 0.0804 0.1288
Sample 2 0.0847 0.0641 0.0395 0.0911 0.1269
SIZE
Full sample 15.9404 1.59 14.6511 15.6265 17.08
Sample 1 15.9233 1.6737 14.6148 15.5274 17.0976
Sample 2 15.6989 1.4005 14.5268 15.5930 16.7302
LEV
Full sample 0.5925 0.1502 0.4917 0.6033 0.6816
Sample 1 0.6096 0.7418 0.5030 0.6096 0.7418
Sample 2 0.5758 0.1488 0.4880 0.5733 0.6816
INVEST
Full sample 0.0737 0.1027 0.0097 0.0564 0.0983
Sample 1 0.058173 0.077353 0.010264 0.05462 0.083067
Sample 2 0.0920 0.1206 0.4892 0.5920 0.6832
" For variable definitions, see Table 1
.
^ Number of observations reduced to 120 for DAC and 133 for FIN, DEBT, CAP, and DEBTCAP due to
missing values.
'^ DEBT = dummy which takes the value 1 if a firm had an increase in its long-term financial debt in the year
after consideration, zero otherwise. CAP = dummy which takes the value 1 if a firm had an increase in its equity
financing in the year after consideration, zero otherwise. DEBTCAP = dummy which takes the value 1 if a firm
had an increase in its financial debt as well as an increase in its equity financing in the year after consideration,
zero otherwise.
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5.2. Descriptive statistics, univariate tests, and the Income Smoothing Hypothesis
Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics on the variables in our analysis for the full
sample and the subsamples of above and below target firms. The entries in the table are
descriptive and self-evident. Our discussion is confined to the results on discretionary
accruals, as the evidence is supportive of our Income Smoothing Hypothesis, namely, that
Belgian companies (both private and public) engage in income smoothing and manage
eamings opportunistically to meet the benchmark target of prior-year earnings. Indeed, from
inspection of Table 4, it is clear that the mean and median values of discretionary accruals
are significantly negative in the subsample of firm-years with premanaged eamings above
target (— 0.070 and — 0.0486, respectively); and that the mean and median values are
significantly positive in the subsample of firm-years with premanaged eamings below target
(+0.1064 and +0.0673, respectively). We also performed some additional univariate tests.
A chi-square test for independence indicates that the proportion of positive (negative)
discretionary accmals is significantly higher in the below (above) target subsample (both P
values <.0001). Also, a t test for differences in means and a Wilcoxon rank sum test for
differences in medians indicate that mean and median discretionary accmals are signific-
antly lower in the above than in the below target subsamples {P value for t test and for
Wilcoxon rank sum test <.0001). All these evidence strongly support our Income
Smoothing Hypothesis.
6. Auditor size and ownership results
Given that we find strong evidence supportive of income smoothing, we estimated our
multivariate model (see Eq. (2)) separately for Samples 1 and 2. Table 5 reports the results of
the OLS estimation for both samples.'" In both cases, the model is significant at P< .01, and
yields R~ values of .3187 and .2055, respectively. Note that the predicted signs of some
explanatory variables are different for the below and above target subsamples. Therefore, we
discuss the results of both subsamples separately.
6.1. Results for above target firms (Sample 1)
We find a significant positive coefficient on the AUDIT variable (at P=.0001) for the above
target subsample. This implies that Big Six auditors constrain (income-decreasing) eamings
management more than non-Big Six auditors in the private client segment of the audit market
when firms are smoothing income downwards. This is consistent with our Auditor Size
Hypothesis. Note however that the interaction coefficient AUDIT x TYPE is negative and
significant ( P=.005 1 ). This suggests that the Auditor Size Hypothesis is not confirmed in the
'^ Examination of the variance inflation factors (VTFs) of Model 1 and Model 2 indicates that our results are
NOT distorted by multicoUinearity.
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Table 5
Regression of discretionary accruals on test and control variables in above and below target subsamples
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Above tar get subsample («,=60) Below target subsample (n2 = 60)
Predicted Coefficient t statistic P value Predicted Coefficient t statistic P value
sign estimate sign estimate
Intercept - 0.73704 -4.26 .0001 0.38737 1.84 .0722
Test variables
AUDIT + 0.18664 4.21 .0001 - - 0.03344 -0.78 .4375
TYPE + 0.17237 3.25 .0020 +/- - 0.05396 -1.19 .2400
AUDIT X TYPE ? -0.19220 -2.93 .0051 7 0.02076 0.32 .7473
Contivl variables
FIN + - 0.00823 -0.22 .8234 + -0.11566 -3.20 .0024
SIZE - 0.02333 2.59 .0125 - - 0.00649 -0.54 .5883
LEV +/- 0.14868 1.48 .1449 +/- -0.04018 -0.41 .6818
CF - 0.81402 2.73 .0087 - -0.11422 -0.42 .6787
INVEST — -0.51183 -1.97 .0547 - -0.14544 -1.08 .2847
Rl .3187 .2055
F statistic 4.45 2.91
P value of F statistic .0004 .0095
public client segment of the audit market, as the size (absolute value) of the coefficient on the
interaction variable (AUDIT x TYPE) is larger (0.19220) than the size of the coefficient on
AUDIT (0.18664).'^ Note that this result may also indicate that AUDIT and TYPE may be
substitutes in constraining earnings management.
The coefficient on the TYPE variable is positive and significant {P value of TYPE=.0020).
This result is supportive of our hypothesis that public ownership works as an incentive to
manage earnings upward and thus has a positive impact on discretionary accruals (for non-
Big Six audited firms). Note again that the negative and significant interaction coefficient
AUDIT X TYPE (P=.0051) suggests that there is no ownership effect if the company is
audited by a Big Six auditor.'^ The ownership results can be explained as follows. Given that
firms have premanaged eamings that are above target, public firms decrease earnings less
than private firms, because of the higher pressure from the stock market to meet eamings
targets. The result is also consistent with privately held firms that decrease eamings more
(smooth income downwards) than publicly held firms. '*^ The reason for this can be that
private firms, which are typically family owned in Belgium, have more incentives (than
Note that both AUDIT and TYPE are indicator variables, and therefore the size of the coefficients can
simply be added.
'^ In particular, a similar magnitude of eamings management occurs in publicly held companies that are
audited by a Big Six auditor, in publicly held companies that are audited by non-Big Six auditors, and in privately
held companies that are audited by Big Six auditors. Only in privately held firms audited by a non-Big Six auditor
is there a higher level of income-decreasing eamings management.
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this valuable insight.
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public firms) to report lower profits, as there are direct family wealth effects if the firm is
viewed as profitable. Higher profits may result in wage-increase demands from employees
and higher taxation. As to the control variables, we only find significant parameter
coefficients for the variables CF (/^.0087), SIZE (/^.0125), and INVEST {P=.05A1).
6.2. Results for below target firms (Sample 2)
We lack evidence that auditor size fiinctions as a constraint on earnings management for
firms that smooth income upwards (engage in income-increasing eamings management) and
do not find evidence supportive of the Auditor Size Hypothesis. This can be concluded from
the insignificant parameter value of the AUDIT variable (P=.4375) and the interaction
variable AUDIT x TYPE (P=.7473) for Sample 2. This result differs from U.S. evidence,
which is supportive of the Auditor Size Hypothesis. We conjecture that companies in general
have weaker incentives to increase eamings in Belgium than in the United States, and that,
therefore, auditor size has no significant association with discretionary accruals in the below
target case.
Note that our result on the AUDIT variable for below target firms differs from our result
for above target firms. This indicates that there are differences in Belgium with respect to
auditors' tolerance vis-a-vis eamings management, depending on whether they are confronted
with income-increasing or income-decreasing eamings management sfrategies. As auditors
face almost no risk of stockholder litigation in Belgium, there may be no incentive for
auditors to report conservatively in the below target case. The fact that this incentive does
seem to exist in the above target case may be attributable to the auditor's worries about the
taxation authorities if their clients are too aggressive in lowering their taxable income. Even
though tax-driven accounting rules are to be overridden for group accounts in Belgium, the
tax environment may affect the audit firms' behavior and therefore may influence eamings
management indirectly.
Finally, our results are also consistent with the conjecture that Big Six and non-Big Six (in
fact second-tier) auditors are generally equally competent at detecting eamings management,
but non-Big Six auditors only constrain it when faced with a sufficiently large business risk
(that is in the below target cases when firms have incentives to smooth eamings upwards),
whereas Big Six auditors always constrain. This also implies that non-Big Six auditors are
"less independent" than their Big Six counterparts, but only when confronted with income-
decreasing eamings management.
We also do not find evidence that is supportive of the Ownership Incentive Hypothesis in
the below target sample, as TYPE {P value=.2400) and AUDIT x TYPE (P=.7473) are not
significant. This indicates that there is no difference in the level of eamings management
between publicly held and privately held companies. An explanation for the lack of (an
incentive) effect of ownership in the below target case in Belgium may be that management is
not under the same kind of stock price pressure as in the United States. This "weaker"
incentive effect may no longer dominate the higher expected cost of eamings management
detection for publicly held firms because of greater scmtiny on the quality of their eamings
numbers. Note, however, that we cannot mle out that the insignificant results are caused by
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the relatively low power of discretionary accruals tests (see Dechow et al., 1995). As
estimations of discretionary accruals may include some nondiscretionary accruals, this may
weaken our tests.
6.S. Sensitivity checks
To test the robustness of the model, we performed several sensitivity checks on the
definition of the above and below target groups as well as on the control variables. We first
discuss some sensitivity checks on the definition of the above and below target group.
DeFond and Park (1997) and Gaver et al. (1995) adopt a similar research design that divides
the observations into an above and below target group based on premanaged earnings. They
point out that selection bias may be a concern. Following DeFond and Park, we tested the
sensitivity of our results to this potential misspecification by partitioning our sample based on
proxies for above and below target firms, which are not influenced by our estimate of
discretionary accruals. First, we used the change in postmanaged (that is reported) earnings to
partition firms in above and below target companies. Second, we used the change in operating
cash flow to distinguish firms that have incentives to increase income to avoid decreases in
reported income fi'om firms that have incentives to decrease income to avoid increases in
reported income. Results of a chi-square test of independence of our partitioning variable and
the sign of discretionary accruals confirm that firms use discretionary accruals to decrease
eamings in above target firm-years and increase earnings in below target firm-years.
Besides using alternative measures to partition firms in above and below target companies,
we checked the robustness of our results to the target itself. In the basic model, last year's
eamings are used as targets but other eamings targets can also be introduced in the model.
One of those is that markets and stakeholders expect a certain growth in eamings. We tested
the sensitivity of our results in the above and below target subsamples by reclassifying our
firm-year observations on whether premanaged eamings were higher or lower than last year's
eamings plus an eamings growth factor varying between 1% and 10%. We find that only a
small amount of firms switch fi-om the above to the below target subsamples. In particular,
there is one firm-year observation that switches subsamples at a growth factor of 6% and
another one at a growth factor of 7%. We subsequently reran our regressions on the above and
below target subsamples. Results of those regressions are qualitafively similar to those
reported in the body of the text and so seem to be robust to an alternative eamings target.
We also performed some sensitivity checks on the control variables. In the basic model, the
control variable FIN,, measures whether the firm raised new capital or debt. We included
separate dummy—variables for whether firms have 1) only an ex post increase in debt
financing or not, (2) only an ex post increase in equity financing or not, or (3) an ex post
increase in equity as well as debt financing or not. Results on the test variables are similar to
those reported in the basic model. We also included other control variables that relate to
stakeholders other than debtholders. For example, employees and labor forces are important
users of financial statements in Belgium. Good group performance may trigger labor forces'
demand for better wage and working conditions. As a consequence, firms may especially
avoid increases in reported eamings, and have incentives to decrease eamings or increase
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earnings to a lower extent. To control for this effect, we included in our model a proxy for
labor intensity, measured as the cost of employees over sales. This variable was, however, not
significant and results on the other variables are qualitatively similar to the results reported in
the body of the text. Finally, to verify that the tax environment has no direct impact on the
earnings management of group accounts, we ran the model on both subsamples, including a
tax variable, i.e., an indicator variable for whether the company paid taxes in the prior year or
not. Our conjecture is that firms that paid taxes the prior year have no tax-loss carry-forwards
and have therefore more incentives to engage in income-decreasing earnings management in
the current year. The tax variable was not significant, which is consistent with our argument
that there are no direct tax effects on earnings management in consolidated accounts. The
results on the test variables were similar to those reported in the body of the text.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we formulate and test three hypotheses on earnings management in Belgium:
(1) the Income Smoothing Hypothesis, (2) the Monitoring Effect of Auditor Size Hypothesis,
and (3) the Public Ownership Incentives Hypothesis. We find evidence that Belgian
companies—both private and public—engage in income smoothing and manage earnings
opportunistically to meet the benchmark target of prior-year earnings. The evidence is also
supportive of the other two hypotheses, but only when companies have earnings that are
above target and have incentives to smooth earnings downwards. Our results also suggest that
auditor size and public ownership have a similar effect on earnings management in above
target companies. We do not find evidence that auditor size works as a constraint for below
target firms; neither do we find that public ownership has an impact then. The fact that our
results on the impact of auditor size and ownership type are different for above and below
target firms in Belgium, and differ with findings on United States samples, can be explained
by the Belgian (i.e. continental European) institutional environment. Apparently, audit firms'
tolerance vis-a-vis eamings management depends on the riskiness of the situation: in below
target contexts, auditors (thus also Big Six firms) may have no incentive to report
conservatively due to the lack of auditor litigation in Belgium. In above target contexts, on
the contrary, Big Six auditors are less tolerant and this may be attributable to their fear of the
taxing authorities. The lack of an ownership effect in below target contexts may be
attributable to the lack of the stock pressure found in the United States.
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Abstract
In September 1 999, the Financial Accounting Foundation issued a special report recommending the
use of the equity method supplemented with appropriate disclosures for corporate joint ventures in the
United States. This study, using data for corporate joint ventures in Singapore, provides some
preliminary evidence regarding the effect of the supplementary information disclosure on information
asymmetry among market participants as measured by bid-ask spreads. The results show that the
disclosure of supplementary information of joint ventures is associated with a significant decline in
bid-ask spreads. The results also indicate that the decline in information asymmetry is larger when the
investment in joint ventures is significant and that larger investing firms tend to have a smaller decline
in information asymmetry compared to smaller investing firms. The implications of this study, that the
provision of supplementary information about joint ventures could reduce information asymmetry
among participants in equity markets, thus leveling the playing field among traders, could have
implications for policymakers.
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1. Introduction
In the United States, the accounting for investment in joint ventures is currently governed
by the Accounting Principles Board [APB] (1971) Opinion No. 18, The Equity Method of
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Accounting for Investments in Common Stock. The Opinion requires an investor to use the
equity method for reporting investments in corporate joint ventures (paragraph 16). However,
there is no international consensus on basic aspects of accounting for joint venture interests.'
The laclc of comparability among financial statements caused by the diversity in accounting
practice is a significant concern given that joint ventures have become a prevalent mode of
entry into global markets."
The rapid expansion of international trade and the accessibility of foreign capital markets
have provided an impetus for harmonizing accounting standards across countries. The
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has actively promoted greater comparability
between U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Account-
ing Standards (IAS). Recently, an attempt was made to harmonize the various accounting
methods used for joint ventures by the G4+1 (1999) through the issuance of a special
report^—Financial Accounting Series (FAS) No. 201-E, Reporting Interests in Joint Ventures
and Similar Arrangements. The report recommends the use of the equity method."* In
addition, the report suggests that the supplementary information about joint ventures be
disclosed in the financial statements of the investing firms. These disclosures include the
investor's share of current and long-term assets, current and long-term liabilities, revenues
and expenses by major components, net income before and after taxes, and cash flows fi-om
operating, investing, and financing activities.
Since 1995, the reporting for joint ventures in Singapore has been governed by the
Statement of Accounting Standard (SAS) No. 29, which is equivalent to IAS No. 31. Under
IAS No. 31 or SAS No. 29, venturers are required to report corporate joint ventures by either
proportionate consolidation or equity accounting. Supplementary information about the share
of revenues, expenses, assets, and liabilities of the joint ventures, as well as a description of
the nature of joint venture activities, and the country where the joint ventures are situated
must be disclosed regardless of the accounting method chosen. This supplementary
information was not available to the public before the issuance of SAS No. 29 and is
expected to provide investors with additional insights into the future profitability, cash flows.
' In Canada, proportionate consolidation is required for all joint ventures. The International Accounting
Standards Committee [lASC] (1992) specifies that proportionate consolidation for joint ventures is its benchmark
standard, but permits the use of the equity method as an allowed alternative. The Australian standard (AASB
1006) requires equity accounting for jointly controlled entities while joint venture operations that are not entities
should be proportionately consolidated.
" For example, FAS No. 201-E reports that 965 of 661 1 active U.S. enterprises with December 31 year-ends
referred to joint ventures in their 1995 financial statements. Moreover, 92 out of 200 Canadian public enterprises
reported interests in one or more joint ventures. In Australia, 95 out of 289 firms reviewed disclosed interest in one
or more joint ventures (paragraph 1.5).
The G4+1 (1999) consists of the Australian Accounting Standards Board, the Canadian Accounting
Standards Board, the New Zealand Financial Reporting Standards Board, the U.K. Accounting Standards Board,
the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board, and observation by the lASC (1992).
* Proportionate consolidation is not recommended as it is fijndamentally inconsistent with the basic economic
concept of assets. A venturer cannot control its pro rata share of individual assets in a joint venture.
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and riskiness of the investing firm, especially where the joint ventures constitute a significant
share of the investing firm.^
In this study, we examine the disclosure effect of a set of Singapore firms that provide
supplementary information of joint ventures as recommended by FAS No. 201-E.^ To our
knowledge, there is no other empirical study on whether the disclosure of supplementary
information ofjoint ventures provides information to market participants. Our findings on the
usefulness of mandatory disclosure of supplementary information for joint ventures in an
international context are timely and should serve as a valuable reference to standard setters.
Lev (1988) suggests that information asymmetry among market participants could cause
high transaction costs, thin markets, and low liquidity. According to Verrecchia (1982), the
disclosure of more finely partitioned data is expected to result in increased informedness about
the value of the firm to investors. In our study, we investigate whether the disclosure of
supplementary information of joint ventures mandated by IAS No. 31 or SAS No. 29 is
associated with a decline in information asymmetry among market participants regarding the
value of the investing firms. Prior research have used bid-ask spreads (Greenstein & Sami,
1994), trading volume (Bartov & Bodnar, 1996), and security price variability (Swaminathan,
1991) to measure information asymmetry. Greenstein and Sami (1994) and Swaminathan
(1991) demonstrate that the disclosure of segment information due to the SEC's 1970 segment
disclosure regulation is associated with a significant decline in bid-ask spreads and an
increase in price variability. Similarly, the disclosure of present values ofpetroleum reserves is
also related to a significant drop in bid-ask spreads (Boone, 1998; Raman & Tripathy, 1993).
This study allows us to determine whether the disclosure effect, so widely documented for
U.S. firms, is an international phenomenon or is idiosyncratic to specific capital markets. The
current study analyzes an increasingly influential capital market in which joint ventures play a
critical role. Because Singapore is a small but open economy, international joint ventures
represent an important method for new capital acquisition and business expansion. Recently,
the government of Singapore has vigorously promoted the country as a gateway into the
Asian economy for U.S., European, and other international firms. ^ Since it is at the crossroads
of capital inflows from so many different investors, Singapore is an interesting market in
which to study the economic consequences of adopting LAS No. 3 1
.
^ APB Opinion No. 18 also indicates that when the investments in common stock of corporate joint ventures
are accounted for under the equity method, it may be necessary for summarized information about assets,
liabilities, and results of operations of the investees, if material, to be disclosed in the financial statements
(paragraph 20d). The disclosure of the supplementary information for joint ventures is mandatory in Singapore,
whereas that in APB No. 18 and FAS No. 201-E is not so clear.
^ An examination of U.S. data regarding the impact of the supplementary disclosure of joint ventures would
necessitate the use of dated data of joint ventures in the late 1960s and early 1970s, since APB No. 18 became
effective in 1971.
' In the recent 1 999 Global Competitiveness Report conducted by the Geneva-based World Economic Forum
(WEF), Singapore maintained top position as the world's most competitive economy for the fourth consecutive
year since 1996 despite the currency turmoil that has hit the Asian region. Singapore's GDP per capita projected
by WEF for the period 2000-2008 would be 5.02%, the fastest growing economy in the world (The Straits Times,
July 14, 1999).
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The results of our study indicate that firms that have disclosed supplementary information
regarding the share of assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses since the issuance of SAS No.
29 experience a significant decline in information asymmetry as evidenced by a decline in
bid- ask spreads. Our results also indicate that the decline in information asymmetry
associated with the disclosure of supplementary information is larger when the investment
in joint ventures is significant and that larger investing firms tend to have a smaller decline in
information asymmetry compared with smaller investing firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an
overview of the accounting and regulatory environment in Singapore. We discuss the
development of hypotheses in Section 3. Section 4 describes the sample selection and
research design while Section 5 analyzes and discusses the research results. The Section 6
contains our conclusion.
2. Accounting for joint ventures in Singapore
Prior to 1995, there was no specific accounting statement governing the reporting of
corporate joint ventures in Singapore. Consequently, joint ventures that were incorporated
before 1995 were consolidated by the investing firm if the ownership interest in the joint
ventures is more than 50%.^ On the other hand, if the ownership interest of the incorporated
joint ventures is less than or equal to 50%, the ventures are equity accounted for by the firm.^
Both equity accounting and consolidation compresses all information about the joint
venture into one line or several lines in the balance sheet and the income statement of the
investing firms. Information is lost when the assets and liabilities are netted into an aggregate
number (Eddey, 1995, p. 421; Whittred & Zimmer, 1992, pp. 364-366). As the size, number,
and variety of investments in joint ventures increase, the loss of information in the financial
statements due to equity accounting or consolidation could thus be significant.
The reporting of interests in joint ventures has been governed by SAS No. 29 since 1995.
This standard introduced proportionate consolidation for jointly controlled ventures, thus
better reflecting the substance and economic reality of a venturer's interest in a jointly
controlled entity.'^ Though it is less preferred for reporting interests in corporate joint
ventures, SAS No. 29 also allows the use of the equity method. This is an accommodation to
In consolidation, the financial statements of the firm and its subsidiaries are combined on a line-by-line basis.
^ The Singapore Accounting Standard requires that the investment in an associated company be equity
accounted for in the consolidated accounts. Under the equity method, the investment is initially recorded at cost
and adjusted thereafter for the postacquisition change in the investor's share of net assets of the investee. In
consolidated accounts, the investor's share of the associated company's net assets will be shown in the
consolidated balance sheet as a single item, "Investment in associated company." The investor's share of the
associated company's profits or losses will also be shown in the consolidated profit and loss account as a single
item, "Share of profit (loss) after tax of associated company."
Proportionate consolidation is a method of accounting and reporting whereby a venturer's share of each of
the assets, liabilities, income, and expenses of a jointly controlled entity is combined on a line-by-line basis with
similar items in the venturer's financial statements.
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those who argue that it is inappropriate to combine controlled items with jointly controlled
items and those who believe that venturers have significant influence, rather than joint
control, in a jointly controlled entity. Whether the firm chooses proportionate consolidation or
equity accounting, SAS No. 29 requires the firm to disclose supplementary information such
as share of assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses of the joint ventures in the footnotes of
the annual report. Hence, the same amount of information is disclosed regardless of the
accounting method chosen.
3. Research hypotheses
3.1. Disclosure policy and information asymmetry
Welker (1995) provides evidence that disclosure policy influences market liquidity, since
uninformed investors "price-protect" against adverse selection, and this price protection is
manifested in bid-ask spreads. The disclosure of supplementary information usefiil for
assessing the viability and future prospects ofjoint ventures is expected to reduce information
asymmetry among market participants and the bid-ask spread. The above discussion
suggests the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Firms that disclose supplementary information for joint ventures after the
issuance of SAS No. 29 will have lower bid-ask spreads compared to the bid-ask spreads
before the issuance of SAS No. 29.
3.2. Size ofJoint ventures
If the provision of supplementary information about joint ventures is associated with a
reduction in information asymmetry, such a reduction is likely to be accentuated by the size
of the joint ventures. The larger the investment in joint ventures, the greater the impact and
the more material the actions of the joint venture transactions in the financial statements of
the investing firm. Thus, the disclosure of material information about joint ventures in the
financial statements available to market participants, in compliance with SAS No. 29, is
likely to result in a larger decline in information asymmetry as measured by bid-ask spread
than when the investment in joint ventures is less material. This leads to the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. The larger the investment in joint ventures by firms, the greater the reduction
in the bid-ask spreads.
3.3. Size of investing firms
Greenstein and Sami (1994) argue that as securities of larger firms are traded more
frequently, there should be more public information available for larger firms. In addition.
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larger firms are followed by more analysts than smaller firms. Consequently, information
asymmetry should be lower for these larger firms. The size of the firm is deemed a
mitigating variable in the downward adjustment of the bid- ask spread when there is
disclosure of new information. Diamond and Verrecchia's (1991) model suggests that the
increase in expected liquidity for a unit improvement in disclosure is greater for higher
inifial levels of information asymmetry. Hence, smaller firms that have higher initial levels
of information asymmetry should experience a greater decline in information asymmetry
with the disclosure of supplementary information for joint ventures, while larger firms that
have lower initial levels of information asymmetry should experience a smaller decline in
information asymmetry. Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is
formulated.
Hypothesis 3. Larger firms that disclose supplementary information for joint ventures after
the issuance of SAS No. 29 will have lower declines in bid-ask spreads compared to smaller
firms.
4. Sample selection and research design
4.1. Data
We select all firms that have joint ventures from the Financial News,^^ a daily publicafion
of the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES), and from the annual reports of listed firms. Table
1 shows a distribution of the firms. The firms are divided into three groups. Group 1 consists
of 40 firms with joint ventures that do not provide supplementary information before the
issuance of SAS No. 29 but disclose such information after SAS No. 29 is introduced.'" We
use Group 1 as the primary experimental group to examine the impact of SAS No. 29 on
information asymmetry. Group 2 consists of 42 firms that have joint ventures but do not
disclose supplementary information.'^ We use Group 2 to mitigate the concern that the results
in experimental Group 1 are driven by events correlated to the use of joint ventures rather
" Financial News is a daily publication by the SES. All listed firms are required to disclose firms' corporate
events to the SES on a daily basis. Upon receiving the news, the SES will publish the events in the forthcoming
issue of the Financial News. Thus, Financial News covers all listed firms in Singapore and represents the most
complete and reliable source for corporate events such as joint ventures.
'" Two very large firms, Singapore Telecommunications .and Singapore Airlines, are excluded as the empirical
results might be biased by their sheer size.
'^ An interview with senior auditors of Big Five accounting firms revealed that nondisclosure is due to the
immateriality of the investment in joint ventures. A separate analysis is conducted to examine firms' disclosure
decisions for joint ventures. We examine the annual reports of firms that report joint ventures in the Financial
News after 1995, when SAS No. 29 becomes operative. We find that investment size of the corporate joint
ventures reported in the financial statements are generally larger than the investment size ofjoint ventures that are
not reported in the financial statements. The findings lend some support to the idea that nondisclosure of joint
ventures is due to the immateriality of investment in joint ventures.
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Table 1
Distribution of sample firms into groups
Group Description No. of firms
1 Joint venture firms that disclose supplementary 40
information after the issuance of SAS No. 29
2 Joint venture firms that do not disclose supplementary 42
information after the issuance of SAS No. 29
3 Firms that do not have joint ventures 40
Total 122
than the supplementary information disclosure of the joint venture as required by SAS No.
29.
•^
We examine the annual reports of the sample firms to ensure that the impact on
information asymmetry is not due to changes in other accounting policies. We also review
the Financial News to ensure that there are no unique events that might potentially affect
the results for the primary experimental group. We do not find any accounting policy
changes or unique events that might potentially confound the results. As it is impossible to
control for all possibilities, we acknowledge that the inference of this study may partially
be related to undetected confounding events or the acts of firms entering into joint
ventures.
^^
SAS No. 7, Accounting for Cash Flow Statements, was issued at the same time as SAS
No. 29. Prior to 1995, all firms were required to report the Statement of Changes in
Financial Position. Since 1995, all firms listed on the SES have been required to prepare
Cash Flow Statements. The information provided by the Cash Flow Statements is not
expected to systematically distort our results. With SAS No. 7, the information that was
previously disclosed in the Statement of Changes in Financial Position is now being
reclassified and disclosed as cash flows fi-om operating, investing, and financing activities
Group 2 firms have joint ventures but do not disclose supplementary information ofjoint ventures. Group 2
firms can therefore serve as a control group to mitigate the concern for the self-selection bias issues mentioned in
footnote 15 below. If the changes in bid-ask spreads are driven by events correlated to the use of joint ventures,
such as increased voluntary disclosures arising fi-om the need to access capital markets, and not due to the
supplementary information disclosure of the joint venture as required by the accounting standard, we would expect
the difference in bid-ask spread reduction between Group 1 and Group 2 firms to be not significant. The results,
however, show a significant difference.
^ The capital market effects observed in the study could be related to the overall expansion strategy of the
firm and increased voluntary disclosures could arise due to the need to access capital markets. The changes in
bid-ask spreads could thus be due to these events correlated to the use of joint ventures rather than the
supplementary information disclosure required by the accounting standard for joint ventures. In order to mitigate
this concern, we examined annual reports of the sample firms to ensure that the impact on information asymmetry
during the event period is not due to changes in other accounting policies. We also reviewed the Financial News to
ensure that there were no unique events during the event period that might potentially affect the results for the
primary experimental group. Typical announcements being made by all sample firms include dividend and
earnings announcements. Since these announcements are common across all firms, they should not systematically
affect information asymmetry in our study.
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in the Cash Flow Statements. Since SAS No. 7 apphes to all firms, the effect is expected to
be uniform across all sample firms. However, to ensure that our results are not driven by
the disclosure of additional cash flows information, we include firms that are listed on the
SES but do not have joint ventures (Group 3). Firms in Group 3 (the control group) are
matched with firms in Group 1 (experimental) by industry, market capitalization, and same
corresponding year. The required data on bid-ask spreads and other financial data are
obtained from the SES.
Descriptive statistics of firms that disclose supplementary information of joint ventures
in the annual reports are reported in Table 2. Panel A shows the distribution of the firms by
industry. Panel C indicates that joint ventures on average contribute 9.2% of current assets,
12.97% of fixed assets, 10.61% of current liabilities, 25.11% of long-term liabilities, and
13.72% of sales revenues of the investing firms. The mean contribution of profitable joint
ventures to overall investing firms' profitability is at a sizable 15%, and investing firms'
overall profitability declined by 5% due to loss-making joint ventures (Panel D). On
average, the joint ventures' contribution to the investing firms' assets, liabilities, and
profitability is not immaterial. Thus, the additional information, required under SAS No.
29, could be useful in assessing the investing firms' future profitability, cash fiows, and
riskiness.
4.2. Method
The event date is defined as the date stamped on the annual reports of sample firms by the
SES.'^ This is the earliest date that the information contained in financial statements becomes
publicly available. Following Greenstein and Sami (1994), we employ time-series interven-
tion analysis to examine changes in bid-ask spreads. The entire time-series length is 104
weeks: 52 in the pre-event and 52 in the post-event period. As in the Greenstein and Sami
study, Wednesday data of each week are used. The relative bid-ask spread is measured as the
difference between the ask and bid prices divided by the average share price (Greenstein &
Sami, 1994).
Prior research has shown that trading volume and variability in price are related to bid-ask
spreads.'^ As a result, an appropriate white noise model is first obtained for each firm in the
pre-event period. The model is then run for the entire 104 weeks with an intervention
component (/,) and two variables, LVOL and PRVAR (defined below) that control for trading
volume and price variability. Similar to Greenstein and Sami (1994), we measure price
variability as the standard deviation of the weekly prices after adjustment for stock dividends,
"* Three of the treatment sample firms that had joint ventures in 1994 and before did not comply in 1995 but
did so in 1996. Control Group 3 firms are matched with experimental Group 1 firms by industry, market
capitalization, and the same corresponding year. This removes the concern of event dates falling in different time
periods for the treatment and control samples, driving the results. Control Group 2 firms had a 1995 event date,
since the joint ventures were entered into in 1994 and before.
'^ For example, see Benston and Hagerman (1974); Copeland and Galai (1983); Demsetz (1968); and Ho and
Stoll (1981).
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics of Group 1 firms that disclose supplementary information of joint ventures
Panel A: Industry classification of firms that disclosed supplementary information about joint ventures
Construction 9
Manufacturing 8
Multi-industry 6
Transportystorage/ 6
communication
Property 5
Commerce 4
Hotels/restaurants 2
Total 40
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the supplementary information about joint ventures (in SS'OOO)
Current
assets
Fixed
assets
Current
liabilities
Long-term
liabilities
Sales
revenues
Mean (S.D.) 29,392 45,212 19,401 40,632 52,985
(37,288) (75,560) (27,406) (51,233) (95,010)
Median 12,601 6753 6345 19,029 15,914
Panel C: Percentage of the assets, liabilities and sales revenues of the joint ventures relative to the investing firms
Current
assets
Fixed
assets
Current
liabilifies
Long-term
liabilifies
Sales
revenues
Mean [%] (S.D.) 9.20 12.97 10.61 25.11 13.72
(0.1200) (0.2154) (0.1902) (0.3358) (0.2038)
Median [%] 4.79 3.26 3.65 12.23 3.86
Panel D: Profitability of the joint ventures''
Profitable Nonprofitable Percentage Percentage
joint joint contribufion decline in
ventures ventures of profitable overall profitability
(in SS'OOO) (in SS'OOO) joint ventures
to overall
profitability
of the invesfing
firm
of the firm due to
nonprofitable joint
ventures
Number 18 13 17 13
Mean profit (S.D.) 5070 -5491 15.24% - 5.20%
(7020) (16,539) (0.2055) (0.0689)
Median profit 2037 - 146 6.50% -1.16%
^ Total number of firms that report joint ventures' profitability is 31. The other nine firms have not started
operations and therefore profits are not reported. Of these 3 1 firms, 30 report an overall positive net income.
Stock splits, and trading volume as the weekly average number of shares traded in the SES.
The full model is given below:
Y, = TSM, + wli, + ,3, LVOL,, + 32PRVAR/, + Zu (1)
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where: 1^7 = weekly relative spread for firm / at time ?; TSM/ = vector of coefficients of time-
series for firm /; /,, = the intervention component for firm i at time t, with representing the
pre-event period and 1 representing the post-event period; LVOL,, = natural log of average
weekly trading volume for firm / at time /;'' PRVAR/, = weekly price variability for firm / at
time /; and £,, = white noise for firm i at time t.
The intervention component, //„ is the primary concern in testing the hypotheses. A
negative coefficient of m' indicates a drop in bid-ask spread while a positive sign indicates an
increase in the spread from the pre- to post-event period.
Cross-sectional OLS regressions are then run to test Hypotheses 2 and 3. The independent
variables are size of joint ventures (SJV), firm size (FSIZE), and two control variables,
percentage change in price from pre- to post-event period (CHPRICE) and percentage change
in market capitalization from pre- to post-event period (CHFSIZE). As in Greenstein and
Sami (1994, p. 187), CHPRICE is included as a control variable to assess whether changes in
the denominator of the relative spread contribute to the changes found in the intervention
analysis. CHFSIZE is included to control for changes in firm size that may affect the bid-ask
spreads. The measurement of these independent variables is defined below. The dependent
variable uj is the shift parameter of the time-series intervention analysis (w) adjusted for the
standard error of that estimate. To interpret the estimated coefficients more easily, the
dependent variable is first multiplied by — 1 . A positive u) indicates a decline in spread and
vice versa. The following model is analyzed:
uo - a + 7i SJV + 72FSIZE + 73CHPRICE + 74CHFSIZE + e (2)
where: 00 = estimated regression coefficient from intervention analysis deflated by the
standard error of the estimate multiplied by — 1; SJV = total assets of joint ventures relative
to total assets of the investing firm; FSIZE = natural logarithm of market capitalization of
the investing firm;'*^ CHPRICE = percentage change in average daily price from the pre- to
post-event period; CHFSIZE = percentage change in market capitalization reported in the
annual report one year before the disclosure of supplementary information to the year of
disclosure.
5. Results
5.7. Changes in bid-ask spread
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the time-series intervention analysis. Panel A
describes the characteristics of the three groups of firms in tenns of finn size, 3, profitability,
and capital structure. ANOVA tests are conducted to detennine whether differences among
Log transformation is used due to nonnormality of the volume data.
''' Log transformation is used due to nonnormality of the market capitaHzation data.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the time-series intervention analysis
Number of firms Group 1 Group 2
40 42
Group 3
40
ANOVA
Pr>F
Panel A: Characteristics of the sample fi?-ms
Market capitalization:
(in S$ millions)
Mean 888.78
Median 307
S.D. 1524
Firm's 3
Mean 1.27
Median 1.37
S.D. 0.53
Returns on assets (%)
Mean 5.57
Median 4.38
S.D. 3.48
Long-term debt-equity ratio (%)
Mean 56.26
Median 36.4
S.D. 72.36
511.85
257
1041
1.22
1.17
0.42
3.15
4.28
6.77
65.04
22.99
235.98
Panel B: Comparison ofpre- vs. post-event relative spreads
Mean pre-event relative 0.0358 (0.3574) 0.0373 (0.1958)
spreads (S.D.)
Mean post-event relative 0.0234 (0.1487)
spreads (S.D.)
Median pre-event 0.0190
relative spreads
Median post-event 0.0106
relative spreads
Percentage change -24.60(37.10)
in mean (S.D.)
Percentage change — 29. 1
1
in median
0.0320 (0.1848)
0.0189
0.0171
- 12.14 (44.35)
- 10.37
917.08
341.5
1535
1.11
1.12
0.37
5.68
3.70
7.31
24.72
8.19
35.74
0.0356 (0.4001)
0.0336(0.1554)
0.0192
0.0179
-5.88 (35.12)
-6.75
0.580
0.269
0.110
0.434
groups exist with respect to these variables. We find that firms in the control groups are not
significantly different from the experimental firms.
Descriptive statistics for the mean and median pre- and post-event overall relative spreads
for each group is presented in Panel B of Table 3. The mean and median relative spread shifts
downward fi-om the pre- to post-disclosure period for all three groups. At the individual firm
level, the means of the relative bid-ask spreads are calculated for the pre- and post-disclosure
periods. The percentage changes in mean are then computed from pre- to post-disclosure for
each firm. The mean, median, and standard deviation of the distribution of the percentage
changes in spreads at the firm level are reported in Panel B. As expected, those firms that
disclose supplementary information for joint ventures after the issuance of SAS No. 29
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experience the largest decline in spreads (24.60%). The decline in average mean spreads for
Groups 2 and 3 is less at 12.14% and 5.88%, respectively. The decline in the median relative
spreads also exhibits a similar pattern.
Table 4 provides the results of the time-series intervention analysis. Panel A shows that
30% of the identified models required adjustment to meet serial independence and stationarity
assumptions."" Panel B shows that the proportion of all sample firms that have significant
negative LVOL is greater than 60%, while the proportion of all sample firms that have
significant positive PVAR is 25%.
Panel C presents the descriptive statistics of the frequency of significant shifts at 0.10 or
better (one-tailed test) for the intervention component, /,,. On average, the shift is downward
for all the three groups. The decline in relative spreads is 6.01% for Group 1 firms, 1.92% for
Group 2 firms, and 2.44% for Group 3 firms. These results provide some support for the
claim that the disclosure of supplementary information by Group 1 firms, after the issuance of
SAS No. 29, is associated with a larger decline in information asymmetry as measured by
bid-ask spreads.
The results the ofANOVA test, which are reported in Panel D of Table 4, show that there is
a significant difference in the decline in mean shifts among the three groups (j:?-value 0.03).
The mean decline in spreads for firms of Group 1 is statistically larger than the mean decline
in spreads for firms of Groups 2 and 3. This evidence suggests that the decline in the bid-ask
spread in the experimental group is associated with new information of joint ventures being
disclosed and the decline is unlikely to be driven by the disclosure of cash flow data or other
factors."'
5.2. Regression results
We run OLS regressions to investigate whether the size of joint ventures and investing
firms are related to the downward shift in information asymmetry. The descriptive statistics,
Pearson correlation coefficients for the explanatory variables, and the results of the OLS
regressions are presented in Table 5.
The dependent variable for the regression is the change in spread (oo). SJV is statistically
significant and the sign is posifive as expected. The evidence suggests that when the
investment in joint ventures is significant, disclosing information about the ventures in the
"" A series of diagnostic checks is performed using the estimated autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation
functions. The appropriate ARIMA structure is selected using the rule of parsimony. The Q statistic fails to reject
the null hypothesis that the error term is serially uncorrelated.
"' Since Groups 1 and 2 firms have joint ventures, there is a need to show that the decline in bid-ask spread is
greater for Group 1 than Group 2 firms so that we can attribute the significantly greater decline in Group 1 fimis to
the supplementary disclosure ofjoint venture infonnation as required by SAS No. 29, and not to events correlated
to the use of joint ventures as mentioned in footnote 15 above. All firms need to provide cash flow statements, so
both Groups 1 and 3 firms should have a decline in bid-ask spreads due to the additional cash-flow infonnation
disclosed. To show that the decline in bid-ask spread is due to the disclosure of supplementary information on
joint ventures. Group 1 firms need to have a significantly larger decline in spread.
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Table 4
Time-series intervention analysis
Panel A; Time-series models identified
ARIMA ip.d.qf Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
No corrections
pdqiOA,l)
pdq{0,0,l)
pdq(l,0,0)
pdq{l,0,l)
pdq{\, 1,0)
pdqilAA)
pdq(2,l,0)
Total
32 27 27
2 3 2
3
2 2 3
4 7 2
2 2
1
1
40 42 40
Panel B: Number of firms with significant coefficients
ARIMA {p.d,qf Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
LVOL with significant negative coefficient 25 (63%)
PVAR with significant positive coefficient 10 (25%)
Panel C: Number of firms with significant shift*
28 (67%)
6 (14%)
25 (63%)
11 (28%)
Significant shift
Significant negative shift
Mean shift (S.D.)
32 (80%)
26 (65%)
-0.0601
(0.1375)
17 (40%)
9 (21%)
-0.0192
(0.0525)
15 (38%)
11 (28%)
- 0.0244
(0.1054)
Panel D: ANOVA test and pairwise test of mean shifts (F=3.549, P=.032)
ANOVA test of mean shifts Student's / test Mann-Wh itney U test
t value P (one-tailed) z value P (one-tailed)
Group 1 vs. Group 2
Group 1 vs. Group 3
Group 2 vs. Group 3
1.74
1.77
0.22
0.04
0.04
0.41
2.67
2.20
0.23
0.00
0.01
0.46
Please refer to Eq. ( 1 ).
^ ARIMA (p,d,q) is an autoregressive integrated moving average time series, where/? denotes the number of
autoregressive terms, d the number of times the series has to be differenced before it becomes stationary, and q the
number of moving average terms.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level (one-tailed).
financial statements provide more useful information to the users than when the investment is
less significant. FSIZE has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant. The
result is consistent with the prediction that larger firms that disclose supplementary
information of joint ventures after the issuance of SAS No. 29 have a lower decline in
bid-ask spreads than that of smaller firms. The two control variables, CHPRICE and
CHFSIZE, are not statistically significant. Overall, the resuhs reported in Table 5 render some
support for Hypotheses 2 and 3.
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Table 5
Results of the OLS regression
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the explanatoiy variables in the OLS regression
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum S.D.
SJV
FSIZE
CHPRICE
CHFSIZE
0.06
12.74
0.01
0.16
0.03 0.20 0.00 0.06
2.66 15.83 10.17 1.40
0.04 0.96 -0.63 0.30
0.11 1.17 -0.22 0.25
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients
SW FSIZE CHPRICE CHFSIZE
SJV
FSIZE
CHPRICE
0.116 0.128
-0.188
0.247
0.006
0.225
Panel C: Coefficient estimates (t statistics are in parentheses)
Variables (exp. sign) Dependent variable (lo)
SJV(+)
FSIZE (
-
)
CHPRICE
CHFSIZE
Constant
N
Adjusted R~
Model F
8.210* (1.71)
-0.366* (-1.76)
-0.283 (-0.25)
1.745 (0.29)
4.774**
40
0.14
2.54
uj = estimated regression coefficient from intervention analysis deflated by the standard error of the estimate
multiplied by — 1; SA^ = total assets ofjoint ventures relative to total assets of the investing firm; FSIZE = natural
logarithm of market capitalization of the investing firm; CHPRICE = percentage change in average daily price
from the pre- to post-event period; CHFSIZE = percentage change in market capitalization reported in the annual
reports one year before the disclosure of supplementary information to the year of disclosure.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level (one-tailed).
** Statistically significant at the 10% level (two-tailed).
5.3. Additional analyses
We address concerns that the decHne in bid-ask spreads discussed in Table 4 may reflect
the existence of joint ventures and not the disclosure of supplementary information. As
stated in the Method section, the event date used in our study is the date of the SES stamp
on annual reports of sample firms. Also as previously discussed, the pre-event period is 52
weeks before the event date and the post-event period is 52 weeks after the event date. The
decline in bid-ask spread (from the pre- to post-event period) due to disclosure of
supplementary information of joint ventures could potentially be confounded by the act
of entering into the joint venture (if the joint venture is entered into) during the event
period of 1 04 weeks. We examine each of the 40 firms in the experimental Group 1 that
have disclosures after SAS 29. There are nine firms that entered into joint ventures during
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the event period. We removed these nine firms and reestimated Eq. (1) for the intervention
analysis. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. This additional analysis mitigates the
concern that entering into the joint venture during the event period might be a confounding
factor driving the results.
We perform a series of tests to ensure that the length of the pre- and post-event periods in
the time-series intervention analysis as well as changes in the bid-ask spreads in the pre-
event periods do not drive our results. Following Greenstein and Sami (1994), we conduct the
same intervention analysis for a shorter period, 26 weeks for the pre- and 26 weeks for the
post-event periods. Qualitatively similar results are obtained. We also conduct the interven-
tion analysis using a dummy event period to detect whether there are systematic changes in
bid-ask spreads in the pre-event periods. The first 26 weeks are treated as a pre-event period,
while the next 26 weeks are treated as a post-event period. The results indicate that there is no
systematic change in the bid-ask spreads over the first 52 weeks. These results, in
conjunction with the use of the control groups in the research design, are consistent with
the inferences that the joint venture disclosures are associated with the decline of relative
bid-ask spreads.^^
We divide Group 1 into two equal subgroups of 20 firms each, according to accounting
method: (a) proportionate consolidation and (b) equity method with supplementary informa-
tion on joint ventures. The decline in bid-ask spreads is significant {t value of 2.1) for firms
that report joint ventures using equity method with supplementary disclosure. This evidence
provides some preliminary support for the use of equity method supplemented with
additional disclosure of joint ventures proposed by FAS No. 201-E. For firms using pro-
portionate consolidation, the decline in bid-ask spreads is also significant (t statistic value of
2.1).--^
We employ the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smimov Test to examine whether the variables
in the regression Eq. (2) are normally distributed, a necessary assumption under the OLS
regression. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distribution is normal for all variables
used in Eq. (2). The residuals of the regression model follow a white noise process and the
Durbin-Watson Test (DW statistic 2.26) indicates that there is no serial correlation problem.
Both the variance inflation factor and the tolerance value for each variable are close to one.
Hence, multicollinearity problems do not seem to be a major threat. These evidences reduce
the concern that the model in Eq. (2) might be misspecified.
We employ a dummy variable to proxy for different accounting methods in the regression
analysis (Table 5) to investigate whether different accounting methods are related to different
patterns of the decline in bid-ask spread. The results (not reported) indicate that the decline
"" We also examine the impact of mandatory SAS No. 29 on information asymmetry by comparing changes in
trading volume and price variability among the three sample groups. Prior research suggests that these variables
are also proxies for information asymmetry (e.g., Bartov & Bodnar, 1996; Swaminathan, 1991). Overall, the
patterns of changes in trading volume and price variability from the pre- to post-event periods are consistent with
the pattern of changes in bid-ask spread reported in Table 4.
There is no significant difference in the changes in bid-ask spreads between firms using equity accounting
and proportionate consolidation for joint ventures.
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in information asymmetry is unrelated to the accounting method used as long as the joint
venture information is disclosed in the financial statements.
To check for robustness of our results, we use share of revenues ofjoint ventures relative to
total revenues of the investing firm as another measure for size of joint ventures (SA^). We
also use owners' equity (as in Greenstein & Sami, 1994) to measure firm size (FSIZE). The
use of alternative measures for SJV and FSIZE do not change our results qualitatively.
6. Conclusion
This study examines the impact of the disclosure of supplementary information for joint
ventures on information asymmetry among market participants as measured by relative bid-
ask spreads. The results show that the disclosure of supplementary information for joint
ventures is associated with a significant decline in bid-ask spreads. This decline in
information asymmetry is larger when the investment in joint ventures is significant. Larger
investing firms tend to have a smaller decline in information asymmetry compared to smaller
investing firms. The implication of this study to policymakers is that the provision of
supplementary information about joint ventures could reduce information asymmetry and has
the potential to level the playing field among participants in the equity market. These
conclusions should be of interest to standard setters who have recently changed reporting
requirements and are discussing harmonization of financial reporting for joint ventures.
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Abstract
This study assesses the quality of information disclosed by a sample of nonfinancial Saudi
companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange. The study also compares the extent of corporate
disclosure before and after the creation of the Saudi Organization of Certified Public Accountants
(SOCPA). We classify information disclosed in the annual reports into three main categories:
mandatory; voluntary related to mandatory; and voluntary unrelated to mandatory disclosure. The
sample provided 63% and 66% of the total population of companies listed on the Saudi Stock
Exchange in the years 1992 and 1999.
In departure from most previous studies conducted in this area of research, we weighted the
indexes of disclosure by the mean and median responses of seven users of the annual reports in Saudi
Arabia. The results of both unweighted and weighted indexes are reported. The outcome of the
analysis indicated a relatively high compliance with the mandatory requirements in all industries
covered by the study, with the exception of the electricity sector. As for the voluntary disclosure,
whether related or unrelated to mandatory disclosure, the analysis revealed that Saudi companies
disclose information more than the minimum required by law. The level of voluntary disclosure,
however, is relatively low. The analysis also showed that the creation of SOCPA has had little impact
on corporate reporting in Saudi Arabia.
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1. Introduction
After two Gulf Wars and continued fluctuations in oil prices, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
States started to experience budgetary deficits. This reality coincided with a revolution in
information technology that abolished borders between countries and emphasized global-
ization. Because of these developments, policymakers in Saudi Arabia realized the importance
of restructuring their economy to be able to compete in the international arena. Consequently,
during the 1 990s, Saudi Arabia underwent liberalization and privatization programs aimed at
reducing government expenditure and inviting the private sector to take a more effective part in
shaping the national economy (Naser, 1998). In fact, Saudi authorities introduced a number of
measures as a clear indication of their intention to transform the economy. During the 1 990s,
Saudi authorities issued government bonds to finance their activities and borrowed from the
banking sector to cover the budgetary deficit. In April 2000, the Saudi government issued a
law that allowed foreign investors, for the first time, to invest in Saudi Arabia. The new law
gives tax incentives to foreign investors and, according to the Saudi Finance and Economics
Minister, a corporate tax rate on foreign investment that does not exceed 30% of the reported
income.' The minister also indicated that the corporate income tax rate would be 25% on
companies that reported < 100,000 Saudi riyals (SR). Foreign companies will be given an
unlimited period to write off their losses." More importantly, the Saudi Finance Minister
emphasized that Saudi Arabia will undergo an improvement in the accounting and auditing
systems that involve the Department of Zakat and Income Tax authorities.
Central to the abovementioned developments are the annual reports published by
companies operating in Saudi Arabia. These published reports are the main vehicle firms
use to communicate information to external users. Given that the report contains information
on a firm's profitability and liquidity, it is expected to help investors, creditors, and other
users make informed decisions about the company. Unlike companies operating in the
developed world, the annual report published by a Saudi company represents the only source
of financial information available to users.
^
In this study, an attempt is made to assess the quality of information disclosed by
nonfinancial companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange. In particular, the study examines
the extent to which Saudi firms comply with stated accounting measurement and disclosure
requirements. The first Saudi national accounting body was formed in 1992, at which time
company disclosure requirements became effective. Until now, no attempt has been made to
assess changes in the quality of accounting measurement and disclosure reported by the Saudi
companies.
' Ibrahim al-Asaf said that "30% the taxation limit to tax on foreign investment and flexibility will be given to
wnte off losses" (Asharq Al-Awsat, April 12, 2000, Wednesday [7806] p. 11).
" This new law will replace a previous one that permits a company to write off sustained losses 1 year after
their occurrence.
"*
In a developing country like Saudi Arabia, investors or creditors can get information fi-om the company
through direct contact with the management. Yet, the annual report is still the only formal source of information
published by the company.
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The timeliness of this study lends to its importance. It comes a few years after the creation
of the Saudi Organization of Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) in 1993 and shortly after
the Saudi authorities passed a new foreign investment law in which accounting information
plays a significant role in assuring local, as well as foreign, investors. We expect this study to
shed light on SOCPA's impact on the extent of disclosure by national companies. Our results
have the potential to assist Saudi policymakers as they develop the requirements of financial
reporting. In addition, it will offer both local and foreign investors an objective assessment of
the current reporting practices in Saudi Arabia. Such information is important to all investors
who want to make informed decisions before they invest in a company.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. The framework for financial reporting in
Saudi Arabia is presented in the next section. Previous studies that covered the quality of
corporate disclosure are reviewed in Section 3. Research questions, data collection, statistical
tests, and index construction are all presented in Section 4. The findings are detailed in
Section 5 and the conclusion is given in the final section.
2. The framework for financial reporting in Saudi Arabia
Accounting practices in Saudi Arabia are regulated by three laws: the Company Law,
Accountancy Law, and Income Tax and Zakat Law. None of these laws define the scope,
ftinction, or objectives of accounting or financial reporting.
The Company Law, the primary authoritative reference for professional accounting
practice, includes some accounting guidelines. It determines the legal basis for companies
and accountants and its articles deal with the fiindamental details of formation, such as
registration procedures, minimum capital required number of partners, number of directors,
and other related matters. Article 38, for example, asks the board of directors to prepare a
balance sheet for every financial year, a profit and loss account, and a report on the
company's operations and financial position. It also provides some guidance on auditing and
accounting measurement and procedures.'^
The Accountancy Law was enacted by Royal Decree No. 43 (1974) and was the first to
regulate the accounting profession in Saudi Arabia. It is still in effect and sets the standards
that should be followed by auditors. It consists of 35 articles, which establish the fundamental
requirements of practicing accounting services such as registration procedures and fees,
qualifications, the responsibilities of the auditor, violation and trial proceedings, and other
related issues.
During the past decade, the Ministry of Commerce realized there was an urgent need to
update the 1974 Accountancy Law. Accordingly, a new law was enacted by Royal Decree
Private as well as publicly owned companies are expected to comply with the Company Law. Hence, it is
very likely for privately owned companies to publish an annual report to assist the DZIT in estimating the amount
of Zakat that the company should pay. In addition, the private company needs to produce accounts when applying
for bank loans. Yet, the accounts produced by the privately owned companies are not as regular and intensive as
those produced by the publicly owned companies.
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Number 12/M on 13.5.1412 H (1991). This law comprises the following: conditions for
registration, registration procedures, the obligations of a chartered accountant, and the
establishment of the Saudi Public Accountants' Committee.
The Income Tax and Zakat Law was first introduced in Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree No.
17/2/28/3321, dated 21.1.1370H (1950), and has been amended several times. Zakat is a
religious duty (tax), in accordance with Islamic Law, charged to Saudi citizens, wholly Saudi-
owned companies, and the Saudi portion of profit of companies owned jointly with
foreigners. The Zakat is imposed on capital and earnings: all profits, gains, and proceeds
from business, industry acquisitions of whatever kind or description, including financial and
commercial transactions, and dividends, crops, and livestock.
2.1. The accounting profession
The first accounting firm, the non-Saudi firm of Saba, Nawar, and Co., was established in
Saudi Arabia in 1955. The first Saudi accounting firm, Daghastani and Abdul Wahab, was
established in 1959. By the end of the 1950s, there were still only seven accounting firms in
Saudi Arabia.
2.2. Tlie Ministry of Commerce
Financial accounting objectives and concepts approved as the basis for financial account-
ing principles by Ministry of Commerce Decision No. 692 (1985) are very similar to the
accounting principles issued by FASB. In 1986, the Ministry of Commerce issued "Account-
ing Objectives and Concepts," which dealt with three issues, namely financial accounting and
objectives, financial accounting concepts, and the standard of general presentation and
disclosure.
In addition, the Ministry of Commerce issued its "Auditing Standards," comprising seven
standards, which are as follows: adequate professional competence, auditor neutrality and
independence, due professional care, auditing planning, documentation and control, auditing
evidence, and auditing reports.
In 1990, the first accounting standard on the objective and concepts of accounting and
general presentation and disclosure was issued." This was followed, in 1992, by the formation
of SOCPA.^ The organization has the responsibility of issuing accounting and auditing
standards and has the authority to qualify public accountants.
The standard became effective that same year.
While the Company Act sets the basic rules and guides for accounting and auditing, SOCPA develops,
reviews, and approves detailed accounting and auditing standards. SOCPA affairs are managed by 13 board
members and chaired by the Minister of Commerce. The following serve as members: the Deputy Minister of
Commerce and Deputy Minister of Finance, the vice president of the General Controller's Bureau, two
representing accounting faculties of Saudi universities, a representative from the Council of Chambers of
Commerce and Industry, and six members representing Saudi audit firms to be elected at the organization's general
meeting for a term of 3 years.
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In addition to the Company Law and the standard issued by SOCPA, companies listed on
the stock exchange should meet the requirements set by the market/
3. Previous research and study questions
In the literature, a number of studies have been undertaken to assess the degree of
firms' compliance with the stated standards and to explain variations in the extent of
corporate reporting. In this respect, Evans and Taylor (1982) investigated the impact of
lASC on corporate reporting practices of five industrial countries (France, Germany, Japan,
United Kingdom, and United States). They observed that the International Accounting
Standards (lASs) have little impact on the extent of corporate disclosure. Ahmed and
Nicholls ( 1 994) investigated factors that influence the level of compliance by Bangladeshi
companies with mandatory disclosure requirements. They found that mandatory disclosure
tends to increase in cases where the company is a subsidiary of a multinational company
(the company is audited by a large audit firm) and the accounts are prepared by a qualified
accountant. They found, however, that company size has no effect on the level of
disclosure. In a similar line of research. Murphy (1999) looked at specific firm features
distinguishing Swiss firms who voluntarily adopted the lASs fi"om other companies that
chose to use national accounting standards. He found that a firm's involvement in foreign
activities, percentage of foreign sales, and foreign stock exchange listing impact the use of
the lASs.
El-Gazzar, Finn, and Jacob (1999) examined the reasons and company characteristics
that influence a company's choice in adopting the lASs. They found that multiple foreign
stock exchanges listing, the magnitude of a firm's foreign operations, and membership in
regional organizations (European Union) dictate the use of the lASs. Tower, Hancock,
and Taplin (1999) conducted a regional study that investigates the degree of compliance
with the lASs of companies listed on the stock exchanges of six countries in the Asia-
Pacific region. They found that the mean of compliance in countries like Australia,
Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore was 90% or more. The degree of compliance of other
countries covered by a study by Tower et al. reported a slightly lower mean (88% and
89%). Given that Hong Kong and the Philippines are influenced by British and American
accounting standards, respectively, the resulting mean of compliance with the LASs is
encouraging.
In 1984, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) took control of the capital market in Saudi Arabia
and became the legislative body that regulates general and operational rules. SAMA circulated the rules and
regulations controlling and supervising the Saudi Stock Exchange to commercial banks, responsible for all share-
trading activities. The stock market requirements emphasize the requirements set in the Company Law and the
accounting standards issued by SOCPA.
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On the other hand, Dye (1986) indicated that the lack of voluntary disclosure might
result in an increase in the demand for additional information through mandatory dis-
closure. This might lead to a positive association between the extent of mandatory and
voluntary disclosures. It is therefore important to seek answers to the following research
questions.
Research question 1 : To what extent do Saudi companies comply with the requirements of
mandatory disclosure?
Research question 2: Do Saudi companies disclose information more than the minimum
required by accounting standards?
Research question 3: Is there any association between the extent of mandatory disclosure and
voluntary related/unrelated to mandatory disclosure?
Research question 4: Is there any significant difference in the extent of corporate disclosure
before and after the creation of the SOCPA?
4. Index construction, data collection, and statistical tests
4.1. Index construction
For the purpose of this study, corporate disclosure was put in three major areas: mandatory,
voluntary closely associated with mandatory, and voluntary unrelated to mandatory. A
disclosure index was constructed for each of these areas taking into consideration financial
reporting requirements in Saudi Arabia.^ The literature on the use of indexes was divided
between unweighted and weighted indexes. Under the unweighted index, dichotomous
scores, where is given for nondisclosure and 1 is given for disclosure item, are used.
The weighted index, however, is based on the rank a user of the annual report attaches to the
information disclosure item. Those who advocate the use of the weighted index believe that
such a score reflects both the extent and importance of each disclosure item that forms the
index (Robbins & Austin, 1986). However, those who argue against the use of the weighted
index contend that the weighting does not significantly alter the results (Chow & Wong-
Boren, 1987; Wallace & Naser, 1995). In all cases. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and
Robbins and Austin (1986) obtained the same results under the unweighted and weighted
indexes.
In this study, the analysis is based on both methods. This helps assess the outcome under
the two methods and provides new evidence fi^om a developing country such as Saudi Arabia.
In departure from previous studies (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Robbins & Austin, 1986;
Singhvi & Desai, 1971), which relied on a limited number of accounting information users,
the disclosure index is weighted by the importance given to each item of disclosure by seven
^ Details of the disclosure items included in the index and the weight given to each of the disclosure items by
various users of corporate report are reported in Appendix A.
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user groups. This procedure is expected to give a more objective index. Five weighting
points were given to items viewed as very important by the respondents; four points for those
viewed as important, two points for some importance, and one point for Httle importance. The
disclosure index scored by each company was then divided on the maximum score. This can
be presented mathematically as follows:
UIv = Y.T. fix
where UIv is the unweighted index scored by company, x, 0<I^-<\; T,^ is the information
item disclosed by company x\ n^ is the maximum number of items expected to be disclosed
by a company;
WIv
where WI^ is the weighted index scored by company x, < 4 < 1 ; w is the weighting point,
i.e., five weighting points were given to items viewed as very important by the group of users,
four points for those viewed as important, two points for some importance, and one point for
little importance; and 7,^ is the information item disclosed by company x.
4.2. Data collection
To provide answers to the above research questions, we used the annual reports of
companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange. By the end of 1999, 91 companies were
listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange, 12 of which were operating in the financial sector. Since
the purpose of this study is to look at disclosure practices by nonfinancial companies, annual
reports were requested from all nonfinancial companies for the years 1992 and 1999.'^^ These
years were chosen because 1992 precedes the creation ofSOCPA and 1999 is the latest annual
^ Two research students scored the accounts. In cases where a significant difference in the score appeared, the
authors double-checked them. The weighting, however, was based on a questionnaire survey mailed to a sample of
users of the annual reports. The sample includes individual investors, institutional investors, academics, auditors,
government officers, bank credit officers, and financial analysts. The disclosure index was then weighted by the
mean and the median of the users' ranking of the importance of each of the items that made the index. Due to
variations in the importance that various individual user groups attach to different disclosure items, the mean/
median of the whole sample were used to weight the index.
"^ The Saudi companies surveyed in this study vary in size, average volume traded on the Saudi Stock
Exchange, and government ownership. For example, the market capitalization ranges between SR 6 million, in the
case of Beshah Agriculture and Development, and SR 29,350 million, in the case of the Saudi Basic Industries
(SABIC). TTie average daily volume traded also ranges from as low as 2, in the case of Beshah Agriculture and
Development, to more than 100,000, for the Saudi Cement. A government share in the surveyed companies was
evident in companies operatmg in the electricity, transportation, hotel, manufacturing, and real estate sectors. For
example, while government ownership reached almost 99% in the case of Saudi Consolidates Electricity
Companies (SCECO-Southem), shares m a company like Saudi Arabia Refineries (SARCO) were all owned by
the private sector.
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report the researchers could obtain. Comparing the extent of corporate disclosure within the
two periods would enable us to examine possible changes in the extent of disclosure and the
impact, if any, ofSOCPA on such disclosures. Annual reports of 40 out of 64 companies were
collected for the years 1991/1992 and 52 out of 79 companies for the years 1998/1999.
4.3. Statistical tests
The univariate analysis that measures central tendency and dispersion (mean and S.D.) and
a test that identifies whether changes in one variable are associated with another (correlation)
was employed. Since the data covered three major areas of disclosure (mandatory, voluntary
related, and unrelated to mandatory), a Wilcoxon test was performed to identify whether the
index of disclosure under the areas of disclosure is coming from the same population.
5. Findings
5.7. Degree of compliance with standards requirements
As mentioned earlier, the degree of compliance and the extent of corporate disclosure will
be used as a proxy of quality; a high degree of compliance and more disclosure are viewed as
better quality. Hence, corporate disclosure was divided into three main categories. The first
area covers mandatory disclosure that satisfies the minimum required by the Saudi accounting
standard, such as the disclosure of company's total assets. The second category covers
voluntary related to mandatory disclosure, such as the breakdown of assets (current and fixed
assets). The third category covers voluntary unrelated to mandatory disclosure, such as future
expansion in a company's assets.
Twenty-three disclosure items were derived from the main source of disclosure require-
ments, the General Presentation and Procedure Standard in Saudi Arabia, and formed the
basis for the mandatory disclosure index. The annual reports of the sample Saudi nonfinancial
companies were scored against the index. Descriptive statistics and comparison between the
degree of significance of the difference between the unweighted and weighted disclosure
indexes are given in Tables 1 and 2, respectively."
It is evident from Table 1 that the mean of the mandatory disclosure index is relatively high
across different sectors of industry with the electricity sector being the exception. The low
level of disclosure achieved by the electricity sector can be explained on the grounds that this
industry is viewed as a strategic one and is mainly owned by the government; in some
companies, the government owns up to 95% of the outstanding shares. In addition, a view of
'
' The weighting was based on a questionnaire survey mailed to a sample of users of the annual reports. The
sample includes individual investors, institutional investors, academics, auditors, government officers, bank credit
officers, and financial analysts. The disclosure index was then weighted by the mean and the median of the users'
ranking of the importance of each of the items that made the index. Due to variations in the importance that
various individual user groups attach to different disclosure items, the mean/median of the whole sample were
used to weight the index.
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the profit and loss accounts of the electricity companies revealed that most of these
companies sustained losses over a long period. More importantly, the Saudi government
guarantees a 7.5% return to investors in this sector. Consequently, companies were left with
little incentive to disclose detailed information. Hence, the low level of disclosure, reported in
Table 1, is not surprising.
What attracts one's attention, on the other hand, is that the differences reported between the
weighted and unweighted disclosure indexes were small. This might be because the index is
formed fi"om mandatory disclosure items that most companies are expected to comply with.
Moreover, the users who took part in the survey seem to attach the same importance to the
items that made the index. Needless to say, the disclosure items included in the index
represent the minimum requirement that most companies are expected to disclose.
On the other hand, the Wilcoxon signed ranks test was undertaken to identify possible
difference(s) between the unweighted and weighted disclosure index, documented in Table 2,
and reported significant differences between the unweighted and weighted disclosure indexes
in the agriculture and services sectors. While the difference was marginal in the agriculture
sector, it was significant in the services industry.'" This implies that Saudi users of the
accounts attach different importance to the disclosure items that formed the index. In addition,
companies operating in the services industry vary in size and their total assets range from SR
6 million to SR 1386. Large companies, rather than smaller ones, are expected to approach
extemal sources of funds to finance their activities. Consequently, we expect them to include
a statement of retained eamings in their annual reports as well as detailed and classified
information about their assets. Furthermore, government ownership in the agriculture sector
ranges between 0% and 1 00%. This is also expected to impact the degree of compliance by
the Saudi companies.
Significant differences were also reported for the sample as a whole between the
unweighted and weighted indexes. The result for the whole sample contradicts results
reported by Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Robbins and Austin (1986), who obtained
the same results under the unweighted and weighted indexes. This implies that extemal users
in Saudi Arabia attach different importance to items disclosed in the annual report.
Looking at the individual items of disclosure that formed the index reported in Table 3, the
conclusion is that all surveyed companies disclosed information on most of the items. As for
items expected to appear on the balance sheet, a number of companies failed to classify assets
and liabilities into current and fixed/long-term. A number of companies also failed to report
assets and liabilities in order on the balance sheet. Further, few companies showed a statement
of retained eamings on their balance sheets.
Although some might argue that these issues are not significant and their disclosure might
not affect the quality of disclosure, this additional information helps users make more
informed decisions. For example, financial analysts will find it difficult to assess the liquidity
of a company if the company failed to classify its assets and liabilities into current and long-
term. Other profitability indicators, such as fixed assets turnover, which is usually used to
" A small number of the surveyed companies failed to fully comply with the standards in a limited number of
disclosure items. However, the degree of compliance with standards is on average high.
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Table 2
Level of significance of the differences between the disclosure indexes
Agriculture Manufacturing Petrochemical Services Electricity Real Whole
estates sample
Level of significance of the difference between unweighted and weighted scores of mandatory disclosure using
Wilcoxon signed ranks test
Index of unweighted .01* .02* .24 .005** .20 .04* .005**
mandatory vs. index of
mandatory disclosure
weighted by the mean
Index of unweighted .07* .09* .18 .005** .38 .09* .000**
mandatory vs. index of
mandatory disclosure
weighted by the median
Index of mandatory weighted .02* .14 .07* .007** .25 .12 .000**
by the mean vs. index of
mandatory disclosure
weighted by the median
Level of significance of the difference between unweighted and weighted scores of voluntary related to
mandatory disclosure using Wilcoxon signed ranks test
Index of unweighted voluntary .004** .05* .02* .001** .009** .01* .000**
related to mandatory vs.
index of voluntary related
to mandatory disclosure
weighted by the mean
Index of unweighted voluntary .004** .002** .02* .001** .009** .01* .000**
related to mandatory vs.
index of voluntary related
to mandatory disclosure
weighted by the median
Index of voluntary related to .004** .002** .02* .001** .009** .01* .000**
mandatory weighted by the
mean vs. index of voluntary
related to mandatory
disclosure weighted by the
median
Level of significance of the difference between unweighted and weighted scores of voluntaiy unrelated to
mandatory disclosure using Wilcoxon signed ranks test
Index of unweighted voluntary .005** .004** .02* .001** .06 .01* .000**
unrelated to mandatory vs.
index of voluntary unrelated
to mandatory disclosure
weighted by the mean
Indexofunweighted voluntary .01* .004** .04* .001** .03* .02* .000**
unrelated to mandatory vs.
index of voluntary unrelated
to mandatory disclosure
weighted by the median
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Table 2 {continued)
Agriculture Manufacturing Petrochemical Services Electricity Real Whole
estates sample
Level of significance of the difference between unweighted and weighted scores of voluntary unrelated to
mandatory disclosure using Wilcoxon signed ranks test
Index of voluntary unrelated .40* .15 .50 .05* .03* .12 .005**
to mandatory weighted by
the mean vs. index of
voluntary unrelated to
mandatory disclosure
weighted by the median
Level of significance of the difference betM'een corporate mandatory levels of disclosure in the periods
between 1992 and 1999 using Wilcoxon signed ranks test
Index of unweighted .20 .20 .20 .30 .14 .33 .10
mandatory disclosure
Index of mandatory disclosure .30 .20 .20 .35 .14 .33 .12
weighted by the mean
Index of mandatory disclosure .40 .25 .20 .35 .14 .33 .12
weighted by the median
Level of significance of the difference between corporate voluntary related to mandatory levels of disclosure
in the periods between 1992 and 1999 using Wilcoxon signed ranks test
Index of unweighted voluntary .09 .09 .50 .20 .07 .09 .11
related to mandatory
disclosure
Index of voluntary related to .09 .08 .50 .20 .07 .09 .11
mandatory disclosure
weighted by the mean
Index of voluntary related to .12 .09 .45 .20 .07 .09 .11
mandatory disclosure
weighted by the median
Level of significance of the difference between corporate voluntaiy related to mandatoty levels of disclosure
in the periods between 1992 and 1999 using Wilcoxon signed ranks test
Index of unweighted voluntary .16 .12 .24 .15 .04* .09 .14
unrelated to mandatory
disclosure
Index of voluntary unrelated .20 .16 .23 .15 .02* .05* .08
to mandatory disclosure
weighted by the mean
Index of voluntary unrelated .18 .18 .21 .15 .02* .05 * .08
to mandatory disclosure
weighted by the median
* Actual significance level: a < .05.
** Actual significance level: a < .005.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics on items formed disclosure indexes
Items disclosed Mean Median S.D. Min Max Percentage of
companies
disclosed the
item
Items formed mandatory disclosure index
Information on the firm's activities
A section on the significant accounting policies
employed by the firm
Classifying assets between current and fixed
Reporting assets in order: current, investments, fixed,
and intangibles
Categorizing current assets: cash, debtors, stock,
short-term investment, etc.
Disclose the aggregate amount of current assets
Categorizing fixed assets: plant and equipment,
buildings, land, fiimiture, etc.
Disclose the carrying value of fixed assets
(Total fixed assets — depreciation)
Classifying liabilities between current and long-term
Categorizing current liabilities: creditors, short-term
loans, tax, etc.
Disclose the aggregate amount of current liabilities
Categorizing long-term liabilities: bank loans, bonds, etc.
Disclose the statement of owners' equity in specific order
Amount of sales (gross or net)
Other revenues
Cost of goods sold
Gross profit/loss
Categorizing expenses into:
Administrative and general expenses
Selling expenses
Net profit/loss
Retained earnings statement
Changes in owners' equity statement
Two-year figures
Voluntary disclosure related to mandatoty disclosure
Audit Fees
Directors' remuneration
Management's remuneration
Revenue classified into local and foreign markets
Expenses incurred and related to promotion and
advertisement
Wages expenses incurred classified into local and
foreign employees
Classification of debtors into different aging categories
Classification of stock
Market value of stock
.98 1.0 .08 .5 1.0 100
.96 1.0 .16 .0 1.0
.65 .50 .20 .25 1.0 100
.67 1.0 .44 .0 1.0 70
.95 1.0 .20 .0 1.0 96
.0 1.0 .00 .0 1.0 100
.97 1.0 .18 .0 1.0 97
1.0 1.0
.96
1.0 100
.82 1.0 .38 .0 1.0 82
.87 1.0 .25 .0 1.0 96
.98 1.0 .11 .0 1.0 99
.98 1.0 .09 .5 1.0 100
.97 1.0 .05 .75 1.0 100
.90 1.0 .30 .00 1.0 90
1.0 1.0 .00 1.0 1.0 100
.79 1.0 .41 .00 1.0 79
.79 1.0 .41 .00 1.0 79
.90 1.0 .30 .00 1.0
.40 .0 .50 .00 1.0 40
1.0 1.0 .00 1.00 1.0 100
.75 1.0 .37 .0 1.0 85
1.0 1.0 .00 1.00 1.0 100
1.0 1.0 .00 1.00 1.0 100
00 00 00 00 00 00
.90 1.0 .27 00 1.0 90
.15 00 .22 00 1.0 24
.24 00 .41 00 1.0 22
.30 00 .45 00 1.0 28
00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
.89 1.0 .30 00 1.0 90
00 00 00 00 00 00
90
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Table 3 {continued)
Items disclosed Mean Median S.D. Min Max Percentage of
companies
disclosed the
item
Voluntajy disclosure related to mandato)y disclosure
Distinction between raw material value bought locally 00
and from abroad
Details of fixed assets
Information on equity investment
Categorization of equity investment
Market value of equity investment
Information on the calculation of Zakat
Information on long-term debt
Information on pension and retirement plans
Earnings per share
Voluntary disclosure of unrelated to mandatory disclosure
Directors' names
Top management names
Majority shareholders
Information on different types of products
Financial statistics for more than 2 years
Information on events that affected current
year's operations
Information on transactions that expected to affect .05
future operations
Information on the company's dividends policy 00
Information on future expansion (capital expenditures)
Cash flow statement
Percentage of foreign labor force in different section of
the company
Information on training and human resources development
Information on university graduates recruitment policy
Information on donations to universities and charitable
organizations
00 00 00
.20 00
00
1.0
00
.97 1.0 .15 00 1.0 98
.64 .75 .21 00 1.0 97
.44 .50 .21 00 1.0 85
.45 .50 .22 00 1.0 86
.03 00 .10 00 1.0 2
00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
.12 00 .28 00 1.0 11
.62 1.0 .48 00 1.0 45
00 .0 00 00 1.0 00
.92 1.0 .15 00 1.0 95
.90 1.0 .25 00 1.0 95
.18 .0 .37 00 1.0 18
.88 1.0 .30 00 1.0 92
.0 .0 00 00 00
.20 .0 .36 00 1.0 23
.80 1.0 .20 00 1.0 80
.14 .0 .25 00 1.0 20
.12 .0 .22 00 1.0 20
.20 .0 .31 00 1.0 26
.03 .0 .11 00 1.0 3
assess the efficiency of the company in making use of fixed assets, will be difficult to obtain
from a company's report where assets are not classified.
As far as the profit and loss account is concerned, a limited number of companies disclosed
a small amount of information about the cost of sales and gross profit. Few companies
disclosed information on selling expenses. Again, the disclosure of little or no information on
these items would make it difficult for users to assess the financial position and performance
of the company under consideration. For example, the profit-margin ratio relates gross profit
to sales. It indirectly reveals the cost of sales in relationship to sales and gives an indication
about a company's cost management. The same argument applies to selling expenses. A lack
of disclosure information on selling expenses would make it difficult to assess the size of
those expenses relative to the company's sales. Information contained in such disclosure
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would help users monitor and compare expenses before making any decision related to the
company under review.
More importantly, inconsistency and/or failure in reporting reduce comparability between
companies operating within the same industry. This may result in uninformed decisions and
lead to questions about the usefulness of the reported information. By way of explanation, it
is important to mention here that Saudi businesses are still classified as family businesses and
few investors own most of the companies' outstanding shares. Hence, they have little
incentives to disclose detailed information. Moreover, disclosing additional information may
expose companies to their competitors. Thus, companies tend to disclose little or no
information. Since companies in Saudi Arabia are dominated by a small number of investors
and families, it is possible to request information directly from these companies.
5.2. Do Saudi companies disclose more than required by the standards?
The analysis of the mandatory disclosure indicated a high degree of comphance with the
stated standards. It was, therefore, important to investigate whether Saudi companies disclose
detailed voluntary information related to the items of information required by law. Voluntary
disclosures are classified into those related to and those unrelated to mandatory disclosure.
5.2.1. Voluntary disclosure related to mandatory disclosure
Eighteen voluntary disclosure related to mandatory disclosure items are used to form the
index. Descriptive statistics and comparison between the degree of significance of the
difference between the unweighted and weighted disclosure indexes are summarized in
Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
Table 1 reveals that the mean value of the voluntary related to the mandatory disclosure is
relatively low. The mean value of the voluntary associated with mandatory disclosure, for the
whole sample, dropped from 89% to only 33%. The table also shows that the lowest level of
disclosure was registered by companies operating in the electricity sector and the highest
score was achieved by the sample of agriculture companies.
On the other hand. Table 2 shows a significant difference in the value of the unweighted
and weighted scores for voluntary related to mandatory disclosure indexes in all industries
under study. This implies that although the level of voluntary related to mandatory disclosure
is low, the users seem to attach a high level of importance to the disclosed information.
The relatively low level of voluntary disclosure can be explained on the grounds that a
significant proportion of companies in Saudi Arabia are owned either by families or the
government who have little incentive to disclose voluntary information. According to Naser
(1998), users of corporate information in Saudi Arabia are financial institutions, major
investors, and governmental agencies, all of whom have access to company records and can
demand whatever information they need, public financial disclosure is kept at a minimum.
An examination of the descriptive statistics on individual disclosure items that formed the
index, summarized in Table 3, shows that Saudi companies do not disclose any information
on seven of the listed items. The companies surveyed disclose detailed information on the
classification of fixed assets on the balance sheet, directors' remuneration, and stock
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classification. However, little information is disclosed on information relating to the
calculation of Zakat. In a conservative country like Saudi Arabia, where Islam is evident
in all aspects of daily life, one would have expected detailed information on Zakat, one of the
five pillars of Islam.
5.2.2. Voluntary^ unrelated to mandatory disclosure
An index formed from a list of voluntary disclosure items not related to mandatory
disclosure was used to score the disclosure of Saudi companies as reported in their annual
reports. Descriptive statistics on the industry level and comparison between the degree of
significance of the difference between the unweighted and weighted disclosure indexes are
presented in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
Table 1 reports a slight drop in the mean of the entire sample for voluntary unrelated to
mandatory disclosure compared to voluntary related to mandatory disclosure. While the level
of voluntary disclosure improved on the voluntary related to mandatory disclosures in the
agriculture and real estates industries, it declined in the manufacturing, petrochemical,
services, and electricity industries. It should be noted that the mean level of disclosure for
all industries, with the exception of electricity, was very close to the mean value of the whole
sample.
On the other hand, the results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks test reported in Table 2 points
to significant differences between the mean values of the unweighted and weighted disclosure
indexes in most industries. The difference was less evident between the indexes weighted by
the mean and the median in most industries, except for electricity.
A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 reveal that the mean index of disclosure for the whole
sample is low. This is in line with the results achieved in the voluntary related to mandatory
index of disclosure. While a high level of disclosure was registered by the agriculture
industry, the lowest level of disclosure was reported by the electricity industry.
Descriptive statistics on individual items that formed the index of voluntary disclosure
reveal that none of the surveyed companies disclose information relating to dividends policy
(see Table 3). Similarly, none of the surveyed companies disclose a list of the top
management's names. A sizeable number of the surveyed companies disclose detailed
information on the majority shareholders, different types of products that they produce,
and major activities that affected the current financial year.
5.2.3. TJie relationship betM'een mandatory and voluntary disclosures
In this section, the relationship between the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosures is
examined. In Table 4, the coefficients of correlation together with the level of significance
between the unweighted values of disclosure indexes are presented. The correlation of the
weighted disclosure indexes, measured by the mean and their level of significance, are
summarized in Table 4.
Table 4 reports a positive and significant correlation (/'=.53, P<.000) between the
mandatory and voluntary related to mandatory disclosures for the sample as a whole. Hence,
the results support Dye (1986), who suggested a positive association between mandatory and
voluntary disclosure as voluntary disclosure complements the mandatory.
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The correlation between the mandatory and voluntary related to mandatory disclosures in
individual sectors reveal a different story. Of all the sectors covered in the study, only electri-
city registered a significant and positive correlation between the two indexes. The manufac-
turing industry reported a significant but negative correlation between the two indexes as noted
earlier. This might be explained because the electricity industry is considered strategic, and
companies in this sector are mainly owned by government. We expect these companies to
produce voluntary information related to employees and other environmental factors that
reflect the government's commitment towards employees' welfare and society at large.
On the other hand, the correlation between the index of voluntary disclosure for the whole
sample and the other two indexes used in this study is weak and insignificant. It is important
to mention that the disclosure items of voluntary disclosure that formed the index are mainly
derived fi-om the director's report. Voluntary related to mandatory disclosure is taken fi-om the
notes to the accounts. A relationship between these statements is unlikely to exist, since each
part of the annual report is prepared by different parties, where each party attempts to signal a
different message to the external users of the report.
The above results may emphasize the following. First, the weighted and unweighted
indexes produced relatively similar results. Second, in Saudi Arabia, no significant correla-
tion exists between mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure. The assumption that good
mandatory disclosure results in good voluntary disclosure is not evident in the case of Saudi
companies.
5.5. Difference(s) in the level of disclosure after the creation ofSOCPA
5.3.1. Mandatory disclosure
As mentioned earlier, SOCPA was established in 1993. Hence, the attempt was made to
examine possible changes in the level of disclosure after its creation. To compare the effect of
the SOCPA on financial reporting practices in Saudi Arabia, disclosure indexes were
constructed from a sample of companies for the years 1992 (1 year before the establishment
of SOCPA) and 1999.'" Table 5 provides comparative descriptive statistics on the unweighted
and weighted indexes. The results of statistical tests on the differences in the level of
disclosure between the years 1992 and 1999 measured by Wilcoxon signed ranks test are
given in Table 2.
It is evident from Table 5 that little improvement in the level of disclosure took place in all
industries except that reported by electricity companies. In addition, variations between
companies within all industries, except the electricity industry, diminished in the period
between 1992 and 1999. This can clearly be seen from the reported standard deviations. As
for the whole sample, very little increase in the level of disclosure occurred.
As noted above, electric companies (utilities) are largely government owned and generally
operate at a loss, hence, their management has few incentives to improve disclosure practices.
The little improvement achieved by the sample as a whole might be explained because some
companies reported high levels of compliance with the stated standards. There is little room to
'^ Annual reports of a sample of the same companies were used.
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disclose more information. The ability of SOCPA to monitor and enforce the standard might
also explain the insignificant change in the level of disclosure. Unless SOCPA has the power
to disqualify the accounts of companies that do not comply with the stated standard, we
expect little improvement in the extent of disclosure. On the other hand, the Wilcoxon signed
ranks test reported in Table 2 showed no significant difference in the level of mandatory
disclosure in the years 1992 and 1999 between industries and/or the sample as a whole.
The outcome of the analysis makes it difficult to verify whether the little improvement in
the level of disclosure is due to the creation of SOCPA. In the Middle East, where a number
of governments have embarked on privatization programs, most of the local auditors are
affiliated with international firms to give assurances to the national as well as foreign
investors. Hence, the improvement in the level of disclosure reported by Saudi companies
operating in most industries might be attributed to this move. It could also be that a number of
companies are considering floating more shares on the stock exchange. Additional disclosure
assists investors in making informed decisions about the company. Disclosing additional
information may also assist in cases of merger or takeovers.
5.3.2. Voluntary disclosure
The level of voluntary related to mandatory disclosure before and after the creation of
SOCPA was examined and descriptive statistics on changes in the level of disclosure are
summarised in Table 5. Table 5 indicates that the level of voluntary related to mandatory
disclosure for the whole sample was lower in the year 1999 than it was for the year 1992. The
result was consistent under the unweighted and weighted indexes. Looking at the results
achieved by individual industries reveals that while the agriculture, petrochemical, and
services industries reported slight improvement in the level of voluntary related to mandatory
disclosure, a decline in the level of disclosure was registered in manufacturing, electricity, and
real estates industries. It is important to mention, however, that the level of variations within
the industries witnessed a decline, as reflected by the reported standard deviations.
The analysis may point to the fact that, on average, SOCPA has had little impact on the
level of voluntary related to mandatory disclosure. The presence of SOCPA, however,
coincided with the decline in the gap in the level of disclosure between the surveyed
companies. This implies that companies tend to make similar voluntary related to mandatory
disclosure. This might be explained on the grounds that these companies fear competition and
restrict their disclosure to specific items. It is also possible that the companies employ the
same auditor; this might impact the choice of items disclosed in the annual report. It is also
possible that preparers of the accounts (accountants) have the same background.
As for voluntary disclosure with no relation to mandatory disclosure. Table 5 shows a little
increase in the level of voluntary disclosure in 1 999 over that of 1 992 for the sample as a
whole. Individual industry analysis indicates that all but electricity industries registered little
increase in the level of voluntary disclosure. It should be noted that variations in the level of
disclosure for the whole sample slightly increased as measured by the standard deviation.
This phenomenon is evident in industries like manufacturing, petrochemical, services, and
electricity. An interesting point to note in Table 5 is that the maximum level of disclosure for
the whole sample improved in 1999 over that of 1992. This might explain the increase in the
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level of variations within industries. In other words, some companies voluntarily reported
additional information while others continued to report the same information.
To explore significant differences between the level of voluntary disclosure between the
years 1992 and 1999, a Wilcoxon signed ranks test was undertaken and reported in Table 2.
It is evident from the table above that at the industry level, significant differences were
reported in the voluntary disclosure in the services industry. For the sample as a whole,
however, the test shows no significant difference in any of the industries. The resuhs are
surprising since the assumption here is that SOCPA was expected to impact mandatory rather
than voluntary disclosure.
6. Conclusion
This study set out to give answers to a number ofresearch questions relating to the quality of
information disclosed by a sample of Saudi nonfinancial companies listed on the Saudi Stock
Exchange. In addition, in this study, we compare the extent of corporate disclosure before and
after the creation of SOCPA. For our sample, we used 63% and 66% of the total population of
companies listed on the Saudi Stock exchange in the years 1992 and 1999, respectively. In-
formation disclosed in the annual reports was classified into three main categories: mandatory,
voluntary related to mandatory, and voluntary with no relation to mandatory disclosure. The
disclosure indexes constructed for these categories were scored against the disclosed informa-
tion. In departure from most of the previous studies conducted in this area of research, we
weighted the indexes by the mean and the median of responses of seven users of the annual
reports in Saudi Arabia. The results of both unweighted and weighted indexes are reported.
The outcome of the analysis indicates a relatively high compliance with the mandatory
requirements in all industries covered by the study, with the exception of the electricity sector.
Unlike what is advocated by Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Robbins and Austin (1986)
that no significant differences exist in the use of unweighted and weighted disclosure,
significant differences were reported between the unweighted index and the index weighted
by the mean and median of a group of Saudi external users in a number of industries covered
in this study. In all cases, it is fair to say that the Saudi companies included in the study
comply with the standards and disclose more than the minimum information required by law.
The level of voluntary disclosure, however, is relatively low. Furthermore, the level of
disclosure and the importance that the users attach to information item of disclosure appear to
vary from one industry to another.
When we examine mandatory and voluntary related to mandatory disclosure, using both
the unweighted and weighted indexes, we find a positive and significant association between
the two variables for the sample as a whole. Of all the sectors investigated in the study, only
the electricity industry showed a positive and significant association between mandatory and
voluntary related to mandatory disclosures.
Voluntary disclosure unrelated to mandatory disclosure shows an insignificant correlation
with both mandatory and voluntary related to mandatory disclosure for unweighted and
weighted indexes for the sample as a whole as well as for individual industries.
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The analysis also shows that the creation of SOCPA has had little impact on corporate
reporting in Saudi Arabia. This might be because the organization is still relatively new and
lacks an enforcement mechanism. In summary, although the degree of compliance with
accounting standards is relatively high, the level of voluntary disclosure is still relatively low.
Finally, a number of studies conducted on neighboring Arab countries indicated that a
national auditor's affiliation with big intemational audit firms has a positive impact on the
depth of disclosure.
Appendix A. Disclosure items included in the index and the weight given to each item by
various user groups
Disclosure items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(;; = 65) (« = 219) in = 42) in = 52) 07 = 48) in = 50) (« = 58)
Mandatory disclosure items
Description of firm's activities 4.13 4.09 4.15 4.18 3.99 4.24 4.70
Description of significant accounting policies 4.09 4.23 4.44 4.38 4.39 4.29 4.67
Two-year figures 4.73 4.91 4.73 4.87 4.71 4.82 4.59
Classification of assets 4.03 4.36 4.45 4.54 4.65 4.34 4.56
Assets sequence 4.06 4.07 4.23 4.27 4.14 4.66 4.62
Components of current assets 4.04 4.39 4.47 4.46 4.25 4.66 4.71
Total current assets 4.20 4.58 4.19 4.01 4.10 4.66 4.71
Components of fixed assets 4.06 4.10 4.30 4.34 4.17 4.66 4.74
Depreciable assets net amount 3.88 3.81 4.08 4.20 3.92 4.47 4.64
Sequence of liabilities 3.97 4.03 4.25 4.39 4.16 4.84 4.71
Classification of current liabilities 4.12 4.29 4.43 4.59 4.45 4.84 4.71
Total current liabilities ,4.16 4.36 4.23 4.18 4.17 4.66 4.69
Components of noncurrent liabilities 4.03 4.07 4.33 4.48 4.35 4.66 4.79
Sequence of owners' equity 4.46 4.39 4.56 4.31 4.57 4.68 4.90
Sales or net sales 4.62 4.77 4.81 4.76 4.83 4.95 4.87
Other revenue 4.52 4.53 4.41 4.52 4.57 4.71 4.77
Cost of sales 4.60 4.74 4.68 4.71 4.73 4.61 4.92
Gross profit 4.80 4.78 4.47 4.58 4.71 4.71 4.92
General and administrative expenses 4.59 4.78 4.57 4.67 4.78 4.58 4.74
Selling expenses 4.55 4.74 4.47 4.65 4.74 4.55 4.72
Net profit (loss) 4.84 4.91 4.67 4.69 4.82 4.94 4.70
Retained earnings statement 4.51 4.63 4.43 4.27 4.43 4.92 4.97
Statement of changes in owners' equity 4.42 4.56 4.37 4.26 4.18 4.24 4.70
Voluntary disclosure related to mandatory disclosure
Audit fees 3.80 4.25 3.51 3.61 3.59 3.92 3.56
Directors' remuneration 4.31 4.22 3.41 4.39 4.43 4.28 4.31
Management's remuneration 4.20 3.92 4.15 4.24 3.81 4.08 3.96
Revenue classified into local and 4.28 4.30 4.28 4.65 4.12 4.29 4.47
foreign markets
Expenses incurred and related to 3.79 3.81 3.90 3.99 3.80 3.81 3.92
promotion and advertisement
Wages expenses incurred classified into 3.42 3.12 3.28 3.61 3.11 3.27 3.36
local and foreign employees
(continued on next page)
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Appendix A {continued)
Disclosure items 12 3 4 5 6 7
(/; = 65) (« = 219) (« = 42) (n = 52) (« = 48) (;j = 50) (/j = 58)
Voluntaiy disclosure related to mandatory disclosure
3.75Classification of debtors into different
aging categories
Classification of stock
Market value of stock
Distinction between raw material
value bought locally or from abroad
Details of fixed assets
Information on equity investment
Categorization of equity investment
Market value of equity investment
Information on the calculation of Zakat
Information on long-term debt
Information on pension and retirement plans
Eamings per share
Voluntary- disclosure unrelated to mandatoiy disclosure
Directors' names
Top managements' names
Majority shareholders
Information on different types of products
Financial statistics for more than 2 years
Information on events affected current
year's operations
Information on transactions that expected to
affect fiature operations
Information on the company's dividends policy
Information on future expansion
(capital expenditures)
Cash flow statement
Percentage of foreign labor force in different
sections of the company
Information on training and human
resources development
Information on university graduates
recruitment policy
Information on donations to universities and
charitable organizations
4.35
3.83
4.67
4.08 4.35 3.50
4.42 4.79 4.01
3.79
3.84 3.80 4.10 4.34 3.82 3.81 3.98
4.25 4.26 4.24 4.49 4.10 4.27 4.36
3.78 3.83 3.61 3.95 3.26 3.80 3.58
4.32 4.22 4.44 4.52 4.40 4.27 4.46
4.46 4.57 4.45 4.71 4.50 4.51 4.61
4.33 4.41 4.32 4.49 4.31 4.35 4.40
4.34 4.45 4.37 4.56 4.38 4.42 4.57
3.70 3.41 3.65 3.99 3.75 3.58 3.74
4.31 4.42 4.63 4.66 4.36 4.43 5.51
3.37 3.19 3.48 4.10 3.21 3.27 3.41
4.78 4.83 4.41 4.40 4.37 4.52 4.79
j
4.26 4.22 4.37 4.58 3.97 4.24 4.27
4.13 3.65 4.10 4.45 3.63 3.99 3.78
3.78 3.55 3.99 4.18 3.10 3.69 3.62
4.40 4.34 4.42 4.50 4.25 4.38 5.51
4.15 4.34 4.18 4.47 3.39 4.17 4.38
4.61 4.90 4.55 4.88 4.52 4.64 4.70
4.39 4.51
4.62 4.55 4.36 4.65 4.35 4.52 4.59
4.30 4.10 4.32 4.62 3.95 4.27 4.15
4.40 4.70 4.79 4.90 4.20 4.55 4.68
4.11 3.85 3.84 4.05 3.68 3.87 3.77
3.75 3.89 3.79 3.96 3.63 3.78 3.74
3.87 3.46 3.59 3.75 3.42 3.67 3.57
3.82 4.20 3.56 3.91 3.89 3.59 3.83
(1) Individual investors, (2) institutional investors,
representative, (6) academics, (7) auditors.
Mean values: scoring: 1 =not important at all; 5 =
(3) financial analysts, (4) bank credit officers, (5) government
very important.
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Abstract
A controversial area of U.S. securities regulations involves the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) financial reporting requirements for foreign firms, specifically, the necessity
of providing a quantitative reconciliation to U.S. GAAP (Form 20-F). The results of earnings-
returns research to date indicate that the release of foreign GAAP earnings provides important
information. However, the results of earnings-retums studies using reconciled information are
mixed. Instead of using an earnings -retums methodology adopted in prior research, this study
utilizes analysts' revisions as a market indicator of the effect of information released in foreign
GAAP earnings and the reconciled information in Form 20-F. Additionally, the study investigates
the influence of four firm-specific variables in the firm's information environment—similarities of
accounting systems, analyst following, difference between reconciled earnings and foreign GAAP
earnings, and dispersion of analysts' expectations—on positive abnormal revision activities of
financial analysts at the time of filing Form 20-F. The results indicate that the release of foreign
GAAP earnings (at earnings announcement dates) and reconciled information (at the time of
filing Form 20-F) contains relevant information as measured by analysts' revisions. Further,
variables representing analyst following, change in reconciled earnings, and dispersion of
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analysts' expectations are significant in explaining the variation observed in positive abnormal
revisions.
© 2003 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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forecasts
1. Introduction
Globalization of equity markets involves numerous institutional activities and regulations
that facilitate access to foreign markets for both investors and issuers. In order to list securities
on U.S. exchanges, foreign firms must register with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in accordance with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Among other things,
registration requires a foreign firm to provide periodically a quantitative reconciliation of
selected financial data according to U.S. GAAP (hereafter referred to as reconciled
information).
Currently, the SEC allows registered foreign firms to file Form 20-F to satisfy the
SEC's financial reporting requirements rather than using the domestic reporting forms (10-
K and 10-Q). Firms filing Form 20-F may present their financial statements in accordance
with a comprehensive body of accounting principles other than U.S. GAAP (e.g.,
German, UK, or other national body of accounting principles) if accompanied by a
quantitative reconciliation to U.S. GAAP of net income, shareholders' equity, and
earnings per share (SEC, 1995). In addition to filing Form 20-F within 6 months of
the fiscal year-end, any reports filed in their foreign jurisdiction must also be filed with
the SEC.
The question ofwhether the reconciliation requirement enhances or diminishes the investor
protection and market-quality objectives of the SEC has been widely debated. Some believe
that requiring foreign firms to reconcile certain financial information to U.S. GAAP upholds
the investor protection objective by requiring fiill and fair disclosure by foreign firms
(Breeden, 1994; Kosnik, 1994; Shapiro, 1993). Others believe that the mandatory SEC
requirements may deter foreign firms from listing on U.S. exchanges, thereby forcing U.S.
investors to transact in more costly and less regulated markets (Baumol & Malkiel, 1993;
Cochrane, 1994; Edwards, 1993; Grundfest, 1992).
In general, prior empirical studies using an earnings-returns methodology show that
foreign GAAP eamings have information content, but the evidence regarding the information
content of U.S. GAAP-reconciled information is mixed. This study extends the literature by
utilizing financial analysts' forecasts revisions as an alternative indicator of the effect of
information presented by foreign firms. Additionally, this study investigates the influence of
four firm-specific characteristics in the firm's information environment on positive revision
activities (discussed later) at the time of filing Form 20-F. The four firm characteristics
examined are the following: (1) similarities of accounting systems, (2) analyst following, (3)
magnitude of the difference between reconciled eamings and foreign GAAP eamings, and (4)
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dispersion of analysts' expectations. This study provides evidence of the impact of required
financial reporting for foreign firms on financial analysts' revisions. The results have
policymaking implications for U.S. securities regulation.
This paper is organized in the following manner. The next section reviews the prior
literature, followed by Section 3 which defines the model variables, states the hypotheses, and
describes the sample. A discussion of the results in Section 4 follows and a Summary section
concludes the paper.
2. Prior literature
2.1. Information content offoreign GAAP and reconciled earnings
Studies investigating the relation between foreign GAAP earnings and earnings reconciled
to U.S. GAAP have generally employed a capital-markets methodology based on stock
returns (prices) as a proxy for market expectations. These studies show that foreign GAAP
earnings have information content; however, they report that the quantitative reconciliation in
Form 20-F generally provides no significant information above that provided by the foreign
GAAP earnings number (Amir, Harris, & Venuti, 1993; Bandyopadhyay, Hanna, & Richard-
son, 1994; Chan & Seow, 1996; Frost & Pownall, 1994; Meek, 1983; Pope & Rees, 1992).
Exceptions to these findings suggest that the incremental information content for reconciled
information may exist, may be a longer-term phenomenon, or may be country-specific (Barth
& Clinch, 1996; McQueen, 1992; Rees, 1995).
The observed lack of value of the quantitative reconciliation in assessing abnormal returns
may be a function of the ability of financial analysts to successfully perform pro forma
reconciliations, thus preempting a disclosure effect (Fulkerson & Meek, 1998). This finding is
especially true for firms fi^om countries with accounting systems similar to the U.S. system.
Value, however, is exhibited for firms with reporting systems dissimilar to U.S. GAAP
(Fulkerson & Meek, 1998). Moreover, market participants may use a coping mechanism to
interpret foreign GAAP earnings and thereby predict U.S. GAAP earnings by utilizing other
sources of information before the release of a quantitative reconciliation (Gomik-Tomaszew-
ski & Rozen, 1999).
The role of analysts in assessing relevant information has been established in the
accounting and finance literature (Schipper, 1991). Specifically, analysts impound new
information into their forecasts of eamings and into revisions of their earnings forecasts
(Brown, Griffin, Hagerman, & Zmijewski, 1987; Chang, Most, & Brain, 1983; Fried &
Givoly, 1982; Givoly, 1985; Imhoff& Lobo, 1984; Kim & Verrecchia, 1994). Therefore, it is
logical to conclude that analysts would revise their original forecasts upon the release of both
foreign GAAP eamings and eamings reconciled to U.S. GAAP if these releases contain
relevant information. This study utilizes financial analysts' forecast revisions as an indicator
of the effect of information presented by the firms in their foreign GAAP eamings and
reconciled information in Form 20-F. If financial analysts revise their foreign GAAP
eamings forecasts for the current period at the foreign eamings announcement date and at
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the Form 20-F filing date, such revisions are indicative of relevant information fi-om these
events.
This study also investigates the influence of four firm-specific characteristics in the firm's
information environment on positive abnormal revisions at the time of filing Form 20-F. The
four firm-specific characteristics are: (1) similarities of accounting systems, (2) analyst
following, (3) difference between reconciled earnings and foreign GAAP earnings, and (4)
dispersion of analysts' expectations.
2.2. Firm-specific characteristics
Accounting systems similarity has been characterized by numerous classification
schemes (AlNajjar, 1986; DaCosta, Bourgeois, & Lawson, 1978; Doupnik, 1987; Frank,
1979; Mueller, 1968; Nair & Frank, 1980, 1981; Nobes, 1983). Ali and Hwang (2000) use
the accounting classification scheme of Mueller, Gemon, and Meek (1994) to examine the
measures of value of financial accounting data. Doupnik and Salter (1993) use cluster
analysis to examine the relationship between contemporary clusters constructed using
current accounting practices and those constructed using the underlying environmental
factors that have been hypothesized as affecting a country's reporting system. Their study
produced a global two-cluster classification—a macro-uniform grouping and a micro-based
grouping of countries. Underlying environmental factors were found to differentiate the
two groupings on the basis of differences in the legal system, language, and political
heritage.
Financial reporting practices are the result of the interaction of a society's external
environment, cultural norms, and institutional structures (Adhikari & Tondkar, 1992). Saher
(1991) concluded that, in general, macro-uniform countries (1) employ less complex
measurement rules, (2) use more conservative income calculation criteria, (3) tend to be
code law countries that adhere to tax requirements for financial reporting, and (4) provide less
disclosure than do micro-based countries. On the other hand, micro-based countries (1) rely
primarily on practitioners and other nonlegislative sources to develop accounting principles,
(2) tend to be less influenced by tax considerations, and (3) are more likely to provide
supplementary disclosure.
It is not surprising, then, that countries with environmental factors similar to the United
States, such as Australia, Canada, and the UK, use income measurements, recognition criteria,
and asset valuation techniques similar to those used in the United States. Thus, reported
earnings of firms from micro-based countries with similar environmental factors would be
expected to contain information that is similar to that disclosed in the U.S. In contrast, macro-
uniform countries, such as France, Germany, and Mexico, use different income measure-
ments, recognition criteria, and asset valuation techniques than those used by micro-based
countries, e.g., the U.S. in this case. The information contained in the reported earnings of
firms fi*om macro-uniform countries would be expected to contain information that is different
from that reported by U.S. firms. Thus, it would be expected that infonnation provided in
Form 20-F for firms from macro-uniform countries would exhibit more utility to financial
analysts than reconciled infonnation for firms from micro-based countries.
J.A. Hora et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 71-93 75
Analysts' revisions are also expected to be affected by firm size (Meek, 1 99 1 ). In general, the
market weighs both foreign earnings and reconciled information more heavily for small firms
than for large firms, possibly reflecting less information available in the market concerning
these firms (McQueen, 1992). Apparently, earnings announcements and other reconciled
information increase the amount of relevant information available for smaller firms.
In measuring firm size across countries, most studies use either assets or revenues as a
proxy for firm size. However, in cross-country studies, the magnitude of assets can be
affected by variations in different GAAP regimes (Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995). Although
it is generally agreed that revenue recognition rules across countries are not as diverse as
asset valuation rules, the use of revenue as a proxy for firm size still creates difficulties in
cross-country studies. Since revenues are denominated in local currencies, it is necessary to
select a common currency and jusfify a timely conversion rate (e.g., average, year-end, etc.)
for comparative purposes. In order to avoid these measurement problems, this study uses
the number of analysts following the firm as a proxy for firm size. Hereafter, we use
analyst following rather than the term firm size. Bhushan (1989) reports that the number of
analysts providing and processing information about a firm increases as firm size increases.
Thus, we would expect that the information content in Form 20-F will have greater
relevance when firms are followed by a smaller number of analysts.
We also expect that the magnitude of the difference between foreign GAAP earnings and
reconciled earnings is relevant to financial statement users. Although Form 20-F includes a
quantitative reconciliation to U.S. GAAP ofnet income, shareholders' equity, and eamings per
share (SEC, Division of Corporation Finance, 1995), this study uses the difference between
reconciled eamings and foreign GAAP eamings as a proxy for the supplemental information in
Form 20-F. While this reconciliation difference has not been statistically associated with stock
retums by most researchers (Amir et al., 1993; Bandyopadhyay et al., 1994; Meek, 1991), an
association was noted by McQueen (1992) and Rees (1995). We would expect the magnitude
of the eamings difference to reflect unexpected eamings not impounded into analysts' pro
forma reconciliations. Thus, larger differences between foreign GAAP eamings and the
reconciled eamings are expected to provide additional information to analysts.
Finally, we expect the information in Form 20-F to have greater relevance when analyst
uncertainty exists. Stickel (1989) examines analysts' incentives for revisions of annual
eamings near interim eamings announcements for U.S. firms. Among other things, he finds
that revision activity increases if ex ante uncertainty of annual eamings is larger. A common
measure of analyst uncertainty is the dispersion of analysts' expectations. Analysts are more
likely to revise eamings estimates for firms with greater eamings variability (Bhushan,
1989). Eamings variability, then, is indicative of uncertainty for an analyst who provides
eamings forecasts (Ajinkya, Atiase, & Gift, 1991; Comiskey, Walkling, & Weeks, 1987;
Imhoff & Lobo, 1984). Thus, a high level of dispersion in consensus of eamings forecasts
implies disagreement among forecasters. Based on the findings of these and similar studies,
we expect Form 20-F information to have greater relevance in settings where greater analyst
uncertainty exists.
In summary, we utilize analysts' forecasts revisions to assess the effect of information
released in foreign GAAP eamings and information content of Form 20-F. Furthermore, we
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posit that the relevance of the information presented in Form 20-F to analysts will be
enhanced for firms with positive abnormal revisions under any of the following circum-
stances: (1) the degree of similarity between a firm's home reporting requirement and U.S.
GAAP is low, (2) fewer analysts follow the firm, (3) the magnitude of the difference between
U.S. GAAP reconciled earnings and foreign GAAP earnings is large, or (4) a greater general
uncertainty exists concerning earnings forecasts.
3. Model variables, hypotheses, and sample selection
S.l. Revisions of analysts' forecasts
This study investigates whether financial analysts revise their earnings forecasts at the
foreign GAAP earnings announcement date and at the Form 20-F filing date. Exhibit 1
(Appendix A) shows the sequence of the two events initiated by management of a foreign firm
and possible reactions by financial analysts. Iffinancial analysts receive information that causes
a change in their expectations about a firm, they are likely to revise their earnings forecasts.
Therefore, if financial analysts revise their earnings forecast at the foreign earnings announce-
ment date and at the Form 20-F filing date, such revisions would indicate relevant information
from these events.
In event studies, analysts' revisions are defined as the difference in forecasts when
comparing the post-event forecast to the pre-event forecast. If an analyst issues a forecast (in
the event window) that is different from the prior forecast, the newly issued forecast is
considered a revision of the prior forecast. To determine if analysts' revisions are affected by
new information at event j (foreign GAAP earnings announcement) or event k (Form 20-F
filing), a method similar to Stickel (1989) is used to define event periods and determine
abnormal percentage revision. Event windows of 15 days ( — 1, + 13) are used to capture the
reaction of each analyst following firm i to the two events, event/ and event k. A nonevent
period of 15 days ( — 26, — 12) occurs prior to event/ after an exclusion window of 10 days
to confine activity of the event period from the nonevent period. For event k, a nonevent
period of 1 5 days ( + 24, + 38) occurs subsequent to event k after an exclusion window of 10
days to confine activity of the event period from the nonevent period.
The abnormal percentage revision measures the number of financial analysts revising
their earnings forecast at event/ or event k. The abnormal percentage revision is defined as
the percentage revision in the event period minus the percentage revision in the nonevent
period. The percentage revision for firm / in the event period is defined as the number of
analysts revising their forecast for firm i divided by the number of analysts with an
outstanding forecast for firm z, multiplied by 100. For the sake of brevity, throughout the
remainder of this paper, use of the phrase "abnormal revision" will be construed to mean
"abnormal percentage revision." The variable, abnormal revisions for firm / at event k, is
defined as:
ABREV,(u.S. GAAP) = REV/A — REV,;non-A-
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where
REV/^ = percentage revisions for firm z at event k
ists for firm / at event Ic
100
Number of analysts revising their forecast k
^
Number of analysts with outstanding forecast for firm / at event k
and
REV/.non-A = percentage revisions for firm / at the nonevent period non— A:
If ABREV is positive, then we assume that significant revision activity has occurred. If
ABREV is nonpositive, then we assume that the revision activity has not been significant
because fewer analysts revised their forecasts in the event period than in the nonevent
period. The measurement of ABREV/( Foreign gaap) and ABREV/(u §. gaap) are identical;
however, they are measured at different points in time. Only ABREV/(y s. gaap) is fully
defined here.
With regard to the value of foreign GAAP earnings, consistent findings across prior
research using earnings-returns models indicate evidence of information content in foreign
earnings announcements. In this study, if abnormal revisions occur in the period surrounding
the announcement date, it would suggest that the foreign earnings announcement had an effect
on analysts' revisions. On the other hand, if abnormal revisions do not occur in the period
surrounding the announcement date, then the absence of abnormal revisions may indicate that
the foreign eamings announcement was not relevant for analysts. It is expected that abnormal
revisions would be made around the announcement dates. (All hypotheses are stated in the
altemative form.) Thus, it is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 1 : Abnormal revisions around the announcement date of eamings prepared under
foreign GAAP are positive.
With regard to the value of the reconciled information in Form 20-F, the results of prior
earnings-returns research are mixed. This study examines whether reconciled information
from Form 20-F is associated with abnormal revisions of financial analysts' eamings
forecasts. Although reconciled information includes financial data other than eamings, i.e.,
stockholders' equity, only the reconciled eamings are used for the purpose of this study. If
there is useful information in the reconciliation of foreign eamings to U.S. GAAP in Form
20-F, then analysts would be expected to revise their forecasts around the filing of Form 20-
F. On the other hand, if there is no evidence that analysts revise their eamings forecasts at
the time of filing Form 20-F, then it can be assumed that reconciled information has either
been previously incorporated in the forecasts or it does not provide useful information to
analysts. Although no prediction as to the expectation in Hypothesis 2 is made, the
hypothesis follows the same form as that for abnormal revisions around the foreign GAAP
eamings announcement date. Thus, it is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 2: Abnormal revisions around the time of filing Form 20-F are positive.
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3.2. Firm-specific variables
The analysis in this study is twofold. First, Hypotheses 1 and 2 investigate whether
analysts revise their forecasts at the two events under investigation. If positive abnormal
revisions exist at the time of filing Form 20-F, then the second level of investigation is
undertaken. The intent in examining the firm-specific hypotheses (Hypotheses 3.1-3.4) is to
investigate if these variables (similarities of accounting systems, analyst following, differ-
ence between reconciled earnings and foreign GAAP earnings, and dispersion of analysts'
expectations) are associated with positive abnormal revision activity. But if there are
nonpositive abnormal revisions, then there is no reason to assume that there would be
any association between analysts' revision activity to Form 20-F and any of the firm-specific
variables.
3.2.1. Similarities of accounting systems
In order to investigate the effect of differences across countries in terms of accounting
systems on the abnormal revisions of analysts' forecasts at the time of filing Form 20-F, the
country of the firm's domicile is partitioned according to the dichotomous classification
scheme—macro-uniform and micro-based countries (Doupnik & Salter, 1993). As discussed
earlier, one would expect that reconciled information in Form 20-F for firms from macro-
uniform countries would provide more valuable information to U.S. analysts than the
reconciled information from micro-based countries because of the dissimilarities of account-
ing measurement techniques and reporting systems between firms in macro-uniform
countries and the U.S. (a micro-based country). On the other hand, reconciled information
for firms fi^om micro-based countries would be expected to provide less valuable informa-
tion to U.S. analysts because of the similarities of the accounting measurement techniques
and reporting systems among micro-based countries. Accordingly, U.S. analysts would be
less likely to initiate revisions of their earnings forecasts when reconciled information is
filed by firms from micro-based countries than macro-uniform countries. Thus, it is
hypothesized:
Hypothesis 3.1: Among firms with positive abnormal revisions, the abnormal revision
around the time of filing Form 20-F is greater for foreign firms fi"om macro-uniform countries
than micro-based countries.
A categorical independent variable is created to represent firms from micro-based and
macro-uniform countries. Firms from macro-uniform countries are coded as 1; firms from
micro-based countries are coded as 0. The source of the data is Salter's (1991)
classification of reporting systems. The variable, similarities of accounting systems, is
defined as:
SYSTEM = 1 (firm from macro — uniform country) or
(firm from micro — based country)
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3.2.2. Analyst following
As stated earlier, in this study we use the number of analysts following the firm to proxy
firm size. We expect that there is a direct relationship between analyst following and the
amount of information disclosed by a firm. Prior research shows that as the analyst following
increases, more information becomes available about the firm in the markets. If more
information is available to analysts, then one would expect the eamings expectations of
analysts to be less diffuse and more accurate, leading to fewer revisions. Thus, it is
hypothesized:
Hypothesis 3.2: Among firms with positive abnormal revisions, the abnormal revision around
the time of filing Form 20-F decreases with the number of analysts following the firm.
The variable, number of analysts following firm /, is defined as NOANA,.
3.2.3. Difference between U.S. GAAP reconciled earnings andforeign GAAP earnings
Generally speaking, the reconciled eamings (net income) reported in Form 20-F will be a
different amount than the eamings prepared in accordance with foreign GAAP and released
at the eamings announcement date. The magnitude of the change in reconciled eamings
may influence analysts' revisions. Prior eamings-retums studies examine a similar variable
to determine its significance in explaining stock retums. Although Meek (1991) did not
find the variable to be a significant explanatory variable, McQueen (1992) and Rees (1995)
found that the change in reconciliation variable is significantly correlated with stock
retums.
It is expected that the difference between eamings calculated in accordance with U.S.
GAAP and foreign GAAP will be valuable information. Furthermore, the larger the difference,
the more likely that the event will result in abnormal revisions. Thus, it is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 3.3: Among firms with positive abnormal revisions, the abnormal revision
around the time of filing Form 20-F increases with the difference between reconciled eamings
and foreign GAAP eamings.
The magnitude of difference will be measured as the percentage change in reconciled
eamings from foreign GAAP eamings for each firm in each sample year. Net income data are
collected directly fi-om Form 20-F on LEXIS-NEXIS (1998). The variable, percentage
difference in eamings between U.S. GAAP and foreign GAAP for firm i, is defined as:
RECNI/
Net Income,(u.s. gaap) - Net Income,, Foreign gaap)
Net InCOme/( Foreign GAAP)
3.2.4. Dispersion of analysts' expectations
As discussed previously, a high level of dispersion in eamings forecasts implies
disagreement among forecasters (Ajinkya et al., 1991; Comiskey et al., 1987). It is expected
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that information released at the time of filing Form 20-F will reduce the information
uncertainty to a greater extent for firms with a relatively higher dispersion of analysts'
forecasts. Thus, it is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 3.4: Among firms with positive abnormal revisions, the abnormal revision
around the time of filing Form 20-F increases with the amount of dispersion of analysts'
expectations.
Dispersion of expectations is measured by the coefficient of variation for each firm, i.e., the
standard deviation of analysts' forecasts divided by the mean forecast, in the period prior to
filing Form 20-F (period k-v). The source of the data for the period prior to the filing ofForm
20-F is the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) International database.^ The
variable, dispersion of analysts' forecasts for firm /, is defined as:
DISP/
J2{^^ai,k-y — FCa--v
FC,,,_
where FC^,^_,, = annual forecast by analyst a for firm i in period k-v; FC/^_v = —
« = number of analysts' forecasts for firm i.
3.3. Sample selection
A list of foreign firms registered with and reporting to the SEC during the sample period
January 1, 1988, to December 31, 1995, was extracted from LEXIS-NEXIS (1998). Because
the focus of this study is the financial reporting information of foreign firms, it is necessary
for the selected foreign firms to use foreign GAAP (non-U. S. GAAP) in preparing financial
statements. Thus, the following three types of firms are excluded from the sample:
1. Foreign firms that use U.S. GAAP in preparing their financial statements.
2. Foreign firms that use Intemational Accounting Standards (IAS) in preparing their
financial statements.
3. Canadian firms. This is due to the fact that Canadian accounting practices are very similar
to U.S. GAAP
The period of this study includes years prior and subsequent to the Comparability/
Improvements Project of the Intemational Accounting Standards Committee (lASC). Prior
^ The Institutional Brokers Estimate System (1/B/E/S) is a service of I/B/E/S Intemational. The data has been
provided as part of a broad academic program to encourage earnings expectations research.
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to the project, a number of acceptable alternatives for similar economic circumstances were
allowed for the preparation of financial statements. Subsequent to the project, the number of
acceptable alternatives was significantly reduced. Due to the changing nature of IAS during
the period of this study, firms using IAS are excluded.
In addirion to the changing nature of IAS, serious concerns have been raised in the
accounting literature about noncompliance with IAS by firms that claim full compliance.
Even where compliance with all or most IAS was indicated in the accounting policy
footnotes and/or audit opinion, notable examples of noncompliance were found with the
measurement and disclosure requirements of individual IAS in practice (Street, Gray, &
Bryant, 1999). Moreover, noncompliance with IAS presents significant methodological
implications when examining the effect of reconciliations fi-om IAS to U.S. GAAP. Street,
Nichols, and Gray (2000) find that several sample companies appear to be violating IAS,
necessitating adjustments to IAS income. Thus, firms using IAS are excluded fi-om the
sample.
Similarly, Canadian firms are also excluded from the sample based on the results of
prior research. Bandyopadhyay et al. (1994) sampled 96 Canadian firms for the period
1983-1989 and found no significant association between reconciled information from
Canadian GAAP to U.S. GAAP and stock returns. In addition, Barth and Clinch (1996)
investigated differences between non-U.S. and U.S. GAAP earnings-returns association
tests on reconciliation items for UK, Australian, and Canadian firms. The results indicate
that the quantitative reconciliation required in Form 20-F is correlated with information
used by investors in establishing prices for UK and Australian firms, but not for Canadian
firms.
Moreover, elimination of Canadian firms was also based on the fact that the SEC has long
recognized that Canadian accounting practices are very similar to U.S. GAAP. A mutual
recognition policy (multijurisdictional disclosure system [MJDS]) between the SEC and
Canada's Ontario Securities Commission allowed certain Canadian firms to list on U.S.
exchanges by providing regisfration documents filed on their home exchanges. Based on the
prior research and the SEC's decision, we believe that elimination of Canadian firms is
justified.
Additionally, for inclusion in the sample, a foreign firm must be followed by at least two
U.S. analysts contributing forecasts to the I/B/E/S database. Applying this I/B/E/S filter
results in 76 firms and 343 firm-years. Information concerning sample firms (e.g., company
name, country of domicile, and type of accounting system) are presented in Exhibit 2
(Appendix B) and Exhibit 3 (Appendix C).
The study investigates revisions of U.S. analysts' earnings forecasts upon the release of
foreign GAAP eamings. In order to examine individual analyst's revisions, the study uses
information provided by I/B/E/S (International edition) database to identify revisions (point
estimates and dates) of eamings forecasts of individual U.S. analysts, analyst following, and
dispersion of analysts' forecasts.
Two event dates of interest in this study are the eamings announcement date and the 20-F
filing date. With regard to the eamings announcement date, all previous studies examining
similar research questions have used the eamings announcement date available from the Wall
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Street Journal Index. This study uses the Wall Street Journal Index as well. Identifying the
date when the information in the Form 20-F becomes public knowledge is generally agreed
upon as the date of filing Form 20-F. SEC documents from LEXIS-NEXIS (1998) include the
date of filing Form 20-F.'^
4. Discussion of results
In order to determine if positive abnormal revisions occur around the announcement date
of foreign GAAP earnings and Form 20-F filing date, an increase in revisions in the event
period relative to the nonevent period is compared using a test of means and a Wilcoxon
signed ranks test. Data regarding analysts' revisions are presented in Table 1. Due to the
lack of publication of foreign GAAP earnings announcements by some firms, the sample
size at the foreign GAAP earnings announcement date was reduced fi'om 343 to 160. As
hypothesized, the abnormal revisions around the announcement date of earnings prepared
under foreign GAAP are positive and statistically significant (F<.0001) as indicated by the
results of the test of means. Approximately 28% of U.S. analysts following foreign firms
revise their forecasts during the event period (eamings announcement date) compared to
14% who revise their forecasts in the nonevent period. This suggests that the release of
firms' eamings prepared under foreign GAAP contains relevant information for analysts.
The Wilcoxon signed ranks test uses the median revisions and yields similar results, i.e.,
abnormal revisions around the foreign GAAP eamings announcement date are positive and
statistically significant (P<.0001). This finding regarding the foreign eamings announce-
ment supports the results of prior research using an eamings-retums model, indicating that
foreign GAAP eamings is value-relevant (Chan & Seow, 1996; Fulkerson & Meek, 1998;
McQueen, 1992; Meek, 1983).
Testing the same hypothesis at the time of filing Form 20-F for 343 available firm-year
observations yields similar results. As indicated in Table 1, the posited relationship is
supported by the statistically significant resuhs of both the test of means and the Wilcoxon
signed ranks test (P<.0001). Approximately 19% of U.S. analysts following foreign firms
revise their eamings forecast during the event period (filing Form 20-F) compared to
approximately 12% who revise their forecasts during the nonevent period. The Wilcoxon
signed ranks test uses the median percentage revisions and yields similar results. Thus, the
filing of Form 20-F appears to provide relevant information to analysts. This finding is
consistent with the results of several studies that utilize eamings-retums models to
examine the information content of reconciled eamings (Barth & Clinch, 1996; McQueen,
1992; Rees, 1995). As discussed earlier, four firm-specific variables, namely, (1) similar-
ities of accounting systems, (2) number of analysts following the firm, (3) change in
reconciled eamings, and (4) dispersion of analysts' forecasts, are posited to also be
'* In cases when the firm files its annual report, including reconciled information, with the SEC before filing
Form 20-F, then filing of the annual report was assumed to be the date the reconciled information became public
knowledge.
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Table 1
Revisions around foreign earnings announcement date and around filing of Form 20-F
Revisions around Revisions around
earnings announcement filing of Form 20-F
(Days -1 to +13) (Days -1 to +13)
Test of means
Mean revisions (%) 27.88^ 19.44''
t statistic 6.56* 5.42^
n 160 343
Wilcoxon sigried ranks test
Median revisions (%) 25.00' 14.28''
Z score 6.022* 4.92=*
77 160 343
^ Mean revisions (14%) in nonevent period (Days —26, —12).
'' Mean revisions (12%) in nonevent period (Days +24, +38).
^ Median revisions (11%) in nonevent period.
'^ Median revisions (0%) in nonevent period.
* P<.0001 (one-tailed test).
associated with analysts' revisions at the time of fihng Form 20-F. We examined the
relation between positive abnormal revisions and the four firm-specific variables using a
two-stage process.
First, we regressed the magnitude of analysts' revisions on these variables at the Form 20-F
filing date. Since our sample includes many different currencies, we used the percentage
forecast revision to standardize. We included all analyst revision observations whether or not
the firm-year observation showed positive abnormal revisions. Our second stage of the
process examines only those firm-year observations with positive abnormal revisions, i.e.,
firm-years in which the percentage of analysts revising in the event period exceeds the
percentage of analysts revising in the nonevent period. In this stage, we regressed the positive
abnormal revisions on the four firm-specific variables at the Form 20-F filing date.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, absolute percent revision
magnitude (hereafter referred to as REVMAG), and four independent variables examined in
the regression. The percent revision magnitude is defined as the analyst's forecast prior to
the revision minus the revised forecast (in the event period) divided by the forecast prior to
the revision. Using 347 observations of revision magnitude, the absolute mean revision was
10%. In addition to the descriptive statistics, Table 2 also documents a significant relation
between analyst revision magnitude and analyst uncertainty (dispersion of analysts'
forecasts) at the Form 20-F date, which supports Hypothesis 3.4. However, our other
hypotheses were not supported for the entire sample of analysts' revisions. We posit that this
effect may occur in situations where the Form 20-F offers little relevant new information
beyond that aheady offered to the markets through altemative sources. Thus, information
provided by Form 20-F has already been impounded into analysts' forecasts by the Form
20-F date for some firms.
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Table 2
OLS regression results
Revision magnitude on firm-specific variables
REVMAG = 3o + 3, SYSTEM
-
32NOANA + 33RECNI + 34DISP + £
Intercept SYSTEM NOANA RECNI DISP
Hypothesis H3.1 H3.2 H3.3 H3.4
Expected sign + - + +
Coefficient 0.074 -0.021 0.001 0.031 0.119
t Statistic 2.95* -0.76 0.01 1.29 6.39**
Descriptive statistics for the regression variables
Variable n Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
REVMAG 347 0.10 0.18 1.28
SYSTEM 347 0.12 0.33 1
NOANA 347 7.06 2.93 2 18
RECNI 347 0.29 0.39 3.99
DISP 347 0.18 0.49 3.87
Fvalue= 12.32 (Prob>F=.0001); 7?"= 126; Adjusted i?-=. 11 6; « = 347.
REVMAG = absolute percent revision magnitude at event period.
SYSTEM = if the firm is from a micro-based country and 1 if the firm is from a macro-uniform country.
NOANA= analyst following.
RECNI = difference between U.S. GAAP reconciled earnings and foreign GAAP earnings.
DISP = coefficient of variation in period prior to Form 20-F filing.
* One-tailed P values: P<.05.
** One-tailed P values: P<.001.
Of interest to the current study is the effect of Form 20-F information which is new to the
markets. We can infer the effect of the Form 20-F disclosure in providing "new"
information by examining only those instances where analysts substantively revised their
forecasts at the Form 20-F date and to a greater extent than analyst revisions during the
nonevent period. Of the 343 firm-year observations available, 142 showed positive abnormal
revisions. The remaining 201 observations showed nonpositive abnormal revisions, e.g.,
instances where the percentage revisions in the event period were either less than or equal to
the percentage revisions in the nonevent period. We describe this level of revision activity as
nonpositive abnormal revisions.^
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, abnormal revisions,
and four independent variables examined in the second regression. Based on 142 firm-year
^ A logistic regression on the full sample of 343 observations resuUs in no significant effects on the
independent variables. In this study, we limit our investigation of the four firm-specific variables to only positive
abnormal revisions to determine whether the firm-specific variables played a significant role in the amount of
revision activity of the analysts. If the analysts did not revise their forecasts at a level to qualify as a positive
abnormal revision, then there is no reason to assume that there would be any association between the firm-specific
variables and their decision to revise.
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Table 3
OLS regression results
Positive abnormal revisions on firm-specific variables
ABREVu.s. GAAP = 3o + 3i SYSTEM - p.NOANA + 33RECNI + 34DISP + s
Intercept SYSTEM NOANA RECNI DISP
Hypothesis H3.1 H3.2 H3.3 H3.4
Expected sign + - + +
Coefficient 37.104 - 2.549 -1.663 7.743 6.744
f statistic 8.894** -0.551 -3.199** 2.164* 2.335*
Descriptive statisfics for the regression variables
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
ABREV 142 29.65 19.02
SYSTEM 142 0.12 0.33
NOANA 142 6.61 2.93
RECNI 142 0.33 0.43
DISP 142 0.20 0.53
5.88 100
1
2 18
2.35
3.87
F value = 6.36 (Probm>F=.0001); 7?"=. 157; Adjusted /?-=. 132; /7 = 142.
ABREV = abnormal positive revisions (percentage revisions at event period less percentage revisions at nonevent
period).
SYSTEM = if the firm is fi^om a micro-based country and 1 if the firm is from a macro-uniform country.
NOANA = analyst folloM^ing.
RECNI = difference between U.S. GAAP reconciled earnings and foreign GAAP earnings.
DISP = coefficient of variafion in period prior to Form 20-F filing.
* One-tailed P values: P< .05.
** One-tailed P values: P< .001.
observations, each variable exhibits some degree of skewness, a condition which Box-
Cox transformations significantly reduce. The abnormal revisions were approximately
30%, indicating that 30% more financial analysts revised their forecasts in the event
period than in the nonevent period. Additional descriptions of the variables are shown in
Exhibit 4 (Appendix D).
Table 3 also shows the results of the regression model for firms with positive abnormal
revisions and provides support for 3.2-3.4.^ As expected, the coefficient for analyst
The following three data diagnostics tests were performed.
a. A matrix of correlations between estimated regression coefficients indicated that multicollinearity is not an issue
of concern in the model.
b. Skewness -kurtosis tests for normality indicate that all of the variables appear significantly nonnormal for either
skewness, kurtosis, or for both considered jointly.
c. Results of the Cook-Weisberg test showed significant heteroscedasticity, which may be due, in part, to the
lower bound of a positive number for the dependent variable (Hamilton, 1998). Box-Cox transformations are
often employed to change distributions' shapes, with the aim of making skewed distributions more symmetrical,
and thereby more nearly normal (Hamilton, 1998) and/or to correct for heteroscedasticity (Neter, Wasserman, &
Kutner, 1990). Results of an OLS regression are reported in Table 3, although both transformed and
untransformed data yield similar results.
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following, NOANA (Hypothesis 3.2), is negatively related to abnormal revisions,
indicating that abnormal revisions are associated with firms followed by fewer analysts.
The P value for NOANA is significant at the P<.001 level. Thus, Hypothesis 3.2 is
supported by the results of the model. Generally speaking, throughout the year, firms
followed by fewer analysts disclose less information than firms followed by more
analysts. Thus, the information in Form 20-F is more relevant for those firms followed
by fewer analysts. Regression results are unchanged if we replace analyst following with
revenues measured in U.S. dollars. This result is consistent with findings of prior studies
using firm size as a firm-specific variable in earnings-retums models (McQueen, 1992;
Meek, 1991).
For the reconciled income variable, RECNI (Hypothesis 3.3), it is hypothesized that
the larger the difference between the reconciled and foreign GAAP earnings, the greater
the abnormal revisions around the filing of Form 20-F. The results of the regression
model indicate that RECNI is significant at the P<.05 level and is positively rela-
ted to abnormal revisions. The sign of the coefficient is in the predicted direction,
providing support for Hypothesis 3.3. The results suggest that larger differences
between foreign GAAP earnings and reconciled eamings provide additional information
to analysts. This finding is consistent with the results reported by McQueen (1992) and
Rees (1995).
The posited relationship between the dispersion variable, DISP (Hypothesis 3.4), and
abnormal revisions is noted in Table 3 and is statistically significant at the P<.05 level.
The positive sign indicates that a larger dispersion of expectations by analysts is
associated with abnormal revisions around the time of filing Form 20-F. The results
provide support for Hypothesis 3.4. Filing Form 20-F may reduce the information
uncertainty to a greater extent for firms with a relatively higher dispersion of expect-
ations.
The remaining independent variable, SYSTEM (Hypothesis 3.1), is not statistically
significant at the P<.05 level. The sample of firms from macro-uniform countries (17
firms) may be too small to discover significant differences. Furthermore, another possible
explanation could be that the dichotomous classification—macro-uniform and micro-
based groupings—might not be a suitable proxy to capture differences in accounting
systems.
5. Summary
As equity markets around the world become more integrated, the SEC is faced with the
difficult task of protecting U.S. investors while maintaining the preeminence of U.S. capital
markets. In order to ensure that foreign issuers are held to substantially the same financial
reporting standards as U.S. issuers, the SEC requires foreign issuers to provide a
quantitative reconciliation of certain financial information from foreign GAAP to U.S.
GAAP. The requirement for reconciliation implies that the reconciliation provides the user
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with additional useful information over and above that provided by financial statements
prepared using foreign GAAP.
This study uses analysts' revision activity to determine if foreign eamings and reconciled
information in Form 20-F have an effect on revisions. The results indicate that abnormal
revisions around the announcement date of eamings prepared under foreign GAAP and
around the filing of Form 20-F are significant and in the predicted direction. This suggests
that both foreign eamings information and reconciled information in Form 20-F have
incremental information for U.S. financial analysts.
This study also examines four firm-specific variables in the firm's information
environment—similarities of accounting systems, analyst following, magnitude in the
change in reconciled eamings, and dispersion of analysts' forecasts—to determine if
they are systematically associated with firms with positive abnormal revisions around
the time of filing Form 20-F. Our findings suggest that in situations where Form 20-F
is presumed to offer "new" information, i.e., firms with positive abnormal revisions,
three of the four firm-specific variables are significant and in the predicted direction.
Only the firm-specific characteristic, similarities of accounting systems, is not statist-
ically significant.
For the variable, analyst following, the results indicate that there is an association between
a foreign firm with a relatively smaller analyst following and a greater level of change in
revision activity. For the reconciled income variable, the results indicate that there is an
association between a relatively larger difference in the change firom foreign GAAP eamings
to reconciled eamings and a greater level of change in revision activity. For the dispersion
variable, the results suggest that there is a similar association between a relatively greater
dispersion of analysts' expectations and a greater level of change in revision activity around
the time of filing Form 20-F.
The results do not support the variable conceming the similarities of accounting systems.
One possible explanation is that the dichotomous classification—macro-uniform and micro-
based groupings—might not be a suitable proxy to capture differences in accounting
systems. Also, the sample of firms from macro-uniform countries may be too small to find
significance even if it were to exist.
The primary limitation to be considered in interpreting the results of this study is the
possibility of omission of certain variables which is a common concem in the design of
event studies like this one. Although researchers attempt to capture the reaction to a single
event in the marketplace, potentially confounding events may be responsible, at least in
part, for the observed reaction. This limitation is potentially more problematic in inter-
national accounting research. Although the study measures reactions of U.S. analysts to
information releases in U.S. markets, the U.S. is a secondary marketplace for foreign
firms. Therefore, events which may not otherwise affect the U.S. environment may
account for the reactions being measured. Examples include national, political, or
economic factors/events. Notwithstanding these limitations, this study provides fiirther
insight into the continuing controversy conceming the SEC's financial reporting require-
ments for foreign firms.
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Exhibit 1 (Appendix A)
A.l. Sequence of events: Announcements by management and possible analyst reactions
Announcement (event j):
19X0 foreign GAAP
earnings announcement
Announcement (event k):
19X0 Form 20-F reconciliation
to U.S. GAAP
12-31-XO 12-31-Xl
Possible analyst reaction:
Information content may
precipitate a forecast
revision for 19X1
Possible analyst reaction:
Incremental information content
in Form 20-F may precipitate a
forecast revision for 19X1
Exhibit 2 (Appendix B)
B.l. List of sample firms
ADT Limited
Aegon NV
Akzo Nobel NV
Allied Irish Banks PLC
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya SA
Barclays PLC
Bass PLC
Beazer PLC
Benetton Group SPA
Bet PLC
British Airway PLC
British Gas PLC
British Petroleum Co. PLC
British Steel PLC
British Telecommunications PLC
Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd.
Cable & Wireless PLC
Cadbury Schweppes PLC
Carlton Communications PLC
Coles Myer Ltd.
CRH PLC
Daimler Benz AG
National Westminster Bank
News Corporation Ltd.
NFC PLC
Novo Nordisk AS
Pacific Dunlop Ltd.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co.
Philips NV
Polygram NV
Portugal Telecom SA
Powergen PLC
Racal Telecom
Ratners Group PLC
Rauma Corporation
Reed International PLC
REPSOL SA
Reuters Group PLC
Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC
RTZ Corporation PLC
Saatchi & Saatchi Co. PLC
Saga Petroleum AS
SKF Incorporated
SmithKline Beecham PLC
Telefonica de Espana SA
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Exhibit 2 (Appendix B) (continued)
Elsevier NV
English China Clays PLC
Enterprise Oil PLC
Ericsson Telephone Co.
FAl Insurances Ltd.
Glaxo Holdings PLC
Grand Metropolitan PLC
Hafslund
Hanson PLC
Hong Kong Telecommunications Ltd.
Imperial Chemical Industries PLC
INVESCO PLC
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
Korea Electric Power Corp.
Lasmo PLC
Medeva PLC
National Power PLC
Tele Danmark AS
Tomkins PLC
Total
Unilever PLC
Unilever NV
Vodafone Group PLC
Volvo Corporation
Willis Corroon Group PLC
Westpac Banking Corporation
Western Mining Corporation Holdings
WPP Groups PLC
YPF SA
Zeneca Group PLC
Exhibit 3 (Appendix C)
C.l. Sample firms by country, classification system, and analyst following
Sample firms Mean U.S.
Number % analyst following
Country (micro-based)
UK 42 55.3 5.6
Netherlands 7 9.2 9.2
Australia 5 6.6 3.6
Ireland 2 2.6 9.2
Philippines 2 2.6 2.6
Hong Kong 1 1.3 8.0
Firms from micro-based countries 59 77.6 6.0''
Countiy (macro-uniform)
Sweden 3 3.9 6.1
Spain 3 3.9 8.6
Norway 2 2.6 7.0
Denmark 2 2.6 6.1
Argentina 1.3 2.0
Finland 1.3 2.0
France 1.3 6.3
Germany 1.3 14.0
Italy 1.3 5.0
Republic of Korea 1.3 2.5
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Exhibit 3 (Appendix C) {continued)
Sample firms
Number
Mean U.S.
analyst following
Count)-}' (macro-uniform)
Portugal
Firms from macro-uniform countries
Total sample firms
17
76
1.3
22.1
100"^
2.0
6.4"
6.1'
" Weighted by number of observations (343).
'' Difference due to rounding.
Exhibit 4 (Appendix D)
D.l. Sample firms by country, classification system, and values of firm-specific variables
and positive abnormal revisions regression model (/i=142)
Sample firms NOANA RECNI DISP ABREV
Number %
Country (micro-based)
UK 37 56.9 6.3 0.379 0.203 32.9
Netherlands 7 10.8 8.8 0.177 0.299 18.5
Australia 4 6.2 4.8 0.269 0.093 31.7
Ireland 2 3.1 8.7 0.030 0.078 19.0
Philippines 2 3.1 2.5 0.398 0.316 41.7
Hong Kong
based countries
1 1.5 8.5 0.065
0.322"
0.026
0.208"
21.2
Firms from micro- 53 81.6 6.7" 29.8"
Countiy (macro-uniform)
Sweden 3 4.6 4.8 0.933 0.186 36.5
Spain 2 3.1 9.3 0.383 0.078 24.2
Norway 2 3.1 8.0 0.056 0.111 40.0
Denmark 1.5 6.0 0.188 0.031 22.6
Argentina 1.5 2.0 0.020 0.026 33.3
Finland 1.5 2.0 0.010 0.030 12.5
France 1.5 5.0 0.049 0.070 16.7
Republic of Korea
-uniform countries
for regression model
1.5
18.3
lOO''
2.0
5.6"
6.6"
0.580
0.377"
0.328"
0.164
0.095"
0.195"
33.3
Firms from macro 12 28.5"
Total sample firms 65 29.7"
NOANA = analyst following.
RECNI = difference between U.S. GAAP reconciled earnings and foreign GAAP earnings.
DISP = coefficient of variation in period prior to Form 20-F filing.
ABREV = abnormal positive revisions (percentage revisions at event period less percentage revisions at nonevent
period).
" Weighted by number of observations (142).
Difference due to rounding.
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Abstract
Alexander and Archer (AA) in this journal suggest that the existence of Anglo-Saxon accounting
(ASA) is a myth. They identify four hypotheses that might be thought to underpin ASA and seek to
show that they are false. This comment suggests that two of the hypotheses are not central to AA's
definition of ASA, and that the other two are more complex but do contain some support for the
existence of ASA. More importantly, strong support for the existence ofASA can be found elsewhere
in similar conceptual approaches and accounting practices and in international cooperation. It is
suggested that the identification of ASA does have explanatory and predictive power for recent and
forthcoming intemational developments.
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1. Introduction
Alexander and Archer (2000) in a clear and interesting paper seek to establish that the
existence of Anglo-Saxon accounting (ASA) is a myth in the sense of "similar conceptual
and technical approaches, but also a hegemonic alliance in the intemational politics of
accounting regulation" (p. 539). As they say (pp. 541-543), the concept of ASA is well
established in the literature. Therefore, their claim, if founded, is a major one.
Alexander and Archer (hereafter AA) identify four hypotheses that might be thought to
support the existence of ASA but conclude that there is no support. This comment asks
whether the four hypotheses are relevant to AA's claims and, if so, whether AA prove the lack
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of support for the existence of ASA. It is useful to distinguish between conceptual
approaches, accounting practices, international alliances, and regulatory systems. For the
first three, it is suggested here that ASA does exist.
AA also discuss the politics of the International Accounting Standards Committee (lASC).
Contrary to AA's claim (p. 533), this comment suggests that the identification of ASA does
help to explain the lASC's past and to predict its future.
2. Similarities and differences
The identification of a group of similar objects only gains relevance in the context of a
wider classification. Thus, ASA could only be a useftil category when put in the context of
other accounting systems. AA (p. 541) sensibly begin their analysis in the context of broader
classifications. However, they then concentrate almost exclusively on two countries (the
United Kingdom and the United States). To show that there are differences between the two
countries does not tell us whether or not the two can usefully be seen as members of the same
group. There are generally differences between members of a group. The question is whether
the group members share features in a way that distinguishes them from members of other
groups. On the subject of similarities between things, Wittgenstein (1953) notes:
. . .we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing:
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail ... I can think of no
better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the
various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait,
temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. (paragraphs 66 and 67)
In order to assess the existence of ASA, it is necessary to see whether the differences
between members of the proposed group are dwarfed by differences between the shared pool
of group traits and the traits of individuals outside the group. For this, it would be necessary
to study other proposed groups, and also preferably more than two members of the ASA
group.
3. AA's hypotheses
Although concentrating on two members in a proposed group is not sufficient, it can be
part of assessing the existence of the group. In this context, AA's four hypotheses are now
examined. For each, it will be noted whether they seem to concern conceptual approaches,
accounting practices, international alliances, or regulatory systems. It is suggested here that
the last of these four is not central to the definition of ASA, and is indeed omitted from AA's
initial definition (p. 539). That is, companies from two countries might practice very similar
accounting even if their regulatory systems are noticeably different. Similarly, two sets of
companies in the same country might use similar accounting practices even though they are
subject to different regulatory systems. For example, United States generally accepted
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accounting principles are used by many European companies that are not within the
regulatory control of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and also by many
United States companies that are not SEC-registered and have no auditing or reporting
requirements.
3.1. True and fair view (TFV)/fair presentation (FP)
AA seek to show that there are more differences than similarities in Anglo-Saxon countries
(particularly the United Kingdom and the United States) under this heading. I think that AA
and I agree on the following:
(i) There is a TFV or FP requirement for preparers and auditors in both the UK and the US.
(ii) The TFV does not mean in practice the same thing as FP.
(iii) There is an override in the United Kingdom but not in the United States.
Two expansions of these points need to be made here. First, although the TFV is a legal
requirement for preparers in the United Kingdom (with no equivalent legal requirement in the
United States), this requirement is generally fulfilled by complying with standards (Arden,
1993). Secondly, the override in the United Kingdom is mainly used now by the standard
setters (and then preparers and auditors) to enable standards to override the law (Alexander,
1999; Nobes, 2000). In this sense, the override is not needed in the United States because
there is no accounting law. Consequently, the UKAJS differences are less important in
practice than in concept.
I disagree with AA that the United States is different from the United Kingdom because
"there is no requirement that any U.S. standard-setting body should use the FP criterion"
(p. 548). AA try to support this suggestion with two published references (p. 549). First there
is Zeff (1995), but he talks of auditors, preparers, and the regulators (the SEC) not the
standard setters (the FASB). Secondly, they refer to the U.S. position during the IAS 1
discussions, but again there is no mention of the standard setter in this section of their paper.
The U.S. member of the lASC Board was the AICPA and their reference is to the SEC.
Although the FASB might agree with the AICPA and the SEC, the U.S. opposition to IAS I
was, as AA make clear, concerned with the override not with the use of FP by preparers,
auditors, or standard setters.
In sum, AA offer no evidence concerning the FASB and FP. The FASB's Statements of
Financial Accounting Concepts refer to such notions as understandability, relevance, and
representational faithfulness which are said by the lASC's Framework (paragraph 46) to lead
to TFV/FP. The criterion is sufficiently vague that absence of the exact words in the U.S.
framework does not tell us that the content is different in substance from the LASC or U.K.
frameworks. There is no U.S. requirement in law concerning use by standard setters of FP
because, as noted above, there is no direct equivalent of the Companies Act in the United
States. The situation seems little different from the United Kingdom, where the ASB is not
directly given instructions by law. It operates (as does the FASB) by reference to its own
framework and to the requirements for TFV/FP imposed on preparers or auditors. It would be
98 C. Notes / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 95-104
easy, in both countries, to find cases where the TFV/FP criterion seems to have been
overcome by poHtics or other factors, but that is not the same as saying that it is not required
to be used by standard setters.
Ifwe are to identify a relevant TFV/FP feature that distinguishes ASA, it would not be the
override (which, as in the United States, is now little used' by listed companies in the United
Kingdom except to comply with standards); nor would it be any general use of TFV by
preparers (because, as in the United States, it seems of little importance to them in practice in
the United Kingdom; Nobes & Parker, 1991). Of course, versions of the TFV and the override
have been exported to many continental European countries (Aisbitt & Nobes, 2001; Nobes,
1993), so a TFV requirement for preparers or auditors can now hardly be seen as a defining
feature of ASA. The distinguishing feature ofASA would be the general purpose of financial
statements according to the standard setters. This takes us to the second hypothesis.
5.2. Conceptualframeworks
AA seem to be arguing here that, although the ASA countries share a propensity to
develop frameworks, there are two myths: (i) self-regulation, and (ii) actual use of the
fi^ameworks. The first point is taken up again in Section 3.4 (below). As for use by the
standard setters of the fi"ameworks, my own lengthy experience on two standard-setting
bodies" is of very extensive use of the frameworks (in draft or otherwise). In standard-setting
discussions, references to the purpose of accounting and to the definitions of "asset" and
"liability" are continual. The main relevant point here is that the ASA standard setters closely
share these purposes and definitions, but that these differ for continental European rule-
makers. As noted earlier, I agree with AA (p. 549) that frameworks are not always complied
with by the standard setters, a point discussed elsewhere (Nobes, 2000, p. 311).
A relevant body, not mentioned by AA, is the "G4+ 1" group of standard setters which
operated from 1992 until early 2001. It comprised the standard setters from exactly the
countries that AA identify (p. 539) as ASA countries.^ Why did these standard setters bother
to meet, and why did they not invite non-ASA standard setters? It was because they all
(including the lASC)'^ shared a conceptual framework and that they wanted to move faster
than the lASC Board (some of whose countries did not share the fi"amework). In other words,
there is evidence of "similar conceptual and technical approaches" in ASA (part of the
definition of ASA in AA, p. 539). This is considered further later.
' See, for example, AA's Fig. 2 (p. 548). Most of the departures are to enable compliance with SSAP 19 on
investment properties.
~ The Accounting Standards Committee of the United Kingdom and Ireland (1987-1990), and the lASC
(1993-2001). In the case of the former committee, the U.S. framework was occasionally referred to and the
lASC's framework was fomially noted on its release.
The United Kingdom (which also covers standard setting for Ireland), the United States, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand, with lASC staff (the " + 1 ") as observers.
'^ The staff of the lASC (observers at G4+ 1) were accustomed to arguing on the basis of the Framework, even
if some board members were not.
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3.3. Codified versus common law
The relationship of common law and ASA is discussed only briefly by AA, but I agree
with them in principle that causality is not proven. Elsewhere, more detailed treatments see
some relevance in the association (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997;
Nobes, 1998a; Nobes & Roberts, 2000). However, for the purposes of this comment, no more
need be said because this is an issue of ASA regulatory systems which is not central to AA's
theme of conceptual/technical approaches and hegemonic alliances.
3.4. How private-sector is U.S. regulation?
AA's treatment of this feature overlaps with the second feature (Section 3.2). I can agree
with their conclusion that government bodies may have a stronger influence in the United
States than in the United Kingdom. However, this is again about the peripheral issue of
regulatory systems.
3.5. Summary so far
AA have illustrated that certain features related to regulatory systems differ among ASA
countries. However, this is not central to the existence or otherwise of ASA as defined. They
have also shown that TFV and FP are different and so is the override, although this has little
practical effect on compliance with standards. However, to show differences between two
countries does not prove that they are not in the same group. More importantly, AA have not
shown that the conceptual and technical approaches of ASA standard setters differ.
4. ASA approaches and practices
AA say (p. 541) that the above four hypotheses "could be taken" to support the validity of
ASA. Consequently, they leave open the possibility that other hypotheses are more relevant. I
suggest the hypothesis that ASA does exist and can be seen in shared conceptual approaches
and accounting practices. In terms of approaches, the hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
ASA (compared to other forms of accounting) is oriented towards decision-making by
investors; it plays down the measurement of taxable income and distributable income; it
is less worried about prudence; it is more willing to go beyond superficial legal form.
Of course, it will be possible to find certain features of U.S. accounting (for example)
which do not fit the above, or certain features of conventional German accounting (for
example) which do. However, taken as a package, it is suggested that the above is a fair
description of U.S. and U.K. accounting compared to conventional German accounting. It is
^ That is, accounting as set out in the HGB, rather than as now practiced by some hsted companies in their
consolidated statements whereby §292 enables use of international rules instead.
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Table 1
Specific accounting practices
Anglo-Saxon Some Continental European^
Percentage of completion method
Depreciation over usefUl lives
No legal reserves
Finance leases capitalized
Cash flow statements
No secret reserves
No tax-induced provisions
Preliminary expenses expensed
Taking gains on unsettled foreign
currency monetary items
Completed contract method
Depreciation by tax rules
Legal reserves
Lease capitalization rare
Cash flow statements rare
Secret reserves
Tax-induced provisions
Preliminary expenses capitalizable
Deferring gains on unsettled foreign
currency monetary items
^ This heading is used to cover conventional accounting in Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy, which
concentrates on individual companies.
clear that AA fundamentally agree with the above characterization of ASA because they too
identify its "investor-oriented approach" (p. 553).
Incidentally, France, Germany, and Japan have recently established private sector standard
setters who may share some aspects of the above approach. This would not undermine the
existence of an ASA approach, it would show that it was being exported.
In terms of detailed accounting practices, I suggest that, here also, ASA can be identified.
A second hypothesis can be set out as in Table 1. Again, not all companies in all ASA
countries have always to exhibit all the features on the left of the table for ASA to exist as a
recognizable body of practices. Table 1 concerns accounting policies related to the financial
statements of individual legal entities. The reason for choosing this scope is that the laws of
certain countries (e.g., Germany) allow the use of U.S. or lASC rules for consolidated
statements under certain conditions; and the laws of others (e.g., France) allow certain ASA
features as options in consolidated statements. Consequently, it is complicated to include
consolidated statements and therefore to include consolidation issues. The fact that some
German or French listed companies can adopt features on the left of Table 1 for their
consolidated statements does not threaten the existence of ASA. This debate has also been
played out elsewhere (e.g.. Cairns, 1997; Nobes, 1998b).
5. The politics of the lASC
Roberts (1995) suggests that there are no real, objective, or natural classifications (p. 661)
so that a "good" classification is one that is useful for its purpose. Here, one can agree with
AA that it is important whether ASA has "explanatory power for today's developments and
. . . predictive power for tomorrow's" (p. 543). AA's claim that ASA lacks such power will be
refuted below by assessing their arguments about the lASC.
AA examine the membership of the lASC in 1999 and show that ASA countries did not
make up the then necessary 75% majority to pass a standard. However, they note that the
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ASA's investor-oriented approach has dominated international standard setting. I agree with
them on these points. Of course, there were frequent disagreements between and within ASA
delegations on the lASC Board, and they did not vote as a group. However, this does not
prove AA's major theses, as now explained.
One of AA's purposes (p. 540) is to suggest that the ASA countries had no hegemony over
the LASC, and that in the future (after 1999) "internecine warfare is inevitable" (p. 554). In
assessing these claims, it is useful to refer again to the "G4+ 1." The fact that it was needed
by the ASA standard setters supports AA's conclusion about lack of voting hegemony.
The G4 + 1 sets the agenda for international harmonization by discussing and publishing
papers on such topics as provisions, lease accounting, and comprehensive income (Johnson &
Lennard, 1998; Lennard & Thompson, 1995; McGregor, 1996). In this way, the ASA
standard setters have dominated the lASC's agenda. Also, for all the standards fi-om IAS 33 to
LAS 41, only ASA countries had (or were developing) detailed accounting rules. The lASC
always began projects with studies of existing rules, so there was little competition from non-
ASA countries. In these ways, there was ASA hegemony of ideas, if not, of voting power.
It should be noted that AA would have more difficulty countering the idea of ASA voting
hegemony with the new Board of the LASC (i.e., the lASB; see Table 2, which suggests 10
ASA votes out of 14), especially as only a simple majority is now needed to pass a standard.
The G4+ 1 was wound up in February 2001 {lASC Insight, 2001), and a glance at Table 2
shows why it is no longer needed, given the importance on the lASB not only of ASA
countries but particularly of ASA standard setters.
LLowever, I agree with AA that ASA hegemony is not a useful way of looking at it. The
non-ASA board members probably also share the framework's philosophy that the purpose of
IAS accounting is to give useful information to investors.
Table 2
lASB members from April 2001
Country Number Comment
United States 5 (or 3)
United Kingdom 2 (or 4)
Australia
Canada
South Africa
France
Germany
Japan
Switzerland
Total 14
2 former FASB + 1 former FASB trustee
(and former lASC chairman) + 2 part-time
Both former ASB
Former AARF executive director
Former AcSB chair
Former lASC Board
Former Daimler-Chrysler, which uses U.S. GAAP
Former LASC Board
Former lASC Board
AcSB = Accounting Standards Board of Canada.
ASB = Accounting Standards Board of the United Kingdom.
AARF = Australian Accounting Research Foundation, which provided the secretariat for the Australian standard
setter, the AASB.
FASB = Financial Accounting Standards Board of the United States.
Two board members have United States work backgrounds but United Kingdom nationality.
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The previous two paragraphs show that the existence of ASA is helpful in explaining the
lASC developments covered. It is also useful for predictions. For example, will there be
'internecine warfare" among ASA standard setters?
One of the objectives of the lASB arrangements is that the national standard setters and the
lASB should all move together on projects. The G4 + 1 began this process. The lASB seems
set to accelerate it. Seven of the board members have liaison responsibilities with eight
national Boards. These seven are the countries of Table 2, except for South Africa and
Switzerland. The New Zealand standard setter is added to the Australian liaison to complete
the coverage of the former G4 + 1
.
Just as there are disagreements within a country, so there are among ASA standard setters.
However, there seems to be a broad measure of agreement over a wide spectrum of dramatic
proposals, such as:
all noncancellable leases are capital leases,
the income statement needs to be replaced by a comprehensive statement,
share options are an expense when granted,
government grants are income when all their conditions are met,
financial assets and liabilities should be fair valued with gains/losses treated as income,
hedge accounting should not be allowed as an exception from the above,
actuarial gains and losses should be recognized immediately,
proportional consolidation should not be allowed.
These conclusions, which would lead to major changes in US/UK/IASB requirements (and
even larger changes elsewhere) are now part of a consensus ofASA standard setters. Contrary
to AA's conclusion, this enables predictions of change, based on agreement among ASA
standard setters which is itself based on the framework. On most issues, I see no sign of the
fulfillment of AA's prediction (p. 554) of a possible lASB/EU/UK combination against the
United States. Time will tell.
6. Conclusion
AA define ASA in terms of similar conceptual and technical approaches and an
international alliance for standard setting. For the purposes of this coirunent, I accept this
definition and the countries that they identify as Anglo-Saxon.
AA claim that the existence of ASA is a myth. They then choose four hypotheses
connected to ASA and try to show that they do not support its existence. However, two of
these (on law and on regulation), while treated plausibly by AA, are not central to their
definition of ASA so can offer little support to their claims of nonexistence of ASA.
The other two are more complex. On TFV/FP, AA do not prove that there is much
difference between the United Kingdom and the United States in temis of the practical effect
of the override on compliance with standards or on the use of TFV/FP by standard setters or
by preparers and auditors. On conceptual frameworks, they do not show that the ASA
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Standard setters fail to use the frameworks (as opposed to always complying with them), and
they do not consider the relevance of the existence of the G4 + 1
.
Further, to show that there are some differences between two members of a proposed group
does not tell us that the group does not exist. It is useful to look at more members and it is
necessary to look at nonmembers for all the features examined. Luckily, it is easier to prove
existence than nonexistence. This comment has suggested two hypotheses that are more
central to AA's definition ofASA than their own four hypotheses are. That is, in terms of both
shared conceptual approaches and accounting practices, it is proposed here that ASA does
exist and can easily be identified by comparison with other countries. On the topic of
international alliance, it is also suggested that an ASA hegemony of ideas can be identified,
particularly during the 1990s, and that it is set to intensify.
The key point is whether the identification of an ASA family is useftil. Using AA's own
discussion of the lASC, I have suggested that there are several features for which ASA is
helpful for explanation and prediction.
7. Codicil
Given the increasing use of U.S. and international standards for certain purposes in such
countries as Germany, it might be helpful to move from such labels as ASA and continental
accounting towards such descriptors as investor/decision accounting compared to creditor/tax
accounting. AA are pointing us in this direction. However, this would not imply that ASA did
not or does not exist. Rather the reverse; it would acknowledge that, for example, most
German listed companies have chosen to use ASA for their consolidated statements.
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Corporate Financial Reporting: A Global Perspective
by Herve Stolowy and Michel J. Lebas, Thomson, London, UK, 2002, xxvi + 636 pp.
ISBN: 1-861-52753-5. £31.99
Until very recently, local-language financial accounting (FA) textbooks and supporting
materials were typically used in teaching university-level FA courses in European Union (EU)
member states. The specific character of local FA regulation (both legal rules and FA
standards), even after the introduction of the EU FA directives in the 1970s and 1980s, made
this aknost inevitable. Almost, since it could, of course, be argued that FA concepts were the
same everywhere and that it did not really matter which specific set of FA standards were
used as a background for the FA courses as long as it was a sufficiently advanced set.
However, attempts to use nonlocal textbooks, e.g., U.S. textbooks, were always likely to meet
with student opposition and with opposition fi"om the local auditing profession. They would
both complain about a lack of immediate relevance.
As Stolowy and Lebas, authors of the book under review here, correctly point out, this
state of affairs is now rapidly changing in the EU. Three developments have caused this
change: (a) the European Commission's initiative to make the use of the International
Accounting Standards Board's (lASB) FA standards mandatory for firms listed on EU stock
exchanges starting in 2005; (b) the increasing concentration and integration of the first- and
second-tier audit firms in the EU; and (c) the increased mobility of students within the EU.
All three developments are ongoing. Notably, student mobility within the EU is likely to
increase even flirther given the rapid implementation of the "Bologna" agreement on
university education within the EU. This will create everywhere in the EU the distinction
between undergraduate (bachelor's) and graduate (master's) university education. The
expectation is that graduate studies are likely to be pursued in a place (country) different
from that where the student was as an undergraduate.
All of these will have a liberating effect on the teaching of FA and also of auditing in the
EU. An obvious choice will be to teach FA using a FA textbook that uses the lASB FA
standards as background and that is written in English, the EU's modem lingua franca.
Stolowy and Lebas have written just such an introductory FA textbook (SL). SL is one of
several lASB standards-based introductory and intermediate textbooks that have very recently
come on the market. What makes SL unique is that it is the first such book written by non-
English speaking, in this case French, authors. This gives SL an interesting and special flavor,
which I will return to below. It should be noted that competition is likely to emerge soon on
this front as well.
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SL is posited as a global lASB-based textbook. It must be said at the outset that SL has a
very distinctive EU flavor. Quite a few non-EU countries have "adopted" lASB standards as
well. However, SL uses mostly EU-based examples, and its references to the FA research
literature are mostly to research produced in the EU.
SL is, apart from the lASB background, a straightforward introductory FA textbook. It is
written, the authors state, from a user perspective. However, the technical discussions are
sufficiently deep to make the book also interesting for an introductory FA course catering to
the preparer's perspective.
The book consists of three parts. The first part provides a conceptual introduction to
financial accounting. One of the chapters provides a brief introduction to the mechanics of
double-entry bookkeeping.
The second part of the book introduces all main accounting issues, starting with income
statement items and then discussing in successive chapters balance sheet items, assets first
and then obligations; equity, liabilities, and provisions. Income taxes and the related
accounting treatment involving deferred taxation are placed in the first chapter, on revenue
recognition, of the second part of the book. Note that this particular chapter is actually about
both revenue and expense recognition, i.e., about accrual accounting income. A separate
chapter on accounting for income taxes, or its inclusion in the later chapter on liabilities and
provisions would, I think, have been more insightfiil. The final chapter of this part of the book
considers consolidations.
The last part of the book is devoted to financial statement analysis. This part consists of an
oddly placed chapter devoted to the cash flow statement and a chapter discussing financial
ratios. It would have been more insightfiil, I think, to have included the cash flow statement in
the conceptual first part of the book. That would have enabled the authors to more directly
compare accrual and cash-based financial accounting and their relative merits. Of course,
those using the book could move a discussion the cash flow statement chapter to earlier in the
course.
The "special" flavor of SL that I alluded to can be illustrated by referring to the discussion
of deferred taxation. SL also devotes space to carefully explain the background of accounting
for income taxes on a flow-through basis. This is done on the ground that this is a system that
is preferred at the legal entity level in several EU member states, notwithstanding the lASB
pronouncements on this issue. A second example is the discussion of the use of standardized
charts of accounts. In several EU member states these exist, and SL in this case as also
devotes space to the reasons behind their existence. This kind of material is only rarely seen
in FA introductory textbooks written by English language authors. I think the approach taken
in SL does indeed provide balance in the discussion of these FA issues and will enhance
student understanding of the lASB rules (they will have seen an "altemafive").
A few remarks: The discussion of the details of legal company fornis comes rather late in
SL (in chapter 1 1 on shareholders' equity). In that regard, SL could have devoted more space
to the institutional peculiarities of (continental) EU companies, which are often private firms
and relying much more on bank loans than on bond markets. These institutional character-
istics inevitably "color" FA in the EU. A discussion of these characteristics would also have
allowed the authors to provide more material on country-level institutions surrounding FA,
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e.g., enforcement of FA standards, in the EU than is now in the book. The book has a usefiil
subject index. It comes with a CD-ROM that contains additional material and exercises and a
helpfiil multilingual glossary of FA terms. There is also a dedicated Web site.
SL is an interesting alternative to consider for introductory FA courses in the EU, and in
other countries where lASB standards are rapidly gaining in relevance. SL is especially
interesting in that it has a continental European flavor, notwithstanding its focus on lASB
standards. This will help students' comprehension of FA issues in non-English-speaking
countries.
Willem Buijink
Faculty ofEconomics and Business Administration,
Department ofAccounting and Accountancy,
Universiteit van Tilburg,
Tilburg, The Netherlands
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Financial Accounting, Reporting and Analysis, International Edition
by Barry Elliott and Jamie Elhott, Pearson Education, Harlow, England, 2002, xx + 800 pp.
ISBN: 0-273-64692-3
The book provides a comprehensive coverage of contemporary issues in financial
accounting. Primarily based on Intemational Accounting Standards (lASs), it offers a truly
intemational perspective on important accounting issues. The book contains 31 chapters
divided in seven parts.
Part 1 lays a conceptual foundation for alternative income and asset measurement systems
used in accounting and economics. A demonstration of accounting under cash vis-a-vis
accrual basis, together with a reconciliation of selected cash-based accounting data with
accrual accounting information, is the highlight of the first two chapters. Chapters 3 and 4
deal with the accountant's and economist's view of income, capital and value, concepts of
physical and financial capital maintenance, and altemative accounting models. Chapter 5
outlines the implications of price-level changes, pointing out the initiatives taken by the
European Union (EU) and the lASs Board (lASB) in their search for a comprehensive model.
Part 2 of the book ''Regulatory Framework" comprises five chapters. Chapter 6 effectively
supplements parts of an intemational accounting textbook by covering the conceptual issues
of intemational accounting and providing a summary of financial reporting regulatory
fi^ameworks in France, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, and Malaysia. Chapter 7 presents
the UK conceptual fi^amework, discussing the Accounting Standards Board's Statement of
Principles published in 1999. Although the coverage of the lASB and Financial Accounting
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Standards Board's conceptual frameworks appears to be minimal, the discussion of the UK
framework proves to be a valuable resource for intemational and European accounting
students and academics in general and for the UK accounting audience in particular. Chapters
8-10 deal with lASB's financial reporting requirements offering a step-by-step guideline in
preparing a complete set of financial statements in compliance with applicable lASs.
Part 3 comprises five chapters. Chapters 1 1 and 12 take a UK perspective when accounting
for share capital and profit distributions. Chapter 11 deals with financing instruments and
their accounting treatments. It highlights the importance of capital maintenance while
distributing profits in a way to protect creditors. Chapter 12 deals with the restrictions
imposed by the UK Companies Act 1985 on the reduction of share capital and the accounting
treatment of share premium and capital redemption reserve. Chapter 13 deals with off-
balance-sheet financing and financial instruments. It identifies managers' incentives in using
off-balance-sheet financing using irmovative financial instruments. Emphasizing the mag-
nitude of the problem, it identifies the whole range of off-balance-sheet financing vehicles,
including leases, consignment stocks, sale and repurchase agreements, and debt factoring.
Chapter 14 covers another topical issue—accounting for employee benefits. Having shown
the financial reporting implications of employee benefit plans, it provides detailed guidelines
on the application of IAS 19 and IAS 26. Chapter 15 deals with deferred tax. It differentiates
permanent differences from timing differences and shows the two methods of calculating
deferred tax. The chapter includes examples on the application of IAS 12 and a reconciliation
of a home country GAAP with U.S. GAAP on deferred tax.
The five chapters in part 4 deal with assets. Chapter 16 highlights accounting for Property
Plant and Equipment (PPE) under LAS 16 and IAS 23, while chapter 17 covers accounting for
leases under IAS 1 7, showing comparative practices in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and
Malaysia and outlining the theoretical underpinnings of lease accounting. Chapter 18 on
intangible assets raises issues underlying immediate write-off and capitalization of R&D and
goodwill, presents the arguments for and against both methods, and gives a brief account of
the historical development of accounting for intangibles. Chapter 19 provides an innovative
approach to accounting for inventory by including items like self-generating and regenerating
assets, natural and heritage assets, and nature reserves and parks. The valuation issues relating
to these nonconventional items of inventory, along with the background of inventory standard
in the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, prove worthy features of the chapter. Issues
concerning the recognition of revenues and expenses of construction contracts are covered
in chapter 20.
Consolidated accounts, comprising six chapters, are dealt with in part 5. Providing useful
definitions of group and control as per LAS 27 and IAS 22, respectively, chapter 21 shows
the treatments of positive and negative goodwill and provides guidelines to calculate fair
values and minority interests. The next two chapters deal with the preparation of con-
solidated balance sheets and consolidated income statements. The accounting issues
concerning associated companies are dealt with in chapter 24. The chapter demonstrates
the use of the equity method of accoundng for associates but does not show the effects of the
use of cost method. Cost method is mentioned only once in the chapter. Coverage of
accounting for joint ventures is also brief The next chapter covers the pooling-of-interests
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method with a comprehensive illustration. It also compares the results of consolidation under
the two methods and outlines the pros and cons of the pooling-of-interests method. Chapter
26 focuses on accounting for foreign currency transactions and translations under IAS 21
with comprehensive examples.
Part 6, comprising three chapters, deals with financial statement analysis. Chapter 27
provides a review of ratio analysis, identifying six key ratios before proceeding to
"subsidiary" ratios. Financial analysis is extended to chapter 28, including horizontal and
vertical analysis, multivariate analysis, A scores, balanced scorecard, shareholder value
analysis, and economic value added (EVA). The introduction of Taffler's Z score and A
scores makes the chapter interesting and up to date. Chapter 29 deals with earnings per
share—both diluted and undiluted.
The final part of the book, part 7, covers corporate governance and business ethics.
Chapter 30 on corporate governance summarizes the current status of corporate governance
requirements in selected countries. It also looks at the role of remuneration committees,
directors' remuneration, the effect of stock options on directors' remuneration, and auditor
independence. The final chapter, chapter 31, underlines the importance of ethical codes for
businesses as well as for professional accountants. It sees the accountant in the role of a
guardian of business ethics.
1. Strengths
A number of features of the book constitute its main strengths. First, its coverage of
accounting topics with international dimensions is comprehensive. The authors went beyond
the traditional financial accounting topics to cover cash versus accrual accounting (chapters 1
and 2), altemative accounting models (chapters 3-5), financial instruments (chapter 13),
multivariate analysis (chapter 28), and corporate governance (chapter 30). Although the
topics themselves are not new, most accounting textbooks seem to ignore them or take it for
granted that the readers already know them. Second, the depth of coverage of the
conventional topics is also noteworthy. On off-balance-sheet financing, conceptual frame-
works, accounting for share capita and reconstruction of capital structure, leases, intangibles,
and group accounts, the book highlights both theoretical and practical issues underpinning
the concerned accounting treatments. Third, the presentation style used in the book is user
friendly. Almost all of the chapters have adequate worked-out illustrations. Students using
the book would find them very helpful in clarifying the concepts as well as in solving end-
of-chapter problems. The procedure shown for preparing individual financial statements and
consolidated financial statements will prove useful to students and academics looking for
reasonably comprehensive examples. The book did not take the short-cut route of providing
short and simple illustrations without covering all major aspects of the chapters. Finally, the
book has taken an international approach and successfully avoided the authors' home
country bias in all cases where lASs was available. Its use of lASs as the source of
guidelines is timely in the context of the proposed mandatory use of LASs by all EU-listed
companies from the year 2005. It also widens the prospective audience of the book
throughout Europe.
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2. Weaknesses
One of the strengths of the book is also the source of one of its potential weaknesses
—
coverage. The book seems to have attempted to cover financial accounting, international
accounting, and parts of management accounting. In its pursuit to cover a wide range of
topics, it had to sacrifice some depth in chapter 26 on accounting for the effects of changes in
foreign exchange rates, abbreviate discussions on segment reporting in chapter 27, and
compress discussions on a contemporary topic like employee stock options in chapter 30. One
wonders whether the chapters on ratio analysis and business ethics are critical to attaining the
aims of the book. Perhaps a reasonable coverage of analyzing financial statements prepared
under foreign GAAP could provide more justification for a chapter on financial analysis.
3. Audience
The book would make an excellent textbook for coverage of financial accounting in
general and of lAS-based financial accounting in particular. If not the first of its kind, this is
probably one of the first financial accounting textbooks written exclusively based on lASs.
Students internationally would very much appreciate the textbook if it were recommended for
a second to third year undergraduate course on financial accounting.
Waresul Karim
Victoria University of Wellington,
Wellington, New Zealand
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A Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Strategies in Accounting and Their Impact on
Corporate Compliance
by Gabi Ebbers, Peter Lang GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, 2001, xix+263 pp.
ISBN: 3-631-38245-6. €45.50
This book is a republication of Gabi Ebbers' doctoral thesis, which was successfully
defended in 1998 at the University of Wales, Bangor. Dr. Ebbers did her undergraduate work
at the University of Munster, Germany, and did postgraduate qualifications at Bangor and at
the Paris-Dauphine University in France, before starting her thesis under the supervision of
Stuart McLeay.
The thesis is a comparative study centered on nine European countries that are members of
the EU. The main focus of the work is compliance with financial reporting rules by listed
companies and "to investigate whether the avoidance of regulation is associated with the
different regulatory strategies for accounting found in Western Europe" (p. 1). The research
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involves examining company reports for their accounting policy in three areas of accounting,
assessing compliance with the regulations in force and comparing the degree of compliance
with the source of the rules. The outcome of statistical analysis is that compliance appears to
be linked to the nature of the regulatory instruments and that regulation through standard
setting is most likely to achieve a high level of compliance. The analysis also suggests that
prescriptive rules (''formal" in terms of the study) are more likely to achieve compliance than
principles-based rules ("antiformal").
The thesis starts with a rapid review of some of the literature on accounting regulation,
taking in normative approaches, positive accounting theory, social value approaches, and
critical accounting. It also looks at the literature on the forms of regulation and on compliance.
The next building block is an analysis of accounting regulation in the nine sample
countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, and
the UK). Regulation is categorized as legislation, standards, or nonbinding recommendations,
and the framework of the regulation during the years under review (1987, 1993, and 1995) is
outlined for each of the nine countries and put into the three categories.
Dr. Ebbers then looks at three areas of accounting policy: valuation of fixed assets, foreign
currency translation, and the criteria for determining the scope of the consolidation. She
discusses her binomial linear logistic model, which is the basis for her statistical analysis, and
the constraints for selecting her sample companies. She specified that the companies must
have reports available for at least two of the three selected years, should have foreign
transactions, and should be listed on at least two European stock exchanges. This yielded a
sample of 118 companies for 1987, 154 for 1993, and 143 for 1995. Denmark is the least
well-represented country, with only three observations for 1987 and five for the other years.
The UK is best represented, with 29 for 1987, 44 for 1993, and 41 for 1995.
The next section provides a discussion of the disclosures of the sample companies in the
three target accounting policy areas, with citations from some of the published reports. It then
presents the results of the input of the compliance data into the model. Dr. Ebbers says, "The
empirical analysis suggests that compliance by European companies with accounting
regulations is systematically associated with the type of institution issuing the relevant
accounting regulation" (p. 225). She also observes that "the degree of formalism in
accounting regulation is only a systematic explanatory factor in certain policy areas" (p.
226) but "accounting regulation drafted in a formalistic, highly detailed manner was found to
generate a higher rate of compliance than did accounting rules drafted in a general, open-
textured manner" (p. 226).
The publication of doctoral theses as such, while still regularly encountered in continental
Europe, has largely died out in the Anglo-Saxon world, where institutional pressure to be
published in quality journals usually leads to the recycling of smaller segments of the overall
work in article form. Speaking as a past editor of books, I can see both advantages and
disadvantages. The book form of publication makes the work more widely available and
therefore allows the possibility of other researchers drawing inspiration from it. However, the
fact that the intemal structure has been determined by the constraints of a thesis, requiring
demonstration of all aspects of the argument, may mean that there are elements of the work
that are not very useful to the potential book reader. In this case, one could imagine that the
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long analysis of the regulatory framework in the nine countries, as well as the equally lengthy
discussion of accounting for fixed assets, foreign currency translation, and the definition of a
subsidiary, could have been dispensed with or been treated in more summary fashion in a
book version.
This is a very interesting piece of research in a difficult and underresearched area. The
conclusion that standard setting is more effective than legislation will bring encouragement
to Anglo-Saxon regulators, although the evolution of regulation in Europe seems to be going
in that direction in any event. More disturbing is the implication that formal rules generate
better compliance. It is a groundbreaking study in its way, and it is to be hoped that some of
the questions it raises about the mode of regulation will be subjected to further research by
others.
It is very difficult to design research in an area like this, which provides reliable results,
and, in the case of this study, a particular weakness is indeed the very determination of
whether a company has been compliant or not. The thesis does not go into the literature that
addresses the art of assessing compliance based on published accounts. There is no discussion
either of the issue of content analysis. Research in content usually involves testing the
perceptions of the scorer against those of other scorers. In this case, we have only Dr. Ebbers'
percepfions to rely on, and her scoring of the disclosure as (1) compliant, (2) partially
compliant, or (3) noncompliant. She says that a company is scored as compliant when the
''reported policy corresponds unambiguously with the national regulatory environment" (p.
188). Noncompliance is "when there is a clear indication by the company in its annual report
that the rule in question is contravened" (p. 188). However, ambiguous disclosures will lead
to classification in the partially compliant category. An implication of this is that classification
may be a funcdon of how clearly the note was drawn up—or even how accurately it was
translated if, by any chance, Dr. Ebbers was looking other than at the home version of the
accounts.
Another problem with notes is that there is no obligation to disclose when an accounting
policy does not apply. For example, where the national GAAP requires that a company should
be treated as a subsidiary if the parent has 50% of the voting shares, or otherwise has
management control, if a company had only majority-owned subsidiaries, what would its
accounting policy note say? Perhaps the note would explain that companies included within the
scope of consolidation as subsidiaries were all ones where the parent had majority vodng
control. The company has no need to say there are no linked companies where it has
management control but not voting control, but the absence of any mention of this would
presumably lead to the company being classified as partially compliant when in fact it is ftilly
compliant. It might have been useful to include an analysis of the audit reports of these
companies to see whether the auditors considered the accounts fully compliant.
This classification problem is inherent in all compliance studies, which are based on
reported information. One conclusion of this research could have been that standard setters
might give thought to the idea of requiring disclosure of policies that do not apply. This would
enhance the ability of external readers to assess the quality of the published infonnation.
The objective of the research was not to offer any explanation of the patterns that the
empirical analysis identifies. However, one is tempted to wonder whether there is any
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possibility that standard setters tend to be more prescriptive about disclosures, and therefore
where the index of compliance is the published disclosures, it would be normal for the
standards to come out better.
A second area that calls for fUrther work is the other possible factors influencing the
disclosure patterns. The research design specifies that the sample companies must be listed on
at least one other European exchange (actually, I could find no explanation in the text for that
specification). There is no discussion as to whether these companies were listed outside
Europe and in particular in the United States. It is generally accepted by researchers in
international accounting that cross-lisfing will lead to special influences on accounfing policy,
and it would have been useful to run a test on the sample to see if there was any evidence of
this and if this influences the results.
A further question mark concems the existence of compliance control mechanisms in the
home country. Not all the sample countries have any mechanisms for stock exchange or other
bodies to check for compliance, and UK research (e.g., Feamley, Hines, McBride, & Brandt,
2002) into the creation of the Financial Reporting Review Panel suggests that the existence
and behavior of a compliance body may have an impact upon preparers and auditors. Dr.
Ebbers does not include this factor.
Also missing is any consideration of cultural variables and their possible impact upon
compliance. It is slightly surprising that there is no discussion of Gray (1988) or even of
anecdotal evidence from standard setters such as David Cairns that national attitudes to the
role of rules and compliance is impacted by cultural variables.
It is easy, with the benefit of hindsight, to suggest that perhaps it would have been worth
considering narrowing the research to a small number of countries (those with the larger
number of sample companies) and expanding the range of the analysis. However, this is a
very substantial and impressive piece of work that deserves to have a place in the literature
concerned with accounting regulation. It is understandable but regrettable when doctoral
students avoid taking risks in selecting their research area; Dr. Ebbers is to be congratulated
on taking on a difficult subject and breaking new ground.
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How it all began: the rise of listing requirements on the
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Lance Davis^'^, Larry Neal^''^'*, Eugene N. White^''*
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Abstract
The issue of accounting standards for foreign securities listed on a stock exchange arose gradually
over the period 1825-1914 among the leading exchanges in the first global financial market
—
London, New York, Paris, and Berlin. Comparing their listing requirements on the eve of World War I,
we find that the London and New York exchanges were most detailed, reflecting their common-law
legal environments and their status as self-regulating organizations. The evolution of listing
requirements in London and New York therefore influenced the development of accounting standards
in those countries. By contrast, Paris and Berlin relied on validation of a security by political
authorities. One result of these differences in legal and political environments was that American
railroads issued the only securities to be listed on each of the four exchanges.
© 2003 Published by University of Illinois.
Keywords: Listing requirements; London; Berlin; Paris; New York
1. Introduction
The global financial market created in the last quarter of the 20th century, with all its
challenges and opportunities for mobilizing capital across national borders, still pales in size
Presented at the Symposium on "Accounting Issues for Cross-Country Listing on Equity Exchanges," held
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, March 14-16, 2002.
* Corresponding author. Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 328a DKH,
MC 706 1206 S. Sixth, Champaign, IL, 61820, USA. Tel.: +1-217-333-4678.
E-mail address: l-neal@uiuc.edu (L. Neal).
0020-7063/03/$ - see front matter © 2003 Published by University of Illinois,
doi: 1 0. 1 1 6/80020-7063(03 )000 1 9-0
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and significance relative to the international capital market that arose in the last quarter of the
19th century/ During the classical gold standard period, 1880-1913, industrializing nations,
led by Great Britain and followed in turn by France, Germany, and the United States,
exported capital on a scale that still has not been approached in terms of the export's
importance relative to either national capital stock or national product. These immense flows
of capital were mainly funneled through organized stock exchanges, and because of their
interposition, portfolio investments were made readily available to millions of investors
around the world, regardless of whether or not those investors were citizens of the country
where the security was issued or even of the country where it was traded. In addition, recent
research has yielded increasing estimates of the amount of foreign direct investment that also
took place in this period—investments that accompany the massive waves of migration that
were a unique adjunct to the gold standard epoch." An ardent evangelist of the benefits of
overseas investing for the British public, Henry Lowenfeld, writing in 1910, counted 89
principal stock exchanges around the world, with 56% in Europe, mainly western Europe,
and the rest largely in areas of European settlement.^ Together, those markets allowed some
20 million investors to trade holdings in over $160 billion worth (nominal value) of securities.
The French authority on stock exchanges, Alfred Neymark, estimated that British investors
held 24%, Americans 21%, French 18%, and Germans 16% of the world stock of securities."*
In the current expansion of emerging markets and the growing willingness of investors to
look abroad for favorable opportunities, many issues concerning appropriate rules and
regulations arise—those issues are similar to those that arose as well during the 1 9th century.
Looking at the ways that the leading stock exchanges of the first global financial market
handled such issues should prove instructive for today's practitioners and policymakers. From
an academic researcher's point of view, it is especially useful to discover that the four leading
stock exchanges in that earlier epoch derived their rules and regulations under quite different
legal and political environments. Accounting practices and standards also evolved quite
differently across the four countries, and those differences depended largely on the original
motivation for the establishment of the individual set of rules. In England, the demand for
accounting standards came from bondholders, while in France, tax reporting was the raison
d'etre for the government's successive decrees. Germany stressed managerial and cost
accounting, but only in the United States were rules designed to yield data that could be
' Obstfeld, M., & Taylor, A. (1998). The Great Depression as a watershed: International capital mobility over
the long run. In M. Bordo, C. Goldin, & E. White (Eds.), The defining moment: The Great Depression and the
American economy in the twentieth centufy. Chicago. Cf O'Rourke, K., & Williamson, J. G. (2000).
Globalization and histoty: The evolution of a nineteenth-century Atlantic economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
" Wilkins, M, & Schroter, H. (1998). The fi-ee-standing company in the world economy, 1830-1996. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Lowenfeld, H. (1910). All about investment (2nd ed.). London: The Financial Review of Reviews.
Lowenfeld also wrote The investment oftrustfunds in the safest and most productive manner (London, Effingham
Wilson, 1907), in which he demonstrated the risk-return advantages of an internationally diversified portfolio for
British investors in the first global capital market.
Neymark, M. A. (1911). La statistique Internationale de valeurs mobilieres. La Haye.
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used to analyze the various forces that affected net income—an analysis that was critical for
evaluating common stocks/
2. Accounting standards
By the decade before World War I, all four exchanges had listed the shares of major
industrial corporations, and each had laid out detailed requirements for new companies to
gain listing. Berlin and New York concentrated on domestic corporations, while Paris and
London continued to compete as the premier marketplaces for the global financial market that
had arisen over the last four decades of the "long" 19th century. The Appendix A present
summaries of the listing rules existing for each exchange. The issue of accounting standards
that were to be followed by any newly listed company was not raised by any of the
exchanges. Each, however, insisted that its committee charged with the responsibility for
granting listing of the shares in a corporation have full access to the legal documents required
of the corporation in its country, or state, of origin. Moreover, each exchange also required
that advertisements reporting the information provided to the stock exchange be placed in
major newspapers, both in the city of the exchange and in the location of the home office of
the corporation. Presumably, this requirement was intended to elicit comments by know-
ledgeable brokers, bankers, or competitors in the event that the information was incomplete or
misleading.
Specific reference to auditing requirements is notably missing firom the constitution of the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The economist of the exchange rationalized this
omission by pointing to the powerful effects of publicity and the market power of speculators,
but the lack of required audits by all but 2 states of the then 48 was lamented by a leading
contemporary accountant, who pointed to French law requiring outside audits as providing
superior protection to outside investors.^' German law provided that the Aufsichtsrat could
insist on an outside audit at any time; but even the accountant who lauded French law felt that
these audits were perfunctory and self-serving.^
The one piece of accounting data demanded by both New York and London was a
statement ofhow much capital stock of the corporation would, in fact, be available for outside
investors. If most of the capital stock of a firm was not paid up, fi"ee from outstanding liens,
and available to potential investors beyond the founding subscribers, there was little point for
the members of these exchanges in doing business with it. Further, the NYSE wanted, and
received, information on the size distribution of holdings of stock, distinguishing the number
of holders of share lots of 1-100, 101-200, 201-300, 401-500, 501-1000, and 1000 and
Baskin & Miranti (1997). A histoiy of corporate finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.
226-227.
^ Meeker, J. E. (1922). The work of the stock exchange. New York: Ronald Press, p. 446-51 (economist)
and Greenwood, W. J. (1921). American and foreign stock exchange practice stock and bond trading and the
business corporation laws of all nations. New York: Financial Books, p. 106 (accountant).
^ Greenwood, p. 893.
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up, as well as identifying the largest 10 shareholders by name.^ In this way, the economist of
the NYSE could state that, over the years 1909-1920, shares in the common stock of U.S.
Steel moved from a distribution marked by two-thirds in the stock in the hands of speculators
(members of the NYSE) and one-third held by long-term investors at the beginning of the
period to three-fourths held by investors and only one quarter held by "speculators" at the
end of the period.
For listings of shares in foreign corporations before 1914, only the rules of the Paris and
London exchanges are of interest. Both required that a foreign corporation be introduced to
the exchange by a member of the exchange in good standing and that the company show
proof that the corporation's shares had been listed on their home country's exchange
(although the Paris rules made allowance in case the home country had no stock exchange).
Paris, as would be expected from an organization operating under civil law, also required the
consul of the home country of the foreign corporation to swear that it was a legally
constituted corporation in the home country. Beyond these promises, both exchanges wanted
assurances that enough of the foreign corporation's shares would be available for trade on
their floors to make it worthwhile for their members to take on the business.
The most striking evidence from this period of the importance of uniform and fransparent
accounting standards for international cross-listing of equities lies in the nearly universal
acceptance of American railroad bonds and shares for listing in foreign exchanges. It has long
been held that the fraudulent practices of early railroad promoters (described in Charles F.
Adams' classic, Chapters ofErie, and since recounted in every popular history of the NYSE),
as well as the huge amounts of capital sunk into their construction and continued operation
provided the chief impetus for the rise of the professional accounting and auditing profession
in the United States. It was not, however, until after 1895, when 25% of the U.S. railroad
network was in the hands of receivers appointed by bankruptcy courts, that accounting
standards were really enforced upon railroads. Even then, when in 1908, the ICC imposed
uniform depreciation accounting standards upon American railroads (and after the stock
market panic of 1907 had substantially decreased the market values of their securities), the
railroads responded with an impressive array of accounting devices designed to restore the
announced value of their capital stock after required depreciation allowances had been taken.
By lucky chance, long-abandoned freight cars were found, and in some cases, forgotten or
previously overlooked branch lines made their appearance in the annual reports.'^' Weakly
enforced and subject to opportunistic experimentation by railroad accountants, the American
accounting standards nevertheless helped make U.S. railroad securities one of the premier
international investments, even before the creation of the Securities Exchange Commission in
1934. The experience of American railroad securities offers evidence, perhaps, of the relative
*" Meeker, p. 448.
Meeker, p. 464.
'"
It was this surge of new capital "found" to offset depreciation allowances in 1910 that led one economic
historian to mistakenly assert that railroad investment peaked in 1910, rather than 1907 as actually occurred.
(Neal, L. Investment behavior by American railroads: 1897- 1914. Review ofEconomics and Statistics 51 (1969),
126-135.
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weakness of the rules in other countries, but perhaps also of the incentive these rules gave to
American railroad companies to create new securities for issuance abroad. To understand the
historical process by which these differences in listing requirements among the four major
exchanges of the world in 1914 arose, it is useful to go back to the origins of the stock
exchanges themselves.
3. How the stock exchanges arose and developed"
Almost as if they intended to create a controlled experiment in the effects of differing
property rights, London and New York went about creating their new markets in quite
different ways. In London in 1801, a private corporation with a limited number of
shareholders (260) constructed a new building to house trading activity—activity that was
mainly focused on issues of government debt. However, by British common law, they were
unable to exclude nonshareholders from the marketplace that they had buih. So the limited
number of proprietors—the owners of the exchange—deliberately set out to establish rules
that would encourage all potential traders to effect their trades, as dues paying members,
within the confines of the new exchange. In this way, the proprietors could maximize their
revenues from the exchange. The 260 original proprietors largely succeeded in achieving this
goal; they initially attracted 550 subscribers as members in the new facility.'" In New York, in
1792, a much smaller number of brokers—brokers operating a day's journey from the
national capital—agreed to frade the bond issues of the newly created Federal debt only with
each other. They also agreed to maintain minimum commissions that were to be charged to
their clients (one-fourth of 1% of the specie value of the transaction). The 1792 agreement
produced the forerunner of the NYSE.
On the continent, by confrast, absolute rulers tried to set up their secondary markets for
their government debt by fiat. However, the rules they chose differed markedly from country
to country. In Paris, in 1808, Napoleon began by restoring to the Paris Bourse its government-
enforced monopoly on frading in the reconstituted public debt in an attempt to bring order out
of the revolutionary chaos that had both opened access to the stock exchange to the general
public and that had led to the government defaulting on two-thirds of the national debt. He
limited the number of agents de change to 60 individuals willing to pay a price for the
privilege and to post a bond with the government—a bond that was sufficient to cover claims
made by disappointed customers. In Berlin, in 1804, the Prussian king created a new
corporation that was charged with maintaining an orderly market with publicly posted prices
for his debt issues, but with the restriction that anyone desiring to frade could have access to
the marketplace, whether they were a member of the exchange or not.
" This section draws upon material in Davis L., & Neal, L. (1998, May) "Micro rules and macro outcomes:
The impact of the structure of organizational rules on the efficiency of security exchanges, London, New York,
and Paris, 1800-1914. American Economic Review, 88:2, pp. 40-45.
'" Morgan E. V., & Thomas W. A. (1961). The stock exchange, its history andfunctions. London: Elek Books,
p. 143.
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The large number of traders on the London Stock Exchange made it very difficult to reach
collusive agreements among the members, especially as their numbers kept increasing—
a
result of the proprietors' continuing drive for membership (and thus, for profits). Further,
from the beginning, the members were divided into two groups: jobbers, who held inventories
of the most widely fraded securities and traded on their own account as principals, and
brokers, who were not supposed to hold inventories of securities but to only act as agents for
customers who were not members of the exchange. Their respective sources of earnings, bid-
ask spreads versus commissions, made it difficult for the two groups to agree on any change
in the rules. By contrast, the smaller number of traders in New York were able and did collude
to maintain both minimum commissions for the brokers and a restricted number of high
volume securities for the dealers. However, they had to deal constantly with challenges from
other exchanges in New York as well as competition from exchanges in Philadelphia and
Boston.
In Paris, the very small number of brokers were strictly forbidden to act as principals, and
their actions were supposedly under the strict control of the central government. However,
their small numbers and long tenure enabled them to maintain effective influence over a
succession of governments—an influence that led, in tum, throughout the 19th century, to
their personal profit. Between 1815 and 1848, the large numbers of traders acting on the
Berlin exchange, the dwindling level of the Prussian government debt, and the restrictions
placed by the government on the chartering of new corporations meant that the exchange was
less important than the older security markets in Frankfiirt and Hamburg. After 1848,
however, with the change of the governments' chartering policy and the issuance of new debt
by both the Prussian state and the railroads, the business of the Berlin exchange expanded
rapidly. Thus, even before the establishment of the Reich in 1871, and thanks in part to the
initial placement of public securities and to the development of telegraphic communications
links within the ZoUverein, Berlin rapidly became the leading German exchange.
The first listing requirements in each exchange were imposed at the time of their formal
organization—London in 1801, Berlin in 1804, Paris in 1807, and New York in 1817. The
requirements simply enumerated the specific securities and their prices that were to be quoted
in the price lists provided by the exchange to the member brokers. Those members, in tum,
could distribute the lists to their customers and to the financial press. The range of securities
listed and the information provided about each varied widely among the exchanges. In our
view, the differences in listings reflected the differences in microstructures of the several
exchanges, and those structures, in tum, mirrored the purposes for which each exchange was
founded. Later, as each exchange began to list foreign as well as domestic securities,
differences emerged that reflected the different legal and political environments within which
the exchanges operated.
4. Listing of foreign securities
Indeed, the entire issue of how, when, and which foreign securities were to be listed on a
given exchange depended on factors largely out of the control of the individual exchanges.
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The Amsterdam Beurs, the first stock exchange capable of supporting a professional class of
stockbrokers, owed the rise of its business to the fact that the various provinces and
municipalities of the Netherlands tried to make the annuities they issued as attractive as
possible to nonresidents.'"^ When, for the purpose of maintaining convoy protection, the
seven provinces combined their individual fleets—fleets that were trading with the East
Indies—they welcomed shareholding by foreign merchants in their United East India (VOC
for Vereenigde Oost-indische Compagnie)—a company that was formed in 1602. However,
the shareholders had no voting power, the affairs of the company were directed by a board of
17 gentlemen (Heeren XVII), and the 17 members were appointed by the individual
provinces. Each province appointed a specified number of members—a number that reflected
the proportion of the capital stock issued by that province. Amsterdam had just under half of
what was then the capital stock of the largest corporation in the world. It is, therefore, hardly
surprising that throughout the 17th century, trade in VOC shares naturally concentrated in
Amsterdam. Likewise, trade in the life and perpetual annuities that were issued from time to
time by the Dutch cities and provinces whenever they were forced to bear their share of the
costs of nearly constant warfare tended also to concentrate in that city.
When, in 1688, the Prince of the House of Orange became William III, King of England
and Wales, Dutch financial practices were imported wholesale into London by the Stadholder
of the United Provinces. The Bank of England, chartered in 1694, the New East India, created
in 1698, and the South Sea (1710) were all joint-stock companies that held long-term
government debt, and companies that, on the basis of their debt holdings, issued their shares
to citizens and foreigners alike. Foreigners could not hold office in any of the companies, but
if they held enough stock, they could vote for the directors of each company. When, in 1720,
the South Sea Bubble converted most of the remaining national debt into shares in the South
Sea, the Bank of England, and the United East India, the Dutch may have held a quarter of the
national debt of Britain! As the 18th century wore on, Dutch newspapers kept faithful track,
not only of Dutch securities, but also of the share prices of the three main English companies
as well as the prices of the perpetual annuities that the British government began to issue after
1726.'^
By the middle of the century, the Dutch began to diversify their portfolios across Europe,
investing even in the risky shares of the French Compagnie des Indes and taking on bonds
sold on behalf of various kings and princes, including the Tsars and Tsarinas of Russia. At the
end of the 1 8th century, the process culminated with purchases of bonds issued by both
American states and the new Federal government, as well as shares in the First Bank of the
United States.'" In each case, one or more merchant bankers in Amsterdam would make the
loan and then retail shares in their holdings of the loan on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange.
Tracy J. (1985). A financial revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
See Neal, L. (1990). The rise offinancial capitalism: International capital markets in the age of reason.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 3.
Riley, J.C. (1980). International government finance and the Amsterdam capital market, 1740-1815.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Hence, in the 1780s, several houses provided quotations for American securities, and in order
to encourage small investors to purchase shares, each house maintained a resale market for
their holdings. For example, for years after the American Civil War, one banker, who had
been responsible for marketing Confederate bonds in Amsterdam, continued to offer to
repurchase them fi^om his customers at a fraction of their original face value. In this way,
foreign securities could be marketed to local investors—the forerunner of American
Depositary Receipts.
The Amsterdam stock market was exceptional, but it was devastated by the French
occupation (1795-1813), and it took decades for it to recover. In fact, it was only in 1878 that
it was reorganized, and by that time, both the London and Paris exchanges had become the
world's major markets for foreign securities, still mainly government and railroad bonds. In
general, stock markets only entered into trade in foreign securities when the market for the
existing domestic securities turned down, and traders looked for new products to entice back
their former customers or to attract new customers. For example, when, in 1801, the London
Stock Exchange was incorporated, the broker Edward Wetenhall, published a semiweekly
broadsheet. The Course ofthe Exchange—a publication that reported the listed securities and
their prices. These securities were almost exclusively either government bonds or the shares
in the great chartered companies that held permanent government debt—the Bank of
England, the East India, and the South Sea. The three together comprised "the Funds."
However, after the financial crisis of 1810, Wetenhall's price list was greatly expanded to
include public utilities, canals, docks, waterworks, and even railways (still horse-powered)
connecting mines to ports. His intent was to advertise the fiill range of securities dealt with by
the members of the exchange so that customers suffering losses in the downturn of the market
might choose to diversify their holdings, rather than entirely withdrawing their business from
the exchange.
When, in 1812, the rules of the exchange were formally codified, Wetenhall was
authorized to list prices, and he reported every change in a transaction price over the course
of each trading day. His purpose was to provide a public record of the transactions that had
occurred in case of dispute over settlement of any particular "bargain." The operators of the
exchange were not primarily interested in assuring their clients that they had obtained the best
possible price for their order, although the public printing and distribufion of the price list
certainly had that effect. Rather, the Committee of General Purposes wanted a clear record of
the original price so that when accounts between members were settled (first quarterly, then
monthly, then fortnightly as the century progressed), it would be clear to each broker and
dealer how much was owed on a particular transaction. Accounting standards were not an
issue.
The London and Paris exchanges initiated their forays into foreign securities in precise
imitation of the earlier Dutch practice. In 1817, Alexander Baring opened a book for London
investors wishing to purchase part of the flotation of the French rentes that were issued to pay
off French reparations and the costs of the British occupation. Rothschilds, cut off from
participating in either the 1817 or 1818 loans, and in 1821 accused (unfairly) of sabotaging
the possibility of a final loan to pay for the removal of Wellington's troops from French soil,
were nevertheless able to manage the initial issue of a stunning series of loans. Over the next
L. Davis et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 117-143 125
two decades, the firm ''underwrote" loans to Austria, the Kingdom of Naples, Prussia,
Russia, and Brazil. These loans proved immensely profitable to the merchant bankers in
London and Paris, and especially to the Rothschilds.^*^
With the success of the French loans, the London Stock Exchange opened its arms to the
two types of foreign securities that they could legally trade under existing British law
—
namely, government bonds and mining shares established on a "cost book" system under the
Stannaries Laws. In the 1820s, the breakup of the Spanish Empire in Latin America led to the
first Latin American debt crisis and to the London stock market boom, and bust, of 1825.
Likewise, in 1822, the Paris Bourse was allowed to list foreign securities. Its members
quickly took advantage of the knowledge, contacts, and wealth of the Spanish-American
emigres who had established themselves in Paris. In both markets, the securities that
underwrote both the boom and the bust were the bonds issued by the newly independent
Latin American colonies of Spain and the shares in Spain's mines. None of the newly
independent countries proved capable of even making interest payments on their issues, and
the mines proved that, without Spanish subsidies, they were no longer profitable or even
workable.' '' Thereafter, and especially after the widespread defaults of American states in the
1830s, London stockbrokers were much more cautious about foreign loans, gradually
following the lead of Rothschild and Baring in lending only to well-established govem-
ments.'^ Similarly, until the revolution of 1848, the Paris Bourse focused on government
loans to members of the Holy Alliance.
5. Beyond government securities in foreign listings
By the middle of the 1 9th century, the potential profitability of railroad finance led to the
hsting of foreign railroads on the various exchanges of Europe. In 1854, for example, shares
of the Illinois Central were initially placed in the Amsterdam stock market because the
promoter found the London market swamped by the need to finance the Crimean War. ' "^ By
1873, enough British investment had found its way into foreign lands, mainly in the form of
government and railroad bonds, to make it profitable to establish the private Council of
Foreign Bondholders. The Council monitored the performance of each issuer and provided
the institutional mechanism to permit debt holders to make common cause against any
defaulters.
'^ Ferguson, N. (2000). The house of Rothschild: Money's prophets, 1798-1848. London: Penguin Books,
chap. 4.
'^ Neal, L. (1998, May-June ). The financial crisis of 1825 and the restructuring of the British financial
system. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 80, 53-76; Dawson, F. (1990). The first Latin American
debt crisis. The city ofLondon and the 1822-25 Loan Bubble. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
'*^ As late as 1934, British holders of Mississippi bonds issued in 1833 and 1838 brought suit to the U.S.
Supreme Court that they should be redeemed! (Monaco vs. Mississippi Collection, University of Southern
Mississippi McCain Library, http://www.lib.usm.edu/~archives/ml79.htm [accessed September 8, 2001]).
Veenendaal, A. J. (1996). Slow train to paradise: How Dutch investment helped American railroads.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
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During the third quarter of the 1 9th century—a period that includes the shocks of war
finance imposed first on Great Britain (the Crimean War of 1854), then on the United States
(the Civil War, 1861-1865), and finally, on France and Germany (the Franco-Prussian War of
1 870)—all four countries had established freedom of incorporation with limited liability for
shareholders (Great Britain in 1855 and 1862; United States in 1860 and 1875, France in
1863 and 1867, Germany in 1870)."*^ In all four countries, free incorporation meant an
opportunity for industrial firms to grow in order to meet the challenges and opportunities of
the expanded market size that the growth of railroad networks had created. In addition, it
would be obtuse to overlook the significance of the military conflicts in motivating the four
governments to create powerfril firms in military strategic sectors. These new behemoths were
centered in railroads, coal, steel, steamship lines, and heavy machinery.
Despite the common motivation and the closeness of timing in initiating the expansion of
the corporate form of business among the four industrial powers, the scale and scope of their
incorporations varied widely. Because free incorporation was allowed by Massachusetts as
early as 1813, the United States took an early lead. Under U.S. law, these Massachusetts
corporations were allowed to operate in other states. Given the Massachusetts "loophole,"
free incorporation, as opposed to incorporation by specific charter, became widespread in
other states only after the Civil War.^' By contrast, France and Germany had maintained strict
control over corporate charters until the post-midcentury reforms. For both Great Britain and
the United States, in terms of obtaining external finance, before midcentury, the legal
restrictions on forms of business enterprise were much less constraining than in France
and Germany.
Harris (2000) has argued that the corporation was, in fact, very important in providing
finance for British business even before the legislation of 1844—legislation that began the
process of establishing the legal basis for creating corporations throughout the economy.
From the time of the Bubble Act of 1 720, corporations were permitted in public utilities that
had a specific location and function—canals, turnpikes, docks, water works, gas works, and
ultimately, railroads. The success of these utilities actually underwrote the increase in the
pubhc's confidence in the feasibility of the corporate form, and the repeal of the Bubble Act
in 1825 should have allowed them to spread to other sectors. That they did not reflected the
ease of establishing extended copartnerships and business trusts—organizations in which
passive partners could limit their liability to the amount of capital they had invested.
Only when limited liability was extended to corporations in the legislation of 1855 and
1862 did corporations begin to form in significant numbers in the manufacturing and service
sectors of Great Britain. However, even then, the pace of incorporation did not really pick up
until the 1890s. Earlier, ample finance was available to British industrial and commercial
firms through copartnerships and trusts; both could provide limited liability for some equity
holders. By 1906, however. Great Britain had 40,995 joint-stock companies, many more than
^" Horn, p. 182 in Horn, N., & Kocka, J. (1979), Law and theformation of the big enterprises in the 19th and
early 20th centuries. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
"' Evans, G. H. (1948). Business incorporations in the United States. New York: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
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the rest of Europe combined, although their average capital of £48,786 was much less than
that of corporations in France (£85,375) or those in Germany (£135,349). ~~ The United
States, however, was already in a league by itself By 1916, the earliest year for which we
have reliable figures for the entire country, there were no fewer than 341,300 corporations.
{Historical Statistics, U.S. Department of Commerce, p. 914)
The contrast between the Anglo-American and the continental European modes of
financing was striking. Within the Anglo-American mode of finance—a mode that empha-
sized recourse to formal capital markets—the United States had a much larger number of
corporations than Great Britain, and within the continental European mode—a mode that
relied on investment banks—German corporations were much larger than those in France.
Part of the difference can be explained by the larger size of the U.S. and German economies
relative to those of Britain and France. However, part of the explanation lies in the differences
in the political structures—Great Britain and France possessed strong central authorities
—
authorities able to control the numbers and size of their corporations; the United States and
Imperial Germany had both federal and fragmented local political authorities—authorities
that competed for regulatory rents. In the first half of the 19th century, the individual states in
America competed enthusiastically in creating special charters for corporations, while the
separate political units within the German ZoUverein competed in granting concessions to
railroads, ironworks, and coal mines during the "Griindungzeit"—a period that spanned the
years from 1850 to 1873.
Not only did the legal environments produce differences among the four powers in the way
that they governed the creation of the new corporations, but those differences, in part, also
account for the techniques that each country found best suited to employ in placing their new
securities. In Great Britain and the United States, the bankers and attorneys of the new firms
had to turn to specialists operating in their respective stock exchanges to take the initial
placements. In both countries, regional stock exchanges became increasingly important, for
they provided specialists as well as a subsequent secondary market for local securities.
Typically, banks were excluded from direct participation in the stock exchanges as traders. It
was thus up to brokerage firms—firms with formal or informal contacts with other
exchanges—to widen the market for their local securities. By contrast, in France and
Germany, it was the new credit or investment banks that took on the task of initial placement.
In Germany, they could trade on their own account in the stock exchanges, and in France,
they could operate indirectly on the Coulisse, a complementary exchange located on the
outskirts of the formal exchange (the Parquet). In the Coulisse, the investment banks soon
came to dominate trading. The importance of the great banks in handling corporate securities
in both France and Germany, as well as the preferences each government gave to its central
exchange, meant that regional exchanges quickly dropped out of sight, and only the Paris and
Berlin stock exchanges remained important markets for corporate securities. What govem-
ment favoritism did for Paris and Berlin, the rapid expansion of telegraph networks in the
~ Michie, R. C. (1998, January). Different in name only? The London Stock Exchange and foreign bourses, c.
1850-1914. Business History 30, pp. 46-68, p. 52, citing Webb, A. D. (1911). The new dictionary of statistics.
London; Routledge and Sons, 1911, p. 145.
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United States and Great Britain did for New York and London. In those latter cities, the
central exchanges gradually displaced the provincial exchanges in importance.
While the focus of the provincial exchanges was largely domestic, they were not
completely immune to the lure of foreign investment. London remained by far the most
important center for foreign government issues, but a few small issues of Mexican, Egyptian,
Brazilian, and Spanish governments were quoted in Liverpool and Manchester. Those
exchanges were relatively much more involved in overseas railway and mining activity. As
early as the 1850s, both Leeds and Sheffield listed almost as many foreign mines as did
London, and from 1886 onwards, Leeds again became a center of overseas mining activity.
During the 1894-1895 mining boom, nearly 50 foreign mines were listed on that city's
"Unofficial Mining Board." Because of the local interest in "Kaffirs" (South African gold
stocks), that board was called everyday immediately after the official reading of listed
securities. Again, towards the end of the century, as American rails became increasingly
popular with British investors, the Liverpool and, to a lesser extent, the Manchester
exchanges became active centers. Liverpool, because of its position in the American trade,
was actually able to actively compete with London."^^
The first explosion of incorporations in each country underwrote both the new railroad
companies and their issues of securities. In each case, the formal stock exchanges played a
major role in creating and sustaining a market for those new securities. Initially, these issues
were shares in the capital stock of the railroads, but then, increasingly, as construction and
improvement expenses quickly outran initial estimates, they were bonds. Both the shares and
the bonds were marketed in ways that mimicked, as closely as possible, the features of the
existing public securities that were available to investors in each country. '^'^ Only later did
industrial securities become an important part of the business transacted on the major formal
stock exchanges in the four cities. Before industrial securities were admitted to the cenfral
exchange, they had to be seasoned in their immediate markets, and seasoning meant the
regional exchanges came to be dominated by local bankers—bankers who knew the business
plans and abilities of the new firms.
In France, it was only after regulatory reforms in 1 898—reforms that enlarged the role of
the formal relative to the informal markets—that the Paris Bourse turned toward foreign
industrial securities. In contrast, in Germany, the legal reforms of 1 896—reforms designed to
protect outside investors from the speculative collapses that had occurred in 1 890 and 1 893
—
forced the Berlin Stock Exchange to focus more on domestic and government securities."'^ In
both cases, it was the political interests of the government that determined how the two
exchanges did or did not respond to the opportunities for foreign investment. Under civil law
regimes, traders in both the Paris and Berlin exchanges had to accede to the will of their
political masters.
Thomas, W. A. (1973). The provincial exchanges. London: Frank Cass, pp. 188-190.
^^ This was remarked at the time by contemporaries and is emphasized most recently in Baskin and Miranti
(1997).
^^ The new German law placed severe restrictions on time dealings, restrictions that were especially
burdensome for dealings in foreign securities, even after the law was revised in 1908. Time dealings by German
banks then moved to the Amsterdam and London markets.
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The exchanges in New York and London, having arisen spontaneously as self-regulating
organizations, were able to sustain their independence from regulatory constraint by the state,
and both responded in self-interested ways to the opportunities offered the newly created
market for the securities issued by private corporations. Self-interest, however, played out in
quite different ways in the two countries—ways that again reflected the profound differences
in the political environment of a country controlled by a central authority and one structured
as a federal system. In the mid- 1890s, the NYSE, in order to face the competition arising from
the other U.S. stock exchanges—located both in other states and in New York City
—
instituted a series of internal changes that allowed it to become the dominant national stock
exchange. Those changes permitted it to list industrial securities that had been "seasoned" on
a regional exchange or on the curb market in New York. The only "foreign" securities listed
on the NYSE before World War I were the municipal bonds of the city of Quebec; at the time,
Quebec was regarded as nothing but a satellite banking center of New York City."^ London
also instituted major changes in its microstructure in the 1890s. Again, the changes were
made with the intent to dominate the provincial exchanges, but they had the unintended effect
of emphasizing the London Stock Exchange's role as the British marketplace for foreign
securities.
6. Implications for regulation
In England, periodic crises led to parliamentary investigations of the practices of the self-
regulating London Stock Exchange. These investigations typically ended with minor pieces
of legislation designed to both placate the upper classes and to preserve the existing
microstructure of the exchange. Moreover, Parliament's major acts always served to enlarge
the possible scope of trading activity for the London Stock Exchange. For example, it
repealed the Bubble Act of 1720 in the middle of the crisis year of 1825. Then, the Joint
Stock Companies Act of 1844 encouraged the formation ofjoint stock companies in general,
and led, in 1856, to the passage of Lowe's Act that established limited liability for joint stock
corporations. True, some acts restricted speculative practices of one kind or another, but these
were consistently ignored. The Members of the Exchange were far more responsive to
sanctions imposed by the Committee on General Purposes than to the possibility of losing
lawsuits brought by outsiders. "^^ Only jobbers, who always acted as principals in the
transactions, were really subject to the laws that governed the enforcement of contracts.
In New York, stock market panics also produced investigations, but until the change in
national politics—changes partially induced by the Panic of 1907
—
produced the "money
^^ Meeker, J. E. (1922), The work of the stock exchange. New York: Ronald Press, p. 160.
~ After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, some members of the exchange petitioned to outlaw dealings in
options, on grounds that they violated Barnard's Act of 1734, which forbade time dealings unless the seller had
physical possession of the security throughout. The majority of the members, led by Jacob Ricardo, defended
option dealings, noting that Barnard's Act had been violated constantly by members of the exchange ever since its
passage, with no one ever being brought to court. (Minutes of the Committee for General Purposes, 1821,
Guildhall Library, MS 14600/9, flf. 176-183).
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trust" investigation, the investigations had been conducted only by the state legislature. The
state legislators in Albany were easily and frequently bribed into rescinding threatened
regulations. As a result, the regulations of the NYSE were revised only in response to the
threat of competition from other exchanges—the consolidated and curb markets in New York
or the regional exchanges elsewhere in the country. In the last decade of the century, the
NYSE was able to institute two rule changes that strengthened the exchange's imprimatur of
quality, but that competitive threats had previously prevented the Governing Committee from
implementing. In 1892, after three failed attempts, the governors finally established a clearing
mechanism—a mechanism that, by the end of the century, included almost all listed
securities."^ In 1895, the Governing Committee voted to require that listed companies file
annual reports, although it is clear that their word was still not law—they received no reports
in either 1895 or 1896. By 1900, however, annual reports, including both audited balance
sheets and profit and loss statements, became a prerequisite both for initial listing and for
retaining that listing."*^
In France, the regulatory role played by government obviously varied with the radical
changes of regime during the years 1789-1914, but even these changes affected the role of
the Coulisse far more than that of the Parquet. The relative stability of the Parquet, in tum,
can be attributed to the organizational sfrength of its governing body, the Compagnie des
Agents de Change. During the course of the French Revolution, the Compagnie was
outlawed along with all other guilds, but Napoleon reestablished it in 1801. Eighty
individuals were given indefinite tenure when they provided adequate security bonds.
The internal cohesion of the Compagnie was ftirther sfrengthened when, in 1816, the
Restoration government of Louis XVIII asked the individual agents that still remained
(their number had dwindled to 50 at the end of Napoleon's reign) to put up an additional
purchase price to retain their offices. At that time, the fee was raised by law from 100,000
francs to 125,000. In return, however, the government made it possible for each agent de
change to name his successor. Thus, while the government continued to confrol the
nomination and the disposition of the title, the current titleholder had a property right that
could be sold. Possessing heritable rights to their monopoly of the securities frade, the
agents de change were no longer civil servants named for life, but public officers with
specific powers delegated to them. The same act of 1816 also sfrengthened the self-
governance of the Compagnie: it restored the Chambre syndical that enjoyed the triple
powers of recruitment, discipline, and regulation. The corporate solidarity that naturally
arose within the Compagnie des Agents de Change enabled them to exercise effective
influence on the successive governments and, thus, to maintain their privileged position
within France. The power of the Minister of Finance over the operation of the Bourse was
effectively conceded to the Compagnie.
^^ Sobel, R. (1965). The Big Board: A history ofthe New York Stock Market. New York: The Free Press, p. 13
1
and Wilson J. G. (1969). The stock exchange clearing house. In E. C. Stedman (Eds.), The New York Stock
Exchange: Its history, its contribution to national prosperity, and its relation to American finance at the outset of
the twentieth century. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 423-32.
'" Sobel, pp. 123 and 177.
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In Germany, the explosion of corporations that occurred after the founding of the Reich and
the receipt of 5 biUion francs in reparations from the defeated French nation led to speculative
manias that ended in the Griindungkrise of 1873. That crisis was certainly abetted by the new
law governing the creation of corporations that had been passed on June 11, 1870. This
legislation was the high point ofthe move to liberalize the marketing ofcorporate shares, and to
this day, it has sealed the interdependence of banks and industry. Especially noteworthy were
the rise ofnew joint-stock banks. In the first 2 years of the new German Reich, 107 joint-stock
banks were formed—banks with total capital of 740 million marks.^^ By the end of 1 873, 73 of
them were in liquidation.'' The first reaction of the government was to protect the earnings of
the remaining corporations by raising customs barriers, but in 1884, a new law defined the
distinctive features of German corporations. Each corporation had to form a governance
structure with three distinct parts and functions. The managing board of directors (Vorstand)
and a general assembly of stockholders (Generalversammlung) were features common to all
four countries, but the oversight board with heavy representation of outsiders representing
labor, government, the general public, and banks (Aufsichtsrat) was peculiar to Germany.
Like the French reforms of 1 898, the stock market crises of the early 1 890s led to further
major reforms in Germany. Like the French law, the German reform outlawed the informal
exchanges (the so-called Winkelborsen) that had sprung up around the formal exchange, and
it asserted that only transfers validated on the formal exchange had standing in legal disputes.
It went further, however, by also outlawing uncovered, or short sales, of securities. As a
result, trading in corporate securities tended to move, not merely out of Berlin, but out of
Germany, to the more friendly confines of the Amsterdam and London stock exchanges. In
retrospect, it seems that the formation of the Kommission fiir den Borsenenquete—
a
commission that included only token representation from members of the stock exchange
and that was heavily weighted with representatives of agricultural interests eager to do
anything to raise agricultural prices—was responsible for this outcome. However, in terms of
German history, given that the concerns of all potential interest groups had long been
represented in the composition of the Aufsichtsraten—the board charged with overseeing the
governance of each corporation—the broad composition of the commission was logical even
if wrong for dealing with the specific practices of stockbrokers and dealers.
7. Then and now
This brief overview of the disfinctive characteristics of the world's four leading security
exchanges in the 19th century demonstrates that, even in the case of the most highly
developed and most efficiently fimctioning markets of the first global economy, their legal
and political environments led them to adopt different ways to perform essentially the same
operations. If the legal environment was broadly similar, as it was for Great Britain and the
^^ Gommel, R. (1992). Entstehung und Entwicklung der Effektenborse im 19. Jahrhundert bis 1914. In H.
Pohl (Ed.), Deutsche Borsengeschichte. Frankfurt am Main: Fritz Knapp Verlag, p. 154.
^' Gommel, p. 156.
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United States, the political environment led to a different structure of their capital markets. By
the end of the 19th century, moreover, the legal environments of the two countries had
become distinctive in important ways, even though both had evolved from the same base
—
18th century English common law. In Britain, court decisions on the powers of self-
govemance by trade groups clearly favored the freedom of those groups to make and enforce
contracts among themselves. In the United States, the courts and legislatures tended to make
contracts unenforceable, or even illegal, if they infringed on the freedom of competitors to
enter the trade. Regional exchanges flourished in both countries. In Great Britain, they never
competed with the cenfral exchange in London for primacy, but in the United States, it took
the Civil War to establish the permanent preeminence of the New York exchange over the
older exchanges of Philadelphia and Boston and then, the rising exchanges of Cincinnati and
Chicago. Further, differences in the original definition of property rights in the marketplaces
meant that while the NYSE had a constant battle to establish and then maintain its primacy as
the central marketplace, even in New York City, the London Stock Exchange was able to
encompass all the business in London and place the regional exchanges in a complementary,
rather than competing, role throughout almost the entire 19th century. In 1912, however,
when the members of the London Stock Exchange established minimum commissions and
forbade jobbers to shunt business from other exchanges, the complementary role of the
provincial exchanges was threatened. Banks and other financial institutions were expressly
forbidden from participating in the British exchanges, although the few originally entering as
proprietors were grandfathered in. On the American exchanges, financial institutions were
able to form partnerships with brokerage firms or buy seats directly until the regulatory
reforms of the 1930s.
On the continent, where the legal environment provided statutory monopolies for the stock
exchanges of Paris and Berlin, the political environments were again sufficiently distinct that
the roles played by the cenfral exchanges were different. In Paris, over the century, a small
group of agents de change had became very tightly organized as a self-regulating Compagnie,
and they were able to call upon the enforcement powers of the state to maintain their
monopoly. As a result, the rules of the Paris Bourse remained essentially unchanged from the
time of Napoleon until the breakup of its monopoly under pressure from the European
Community in the late 1980s. By contrast, in Berlin, where open access was required from the
beginning, different interest groups were drastically able to alter both the rules of operation on
the exchange and the role that it played in the process of national capital mobilization.
In the current episode of expanding global financial markets—an expansion that started at
the end of the Bretton Woods monetary regime in 1971—each market has made unique
contributions and responded to competitive challenges in characteristic ways. The NYSE,
while still limiting members, now promotes competitive brokerage commissions. Moreover,
the resulting increase in volume has more than made up the loss of revenue from reduced
commissions. The NYSE also generates increased revenue from charges imposed on the
companies whose securities are listed and traded and from selling its information services to
other exchanges and to nonmember firms. In 1973, the London Stock Exchange absorbed all
the stock exchanges in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland and renamed itself
the International Stock Exchange. In 1986, it moved dramatically toward the New York
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model with the so-called "Big Bang"—the fallout from the "Bang" allowed its traders to act
in the double capacity of brokers and jobbers, and it eliminated minimum commissions. In
1966, the Paris Bourse allowed its agents de change to reform themselves as joint stock
corporations so that they could greatly expand their scale of business. One result of this
change was that the now larger Paris market was able to absorb the French provincial
exchanges. At the same time, the number of firms fell from 83 to 61, nearly the same figure
that Napoleon had created in 1808. Furthermore, no foreigners were allowed to hold seats.
After World War II, as the regional exchanges led by Frankfurt came back to prominence, the
Berlin Borse had essentially stopped ftinctioning. This time, however, all the German
exchanges limited entry to banks and maintained fixed commissions. As a result, the problem
of the postwar decade was not so much dealing with the pressures from the nonfinancial
community (although forward frading was not allowed until very recently), but with the
jealousy with which each regional exchange tried and still tries to protect its niche market.^ ^
In recent years, the Frankfurt and Paris exchanges have shown themselves to be the most
innovative and aggressive in their attempts to expand their markets by increasing the equity
holdings of their citizens. As recently as 1991, despite a resurgence of activity after the
collapse of the Berlin Wall and the reunification with East Germany, the capitalization of
domestic equities amounted to only 26% of German GDP, compared to 62% for the United
States and 120% for the United Kingdom. In 1993, 10 of the nearly 800 stocks listed in
German Exchange accounted for 63% of the trading volume. Only a bit over 5% of the
German population actually held any stocks, a figure that compares to over 16% in France
and 21% in the United States and United Kingdom. While the situation has improved
considerably over the past decade, much still remains to be done. The lessons of the first
global financial market show that it will be largely up to the exchanges themselves to make
the necessary changes to reassure outside investors that they should become regular
customers. The common law environment helps, as does the fear of competition in an
environment where decisions are largely the product of a relatively free market rather than of
a government monopoly.
Appendix A. Listing regulations for major stock exchanges in the first global financial
market
London: [Source: Rules and regulations of the London Stock Exchange. London: The
Stock Exchange, 1906, Appendix "Official Quotations"]
A. Conditions precedent to an application for official quotation, [p. 96]
(1) That the Prospectus
Shall have been publicly advertised;
See summaries in Economist Publications, Directory ofworld stock exchanges, for Frankfurt, London, New
York, and Paris, and Schwartz R. (1991). Reshaping the equity markets. New York: Harper Business, chap. 4-5.
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Agrees substantially with the Act of Parliament or Articles of Association;
Provides for the issue of not less than one-half of the authorised capital and for the
payment of 10% upon the amount subscribed.
If offering Debentures or Debenture Stock, states fiilly the terms of redemption.
In cases where a Company has sold an issue of Debentures or Debenture Stock which is
subsequently offered for public subscription either by the Company or any subsequent
purchaser, states the authority for the issue and all conditions of sale.
(2) That two-thirds of the amount proposed to be issued of any class of Shares or Securities,
whether such issue be the whole or a part of the authorised amount, shall have been
applied for by and unconditionally allotted to the public. Shares or Securities granted in
lieu of money payments not being considered to form a part of such public allotment.
(3) That the Articles of Association, and the Trust Deed where such is required, contain the
provisions specified hereafter.
(4) That the Certificate or Bond is in the form approved, [p. 97]
B. Articles of association
Articles of Association should contain the following provisions:
1
.
That none of the funds of the Company shall be employed in the purchase of, or in loans
upon the security of its own shares;
2. That Directors must hold a share qualification;
3. That the borrowing powers of the Board are limited;
4. That the non-forfeiture of dividends is secured;
5. That the common form of transfer shall be used;
6. That all Share and Stock Certificates shall be issued under the Common Seal of the
Company;
7. That fully paid Shares shall be fi-ee from all lien;
8. That the interest of a Director in any contract shall be disclosed before execution, and that
such Director shall not vote in respect thereof;
9. That the Directors shall have power at any time and from time to time to appoint any
other qualified person as a Director either to fill a casual vacancy or as an addition to the
Board, but so that the total number of Directors shall not at any time exceed the maximum
number fixed; but that any Director so appointed shall hold office only until the next
following Ordinary General Meeting of the Company, and shall then be eligible for
reelecfion;
10. That a printed copy of the report, accompanied by the Balance Sheet and Statement of
Accounts, shall, at least seven days previous to the General Meeting, be delivered or sent
by post to the registered address of every member, and that two copies of each of these
documents shall at the same time be forwarded to the Secretary of the Share and Loan
Department, The Stock Exchange, London;
1 1
.
That the charge for a new Share Certificate issued to replace one that has been worn out,
lost, or destroyed shall not exceed one shilling.
i<
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C. Trust deeds
Trust Deeds should contain the following provisions:
1 . Where provision is made that the security shall be repayable at a premium, either at a
fixed date or at any time upon notice having been given, the Trust Deed must further provide
that should the Company go into voluntary liquidation for the purpose of amalgamation or
reconstruction the security shall not be repayable at a lower price, [p. 98]
New York: [Source: Meeker, J. E. (1922). The work ofthe stock exchange. New York: The
Ronald Press, pp. 577-80].
Every application for an original listing of capital stock shall recite:
A. Title of corporation
B. (1) State authorizing incorporation; (2) (a) date, (b) duration, (c) rights.
C. (1) Business; (2) special rights or privileges granted directors by charter or by-laws.
D. (1) Whether capital stock is fiilly paid; (2) non-assessable; and (3) liability attaching to
stockholders.
E. (1) Issues (by classes), dividend rate and par value; (2) total amount of each, authorized
and issued; (3) increases and authority therefore, including 9a) action by stockholders, (b)
by directors and (c) by public authorities, et.; (4) amount unissued, (a) options or contracts
on same, (b) specific reservation for conversion.
F. If preferred stock; (1) whether cumulative or non-cumulative; (2) preferences, including
(a) voting power; (b) dividends; (c) distribution of assets on dissolution or merger; (d)
redemption; (e) convertibility.
G. Voting power of obligations of debt.
H. (1) Purpose of issue; (2) application of proceeds; (3) amount issued for securities, contracts,
property; description and disposition; (4) additional property to be acquired, with partic-
ulars, as required by paragraph M.
I. (1) History of corporation; (2) of predecessor companies, or firms, with location and stock
issues; (b) conditions leading to new organization.
J. Tabulated list of constituent, subsidiary, owned or controlled companies showing (a)
date of organization; (b) where incorporated; (c) duration of charter; (d) business and
(e) capital stock issues (by classes), par value, amount authorized, issued, owned by
parent company.
K. (1) Mortgage, and (2) other indebtedness, (a) date, (b) maturity, (c) interest rate, (d)
redemption by sinking fiind or otherwise, (e) amount authorized, and (f) amount issued;
(3) similar information regarding mortgage and all indebtedness of constituent, subsidiary,
owned, or controlled companies.
L. Other liabilities, joint and several, (1) guaranties, (2) leases, (3) traffic agreements, (4)
trackage agreements, (5) rentals, (6) car trusts, etc., (7) similar description of other
easements; (8) terms of each, and provision for payment; (9) similar information as to
constituent, subsidiary, owned or controlled companies.
M. (1) Description, location, nature and acreage ofproperty, (a) owned in fee; (b) controlled; (c)
leased; (2) railroads, mileage completed, operated and contemplated; (3) equipment; (4)
character of buildings and construction; (5) tabulated list of franchises showing (a) where
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granted, (b) date, (c)duration, (d) purpose; (e) timber, fiiel or mining lands, water rights; (f)
similar information as to constituent, subsidiary, owned or controlled companies.
N. Policy as to depreciation.
0. (1) Character and amount of annual output for preceding five years; (2) estimated output
(character and amount) for current year; (3) number of employees.
P. (1) Dividends paid; (a) by predecessor, and constituent, subsidiary, owned or controlled
companies.
Q. Financial statements: (1) earnings for preceding five years, if available; (2) income account
of recent date for at least one year, if available; (3) balance sheet of same date; (4) similar
accountings for predecessor, constituent, subsidiary, owned or controlled companies; (5)
corporations consolidated within one year previous to date of application, income account
and balance sheet of all companies merged and balance sheet of applying corporation; (6) if
in hands ofreceiver within one year previous to date of application, (a) income account and
balance sheet of receiver at time of discharge, and (b) balance sheet ofcompany at close of
receivership.
R. Agreements contained on page 5.
S. Fiscal year.
T. Names of (1) officers; (2) directors (classified) with addresses; (3) transfer agents and (4)
registrars, with addresses.
U. Location of principal and other offices of corporation.
V. Place and date of annual meeting.
In addition to the above, applications from corporations that own or operate mines must
recite:
A. Patented and unpatented claims, by numbers.
B. (1) Geological description of country; (2) location and description of mineral and other
lands; (3) ore bodies; (4) average value of ore; (5) character; and (6) methods of treatment.
C. History of workings: (1) results obtained; (2) production each year.
D. (1) Ore reserves compared with previous years showing separately as to character and
metal content; (2) estimates of engineer as to probable life of mines; (3) probabilities by
further exploration.
E. (1) Provisions for smelting and concentration; (2) cost of (a) mining, (b) milling and
smelting, (c) transportation; and (3) proximity of property to railway or other common
carrier.
F. Properties in process of development; income account if available; guaranties for working
capital and for completion of development.
G. Total expenditures for preceding five years for acquisition of new property, development,
proportion charged to operations each year.
H. (1) Policy as to depletion; (2) acquisition of new property; (3) new construction and
development.
1. Annual reports for preceding five years, showing number of tons of ore treated, average
assay, yield, percentage of extraction, recovery per ton of ore.
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In addition to the above, applications from corporations that own or operate oil and gas
wells must recite:
A. (1) Brief history of oil fields; (2) character and gravity of oil.
B. (1) Total area of oil land (developed and undeveloped), (a) owned, (b) leased, (c)
controlled, (d) proven, (e) under exploitation, (f) royalties.
C. (1) Number of wells (oil or gas) on each property, (a) in operation, (b) drilling, (c)
contemplated; (2) average depth of wells drilled (a) shallowest, (b) deepest, (c) probable
life; (3) whether oil sands are dipping.
D. (1) Gross daily production-initial and present; (2) annual gross production from each
property for past five years, if available; (3) estimated output for current year.
E. (1) Storage, capacity and location; (2) (a) amount of oil stored, (b) character, (c) value; (3)
pipe line, (a) gauge, (b) capacity, (c) mileage.
F. (1) Refineries, (a) capacity, (b) acreage, (c) employees (d) products and by-products.
G. Properties in process of development, income account if available, guaranties for working
capital and for completion of development.
H. Total expenditures for preceding five years for acquisition of new property, well drilling
and development, proportion charged to operations each year.
I. (1) Policy as to depletion; (2) acquisition; and (3) development of new properties.
Paris [Source: Greenwood, W. (1921). American and fryreign stock exchange practice
stock and bond trading. New York: Financial Books, pp. 754-760]
Regulations as to issues of French and foreign sliares and bonds in France
(Law of Finance of 30th January 1907, and the Decree of 27th February 1907)
Clause 3 (Law of 30th January 1907)
The issue, the exhibition, the placing on sale, and the introduction on the market, in France
of all shares, bonds, or securities of any kind whatever, of French or foreign companies, are,
so far as concerns securities offered to the public after 1 March 1907, subjected to the
following formalities:
The persons issuing, exhibiting, or placing such securities on sale, and the introducers
of them on the market, must, previous to taking any steps towards advertising, insert a
notice containing the following details in the Supplement to the Journal Officiel, the form
of such notice to be settled by decree. (The Decree of 27 February 1907 follows this
section).
(1) The designation of the company, or its trading name.
(2) A statement as to the legislation (French or foreign) under which the company's
operations are carried on.
(3) The address of the head office of the company.
(4) The object of the undertaking.
(5) The period for which it is formed (duration of the corporation).
(6) The total amount of its capital stock, the amounts of each of the different classes of
shares, and the amounts still unpaid on such shares.
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(7) A certified copy of the last balance sheet, or a statement that no balance sheet has been
prepared.
There must also be stated the amount of any bonds that have been issued by the company,
with details of any charges or guarantees given in connection with them.
If a new issue of bonds is to be made, there must be stated the quantity as well as
the value of the bonds to be issued, the interest to be paid on them, the date of
redemption, and the conditions and the guarantees given to secure the series of bonds to
be issued.
Mention must also be made of any profits or advantages granted to vendors, directors,
managers, and any other persons; the assets brought into the company by vendors and the
method ofpayment for same; the formalities necessary for the calling of the general meetings;
and their place of meeting.
The persons who issue, offer, or place on sale, and the introducers of such securities, must
be domiciled in France; they must sign the above-named notice with their names and
addresses.
All poster, prospectuses and circulars must reproduce the statements of the notice
named, and must contain a mention of the insertion of the said notice in the Supplement
of the Journal Officiel, giving a reference to the number of the issue in which the notice
has appeared.
The advertisements in newspapers and periodicals must reproduce the same statements, or,
at least, an extract of the statements with reference to the said notice, and must indicate the
number of the Journal Officiel in which it has been published.
Every foreign company which makes a public issue in France, or offers, places on sale, or
introduces shares, bonds, or securities of any kind whatever, must, in addition, publish its
articles of incorporation in full, in the French language, in the Supplement of the Journal
official, previous to the placing or offering of the securities.
Breaches of the above regulations are to be declared by the officials of the Registry
Department; such breaches may be punished by fines of from 10,000 frs. to 20,000 frs.
($2000 to $4000).
Clause 463 of the Penal Code is to be applicable to the fines named in the present
clause.
DECREES OF THE 27TH FEBRUARY 1907
Respecting the Offering for Sale, in France, of French and Foreign Shares and Bonds
(Including American Stocks and Bonds)
Clause 1. The insertions named in Clause 3 of the Law of Finance of the 30th January
1907 are to be published in the Supplement attached to the Joumal Officiel, under the title of
the "Bulletin Annexe au Joumal Officiel de La Republique Frangaise" (supplement to the
Official Joumal of the French Republic).
These compulsory notices are to be paid for by the companies.
Clause 2. The charge for the insertions is fixed at 2 frs. (38 1/2 cents) per line "de corps
sept," the ordinary line of the Joumal Officiel being taken as the basis.
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Clause 3. The Supplement will appear weekly, on Mondays. Insertions must be signed by
the persons responsible for such notices, and delivered at the latest on the previous
Wednesday, at the offices of the Joumal Officiel.
Clause 4. The Supplement will be delivered, without extra payment, to the subscribers to
the complete edition of the Joumal Officiel.
The price of subscription to the Supplement, only, is fixed at 12 frs. ($2,332) for France,
Algeria, and Tunis, and 18 frs. ($3.47) per annum for the other countries of the postal
union. Subscriptions must be for the fiill year, and will commence from the first issue of
each month.
Clause 5. The Supplement will be sold by sheets of 16 pages maximum. The price of each
sheet is to be 5 centimes (1 cent) for the issues of each current year, and 50 centimes (10
cents) for those of previous years.
Clause 6. An annual alphabetical index of the Supplement will be published in the annual
index of the Joumal official; the price of the index will be 6 frs. ($1.16).
Clause 7. The President of the Council, the Minister of the Interior, and the Minister of
Finance are charged with the execution of the present decree, which is to be published in the
Joumal Officiel and in the list of Laws.
OFFICIAL QUOTATIONS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES ON
THE PARIS BOURSE
Details and Documents Required
(1) The demand for admission must be made to the Syndic des Agents de Change de Paris
(Secretary of the Paris Stock Exchange).
(2) Two copies must be delivered of the laws and decrees authorizing the loan issue.
(3) A declaration must be made, in duplicate, by the consul in France of that foreign
government, that the security is quoted officially on its own bourse, if one exists; if not,
then a declaration in duplicate that there is no Bourse in that country.
(4) Specimens in duplicate of the temporary or final bond certificates, with coupons, and the
details of the numbers relating to the coupons of each class of certificate issued.
(5) Statement of the price of issue.
(6) Statements of the amounts paid up on each security.
(7) Dates when interest payable.
(8) Present position as to interest payment.
(9) Names and addresses of the bankers in Paris who undertake the sale of the securities and
the payment of the coupons.
Undertakings Required
(10) To fumish the Stock Exchange Committee with 200 copies of each hst of drawings for
the redemption of the securities.
(11) Translations into French, by swom translators, of all documents submitted in foreign
languages (other than French).
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RULES RESPECTING ADMISSION TO OFFICIAL QUOTATIONS OF FOREIGN
SHARES AND BONDS ON THE PARIS BOURSE
Formal application for inclusion in the Official List must be made to the Syndic des Agents
de Change de Paris.
Details Required
The following documents and information must be supplied in duplicate with the
application:
(1) Certified copies, in duplicate, of (a) all public and private agreements and deeds relating
to the formation of the company (charters or articles of incorporation); (b) the by-laws of
the company; (c) resolutions or other consent or permission authorizing the issue of such
securities in the country in which it is registered; (d) translations into French, by sworn
translators, of all documents submitted in other languages.
(2) Duplicate certificate, by the Consul in France of the country in which the company has
been registered, that the deeds and agreements produced are due legal form for that
foreign country, and that the securities are quoted officially on the Stock Exchange in
that country (or a certificate that there is no Stock Exchange in that country.)
(3) Specimens of the temporary and final forms of certificates issued for the securities, with
details of the coupons and of the numbers referring to each class of coupons.
(4)Proof of the acceptance, by the French Department of Finance, of a French "representant
responsable" (agent) who is to be responsible to the Treasury for the stamp and other
duties payable on the company's securities issued in France."
(5) Statement of the price of issue;
(6) Amounts paid up on each class of security;
(7) Dates when dividends or interest are declared and paid;
(8) Present position of the securities as regards dividends or interest;
(9) Names and addresses ofthe Paris bankers who are issuing the certificates, and who will pay
coupons and dividends declared on the securities held in France.
(10) An undertaking by the company to provide for the registration of transfers and the
payment of coupons in Paris, as well as for the repayment there of bonds to be redeemed
by drawings or otherwise.
(11) An undertaking to furnish the Paris Stock Exchange Committee with 200 copies of each
list of drawings of securities for redemption.
(12) An undertaking to furnish the Paris Stock Exchange Committee with a copy, in French,
of the minutes of each general meeting of stockholders.
Berlin [Source: Greenwood, op. cit., pp. 891-896.]
German Stock Exchanges
Official Quotation of Shares and Bonds
The conditions for the admission of shares and bonds to official quotation on the German
Stock Exchanges are fixed by the law of the 22nd June 1 896. The following are the chief
provisions:
All requests for admission must be addressed to the Committee of the Stock Exchange,
which thereupon publishes in the newspapers the prospectus of the company, and details
L. Davis et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) ]17-143 141
of the nominal values and descriptions of the securities for which the official quotation
has been demanded, together with the name of the firm of stockbrokers making the
demand.
At least six days must elapse between the date of such publication and the admission to
quotation.
A prospectus of the company must be submitted, containing sufficient details to allow of
a proper estimation of the value of the securities to be quoted. This applies also to increase
of capital and to conversions. The prospectus must state the quantity of shares in
circulation, and the quantity temporarily excluded from negotiation and the period of such
exclusion.
For securities of German states or municipalities, or of undertakings under German
government control, the prospectus is not generally required, as the official quotation cannot
be refused.
Persons knowingly making false or misleading statements in any prospectus are jointly
responsible, during five years afterwards, for damages to all German purchases of securities
bought by reason of the publication of such prospectus.
The making of fi^audulent statements in a prospectus or in advertisements, with a view
to obtaining subscriptions for the purchase, or causing the sale of securities by the
public is punishable by imprisonment and by a fine not exceeding 12,000 marks
($3000).
Any agreement to evade or limit the responsibility for such statements is void in law.
Important
A security cannot be admitted to official quotation by any German Stock Exchange if it has
been previously submitted to another German Stock Exchange which has refiised to quote it
for any reason other than that of local interests.
In the case of public issues of shares for subscription, they cannot be officially quoted
before allotment (allocation of them to subscribers).
The distribution of price-lists of shares not quoted officially is forbidden.
No official quotation can be granted to the shares or bonds of any business which has been
converted into a stock corporation, as a going concern, until after the company has been
registered at least one year, or until after its first annual balance sheet and profit and loss
account, as a stock corporation, have been published.
Directors
Directors must be appointed by the organization meeting (held to vote the incorporation of
the company). They may be dismissed at any time by a general meeting. Managing directors
may be appointed either by the articles of incorporation or by the Board of Directors {die
Direktion); a list of directors and managers must be filed at the Commercial Court, and also
any changes.
Restrictions by the company on the powers of directors cannot be pleaded against third
parties. Directors must not compete with the company, nor undertake personal liabilities for
any other company.
If the articles of incorporation provide for directors receiving any portion of the profits as
remuneration, this payment may be reduced by a general meeting.
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Committee of Inspection (Shareholders' auditors)
This consists of three members. The first committee is elected by the organization meeting,
and it remains in office until after the first annual general meeting. The same members cannot
continue in office for more than four years. Any member may be dismissed by a three-fourths
majority at any general meeting.
All appointments and changes must be registered at the Commercial Court.
The members of the committee must not be directors, nor employed by the company, but
the committee may appoint one of its members to act temporarily for one of the directors
prevented from attending to his duties. The duties of the inspectors are to continuously
supervise the management of the company in all its details. They may at any time demand
special reports on the business from the directors and may also examine all books and
documents and check the cash balances, the securities of the company, and the stocks of
goods on hand.
They must check the annual balance sheets and accounts and make reports on them, and on
the management of the company, to the annual general meeting. They must also call general
meetings whenever necessary in the interests of the company. The articles of incorporation of
the company may impose further duties. The members of the inspection and audit committee
are not allowed to delegate their duties.
The legal provisions concerning the supervision by stockholders' auditors are good, but in
practice such supervision is generally worthless, many of the lay auditors being incompetent,
and others only interested in drawing their fees.
Increase of Capital
No increase of capital can be made unless the original share capital is fully subscribed and
paid in, except for a very small amount of calls in arrears. Each class of stockholders must
vote separately for the increase, by majorities of three-fourths in value of the stockholders
present or represented by proxy. Original stockholders have the preference of subscribing for
new issues, unless voted otherwise.
Reduction of Capital
This may be voted at a general meeting by a three-fourths majority (in value) of the
stockholders present or represented. Separate resolutions must be passed by each class of
stockholders. The reductions may be for (1) writing off losses of capital; (2) repayment of
share capital; or (3) canceling the unpaid portions of the par values of shares.
The reductions of capital must be advertised and notice given to each creditor, any of
whom may thereupon demand guarantees for payment of their debts.
Shares may be repaid from profits, if power to do so is taken by the articles of
incorporation; such repaid capital is not liable to be called up again.
Voluntary Liquidation
When either the interim accounts or the final accounts of a company show a loss of half, at
least, of the share capital of the company, the directors must immediately call a general
meeting of shareholders to consider the position, but the dissolution is not compulsory; the
meeting may resolve to continue trading.
A resolution for dissolution may be passed by a three-fourths majority in value of the
stockholders present or represented at such a general meeting.
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Unless otherwise provided by tlie articles of incorporation, or voted by the general
meeting, the directors of the company act as liquidators (receivers).
The committee of inspection, or stockholders representing one-20th of the capital, may
apply to the Court for the appointment of other liquidators. A general meeting may at any
time dismiss any liquidator not appointed by the Court.
Liquidators are subject to the supervision of the committee of inspection. Balance sheets
must be published annually during the liquidation (dissolution proceedings).
Stockholders representing a three-fourths majority of the value of the company may agree
to the sale of the whole of the business for shares in another company.
Transfers of shares
Transfers can be made by endorsement of the shares, and may be in blank, if the par value
of the shares is over 1000 marks ($250) each. Below that amount, they must be transferred by
affidavit made before a judge or notary, and the transfer is also subject to the consent of the
board of directors.
Transferors are liable for calls made during the two years following the transfer. Each
transferor is liable in turn, moving backwards from the last holder. The transferor paying the
calls in default (installments due on shares) is entitled to a share certificate, from the
company, for such shares.
Dividends
Before paying dividends, a reserve must be made of at least 5% of the net profits of each
year, until such reserves amount to 10% of the total authorized capital of the corporation.
In the case of different classes of shares on which varied amounts have been paid up, there
must be first paid, from the profits, interest at the rate of4% per annum on the actual amounts
paid up, reckoned from the dates of receipt, or such smaller interest as the profits will allow.
Any excess profit may be paid as dividends.
Interest during construction {Bauzinsen) may be paid by railroads and other companies
from the date of their incorporation until the commencement of business.
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Abstract
Foreign companies listing on U.S. exchanges are required to report financial information under U.S.
GAAP on form 20-F using either Item 17 or Item 18 disclosure rules. These two disclosure rules differ
in that Item 17 allows many exemptions from U.S. GAAP, while Item 18 requires disclosure of all
financial information in accordance with U.S. GAAP. This study examines the differential earnings-
return association between Item 17 and Item 18 filers.
We find significantly higher earnings-return associations for Item 18 filers than for Item 17 filers.
While the earnings-return association of Item 18 foreign firms is not different from that of matched
U.S. firms (which fiandamentally use Item 18 rules), the earnings-return associafion of Item 17 foreign
firms is significantly lower than that of matched U.S. firms. Overall, the results are consistent with the
idea that higher levels of disclosure may be related to lower discount rates and higher earnings
response coefficients (ERCs).
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1. Introduction
This study examines the relation between earnings and market returns under alternative
disclosure options for foreign companies that trade stock in U.S. capital markets. Specifically,
we compare the earnings-return association for foreign registrants using Item 18 reporting
rules (i.e., a high level of disclosure) to those using Item 17 reporting rules (i.e., a low level of
disclosure) on form 20-F. Our study is motivated by Frost and Kinney (1996), who found no
difference in the earnings-return association between foreign registrants and U.S. firms even
though the level of disclosure is different. Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001) suggest that the
results in Frost and ICirmey "are consistent with many other unexamined hypotheses.
Furthermore, the link between disclosures and the cost of capital is not developed."
To help us hypothesize about the association between disclosure and the earnings-retum
relation, we rely on previously developed theory that suggests useful information obtained
from additional disclosure reduces investors' informational uncertainty, allowing investors to
apply a lower discount rate, which then increases the earnings-return association. Although
we do not directly examine the impact of company disclosure activities on discount rates, our
resuhs on the association between disclosure and the earnings-return relation suggest an
inverse relation between disclosure activities and discount rates. While our findings are
descriptive of the effects of disclosure in capital markets, they are particularly relevant for
foreign corporations facing a unique set ofdisclosure choices as they enter U.S. capital markets
and file with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).'
The SEC regulates the use of Item 17 or 18 on form 20-F. Non-U. S. companies trading on
a primary U.S. exchange must report financial information based on U.S. GAAP on form 20-
F using either Item 17 or Item 18 disclosure rules. Item 17 allows many exemptions from
U.S. GAAP, while Item 18 requires disclosure of all financial information in accordance with
U.S. GAAP and Regulation S-X. Thus, the use of Item 17 or 18 rules can be viewed as two
different levels of disclosure. Non-U. S. firms that seek to issue shares publicly in the United
States must file financial statements under Item 18 in the registration statement. Non-U.S.
firms that are not issuing shares but simply listing existing shares on a U.S. exchange can
choose to file under Item 18 or the reduced disclosure requirements of Item 17 (U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 1993).
In practice, some foreign registrants voluntarily use Item 18, while many are required to do
so because they are raising capital in the United States. This aspect of the registration process
must be controlled since previous research (Frankel, McNichols, & Wilson, 1995) suggests a
sfrong relation between the need for financing and the level of financial disclosure in capital
markets. Our research design controls the effect of financing needs on the earnings-return
association, which helps us isolate the effects of disclosure.
Other issues surrounding the use of Item 1 7 versus 1 8 reporting rules help to motivate our
study. First, all U.S. registrants that compete with foreign registrants for investor's capital
' The unique set of disclosure choices in question for foreign registrants are Item 1 7 or Item 1 8 financial
statement rules for form 20-F. The choice of Item 17 financial statement mles is unavailable to U.S. domestic
registrants.
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must fully comply with U.S. GAAP regardless of whether they issue new securities or just Hst
existing securities. In other words, there is no reduced disclosure altemative, such as Item 17,
available to U.S. firms that seek to list securities only. This may create inequities in the cost of
disclosure between U.S. and non-U. S. competitors because of the additional financial
reporting burden for U.S. firms (Rader, 1994). Second, selection of Item 17 disclosure rules
by foreign registrants may provide them with a strategic advantage by avoiding the disclosure
of sensitive information. Third, the implied two-fier reporting fi-amework (i.e.. Item 17 or
Item 1 8) available for foreign registrants also conflicts with the findings of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1993), which states that users prefer one set of
accounting standards for all foreign registrants listing securities in U.S. markets. Finally,
concern exists over whether the additional disclosures for foreign firms entering U.S.
capital markets to raise capital enhance an investor's ability to evaluate the registering
firm's financial performance (Cochrane, 1994). Financial-statement users identify Item 18
disclosures as being especially useful (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
1993), yet the cost of complying with Item 18 requirements may be deterring foreign
companies fi^om raising capital in the United States (Mitto, 1992).
Our analysis compares the association between earnings and retums under different filing
status and domicile location using three sets of matched subsamples: (i) Item 17-filing
foreign firms and country-, industry-, and size-matched Item 1 8-filing foreign firms, (ii) Item
17-filing foreign firms and industry- and size-matched U.S. firms, and (iii) Item 1 8-filing
foreign firms and industry- and size-matched U.S. firms. We use market data from U.S.
capital markets only and accounting information available in the registrant's 20-F submission
to the SEC. Our tests control for domicile location (country), industry, size, other
determinants of the earnings response coefficient (ERC), and the need for raising capital
in the United States, which therefore controls for the mandatory or voluntary use of Item 1
8
reporting rules.
After controlling for the need for financing and other ERC determinants, we find that the
eamings-retum association is higher for Item 18 foreign registrants than Item 17 foreign
registrants. We also find that the eamings-retum association for Item 18 foreign registrants
does not differ fi*om that of industry- and size-matched U.S. firms (which fundamentally
report eamings using Item 18 financial statement mles), while the eamings-retum asso-
ciation of Item 17 foreign firms is lower than that of matched U.S. firms. This lends fiirther
evidence to the proposition that the eamings-retum association is higher for firms using Item
18 mles.
Our replication of Frost and Kinney's (1996) eamings-retum correlation test is consistent
with their result in that the eamings-retum relation is independent of domicile location.
However, when we examine the eamings-retum relation across disclosure choice (i.e.. Item
1 7 versus 1 8) using a multivariate analysis, we are able to show that the ERC is significantly
related to disclosure choice. This is the primary contribution of our study, which implies that
higher disclosure levels reduce the discount rate. In the next section, we discuss the
institutional background related to 20-F filings and previous research in the area. In Section
3, we develop our hypotheses. Section 4 discusses our research design. In Section 5, we
present our results, and Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
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1. Background
2.1. Item 17 versus Item 18 disclosures
Non-U. S. firms that are publicly offering new securities on U.S. exchanges must make
Item 18 disclosures. However, non-U. S. firms that are simply listing securities have ihe
option of using either Item 1 7 or Item 1 8 disclosure rules. One popular explanation for the
selection of Item 1 7 over Item 1 8 rules by foreign registrants who do not issue stock is that
Item 18 disclosures divulge sensitive and competitive information (Biddle & Saudagaran,
1989). This is likely to be the case since the primary reporting difference between Items 17
and 18 is that Item 18 requires vastly expanded footnote disclosures on industry segments,
disclosures of related party transactions, contractual terms with significant suppliers, deferred
taxes, loss contingencies, competitors, negative trends and risk factors for the security issue,
financial statements of acquired businesses, nonconsolidated subsidiaries, or investees carried
on the equity method (Decker, 1994; Rader, 1994). Footnote disclosures under Item 17 are
generally limited to those required by home country GAAP, which is typically less stringent
than footnote disclosures required under U.S. GAAP. Because of the expanded disclosure
requirement under Item 18 versus Item 17, we characterize firms choosing Item 18 or 17
disclosures as high or low disclosure firms, respectively.
2.2. Prior research
Previous studies about form 20-F disclosures typically focus on the reconciliation from
domestic- to U.S.-GAAP-based accounting figures (Amir, Harris, & Venuti, 1993; Bandyo-
padhyay, Hanna, & Richardson, 1994; Barth and Clinch, 1996; Chan and Seow, 1996;
Godwin, Goldberg, & Douthett, 1998). These studies compare the value-relevance of U.S.
GAAP to domestic-GAAP disclosures and provide mixed results. Although we do not
examine earnings reconciliation components, we extend research on form 20-F disclosures by
considering differences in the usefulness of aggregate earnings under different levels of
disclosures dictated by Items 17 and 18 reporting rules.
The Frost and Kinney ( 1 996) study is particularly relevant for our study. They find Item 1
8
requirements to be a more costly and higher disclosure requirement than Item 17, and that the
correlations between earnings and returns for Item 17 foreign issuers are not statistically
different from those for U.S. comparison firms. The latter finding suggests that foreign
issuers' choices on disclosure levels are not associated with the usefulness of their earnings in
equity valuation. This result seems inconsistent with previous research in U.S. markets that
finds higher eamings-retum correlations are associated with firms that disclose more
information (Imhoff, 1992).
To address this unexpected result by Frost and Kinney, we make several improvements to
the research design. First, our sample is richer than the one used in Frost and Kinney in that it
includes more observations from a greater number of countries. Second, and more impor-
tantly, we compare the eamings-retum relation of Item 17 foreign registrants to Item 18
foreign registrants by country using a multivariate model. Finally, Frost and Kinney control
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for industry and size through matching, but do not control for the need for financing in the
United States, other determinants of the earnings-return relation, and domicile when testing
for differences across filing status (Item 17 or 18). The use of a multivariate model to control
for all of these factors at once helps to ensure that the results and inferences about the
earnings-return association can, in fact, be attributed to increased disclosure."
Previous research by Collins and Kothari (1989) shows that the earnings-return asso-
ciation is a function of the risk, growth, and persistence of earnings. Collins and Kothari
(1989) also suggest that ignoring the sources of cross-sectional and temporal variation in the
earnings-return relation can result in statistically less-precise parameter estimates and
downward biased test statistics on the response coefficients. This is another possible
explanation for why Frost and Kinney (1996) did not find significant differences in the
earnings-return correlations. We control for ERC determinants by including proxies for firm
risk, growth opportunities, and earnings persistence in addition to the need for raising capital
in the United States.
3. Hypotheses
We approach the research issue in a fashion analogous to Abdel-khalik, Rashad, Wong,
and Wu (1999). We argue that the alternative disclosure rules. Item 17 versus Item 18, give
rise to two information environments firom the perspective of a U.S. investor. The Item 18
information environment is rich and more structured because the registrant has to fully
comply with U.S. GAAR The Item 17 information environment is relatively poor and less
structured due to the reduced disclosure requirements.
The richer information environment under Item 1 8 ultimately reduces the information risk
about the firm's cash flow prospects. Information risk is a component of the firm's expected
discount rate, and as Collins and Kothari (1989) show, the ERC is negatively related to the
discount rate.^ When traditional risk proxies, such as systematic risk, fail to capture the whole
spectrum of discount factors, other information risk variables, such as our disclosure-indicator
variable, serve as an additional discount factor affecting the ERC (Dhaliwal and Reynolds,
1994). Our first hypothesis stated in alternative form is as follows:
HI: The eamings-retum association is higher for foreign registrants filing under Item 18
disclosure requirements than foreign registrants filing under Item 17 disclosure requirements.
An additional issue relates to differential ERCs between U.S. firms and foreign registrants.
Since there is no reduced disclosure alternative for U.S. firms, we expect to find a difference
^ We replicated Frost and Kinney's correlation tests with our sample and got similar results. The returns-
earnings correlations between Item 17 registrants and U.S. matches, or between Item 18 registrants and U.S.
matches, are not significantly different using Fisher's Z test.
^ An ahemative argument is one advanced by Lundholm and Myers (2002), which suggests that more
informative disclosures resuh in current returns reflecting more future earnings news.
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in the earnings-return association between U.S. firms and Item 17 foreign registrants. Our
second alternative hypothesis is:
H2: The earnings-return association is higher for U.S. firms than foreign registrants filing
under Item 17 disclosure requirements.
In addition, we expect to find no difference in the earnings-return associations between
Item 18 foreign registrants and U.S. firms since U.S. firms are always required to file under
Item 18 rules. However, Frost and Kinney (1996) show that noncompliance and SEC-
approved disclosure relief is significant for Item 1 8 foreign registrants. If noncompliance and
disclosure relief reduces the information environment for these firms, then it is conceivable
that the earnings-return association for U.S. firms is higher than the earnings-return
association for Item 18 foreign registrants (assuming U.S. firms fiilly comply and do not
receive SEC-approved disclosure relief)."^ Thus, our third hypothesis stated in alternative form
is as follows:
H3: The earnings-return association for U.S. firms is higher than or equal to the eamings-
retum association for foreign registrants filing under Item 18 disclosure requirements.
4. Research design
4.1. Sample
To obtain our sample, we first identified foreign registrants filing form 20-F fi^om 1991 to
1996 on the Disclosure database. We then examined the 20-F forms to determine each
registrant's use of Item 17 or 18 financial statement rules. The initial search resulted in 140
firms (504 firm-years) using Item 17 and 330 firms (1018 firm-years) using Item 18
disclosures. We then obtained annual stock returns and financial variables from Compustat,
giving us a data set on 83 foreign issuers (299 firm-years) for Item 17 and 261 foreign issuers
(966 firm-years) for Item 18. All financial variables used in the study are based on U.S. GAAP.
Within this initial sample, we develop three sets of matched pairs for Items 1 7 and 1
8
foreign firms separately, using country, industry (based on four-digit SIC code), year, and size
(assets) as the basis for matching.^ First, we matched U.S. firms to Items 17 and 18 foreign
* Even though Frost and Kinney (1996) show a significant rate of noncompliance with reporting rules by
foreign registrants (e.g., 12% noncompliance with segment reporting rules), the majority do comply.
Noncompliance by Item 1 8 registrants would bias our results against finding a significant difference between
Item 18 and Item 17. Additionally, in response to one of the referee's inquiries, we tested differences between
Items 18 and 17 footnote disclosures by examining Compustat footnote indicators for industrial and geographic
segment disclosures. This comparison indicates that Item 18 registrants are making the incremental disclosures
that Item 1 7 registrants are not required to make.
Ail but 5 firm-years in our sample are matched by four-digit SIC codes.
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registrants on the basis of industry, year, and size to assess the difference in the earnings-
return association between U.S. and foreign domicile locations. Matching by industry
controls for cross-sectional variation in ERCs attributable to industry membership. Matching
by firm size controls for differences in firm size-related information environments. This
process reduced our final sample size to 45 foreign firms (175 firm-years) for Item 17 and 166
foreign firms (536 firm-years) for Item 18.^'
Next, we matched Item 18 foreign registrants to Item 17 foreign registrants by country,
industry, size, and reporting year to assess differences in the earnings -return association
between filing status. Matching by country controls for different customs, laws, regulations,
and other factors related to being domiciled outside the United States and matching on the
basis of firm-year controls for overall market effects. This choice of a control sample assumes
that large market movements will affect the experimental and comparison groups in a similar
manner since all return observations are taken from U.S. markets. The resulting set consists of
73 matched pairs of firm-years for Items 17 and 18 firms for a total of 146 firm-year
observations. In summary, we develop three sets of matched pairs: (1) Items 17 and 18
foreign registrants only, (2) Item 17 foreign firms and U.S. matched firms, and (3) Item 18
foreign firms and U.S. matched firms.
Table 1 shows distribution of sample by country, filing status, and industry (economic
sector as defined by Compustat). Since Items 17 and 18 subsamples consist of 12 and 30
different countries, respectively, we provide descriptive statistics by major countries and
groupings by major geographical areas. Panel A of Table 1 indicates that Item 18 is more
frequently used than Item 17 by foreign firms. With the exception of Canada, 86% of our
sample firms used Item 1 8 disclosures. Canadian firms, which represent about half of our
Item 17 subsample, filed under the Item 17 rules 67% of the time. A comparison of mean and
median values of revenues indicates that, in general, smaller firms use Item 17. Panel B
shows that our sample firms are dispersed across many industries.
4.2. Variables
Our basic test examines the association between annual stock returns (including
dividends) and changes in annual accounting earnings. Following Collins and Kothari
(1989), our multivariate model includes variables to control factors that determine ERCs,
namely growth potential, earnings persistence, and risk. Growth potential is proxied by the
market-to-book ratio. The ERC is expected to have a positive association with growth
potential. Following Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) and Douthett and Jung (2001), we
use the first-order autocorrelation coefficient [AR(1)] on 10 years of annual eamings as the
proxy for eamings persistence. Since not all firms in our sample had 1 years of reported
eamings, we accepted a minimum of 5 years of eamings history to calculate the variable.
Since our proxy for eamings persistence is first-order autocorrelation [AR( 1 )] coefficient calculated based on
10 years of annual eamings (minimum of 5 years), we lost firms that had short operating histories. These firms
were relatively small in terms of revenues.
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Table 1
Distribution of sample of foreign fums listed under Item 17 and Item 18 on form 20-F
Panel A: Number of frnns, firm-years, and revenues by country and filing status
Country Item 17 foreign registrants Item 1 8 foreign registrants
Number
of firms
Number of
firm-years
Revenue^ Number
of firms
Number of
firm-years
Revenue^
Mean Median Mean Median
Australia 2 4 2.0 6 25 5765.8 4863.8
Canada 26 89 51.1 17.6 15 44 60.2 58.1
Israel 1 4 11.1 9.1 23 94 122.6 97.1
Japan 6 28 14,614.7 9810.0 4 17 21,641.1 14,189.5
Mexico 1 4 279.2 268.7 9 23 2001.3 969.1
Netherlands 1 6 1635.2 1501.6 10 25 9005.5 9863.5
United Kingdom 2 10 3159.9 2752.9 31 122 6162.1 3617.0
Other Americas 2 6 708.2 700.4 23 47 1099.8 303.7
Other Europe 4 24 18,912.3 17,421.7 32 108 11,689.0 10,010.4
Other Asia Pacific 13 31 2159.0 964.1
All foreign 45 175 5225.6 52.2 166 536 5275.2 1401.6
Matched U.S. 45 175 4308.9 196.4 166 536 4492.0 1058.5
Panel B: Firm-year observations by economic sector and filing status
Economic sector Item 17 foreign registrants Item 18 foreign registrants
Basic materials 37
Consumer goods 42
Health care 6
Energy 22
Financial services 6
Capital goods 28
Technology 31
Communications 2
Utilities and transportation 1
Total 175
72
138
57
32
14
56
86
36
45
536
^ In US$ millions.
^ Economic sector as defined by Compustat.
The mean (median) number of years used to calculate AR(1) coefficients is 8.6 (10). Risk
is proxied using the ratio of debt to shareholder's equity (Frankel, Johnson, & Skinner,
1999)7
As mentioned previously, foreign registrants are required to use Item 18 rules when
they issue new securities in U.S. capital markets. If the registrant is not issuing new
securities, but simply listing on an exchange, they have the option of choosing Item 18 or
^ We attempted to use systematic risk from the market model as a proxy for risk but lost too many observations
in the Item 17 to Item 18 analysis. Requiring a minimum of 40 months of returns in U.S. capital markets
(maximum of 60 months) for the estimation period left us with only 30 pairs of firm-year observations.
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Item 17. Thus, one key difference between Item 18 and Item 17 firms is that the use of
Item 18 may be mandated by the issuance of new stock, while the use of Item 17 is
never associated with the issuance of new stock. To control for such differences, we
include an indicator variable for whether the firm is raising capital in the United States
(RAISE).
We use three alternative measures for RAISE to control for the disclosure effects of
current or anticipated financing. We first define RAISE as equal to 1 if the foreign or U.S.
firm issued stock on U.S. exchanges during the current fiscal year and otherwise.
However, we observe that no foreign registrants in our sample changed their filing status
firom Item 18 to Item 17 during the sample period, which is consistent with our discussion
with a staff representative of the U.S. SEC that a foreign registrant cannot switch back to
Item 17 reporting rules after they have issued stock and used Item 18. This means that the
foreign registrant has to use Item 18 in years subsequent to the new stock issue even
though they may not be issuing stock in U.S. capital markets again. This leads us to a
second measure, where we define RAISE equal to 1 if the firm issued stock on U.S.
markets in any of the sample years prior to the current fiscal year and otherwise. Lastly,
we define RAISE equal to 1 if the firm issued new stock on U.S. markets in any of the
sample years fi'om 1991 to 1996 and otherwise. This most inclusive definition on
capital-raising activities accounts for the possibility that some foreign firms will choose
Item 1 8 when they plan to issue securities in the near future even though they did not raise
capital in the current year. Including RAISE as a control variable helps to ensure that our
results are related to increased levels of disclosure and not driven by the need for
financing.
For the Item 17 versus Item 18 subsample, the RAISE variable is based on whether the
firm filed an S-1, S-2, or S-3 (or an F-1, F-2, or F-3) registrant statement. S- and F-type
registration statements are required of any domestic or foreign firm that issues new
securities on a U.S. stock exchange. Of the 73 matched pairs, 52 firm-years of the Item
18 partition were associated with an S-type registration statement, indicating that the firm
raised capital in the United States that year. The remaining 21 Item 18 firm-year
observations were not associated with an S-type registration. As expected, none of the 73
firm-year observations in the Item 17 partition were associated with an S-type registration
statement and therefore did not raise capital on a U.S. stock exchange that year. We also
used Compustat data item 108 (sale of cominon and preferred stock) as a proxy for raising
capital. The regression results were qualitatively the same regardless of whether RAISE was
based on evidence of an S-type registration submission or Compustat data item 108. For the
remaining two subsamples (Item 17 matched to U.S. and Item 18 matched to U.S.), RAISE
is based on Compustat data item 108 due to the additional work involved with collecting the
S-1 information.
4.3. Regression model
While Collins and Kothari (1989) used a reverse regression to control for measurement
errors in the earnings variable, Cready, Hurtt, and Seida (2000) document statistical problems
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for interactive reverse regression models. Therefore, we use an ERC regression model similar
to Cready et al. for hypothesis testing. The variable of interest, an indicator for Item 17 versus
Item 18, or foreign versus U.S. location of domicile, is interacted with the earnings-change
variable to assess differential ERCs. Additionally, all control variables are interacted with
earnings changes to control for other determinants of the ERC. The specific model used for
regression testing is as follows:
RETURN = ao + a, AEARN + a2/AEARN x A + a3AEARN x RAISE + a4AEARN
X MKBK + asAEARN x PERS + aeAEARN x TDSE + £
where RETURN = cumulative 12-month returns on a common share in U.S. dollars
(including dividends) beginning 3 months after the fiscal year-end t— I; AEARN = the
change in reported fiscal year primary earnings per share in U.S. dollars at time t
(EARN, — EARN, _ i) divided by the market price at the end of year ? — 1 ; Z), = an indicator
variable that equals 1 for Item 18 and for Item 17 for hypothesis 1 (i= 1), and 1 for U.S.
firms and for foreign registrants for hypothesis 2 (i = 2) and hypothesis 3 (/ = 3);
RAISE = an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm issued stock in the current fiscal year
and otherwise;^ MKBK = market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the
end of year t— \f PERS = AR(1) coefficients on annual earnings as the proxy for earnings
persistence; '° TDSE = total debt divided by total shareholders equity at the end of year
r-1; AEARN X A, AEARN x RAISE, AEARN x MKBK, AEARN x PERS, and
AEARN X TDSE = interaction terms of the variables Hsted above; £ = i.i.d. random error
term.
Note that a^, is the coefficient on the earnings-dummy interaction term which takes the
value of or 1 for the Item 17 to Item 18 comparison {i= 1), Item 17 to U.S. comparison
(i = 2), or the Item 18 to U.S. comparison (/ = 3), respectively. We expect a2i to be positive
and statistically significant if earnings reported under Item 18 contain less informational
uncertainty than earnings reported under Item 17. In comparing Item 17 registrants to U.S.
registrants, we expect a^o to also be positive and significant since U.S. registrants
ftindamentally use Item 1 8 rules (note that the indicator variable is assigned a value of one
for U.S. registrants). Lastly, we expect aos to be insignificant (or positive and significant)
when Item 18 registrants are compared to U.S. registrants. The coefficients on all control
variables are expected to be positive, with the exception of a^. As the coefficient on the
earnings-risk interaction term, a6 is expected to be negative, reflecting the argument that risk
reduces the ERC.
Test results were insensitive to two other definitions of RAISE.
^ We also measured MKBK and TDSE at time /, and the regression results were not qualitatively different
from those reported.
'" We also used extreme versus moderate measures of E/P ratio to proxy for persistence (Ali & Zarowin, 1992)
and obtained similar results.
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5. Results
5. J. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 describes financial characteristics for Item 1 8 and Item 1 7 foreign registrants and
industry- and size-matched U.S. firms." The comparison of foreign firms between Item 18
(Panel B) and Item 1 7 (Panel A) indicates that Item 1 8 filers are better performers in capital
markets (16.8% vs. 5.4% mean returns for Item 18 versus Item 17, respectively) and larger in
size by any measure, including sales, assets, or market value. Item 1 8 filers have somewhat
different earnings persistence and debt-to-shareholders equity ratios. Overall, these compar-
isons suggest that Item 18 filers are different fi^om Item 17 filers in the factors that affect
earnings-response coefficients, and therefore, these factors should be controlled in the
regression analysis.
Panels A and B of Table 2 also compare financial characteristics of Items 1 7 and 1 8 foreign
firms with those of matched U.S. firms. As shown in Panel A, there are statically significant
differences between Item 17 firms and their matched U.S. counterparts. U.S. firms have
higher market returns (RETURN), larger increase in earnings (AEARN), and higher market-
to-book ratios. Earnings persistence (PERS) is lower for matched U.S. firms using medians
but not means. As shown in panel B, differences between Item 18 firms and U.S. matched
firms are statistically significant for most variables based on comparisons in means, medians,
or both. Notably, U.S. firms have higher market returns (RETURN), larger increases in year-
to-year earnings (AEARN), and higher market-to-book ratios (MKBK). None of our sample
firms have negative book value of equity.
The size matching of U.S. companies to Item 17 registrants appears to be effecfive since
only one of three size measures, ASSETS, is statistically different (the mean comparison of
assets is different; however, the median comparison is not). SALES and MKTVAL, as
alternative measures of size, are not statistically different based on means or medians. The
size matching of U.S. firms with Item 18 registrants does not appear to be as effective. All
three measures of size, ASSETS, SALES, or MKTVAL, are statistically different using either
means or medians for a basis for comparison. To address the possibility that size matching is
not an effective control in this subsample, we ran the regression tests with a control variable
for firm size. The results were not qualitatively different from the final results.
5.2. Regression results for Item 17 foreign registrants versus Item 18 foreign registrants
Table 3 shows multivariate test results for hypotheses 1-3. The results reported in column
(3) of Table 3 relate to hypothesis 1 and compare the size of Item 17 ERCs to Item 18 ERCs
by using an interaction term in the regression analysis. The estimate for ai, the coefficient on
'
'
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 for Item 1 7 registrants apply only to the matched pairs of Item 1 7 firms
to U.S. firms. The descriptive statistics for the matched pairs of Item 17 to Item 18 registrants are similar to the
descriptive statistics for the matched pairs of Item 17 registrants to U.S. firms and therefore are not presented.
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Table 3
Regression results comparing earnings response coefficients between foreign firms filing under Item 1 7 disclosure
rules, Item 18 disclosure rules, and matched U.S. firms
(1) Variable (2) Expected
sign on
Estimated parameters (t statistic)
(3) Item 17 (4) Item 17 (5) Item 18
parameter
firms matched fmns matched firms matched
to Item 18 firms to U.S. firms to U.S. firms
Intercept ±ao 0.111 (1.78)* 0.113 (4.36)** 0.230(13.28)***
AEARN + «, 2.107(2.12)** 0.047 (0.12) 1.013 (2.20)**
AEARN X D, (D, =-0 + ^21 3.266(1.99)**
for Item 17, Di = 1
for Item 18)
AEARN xD. (£»2 == + ^22 0.639(1.70)*
for Item 17, ^2 = 1
for U.S. firm)
AEARN X D3 (D3 == + 0(23 - 0.434 ( - 0.93)
for Item 18, D3 = 1
for U.S. firm)
AEARN X RAISE + 0:3 3.533 (1.92)* 0.797 (2.07)** 0.736(1.78)*
AEARN X MKBK + a4 0.227 (3.29)* * * 0.055 (1.74)* 0.125 (4.11)***
AEARN X PERS + as -1.711 (-1.29) 0.676(1.50) 1.881 (2.91)***
AEARN X TDSE
-oct -0.799 (-2.29)** -0.128 (-0.99) -0.119 (-4.08)**
Adjusted R~ .451 .050 .081
F value 18.04*** 3.62*** 14.53***
Number of 146 (73 pairs) 350 (175 pairs) 1072 (536 pairs)
observations
Model: RETURN=ao + aiAEARN + a2,AEARN x A + a3AEARNxRAISE+a4AEARN x MRBK + ajAEARN x
PERS + a^AEARN x TDSE + s.
Variables definitions: D = an indicator variable that equals 1 for Item 1 8 disclosure and for Item 1 7 disclosure for
//i (or one for matched U.S. firms and zero for foreign registrants for H2 and Hj). AEARN x D = an interaction
variable between AEARN and D. RAISE = an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm issued stock in the current
fiscal year and otherwise. AEARN x RAISE = an interaction variable between AEARN and RAISE. All other
variables are defined in Table 2.
* Significant at 10% (two-tailed).
* * Significant at 5% (two-tailed).
** * Significant at 1% (two-tailed).
AEARN, is positive and significant at the 5% level (two-tailed). The estimate for a2], the
coefficient on the interaction term AEARN x Di, is positive and significant at the 5% level
(two-tailed), supporting our first hypothesis that ERCs for Item 18 registrants are significantly
higher than ERCs for Item 17 registrants.'"
The estimated coefficient for a3, the interaction term AEARN x RAISE, is also positive
and significant at the 10% level. When we run the regression with AEARN x RAISE omitted,
the t statistic for the coefficient on AEARN x D^ increases fi*om 1.99 to 4.15. This suggests
We also included D, as an independent variable in addition to the interaction term AEARN x Z)„ and the
results do not change.
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that the effect of disclosure will be overstated if we fail to control for the effect of raising
capital, a correlated omitted variable. Estimated coefficients for other control variables are
significant at the conventional levels in the expected direction, with the exception of the
estimate for the interaction of earnings changes and earnings persistence (as). An adjusted R^
of 45.1% indicates that the regression model has a relatively high degree of explanatory
power compared to previous studies. Overall, our results suggest that ERCs for Item 18
disclosure are significantly higher than ERCs for Item 1 7 disclosure after controlling for other
ERC determinants and the need for raising capital in the United States.
We performed additional tests to verify the robustness of the results. Since our sample
contains multiple-year observations per firm, which may not be independent, our regression
results may be subject to the usual serial correlation problem of understating the standard
error and overstating the significance level. In the subsample that matches Item 17 to Item 18
registrants, we have an average of 2.65 firm-year observations per firm (median of 2 firm-
years). We perform a Durbin-Watson test to check the existence of autocorrelation. The
Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.14, indicating that a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot
be rejected at the 5% significance level. ^^ We also ran the regressions using Newey and
West's (1987) autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix, using the means of multiple-year
variables, and limiting the number of observations per firm to one (randomly chosen from
different years). The results from these three regression sensitivities are not qualitatively
different from those reported in Table 3. When we run the regressions by year for the Items 17
to 1 8 comparison, the experimental variables are only significant in two of six regressions
(note that we have 6 years of data). The lack of significance in the other four regressions is
probably attributable to low statistical power since the number of observations in these four
regressions ranges from 14 to 27. Overall, the statistical evidence suggests that autocorre-
lation does not inflate the significance of our results.
We examine how sensitive the results are to changes in the return window. Frost and
Kinney (1996) report that foreign issuers file annual and interim reports with longer lags, and
file interim reports less frequently than do U.S. firms.''* They report that Item 17 firms file
annual financial statements and make disclosures to the media 12.9 and 6.2 days later than
Item 1 8 filers, respectively. This suggests that less information is available on a timely basis
for the Item 17 filers, which may affect the return-earnings association. Frost and Kinney
also report that the mean lag for media disclosures (financial statements) is 72.3 and 78.5 days
(160.6 and 173.5 days) from year-end for Items 17 and 18 disclosures, respectively. Our
retum window, a 12-month window starting 3 months after year-end, captures the mean lags
for disclosures to the media but not the mean lag for financial statement disclosures submitted
with the 20-F filing. We find that the results are qualitatively similar when we use a 15-month
retum window starting 3 months after year-end.'^
' Durbin-Watson statistics for all three regressions range from 1.75 to 2.14, which do not reject the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation at 5% significance levels for their respective subsamples.
Our data set does not contain information on fihng and reporting lags, which is why we rely on Frost and
Kinney's (1996) descriptive statistics.
'"^ However, the results for the Item 17 to Item 18 comparison are qualitatively different if we use a 12-month
retum window starting 6 months after year-end. The t statistics on the experimental variables are not significant.
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Even though we match pairs by country, approximately 34% of the Item 17
registrants in the Items 17 to 18 subsample are from Canada. To see if the Canadian
group influences the results, we performed regression tests separately on Canadian and
non-Canadian observations (results are not reported). The adjusted R" are 72.6% and
18.8%, and the regressions on both partitions are significant with F statistics of 13.3
and 2.8 for the Canadian and non-Canadian groups, respectively. This indicates that
overall explanatory power is derived from both partitions. The estimated coefficient for
a2i in the non-Canadian partition is positive and significant at less than 5%, while the
estimate for aoi in the Canadian partition is positive and marginally significant at the
10% level.
5.3. Regression results for foreign registrants versus U.S. matchedfirms
Test results comparing Item 17 ERCs to matched U.S. ERCs for hypothesis 2 are
presented in column (4) of Table 3. The estimate for a22, the coefficient on the
interaction term AEARN x Z)2? is positive and significant at the 10% level (two-tailed)
supporting our second hypothesis that ERCs for U.S. matched firms are higher than
ERCs for Item 17 foreign registrants. The estimate for olt,, the coefficient on the
interaction term AEARN x RAISE, is also positive and significant at the 5% level.
Since U.S. firms fundamentally use Item 18 rules, this is consistent with our overall
proposition that higher earnings -return correlations are associated with higher levels of
disclosure. Excluding the matched pairs of Canadian registrants does not qualitatively
change the overall results. The estimated coefficients for other ERC determinant variables
have signs consistent with predictions, and the coefficient for MKBK is statistically
significant.
Column (5) of Table 3 presents the regression results for the comparison of Item 18
ERCs to matched U.S. ERCs (hypothesis 3). The estimate for oii^, the coefficient on the
interaction term AEARN x D^, is insignificant at conventional levels, which is consistent
with our third hypothesis predicting U.S. ERCs to be equal to Item 18 registrants ERCs.
The estimate for a3, the coefficient on AEARN x RAISE, is positive and significant at the
10% level. The estimated coefficients for other ERC determinant variables are statistically
significant with the expected signs.
6. Summary and concluding remarks
Using multivariate analysis and a matched sample design, this study examines whether
the market retums are differentially associated with earnings information of foreign
registrants under the alternative reporting rules required by Item 17 and Item 18 on form
20-F. The overall results indicate that the earnings-return association for Item 18 filers is
significantly higher than for country-, industry-, and size-matched Item 17 filers, after
controlling for the need for raising capital in the United States and other ERC determinant
variables.
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The majority of our results are consistent with the argument that a higher level of
disclosure is associated with a lower discount rate due to the reduced level of informational
uncertainty and a larger earnings-response coefficient. This suggests that the additional
disclosures mandated by the SEC in Item 1 8 filings may enhance the associated usefulness of
reported earnings. For the same reason mentioned above, we find lower ERCs for Item 1
7
foreign registrants compared to industry- and size-matched U.S. firms and similar ERCs for
Item 18 foreign registrants compared to industry- and size-matched U.S. firms. We contribute
to the literature by identifying a unique setting of differential disclosure levels and find that
the earnings-return association is positively related to the level of disclosure after controlling
the need for financing and other determinants of earnings-response coefficients.
The design of our study obliges us to recognize some caveats about the conclusiveness of
our results. First, since firms do not change from being an Item 17—or Item 18—during the
sample period, we cannot be completely certain that the results are not attributable to some
omitted variable firm characteristic for which Item 1 7 and Item 1 8 are proxies. Second, our
empirical analyses examine annual associations, which does not allow us to assign direct
causality. Finally, the use of a matched-pairs sample in the analyses reduces the general-
izability of the results.
Although there is pressure on the SEC to relax filing requirements for foreign registrants,
supporters of the current disclosure rules believe Item 18 rules may be useful to U.S.
investors. However, to understand fiilly the cost-benefit trade-offs of these disclosures, the
analysis would have to isolate the opportunity costs and specific reasons why a foreign
registrant that only lists securities on a U.S. exchange chooses not to use Item 18. A
reduced disclosure filing, such as those allowed under Item 17, may increase the cost of
equity capital, compelling managers to use other financing mechanisms, but may save the
opportunity cost of divulging sensitive and competitive information under Item 1 8 rules. A
rational market perspective suggests that managers of foreign registrants weigh the costs
and benefits of all reporting options and choose their disclosure options accordingly. Future
studies might consider the direct effects of these choices on firms' costs of capital and
competitive position.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, the authors' stated objective is to examine the relation between changes in
earnings and market returns under alternative disclosure options (Item 17 vs. Item 18) for
foreign companies that trade in U.S. capital markets. That is, they seek to address whether the
association between unexpected earnings and changes in stock prices is a function of how
forthcoming firms are in their disclosure. While this relation has been studied for U.S. firms
(see, for example, Gelb & Zarowin, 2002; Lundholm & Myers, 2002), I know of no studies
investigating this relation for foreign firms. Therefore, if there is a reason to expect that the
relation would be different for foreign versus domestic (U.S.) firms, then this study has the
potential to make a contribution to the accounting literature. Altematively, the paper could be
interpreted as addressing whether investors find Item 18 disclosures "more useful" than Item
17 disclosures.
2. Discussion methodology and findings
The authors use 'matched-pair' designs to investigate the relative earnings response
coefficients (ERCs) of Item 17 filers versus Item 18 filers, Item 17 filers versus U.S. firms,
and Item 18 filers versus U.S. firms. They find that the ERCs for Item 18 filers are
significantly higher than those for Item 17 filers, ERCs are significantly higher for U.S. firms
E-mail address: lamyers@uiuc.edu (L.A. Myers).
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than for Item 17 filers, and ERCs are not significantly different for Item 18 filers and U.S.
firms. While the second and third findings are largely consistent with those in Frost and
Kinney (1996), the difference in the ERCs of foreign registrants filing with Item 18 versus
Item 1 7 is a new finding. The authors interpret this finding as suggesting that the additional
disclosures provided under Item 1 8 decrease investor uncertainty, and this decrease results in
a lower cost of capital for firms that are more forthcoming in their disclosure.
2.7. Sample selection and research design
According to the authors, there are 966 firm-year observations with Item 1 8 filings and the
required Compustat data, and 299 Item 1 7 firm-year observations with Item 1 7 filings and the
required Compustat data. In their first regression (Item 17 vs. Item 18), the authors match on
country, four-digit SIC code, year, and assets. This yields 73 pairs (or 146 observations)
included in their tests. That is, the use of a matched-pair design results in the loss of 1119
otherwise useable observations. A similar reduction in power exists for the second and third
regression.
It is not clear why the authors chose a matched-pair design in light of the extremely poor
matches (for example, assets are significantly different between subsamples), their ability to
control for country, industry and size in the regression analysis, and the limited number of
candidate observations. A more powerful research design would be to include all observations
with useable data and control for those variables (i.e., country, industry, year, and firm size)
thought to (potentially) affect the association between the level of disclosure and the ERC.
Given that the authors chose a matched-pair design, a few comments come to mind. First,
matching at the four-digit SIC code level seems unnecessarily restrictive and likely resulted in
the loss of many observations. Matching at the two-digit SIC code level is quite common
when matched-pair designs are used. Second, the matching procedure should be described
more clearly so that it can be duplicated. For example, it is unclear how the authors prioritize
SIC codes versus assets.
2.2. The returns-earning model
To test for an association between a change in earnings and the level of disclosure, the
authors employ the "traditional ERC model" (Collins & Kothari, 1989) and interact a
number of independent variables with the change in earnings over the year. That is, they run
the following model:
7? = ao + ai AEamings -f a2AEamings*Disclosure indicator + a3AEamings*Raise
-t- ot4AEamings*Growth potential + asAEamings* Earnings persistence
-t- a6AEamings * Risk -|- e
The independent variables are included to ensure that the Disclosure indicator (the variable of
interest) is not merely a proxy for other factors that may influence the chosen level of
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disclosure and to control for factors previously documented to affect the returns-earnings
association.
With respect to the model specification, Donnelly (2002) shows that the model specifica-
tion matters when earnings contains both permanent and transitory components. Specifically,
a model that includes both the level and changes in eamings may be superior than that used
because it is more consistent with the eamings valuation model (Ohlson, 1995) and because it
helps to mitigate the errors-in-variables problem associated with the estimation of unexpected
eamings (Ali & Zarowin, 1992; Kothari, 2001). Further, the authors are interested mainly in
Oil (the coefficient on AEamings*Disclosure indicator) but because the Disclosure indicator
does not enter the equation separately, the interaction term could reflect the difference in
retums between the groups in question. For example, consider the results in Table 2. The
retums of U.S. firms are significantly greater than those of foreign firms (and retums of Item
18 firms appear to be significantly greater than those of Item 17 firms). Reporting the
regression results where the Disclosure indicator enters in separately would control for the
difference in intercepts.
It is interesting to note that the explanatory power across samples (in Table 3) is highly
variable. While the adjusted R" values seem somewhat low when foreign firms are compared
with U.S. firms (.050 and .081), the adjusted R~ is quite large (.451) when Item 18 filers are
compared with Item 17 filers. I suspect that this result may be due to influential observations,
which can be identified using procedures in Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980). More
importantly, the coefficient estimate on a2 seems implausibly large. Specifically, for Item
17 filers, the ERC estimate is 2.107, while for Item 18 filers, the ERC estimate is 5.373. If this
were driven by the cost of capital (as the authors suggest), the cost of capital would have to be
approximately half diS large for Item 18 filers as for Item 17 filers! If increased disclosure
really has such an effect on the cost of capital, then it is difficult to understand why all
managers would not choose to file under Item 18. While the authors make the conjecture that
proprietary information drives the choice of filing, additional evidence supporting this
conjecture (for example, an analysis of filing type by industry) would be informative.
Additional suggestions regarding the analysis follow. First, for foreign firms, the change in
eamings is often negative, suggesting that there may be more loss firms in the foreign firm
samples. Because ERCs likely vary for gains versus losses, the inclusion of a loss indicator
(in Table 3 analyses) may be revealing. Further, the analysis contains multiple-year
observations per firm (approximately 2.65) so the authors use a Durbin-Watson test to
check for autocorrelation. However, they do not have a sufficient number of observations per
firm to apply this test correctly, and so cross-sectional correlation remains an issue. Lastly,
matching on firm size (assets) is intended to control "for difference in firm-size related
information environments" but there are likely to be many non-firm-size-related differences
in informadon environments for foreign versus U.S. firms. For example, these samples likely
vary with respect to analyst activity and business press coverage. Additional controls for
these differences may be warranted.
With respect to the variable definitions, a few suggestions can be made. First, the authors
set the indicator 'Raise' to one if the firm raised capital in the current year, presumably
because managers must file Item 18 disclosures when going to the equity markets. However,
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if firms do not switch back and forth between Item 1 7 and Item 1 8 filings, then the Raise
indicator should be set to one if the firm raised capital in the current or prior years. Second,
the authors measure growth potential as the market-to-book ratio. A better measure may be to
follow Collins and Kothari (1989) subtract out the median market-to-book in that year (to
control for market-wide growth opportunities). Finally, the authors lose many observations
because their proxy for earnings persistence is the AR(1) coefficient on 5 to 10 years of
aimual earnings run by firm. When faced with similar data constraints, Dechow, Hutton, and
Sloan (1999) and Lundholm and Myers (2002) measure earnings persistence as the AR(1)
coefficient on 2 years of annual earnings run by industry.
3. Contribution
The authors motivate the paper, in part, by stating that the results in Frost and Kinney
(1996) are consistent with many other unexamined hypotheses (e.g., alternative sources of
disclosure) and that their results do not help us to understand the link between disclosure and
the cost of capital. The present study fails to address the first concern, and while they do
assert that "if additional disclosures of usefiil information reduce investors' informational
uncertainty, then investors will apply lower discount rates," this is hardly sufficient to address
the second concern. Moreover, it is not clear to me that the authors can (or should) attempt to
address this second concern in the present study because they cannot convincingly control for
all of the determinants of returns.
Further, the authors state that their "results suggest that higher levels of disclosure are
related to lower discount rates and higher earnings response coefficients." When discussing
their model, they state that they "expect ai to be positive and statistically significant if
earnings reported under Item 1 8 contain less informational uncertainty than earnings reported
under Item 17." My interpretation is that if a^ is positive and statistically significant, then a
given irmovation in earnings has a greater effect on returns for firms with greater disclosure.
However, as argued in Lundholm and Myers (2002), if disclosure is "good," then a unit
change in earnings should contain less surprise because the good disclosure would
presumably have allowed market participants to forecast the change in earnings. In fact,
Lundholm and Myers test the relation between the level of disclosure and ERCs using a
different proxy for the level of disclosure (AIMR scores) and find that "good disclosure"
reduces observed ERCs (but increases ERCs on future earnings). Therefore, it might be
interesting to investigate why opposite conclusions are drawn. Could the persistence of
earnings explain these differences? Could it be that the disclosures of interest in the two
studies describe something fundamentally different (e.g., disclosures that inform investors
about innovations in future earnings versus disclosures that allow investors to feel confident
in the quality of current period earnings changes)?
In conclusion, this paper raises many potentially interesting questions. Further research
may seek to explore such questions as whether (and how) the cost of capital is associated with
the level of disclosure, why some managers choose not to increase disclosure in light of
potentially large benefits, what factors explain the choice of disclosure level, and why the
L.A. Myers / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 163-167 167
level of disclosure may have a different effect on the relation between unexpected earnings
and returns for foreign versus domestic firms.
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The discussant raises a number of points that need to be considered in relation to our paper
and future research. We will address the points in same order presented by the discussant.
1. Sample selection and research design
The discussant questions why we use a matched-pairs design when a larger number of
observations is available. She correctly notes that matching on four dimensions, country,
industry, year, and size, causes a large loss of observations, which if used could provide a
more powerful test of the hypotheses.
There are several reasons why we use a matched-pairs design. First, we want to make our
results directly comparable to results presented by Frost and Kinney ( 1 996), which also use a
matched-pairs design. We contend that some of the insignificant results of Frost and Kinney
are due to the omission of important control variables in the analysis of eamings-retum
correlations. Note that we replicate Frost and Kinney's Z test and get similar results: the
eamings-retum correlation of Item 17 and Item 18 foreign registrants is not significantly
different fi-om the eamings-retum correlation of matched U.S. firms (see footnote 2 in the
paper). When we compare these same correlations after adding controls for financing and
ERC determination, we get significant differences. Thus, by using the same research design
that Frost and Kinney used, we can make a stronger case that the omission of control
variables may explain the insignificance in their resuhs.
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The second reason we chose to use a matched-pairs design is simply to increase the
probabihty of identifying a treatment effect (of disclosure) and not necessarily of measuring
the magnitude of the treatment effect. Randomization through matching may do a better job
of reducing the effects of treatment bias than standard regression on large unmatched samples
(see Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997; Rubin 1979). Larger samples typically require large
differences in means between the treatment group and the control group, and while larger
sample sizes may increase the precision of the estimates, they may also increase the bias on
treatments. This is particularly problematic in the disclosure research where sources of bias
through measurement error, omitted variables, and specification error are likely to be
significant.
Finally, power is not an issue in this study. Significant differences in the regressions are
achieved with the current matched samples. Unless we change the purpose of our tests, it does
not seem necessary to expand the sample for more statistical power.
The discussant also comments about the poor size matching as evidenced by the significant
differences in assets between the subsamples. We agree that the size matching of the Item 1
8
filers to U.S. firms may not be effective since all three size proxies (assets, sales, and market
value) are statistically different between the subsamples. However, the size matching for Item
17 to U.S. firms appears to be effective since two of the three size proxies are not statistically
different between the subsamples (see Table 2, Panel A of the paper). Although not reported
in the paper, two out of three size proxies are not significantly different between Item 1 7 and
Item 1 8 matched firms. The means for Item 1 7 matched to Item 1 8 filers were not provided
since they are qualitatively the same as the descriptive statistics provided for Item 1 7 filers in
the second matched-pairs subsample (Table 2, Panel A; Item 17 matched to the United States)
and the Item 18 filers in the third matched-pairs subsample (Table 2, Panel B; Item 18
matched to the United States).
In summary, size matching may not be effective in one of the three matched-pairs analyses,
namely the analysis on the Item 18 to U.S. matches. This particular analysis, while important
to the study, does not directly impact the basis for the primary findings in the study. Rather,
the matched-pairs analysis of Item 17 to Item 18 disclosures and Item 17 to U.S. disclosures
form the basis for the primary findings in the study. If there are any mismatches of size, it is
due to the fact that size is given the lowest priority in the matching process. We first match on
country (Item 17 to Item 18 only) then industry, year, and size. Had we first matched on size,
there would have been a greater likelihood of higher sample attrition than actually
experienced in our analysis.
2. The returns-earnings model
The discussant recommends using Ohlson's (1995) valuafion model, which may be a
superior specification because it considers both the level and the changes in earnings.
Although we do not footnote this, earlier drafts of the paper relied on Ohlson's model with
similar results. We changed to a Collins and Kothari (1989) ERC model based on review
comments from one of the referees.
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The discussant also suggests that we report resuhs where the disclosure indicator enters the
regression separately to control for difference in intercepts. We report the results to this
sensitivity in footnote 12, indicating that the estimated coefficients are not qualitatively
different.
The discussant raises concerns about the adjusted /?", noting that they range from 0.05 to
0.451. She suggests testing for influential observations using Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch
(1980). During the study, we ran sensitivities deleting extreme values of the residuals, which
did affect the significance level of the estimated coefficients. The use of Belsley et al. would
be a more rigorous test of influential observations.
She also comments about the relative magnitude of the Item 17 and Item 18 ERC
estimates, indicating that our results imply a cost of capital that is half as large for Item 1
8
filers as for Item 17. The ERC estimates are only as good as the specification and proxy
constructs will allow, and so it is not likely that bias is completely eliminated in the test. Also,
the use of a matched-pairs design means that the results are not generalizable to or from the
larger population.
The discussant is concerned with cross-sectional correlation due to multiple-year obser-
vations per firm, stating that the results of a Durbin-Watson test are not appropriate in this
setting (although it is not clear why the Durbin-Watson is not appropriate in this setting). The
referees were concerned with the issue of serial correlation as well, and to address their
concern, we report in the paper the results of sensitivities aimed at eliminating cross-sectional
or serial correlation from the sample. The sensitivities involve running the regressions as
follows: (1) using Newey and West's (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
COvariance matrix, (2) using the means of the multiple-year variables that reduces the
observations to one per firm, (3) randomly limiting the number of observations per firm to
one, and (4) running the regressions by year. The results of these four sensitivities, and a
sensitivity that includes a dummy for loss firms, are not qualitatively different from the results
reported in Table 3.
Lastly, the discussant recommends alternative proxies, additional control variables, and
suggests we clarify whether the nature of the disclosure is additional or preemptive
information about current earnings and how that will affect the eamings-retum relation.
These suggestions are insightful and useful in extending and expanding future research on
disclosure in international capital markets.
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Abstract
This paper develops a model of cultural, national, and corporate factors that influence the financial
disclosure of corporations. This model is then tested empirically using a sample of companies from 33
countries. The paper extends the literature on disclosure by considering a larger number of variables
that represent determinants of disclosure and by empirically testing the model using a larger number of
countries than prior studies. The model is tested using disclosure scores included in International
Accounting and Auditing Trends. The model considers the influence of culture, national political and
economic systems, and corporate financial and operating systems on the amount of corporate financial
disclosure. The results of the regression model indicate that disclosure is influenced by culture,
national systems, and corporate systems. The model developed is shown to provide a reasonably good
explanation of the disclosure decision. Differences among the components of the model help explain
differences in observed financial disclosure between companies in different countries and between
companies within the same country. The results indicate that the financial-disclosure decision for a
company is complex and influenced by many national and corporate factors.
© 2003 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
There is a large body of literature on financial reporting in cross-national contexts (Meek &
Saudagaran, 1990; Saudagaran & Meek, 1997). Zarzeski (1996) demonstrates that disclosure
depends on culture and market forces represented by the level of foreign sales, financial
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leverage, and firm size. Her study is limited to seven countries and includes 256 small, medium,
and large firms. Other studies have examined how other factors affect disclosure (Adhikari &
Tondkar, 1992;Belkaoui, 1983; Doupnik& Salter, 1995; Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995;Nair&
Frank, 1980; Salter, 1998; Salter & Niswander, 1995; Wallace, Naser, & Mora, 1994).
Financial-disclosure decisions are not made in a vacuum. The financial reporting disclosure
decision is one way that corporations communicate information. The mix of communication
sources and the quantity and quality of information disclosed are influenced by many factors
that need to be examined in order to thoroughly understand disclosure choices. To date,
individual papers in the literature investigating international disclosure choices have not con-
sidered a complete set of factors that influence the amount of disclosure. Since several ofthese
factors have led to weak or inconsistent results, this approach in the literature (considering less
than a complete model) has resulted in an incomplete understanding of the disclosure process.
This paper takes a broader view, combining many of the factors considered individually in
the existing literature. By examining these factors together, we can develop a more
comprehensive model of the disclosure decision and we can control for interrelationships
among various influences on disclosure. Since the variables included in our model are less
likely to be a proxy for other factors the weak or inconsistent results of prior literature may be
improved upon. This study seeks to extend the financial reporting disclosure literature by
considering a larger number of countries than in prior studies and by testing a broader set of
factors that represent determinants of disclosure. The effects of culture and a number of social
systems have already been modeled (Harrison & McKinnon, 1986). We then identify
disclosure determinants fi-om cultural, national political and economic systems, and corporate
financial and operating systems.
Examining the influence on corporate disclosure decisions of all these systems together
makes a significant contribution to the international disclosure literature. In this paper, we
develop a model that specifies how accounting systems interact with other cultural, national,
and corporate systems and then empirically test this interaction. This relationship is important to
study since the effect ofchanges in national and economic policies on accounting disclosures is
not well understood. Too often, financial-reporting disclosure is considered exclusively a firm-
specific phenomena, but this study will show that far more is involved. Empirically testing these
proposed interrelationships with a large number ofcountries contributes to our understanding of
the role that accounting plays within the social systems of a nation.
We use multiple-regression analysis to test the significance of disclosure determinants. Our
results indicate that disclosure is influenced by factors fi-om each ofthe identified systems even
while controlling for all of the systems at the same fime. To determine the influence of the
systems, we use F tests. The results indicate that financial disclosure is a function of culture,
national political and economic systems, and corporate financial and operating systems.
Some of the determinants we considered, such as foreign sales and legal systems, have
already been documented in the literature. Other determinants, such as religion, polifical
fi"eedom, auditor, and leverage have been tested and shown to have a weak or inconsistent
relationship with disclosure. Some variables, such as dividends and the number of foreign
exchanges or industries, have received little attention in prior studies. By considering all these
variables together, we show that numerous determinants influence disclosure including
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several that have not been empirically examined in the prior literature or yielded consistent
results. We find that disclosure is a more complex process than previously documented. This
study provides a more complete analysis of the corporate-disclosure decision than does the
existing literature and tests these conclusions on a broader set of countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the existing literature, develops
the model used in the paper, and states the hypotheses to be tested. Data are discussed in
Section 3. Methodology is discussed in Section 4, followed by analysis of results in Section 5
and then conclusions in Section 6.
2. Theory development
Accounting is a social system.' Harrison and McKinnon (1986) model social change within
the context of culture, intrusive events, intra-systems activity, and trans-system activity.
Accounting exists along with other systems, such as political systems and economic
systems. Systems within a country share a cultural environment. Culture influences what goes
on within each system as well as how the systems interact with one another.
Intra-systems activity refers to interactions among elements of a system. Trans-system
activity refers to interactions among different systems. Intrusive events combine with these
interactions to produce system change.
Fig. 1 is a model of corporate disclosure. This model is used in the study to examine the
factors that influence disclosure at the corporate level. The model incorporates national
culture, national political systems, national economic systems, and corporate systems. These
systems are all shown to interact with one another in the model, resulting in a corporation's
response about the amount of information to disclose.
The Enron situation provides an excellent example of how this model functions. Enron
executives made corporate financing and operating decisions in light of existing cultural and
national systems in the United States. These same executives made decisions about what to
disclose about the company and its various special purpose entities. Investors and creditors
relied on these disclosures, interpreting them within U.S. culture and national systems (laws,
GAAP, etc.) These disclosures were not adequately transparent to represent economic reality
for Enron. The company declared bankruptcy and many individuals that had relied on the
disclosures made by Enron sustained losses (Thomas, 2002).
The Enron bankruptcy can be considered an intrusive event that has created a catalyst for
changes within the corporate disclosure model. This bankruptcy resulted from behavior
(excessive private benefit by a few at the expense of many) inconsistent with U.S. cultural
norms. Viewing these misdeeds culturally, individuals from different walks of life have created
pressure on other corporations and Congress (culture interacting with national systems and
corporate systems).
' Harrison and McKinnon (1986) describe social systems in terms of three elements: interdependence, norms
and values, and cultural determinants of behavior. Their paper discusses accounting as a social system.
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Fig. 1 . Model of corporate disclosure.
The bankruptcy itself (corporate-system change) also created pressure directly on
national institutions: Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), and the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) all immediately started considering what went wrong. This pressure has
been leading to promulgating new legislation, changes in the audit process, greater
involvement of the SEC in accounting and auditing, and changes in listing requirements
by the NYSE. An intra-system change is also occurring within national systems; the role of
the SEC in accounting and auditing is being examined. Congress, the SEC, and the
accounting profession are examining the proper role of government in monitoring the
accounting and reporting of corporations as well as overseeing the audit process. In
addition, the Enron bankruptcy has caused intra-system activities, causing other corpo-
rations to examine their own situations to determine if they are making some of the same
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errors as Enron. Companies are examining their financial and operating structures as well
as their disclosures.
Corporate systems are also changing as a result ofthe changes occurring in the culture (less
trust that management is doing what is in shareholders' interests) and national systems (laws
and regulations being discussed). There is pressure on companies to examine the use of stock
options and incentives in changing ownership structures, the size and diversification of
corporations, and the corporate governance structure. The auditor- client relationship is also
likely to be changed as a resuh of voluntary actions by audit firms and legislation. Board of
director membership is likely to change as a result of legislation and/or exchange listing
requirements. One change in the corporate system has already resulted. The number of S&P
500 companies choosing to expense stock-option costs has risen from 2 to 90 (Levinsohn,
2002). Thus, changes in national systems are directly impacting corporate systems.
The end result of all these changes on disclosure is not yet fiilly determined. Corporations
are voluntarily providing more information on some aspects of their businesses. It is likely
that a number of mandated disclosures will also resuh. However, this example shows how a
corporate system change by one corporation can lead to changes and interactions between and
within culture, national systems, and corporate systems. These interactions and repercussions
are what is meant by the double-sided arrows in Fig. 1 . A significant change anywhere in the
model (intrusive event) can lead to multiple changes throughout the model (intra-system and
trans-system changes). The disclosure decision is thus extremely complex and dynamic as the
model never comes to rest at a steady state. This paper considers all of these systems in
determining a corporation's disclosure response.
The individual systems and operational variables within those systems used in the empirical
tests are discussed next. While these systems are discussed individually, it must be noted, as the
previous example illustrates, that these systems are constantly interacting with one another and
a change in one system can lead to responses in all the other systems. Thus, the model is
dynamic and the corporate disclosure response, therefore, is also a dynamic variable.
2.1. National culture
Culture influences how people perceive situations and organize institutions. Hofstede ( 1 99 1
)
identifies five cultural dimensions: power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance,
masculinity, and long-term orientation. Long-term orientation is not used in this study,
however, because it is negatively correlated with individualism (Yeh & Lawrence, 1995).
Power distance represents the extent to which people tolerate unequal distribution ofpower
within society. A high power distance index score means that people have a high tolerance for
power inequality. Individualism refers to the extent to which people are independent as
opposed to collectivism, in which people are organized into strong groups. Uncertainty
avoidance represents the extent to which people feel threatened by unknown situations.
Masculine societies stress achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material success. Fem-
inine societies stress relationships, modesty, caring for the weak, and quality of life.
Gray (1988) uses these cultural dimensions to develop four accounting values: profes-
sionalism, uniformity, conservatism, and secrecy. Of these values, secrecy relates to the
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amount of disclosure. As secrecy increases, the amount of public disclosure decreases.
Secrecy increases with uncertainty avoidance and power distance and decreases with
individualism and masculinity. Salter and Niswander (1995) find that individualism and
uncertainty avoidance were associated with secrecy as predicted but that power distance and
masculinity were not significant. Zarzeski (1996) finds that disclosure (the opposite of
secrecy) increased with individualism, masculinity, and power distance and decreased with
uncertainty avoidance. She comments that power distance may have had the opposite sign
predicted because it is moderately correlated with individualism.
Other cultural factors may also influence corporate disclosure." As the level of education
increases, the number of financial statement users may be expected to increase (Doupnik &
Salter, 1995). As a result, the amount of corporate disclosure may increase with the level of
education.
Religious beliefs greatly influence the cultural fabric of a country. Hamid, Craig, and
Clarke (1993) note that the Islamic tradition places ethical/social activity ahead of individual
profit maximization. Speculative investments, such as margin trading, are not allowed
because Islam prohibits transactions involving uncertainties. Partnerships are a common
form of business organization. These factors limit stock market development. Trust underhes
relationships, reducing the need for accounting as a means of financial reporting. Thus,
companies in Islamic countries may disclose less information. Goodrich (1986), however,
finds no relationship between accounting principles and socioeconomic factors. One of the
socioeconomic factors was a Cathohc culture.
This paper considers Hofstede's (1991) cultural variables, education, and religion to be
measures of a country's culture. These cultural factors are expected to have an effect on the
amount of disclosure the companies within a country provide.
HI. National culture influences the amount of corporate disclosure.
2.2. National systems
National systems include institutions that affect all companies within the country. This
study considers political systems and economic systems. The political and economic systems
chosen by a country are influenced by and influence that country's culture. Thus, culture
interacts with the national systems as they in turn influence corporate-level decisions.
2.2.1. Political systems
Belkaoui (1983) argues that disclosure increases with political freedom. Political freedom
can be measured by political rights and civil liberties. Political rights are the ability to
participate in the political process through such means as voting. Civil liberties represent
Nair and Frank (1980) use official language as a proxy for culture and find that language helps to classify
countries as to amounts of disclosure. However, they provide no conceptual explanation for their results.
Saudagaran and Meek (1997) note that accounting seems to be more developed in English-speaking countries than
in other countries. They also provide no causal explanation. Most countries with English as an official language
use a common law legal system. Therefore, language is not directly considered in this paper.
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individual freedom from state control (McColm, 1992). Political structure, such as democracy
or monarchy, also reflects the degree of political freedom. While Belkaoui expected political
freedom and corporate disclosure to be correlated, he found no significant relationship.
However, Goodrich (1986) does report a significant correlation between political system and
accounting clusters. Deese (1998) finds a correlation between political freedom and economic
freedom. Deese argues that economic freedom may be related to economic development and,
thus, corporate disclosure (Salter, 1998).
2.2.1.1. Legal system. A country's legal system may influence the financial reporting
system. Salter and Doupnik (1992) classify countries into the common law family and the
Romano-Germanic family and demonsfrate that the legal system is related to accounting
practices. The common law family is characterized by solutions to specific cases. The
Romano-Germanic family is characterized by codified laws, including national accounting
standards. Common law may create an environment, such as a shareholder-oriented corporate
governance model, where corporate disclosure is increased to satisfy the specific needs, in-
cluding information asymmetry, of individual corporations (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000).
Doupnik and Salter ( 1 995) report that common law countries have higher disclosure scores than
code law countries. Jaggi and Low (2000) report similar results at the individual firm level.
2.2.1.2. Press. Cooke and Wallace (1990) hst financial press as a factor that influences
accounting regulation. Newspapers are a significant source of information. Societies that
desire more information may support more newspapers. Companies may respond to this
desire for more information by increasing the amount of information they disclose.
A country's political system is described here in terms of the freedom of citizens, the form
of the legal system, and the influence of the press. These factors are expected to have a
significant relationship with the amount of corporate disclosure.
H2. National political systems influence the amount of corporate disclosure.
2.2.2. Economic systems
Economic systems influence how companies and investors relate to one another. These
systems provide structures that influence the information that needs to be disclosed. This study
considers how disclosure is related to economic development, inflation, and the capital
markets.
^ Berry (1987) and Nobes (1983) classify countries as macro-uniform or micro-based in economic orientation.
Nobes (1987) describes accounting in the macroeconomic framework as being subordinated to national economic
policies. In uniform systems, governments use accounting to administer business policies. Microeconomic
systems have market-oriented economies where accounting is focused on businesses, independent of government.
Companies in microeconomic systems with market-oriented economies would be most likely to benefit fi"om
disclosing information. Doupnik and Salter (1993) find that microeconomic countries have a higher level of
disclosure than macroeconomic countries. However, economic orientation is highly correlated with the legal
system. In particular, most common law countries are microeconomic and most code law countries are
macroeconomic. Therefore, economic orientation is not tested in this paper.
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2.2.2.1. Economic development. As an economy becomes more developed, firms need to
raise more capital. As a result, the need for financial reporting increases. Salter (1998) finds
that average firm disclosure is higher in developed countries than in emerging markets.
Similarly, Adhikari and Tondkar (1992), using stock exchange disclosure scores, find
marginal evidence that disclosure is lower in agrarian economies.
2.2.2.2. Inflation. Meek and Saudagaran (1990) identify inflation as an environmental
factor that influences accounting. Inflation violates the historical cost assumption. Companies
that operate in environments with high inflation may be more likely to use price-level
accounting (Archambault & Archambault, 1999). They may also increase disclosure to
further assist investors. Doupnik and Salter (1995) report a positive correlation between
inflation and disclosure among countries with a macroeconomic orientation.
2.2.2.3. Capital markets. Capital markets provide opportunities for investors to trade secu-
rities. The nature of capital markets will then influence the information requirements of inves-
tors. Adhikari and Tondkar (1 992) and Doupnik and Salter (1 995) find that disclosure increases
with capital market size. Therefore, companies from countries with large capital markets should
disclose more information than companies from countries with small capital markets.
This study models a country's economic system as a function of the extent of economic
development, level of inflation, and development of the capital markets. These countrywide
economic factors are expected to influence the level of corporate disclosure.
H3. National economic systems influence the amount of corporate disclosure.
2.3. Corporate systems
In addition to national systems that affect all companies within a country, individual
corporations engage in a number of social systems that result in each corporation being
unique. This study considers factors that relate to financial and operating systems. These
unique responses, however, are determined within the cultural and national systems that the
corporation operates in. Likewise, the corporate finance and operating decisions can create
changes in the national and cultural systems."*
2.3.1. Financial systems
Financial systems deal with the capital-generation process. This study considers own-
ership, exchange listings, dividends, auditor, and leverage.
2.3.1.1. Ownership. Investors are a primary beneficiary of corporate disclosure. However,
investors who own a large percentage ofa company are more able to obtain information directly
from the company. Companies with such large block owners are also less reliant on smaller
"* The Enron discussion earlier in the paper stresses how corporate operating and financing decisions are likely
to lead to some national-system changes within capital markets and/or accounting.
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investors. As a result, the need for corporate disclosure may decrease (LaPorta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Schadewitz & Blevins, 1998).
2.3.1.2. Exchange listings. Exchanges establish disclosure regulations. Adhikari and
Tondkar (1992) report disclosure scores for leading exchanges. A company's disclosure
policy is expected to be influenced by the disclosure policies of the exchanges it trades on.
Ownership dispersion may increase with the number of exchanges on which a firm is listed,
increasing a firm's disclosure.
2.3.1.3. Dividends. Dividends provide information to investors about the amount and timing
of future cash flows (Miller & Rock, 1985). The information provided by dividends may
substitute for other forms of corporate disclosure. This is especially true in instances where
capital markets are less developed and/or subject to manipulation in the trading of securities
(Previts & Bricker, 1 994). As a result, firms that pay dividends may reduce corporate disclosure.
2.3.1.4. Auditor. Wallace et al. (1994) suggest that the contents of annual reports may be
influenced by auditors. Larger audit firms may try to improve the perceived quality of the
annual reports by having clients disclose more information. As a result, firms audited by one
of the Big Six accounting firms may disclose more information than other firms. However,
Wallace et al. find no significant relation between auditor size and disclosure among Spanish
firms. Similarly, based on a meta-analysis, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) find no relation
between auditor size and disclosure.
2.3.1.5. Leverage. Meek et al. (1995) and Wallace et al. (1994) predict that highly leveraged
firms disclose more information in order to reduce the agency costs of debt. Wallace et al. find
no effect of leverage on disclosure. Meek et al. find that disclosure decreases with leverage.
Zarzeski ( 1 996) predicts that disclosure decreases with leverage because creditors may be
able to obtain private information. She also finds that disclosure decreases with leverage.
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) conclude from their meta-analysis that disclosure increases with
leverage. Jaggi and Low (2000) find that disclosure increases with leverage in common law
systems and has no significant relation in code law systems. Thus, various studies have reported
conflicting results.
Corporations make many decisions about the financial structure of the company. This
paper considers block ownership, foreign-exchange listings, dividend policies, auditor choice,
and use of debt as components of corporate financial systems. Disclosure choices are
expected to be a function of these finance-related decisions.
H4. Corporate financial systems influence the amount of corporate disclosure.
2.3.2. Operating systems
Companies make a number of operating decisions that may influence the information
needs of financial-statement users. This study considers firm size, number of industries, and
foreign sales.
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2.3.2.1. Firm size. Several studies have found that disclosure increases with firm size.
Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Meek et al. (1995), Wallace et al. (1994), and Zarzeski (1996) are
recent examples of such studies. The theoretical reason for this relationship is less clear.
Zarzeski claims it may be due to public demand for information and international resource
dependence. Other possible explanations could be that large companies disclose more to
reduce political pressure or that large companies have the resources to produce more
disclosures. Whatever the reason, large firms are expected to disclose more information than
small firms.
2.3.2.2. Number of industries. The disclosure needs of firms may increase as the firm
operates in a larger number of industries in order to satisfy the information needs associated
with obtaining a broader set of resources (Zarzeski, 1996). In addition, the competitive costs
of disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983) may decrease as a firm becomes more diversified.
Therefore, firms may increase disclosure as they increase the number of industries in which
they operate.
2.3.2.3. Foreign sales. Companies with foreign sales are likely to require foreign resources,
such as labor and capital, to support those operations. Zarzeski (1996) predicts that companies
will disclose more information if they have large relafive foreign sales in order to acquire the
necessary resources. Her results support her prediction.
Operating decisions are also made by corporate managers and directors. Firm size, number
of industries, and percent of foreign sales revenue are identified in this study as operating
decisions that are expected to lead to differential amounts of corporate disclosure.
H5. Corporate operating systems influence the amount of corporate disclosure.
3. Data
The sample for this study consists of the 1000 leading industrial companies fi"om the 41
countries included in International Accounting and Auditing Trends (CIFAR, 1995). Each
company is assigned a total index disclosure score equal to the average of the disclosure
scores of seven information categories (number of information variables in parentheses):
general information (8), income statement (11), balance sheet (14), fiands-flow statement (5),
accounting policies (20), stockholders' information (17), and supplementary information
(10). The disclosure score for each category is equal to the percentage, excluding non-
applicable items, of information available based on 1993 or 1992 annual reports. A total of
85 information variables are included in the seven information categories. Within each
category, the disclosure score is an unweighted index of voluntary and nonvoluntary
information disclosures. The total index disclosure is an unweighted average of the seven
categories. Unweighted scores reduce subjectivity and may be considered the norm in
annual report studies (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999). Inclusion of both voluntary and non-
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voluntary disclosures is appropriate in this study because both forms of disclosure result
from social-system processes.
Company-specific data were gathered from First Search Worldscope. These data include
geographic segment sales, common equity, total assets, dividends per share, earnings per
share, exchanges fraded on, number of SIC codes (up to five), auditor, and percentage
ownership by owners with at least 5%. Missing data were gathered from various sources
such as Excite Money and Investing Financial Statements, Hoovers Company Capsule
Financials, SEC filings, or annual reports. Company-specific data, including foreign sales,
could not be found for 239 companies, leaving a sample of 761 in 37 countries.
Cultural-dimension scores were gathered from Hofstede (1991), legal-system family
(common law or code law) from Salter and Doupnik (1992) or the World Factbook Country
Profiles on Lexis-Nexis, and political rights and civil liberty scores from McColm (1992).
Economic development was based on classification as developed or emerging as found in the
World Development Report, 1997. The following data were gathered from Emerging Markets
Data Base 1996 Factbook: 1994 GNP, 1985-1994 average inflation rate, and stock-market
capitalization. The following data were gathered from the World Factbook Country Profiles
on Lexis-Nexis: adult illiteracy; the proportion of population that is Roman Catholic,
Protestant, Jewish, Islamic, or Buddhist; and newspaper circulation per 1000.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard
deviation
Total disclosure 75.686 77 16 94 9.017
Foreign sales 0.327 0.276 1.000 0.264
Debt ratio 0.666 0.672 0.032 2.295 0.183
Log assets 15.573 15.641 10.440 19.533 1.318
Uncertainty avoidance 55.775 46 8 112 21.389
Individualism 70.792 76 13 91 22.377
Masculinity 59.105 62 5 95 20.079
Power distance 45.551 40 11 104 15.671
Adult illiteracy 0.040 0.03 0.62 0.074
Islamic 0.026 0.998 0.118
Catholic 0.280 0.280 1.000 0.276
Protestant 0.368 0.5 0.980 0.284
Jewish 0.010 0.820 0.052
Buddhist 0.128 0.950 0.294
Political rights 1.332 1 1 6 0.985
Civil liberties 1.670 1 1 5 0.930
Circulation 284.344 317 9 684 138.778
Inflation (%) 13.8 3.3 1.3 913 88.20
Market capitalization 0.922 1.018 0.137 3.243 0.553
deflated by GNP
Foreign exchange 0.792 10 1.550
Dividend payout 0.827 0.363 176 7.023
Number of SIC codes 3.939 4 1 5 1.268
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Table 2
Correlation matrix
Variable TD FS DR LA UA ID MS PD Al IS CT PT JW BD PR
TD
FS
DR
LA
UA
ID
MS
PD
AI
IS
CT
PT
JW
BD
PR
.00 .37 -.09 .12 -.43 .36 -.18 -.26 -.09 .05
1.00 -.05 .05 -.14 .15 -.33 -.27 -.22 -.11
1.00 .23 .25 -.04 .17 -.03 -.11 -.13
1.00 .18 .20 .32 -.07 -.33 -.26
1.00 -.48 .43 .33 -.13 -.14
1.00 -.12 -.66 -.26 -.39
1.00 .13 -.08 -.11
1.00 .34 .45
1.00 .63
1.00
-.15
.13
-.03 -
-.07 -
.18 -
.14
-.16 -
.14 -
-.07 -
-.19 -
1.00 -
1
.33 .04
.16 -.00
.10 -.02
.04 -.06
.61 .03
.63 .05
.45 -.04
.64 -.17
.06 .00
.24 .05
.27 -.05
.00 -.02
1.00
-.24
-.23
.17
.19
.51
-.67
.55
.41
-.13
.08
-.49
-.59
-.09
1.00
-.05
-.19
-.18
-.35
-.16
-.56
-.11
.59
.69
.58
-.16
-.22
.00
.17
1.00
Variable CL LG CR DV IF MC FE DP B6 NS
TD -.11 -.32 .03 .22 -.33 .29 12 .06 .26 .19
FS -.19 .18 -.07 .22 -.02 -.15 29 .04 .04 .24
DR -.04 .22 .09 .16 .09 -.17 - 01 .04 -.10 .09
LA -.23 .08 .32 .39 -.16 -.05 24 .06 .21 .15
UA .12 .71 -.02 -.03 .11 -.50 11 -.04 -.18 .12
ID -.74 -.56 .27 .47 -.18 -.04 - 09 .05 .28 -.14
MS .13 -.04 .23 .06 -.06 .07 - 04 .01 .02 .03
PD .67 .19 -.32 -.56 .17 .30 - 02 -.03 -.15 .05
AI .57 -.28 -.38 -.71 .19 .32 - 10 -.01 -.26 -.10
IS .54 -.16 -.26 -.48 -.02 .46 - 04 -.01 -.26 -.00
CT -.19 .09 -.45 -.04 .20 -.45 04 -.01 -.03 .02
PT -.45 -.37 .28 .19 -.15 .05 - 10 .03 .20 -.18
JW -.05 -.14 -.00 .06 -.01 -.05 - 03 -.00 .05 -.11
BD .40 .43 .28 .02 -.07 .14 05 -.03 -.09 .14
PR .83 -.11 -.43 -.80 .09 .57 - 05 -.03 -.17 .03
CL 1.00 .14 -.50 -.71 .19 .39 01 -.03 -.22 .14
LG 1.00 -.08 .02 .13 -.50 22 -.05 -.18 .26
CR 1.00 .53 -.24 .00 - 10 .02 .22 -.16
DV 1.00 -.39 -.29 01 .03 .23 .05
IF 1.00 -.15 08 -.01 -.09 -.13
MC 1.00 - 12 .02 .10 -.00
FE 1 00 -.02 .03 .17
DP 1.00 .01 -.06
B6 1.00 .00
NS 1.00
This table shows Pearson correlation coefficients between pairs of variables. Detailed variable definitions can
found in the Methodology section of the paper.
be
J.J. Archambault, M.E. Archambault / The International Journal of Accounting 38 (2003) 173-194 185
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the total sample of companies. The table presents
the mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation for all of the continuous and
index-value variables considered in the regression models. Firm size ranges from US$34.2
million to US$304,140 million, with mean size equal to US$5798 million.^ Firm size is similar
to that used in Zarzeski (1996) (US$24 million, US$192,876 million, and US$6853 million,
respectively). Means of other independent variables used in Zarzeski are also similar to those in
the data used in this study. The dichotomous variables (legal system and Big 6 auditor) are not
included.
A correlation matrix for the variables used in the study is presented in Table 2. This table
shows some moderately high correlations between variables. The correlation of economic
development with adult illiteracy and inflation is high enough to create multicollinearity
problems. Economic development was therefore not included in the regression model.
There are several high correlations involving cultural variables. This is consistent with the
Harrison and McKinnon (1986) model. Moderate correlation also exists among political
freedom, legal system, and capital market size. None of these variables were dropped,
however, because they generally maintained significance in the results.
4. Methodology
Regression analysis, with the White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, is
used to measure the effect of factors on disclosure. The regression model is
TD = cr + /3iFS -f /?2DR + /^jLA + /?4UA + f35lD + peMS + /^yPD + /^sAI + /^glS
+ AoCT + A iPT + A2JW + A3BD + /3i4PR + A5CL + /?i6LG + /3i7CR
+ /?i8lF + /3i9MC + /32oFE + /^2iDP + /322B6 + /^23NS + s
where: TD = total disclosure score gathered from CIFAR (1995); FS = sum of foreign
geographic segment sales divided by total sales; DR=(total assets — common equity)/total
assets; LA = natural logarithm of total assets; UA = uncertainty avoidance score from
Hofstede (1991); ID = individualism score from Hofstede; MS = masculinity score form
Hofstede; PD = power distance score from Hofstede; AI = adult illiteracy rate; IS = proportion
of population that is Islamic; CT = proportion of population that is Roman Catholic;
PT = proportion of population that is Protestant; JW = proportion of population that is Jewish;
BD = proportion of population that is Buddhist; PR apolitical rights score from McColm
(1992): 1 (high) to 7 (low); CL = civil liberties score from McColm: 1 (high) to 7 (low);
LG = legal system, common law = and code law= 1; CR = newspaper circulation per 1000;
^ Actual total assets are reported here while the log of total assets is reported in Table 1 and used in the
analysis. The actual numbers are reported to make comparisons with Zarzeski (1996).
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Table 3
Regression model results (coefficient, t statistic)
Variable Hypothesis Expected
sign
Model
A B C
Intercept 38.802 54.841 48.625
(5.76)*** (12.72)*** (8.52)***
Foreign sales H5 (+) 12.120 9.119 7.898
(8.53)*** (8.25)*** (7.53)***
Debt ratio H4 (-) - 0.864 -1.865 0.889
(-0.43) (-1.20) (0.44)
Firm size H5 (+) 0.967 1.146 0.115
(3.20)*** (4.51)*** (0.47)
Uncertainty HI (-) -0.116 -0.128 0.076
avoidance (-3.94)*** (-7.57)*** (1.84)**
Individualism HI (+) 0.160 0.084 0.147
(5.23)*** (4.60)*** (3.66)***
Masculinity HI (+) 0.052
(1.75)**
0.012 (0.77) -0.137
(-4.51)***
Power distance HI (-) 0.223 0.037 -0.129
(4.15)*** (1.33)* (-2.72)***
Adult illiteracy HI \ ) - 13.280
(-1.51)*
Islamic HI 16.332
(3.02)***
Catholic HI 9.927
(2.29)**
Protestant HI 9.580
(2.14)**
Jewish HI 2.442 (0.58)
Buddhist HI 13.445
(2.60)***
Political rights H2 (-) -2.757
(-3.69)***
Civil liberties H2 (-) 5.878
(7.40)***
Legal system H2 (-) -6.788
(-3.76)***
Newspaper H2 (+) - 0.002
circulation (-0.52)
Inflation H3 (+) -0.017
(-2.57)***
Market H3 (+) 4.111
capitalization (3.34)***
Foreign exchange H4 (+) 0.573
(3.12)***
Dividend payout H4 (-) 0.024
(3.69)***
Big 6 auditor H4 (+) 3.962
(2.58)***
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Table 3 {continued)
Variable Hypothesis Expected Model
sign A B C
(+) 0.895
(421)***
.303 .291 .499
31.797 45.630 27.835
.000 .000 .000
Number of
SIC codes
Adjusted R'
F statistic
Probability of F
H5
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
IF =1985-1994 average inflation rate; MC = market capitalization deflated by GNP;
FE = number of foreign exchanges on which company trades; DP = dividend payout ratio;
B6= 1 if auditor is a Big 6 firm, otherwise; NS = number of SIC Codes (up to 5).
Wald tests are used to test hypotheses. Therefore, the emphasis is on the explanatory power
of sets of variables representing various social systems. The effects of individual variables are
presented to allow the reader to better interpret the results. However, the sign or significance
of individual variables is not subject to hypothesis testing.
5. Analysis of results
Table 3 presents results of the regression models with the White (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. Models A and B replicate the findings of Zarzeski (1996). These
models also serve to test whether the data gathered from public sources in this study are
comparable to the data she used. Model C tests the hypotheses of this study. Table 4
summarizes the sample size by country for each model.^
Model A includes only those variables and companies from those countries included by
Zarzeski (1996). Each coefficient has the same sign as Zarzeski and each coefficient, except
debt ratio, is significant. The existing literature reports inconsistent results on the effect of
leverage on disclosure. The adjusted R^ is .30, somewhat lower than her .48. Overall, Model
A is very similar to the results of Zarzeski.
Model B includes the same variables as Model A, but includes 761 companies from 37
countries. Results are similar to those in Model A except that the coefficient on masculinity
loses significance and the coefficient on power distance is only marginally significant. This
shows that the increases of disclosure with foreign sales, firm size, individualism, and power
distance, and the decrease of disclosure with uncertainty avoidance generalize to a larger set
Jaggi and Low (2000) report similar results in their disclosure study whether they included 503 firms Irom 28
countries or 401 firms ft-om six countries. Therefore, no minimum sample size per country was used in this study
in order to make the results more generalizable.
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of countries than that used by Zarzeski (1996). Culture and a multinational orientation are
strong influences on disclosure.
Model C includes all variables tested in this study and includes 621 companies from 33
countries.^ The adjusted R~ increases from .29 for Model B to .50. Consistent with Zarzeski
(1996), the coefficients are significantly positive on foreign sales and individualism.
However, the coefficients are not significant on firm size and debt ratio and significant,
but the opposite sign, on uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and power distance. Additional
tests were conducted to examine the firm-size result. These are described later in the paper.
The cultural variables may have switched signs due to multicoUinearity issues. As indicated
in Table 2, they are correlated with several other variables.^
For each hypothesis, a Wald test was used to measure the significance of the related
variables as a whole and an F statistic was computed. Table 5 presents the results. The tests
indicate that each social system significantly influences corporate disclosure.
Disclosure decreases with adult illiteracy, as expected. Furthermore, the coefficients on the
forms of religion, except Jewish, are significant. However, the coefficient on Islam is
positive, which is inconsistent with Hamid et al. (1993). F tests indicate that cultural
variables as a whole and the cultural variables included by Zarzeski (1996) are significant at
the P=.0000 level. The F test for the cultural variables not included in Zarzeski is not
significant. However, the F tests for the religion variables, which have not been empirically
tested previously in the literature, show religion to be marginally significant. These resuhs
indicate that cultural variables beyond those considered by Hofstede (1991) influence
disclosure.
Political rights and civil liberties are scaled one to seven, with one representing high
political freedom. The coefficient on political rights is significantly negative, consistent with
Belkaoui's (1983) prediction. However, the coefllcient on civil liberties is significantly
positive. The coefficient on newspaper circulation is not significant. These results are difficult
to interpret because the political-freedom variables are correlated with each other and with
newspaper circulation and market capitalization. Companies disclose more if they are from
countries with common law (coded zero in the data), consistent with Doupnik and Salter
(1995). Overall, these results indicate that political-system variables influence disclosure
(F= 16.57, P=.0000).
^ The model was first estimated with ownership included as a variable. The coefficient on ownership was not
significant {t=QAA). Furthermore, the sample size was only 504 firms from 32 countries. Given its effect on
sample size while not being significant. Model C was then estimated without ownership. The results reported in
this study are similar to the results with ownership included except that the coefficient on dividends is significant
and the coefficient on circulation is not significant. Resuhs of the estimation with ownership included are available
from the authors upon request.
To examine the influence of correlation on the model, variance-inflation factors for the variables were
examined. The only large factors were for Buddhist, Catholic, and Protestant religions. All religion variables were
removed from the model and it was re-estimated. This resulted in no variance-inflation factors larger than eight.
The only change in the significance or sign of any variables was for dividend payout, which lost significance.
Because of the stability of the model, even after removing these variables and the result in Table 5 that the religion
variables as a group are significant, the full model is reported in the paper.
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Table 4
Sample size by country
Country Model
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Columbia
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
India
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Philippines
Portugal
Singapore
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Totals
Number of countries
40
46
15
87
10
68
232
498
7
2
21
7
8
7
34
2
11
12
40
46
2
15
7
6
3
9
87
11
6
17
8
10
3
6
4
14
13
8
4
20
8
2
4
4
68
232
761
37
2
16
6
7
7
28
9
8
27
27
2
2
5
3
6
87
11
6
14
7
10
3
6
4
13
12
8
4
15
5
4
57
200
621
33
The coefficient on inflation is significant and negative, opposite the expected sign. This
result may be caused by the correlation of inflation and emerging economies. Market
capitalization is scaled by GNP to be comparable to Adhikari and Tondkar (1992), Doupnik
and Salter (1995), Salter (1998), and Salter and Niswander (1995). As expected, the
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Table 5
Hypothesis test results
Hypothesis
number
Hypothesis
name
Variables considered F statistic Significance
HI
H5
Culture
H2 Political
H3 Economic
H4 Financial
Operating
All cultural variables
(UA, ID, MS, PD, AI,
IS, CT, PT, JW, BD)
Hofstede cultural variables
(UA, ID, MS, PD)
Other cultural variables
(AI, IS, CT, PT, JW, BD)
Religion (IS, CT, PT, JW, BD)
Adult illiteracy
All political variables
(PR, CL, LG, CR)
All economic variables
(IF, MC)
All financial variables
(FE, DP, B6, DR)
Debt ratio
Other financial variables
(FE, DP, B6)
All operating variables
(FS, LA, NS)
Foreign sales and log assets
Number of SIC codes
8.84 .000='
8.15 .000***
1.69 .120
2.03 .073*
2.29 .131
16.57 .000***
9.53 .001***
8.01 .000***
0.19 .662
9.94 .000***
30.28 000***
28.34 .000***
17.68 .000***
* Significant at the 10% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
coefficient is positive and significant. These two economic variables significantly influence
disclosure (F=9.53, P= 0001).
Disclosure increases with the number of listings on foreign exchanges, dividends, and
the use of a Big 6 auditor. The result for dividends is opposite that expected. However, this
study does demonstrate a relation between auditor size and disclosure, contrary to the
results of Ahmed and Courtis (1999) and Wallace et al. (1994). The auditor-size result is
consistent, though, with the finding of Fargher, Taylor, and Simon (2001) that Big 6
auditors are more likely to be used in countries with high levels of disclosure. Wald tests
indicate that these financial-system variables are significant as a whole, whether combined
with debt ratio or not.
Disclosure increases with the number of SIC codes. The Wald test indicates that the
variables representing the corporate operating systems (firm size, number of industries, and
foreign sales) are significant (F= 30.28, ^=.0000). In general, disclosure increases with the
diversity of the firm, represented in this study by foreign sales, listings on foreign exchanges,
and number of industries.
The results for financial and operating systems indicate that within the broad cultural and
national framework, individual company differences still have a strong influence on
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disclosure policies. Thus, disclosure is a response to both within-country (corporate systems)
and between-country (cultural and national systems) factors.
5.1. Additional tests
Firm size loses significance in Model C. One possible cause is that size proxies for the
information included in some of the added variables, which provide more detailed reasons for
increased disclosure than just the firm's size. To test this cause, the models were estimated
without the variables for Big 6 auditor, the number of SIC codes, and the number of foreign
exchanges, since these variables are expected to be related to firm size. Firm size became
significant and positive. F tests indicate that the three variables are significant as well. This
resuh indicates that, in this study, firm size proxies for Big 6 auditor, the number of SIC
codes, and the number of foreign exchanges.
As shown in Table 4, the United States represents over 30% of the sample. To ensure that
observations fi"om the United States are not driving the model results, Model C was re-
estimated without the U.S. observations. The adjusted R~ increased to .584, indicating that the
model fits the non-U. S. data better than the entire data set. The results were highly consistent.
Firm size became positively significant at the .07 probability level. Jewish also became
positively significant (P value = .00) like all of the other religion variables. Significance was
lost on adult illiteracy, inflation, and dividend payout. Thus, the U.S. variables have some
influence on the model, but the model is primarily robust to the data set used to estimate it.
These changes in individual-variable significance did not affect the conclusions regarding the
significance of the systems.
Jaggi and Low (2000) conclude that culture is an insignificant determinant of disclosure in
common law countries and provides mixed signals in code law countries. They also report that
disclosure increases with leverage in common law countries but has no significant relation in
code law countries. To test these effects, five variables were added to Model C representing the
interaction of leverage and the four Hofstede (1991) cultural variables with legal system. For
common law countries, the coefficient on leverage is significantly positive and the coefficient
on power distance is significantly negative, as expected. The coefficients on uncertainty
avoidance and individualism are significant but of the wrong sign to be consistent with Gray's
(1988) secrecy hypothesis and the coefficient on masculinity are not significant.
For code law countries, the coefficients on the Hofstede (1991) variables are all
significantly different from common law countries. Disclosure decreases with uncertainty
avoidance as expected. However, the effects of the other three variables are all of the wrong
sign and all closer to zero for code law countries than for common law countries. These
results do not support the Jaggi and Low (2000) conclusion that culture is a more significant
determinant of disclosure in code law countries. Furthermore, the coefficient on leverage is
not significantly different for code law countries and is positive for both common law and
code law countries. Overall, the effects of culture and leverage reported in Jaggi and Low are
not replicated in a more complete disclosure model.
The coefficients on Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Buddhist are not significant and the
coefficient on Jewish is significantly negative, while Islam remains significantly positive. Ten
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of the 14 cultural variables (including the four interaction terms) in this model are significant.
Thus, one may conclude that culture is a significant determinant of disclosure but the effect is
difficuh to specify.
The effects of other variables are similar to those reported in Model C except that the
coefficient on circulation is significantly positive, as expected. R' increases to .53.
The results from the regression models clearly indicate that disclosure decisions are
complex and are influenced by a number of national and corporate factors. The variables
affecting disclosure did not always have the expected directional effect, but most of the
variables considered were shown to influence corporate financial disclosure.
6. Summary and conclusions
This paper models disclosure as a function of culture, national political and economic
systems, and corporate financial and operating systems. Based on F tests, each system
significantly contributes to the disclosure model even while controlling for the other systems.
This result implies that disclosure is a complex process influenced by a broad set of factors.
The results presented here are consistent with much of the existing literature. This study
shows that when those variables considered in other studies are examined together that most
of the variables expected to influence disclosure levels do indeed have a significant
relationship with disclosure. Even relationships that were not found significant in other
research were shown to be significant here. By examining these variables together, the
interrelationships among systems can be controlled for. These other studies may have had
omitted variables that resulted in a poor fit to the data. The high R" and F statistics for the
models in this study indicate that the models fit the data well. The overall conclusion of the
analysis is that Fig. 1 represents a reasonable model for disclosure. The firm-based financial
reporting disclosure decision is made within a complex process that considers national as well
as corporate factors.
This study finds that disclosure is influenced by factors from a broad range of social
systems: cultural, political, economic, and corporate. The signs and/or significance of several
individual factors changed with model specification, however. This implies that fiirther
investigation of disclosure determinants requires control of a variety of factors and further
model development to clarify understanding of the influence of these factors on disclosure.
The results, however, did extend the literature by developing a model within which
corporate-disclosure decisions are made, and testing that model by simultaneously consid-
ering many variables thought to influence disclosure that had only been considered
individually in the prior literature.
The model shows that factors in each system can influence the level of corporate financial
disclosure through their actions. The model developed in this paper helps explain why
disclosure varies across countries (the national system and cultural variables) as well as
among companies within a country (the corporate system variables).
The strong relationships shown between disclosure and the cultural and national systems
indicate that acceptance of mandated disclosures from a body such as the lASC may be met
I
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with resistance. Disclosure is very much a function of national-level factors, although the
paper also indicates that involvement in international markets does lead to increased
disclosure and may lead to acceptance of imposed requirements (Zarzeski, 1996).
This paper only examined disclosure. Additional research could examine other accounting
issues. A model could be developed and tested for accounting standards or professional
standing taking a broad systems view. This study shows that conclusions about accounting-
system factors cannot be made without a careful consideration of how the accounting system
interacts with other systems in the country and within the corporation.
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Abstract
Due to the flexibility of domestic accounting regulations, French groups are entitled to refer to
international or American standards for their consolidation. The objective of this research paper is to
focus on the choices made by the 100 largest French companies during the last 16 years (1985-2000).
In practice, apart from the French rules, three "altemative" sets of standards are used: the International
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1995. Our results show that in this voluntary move towards intemational accounting harmonization,
the choices made by French companies have clearly varied according to developments in French
accounting regulations and the changing power balance between the Intemational Accounting
Standards Committee (lASC) and the SEC-FASB. This indicates a certain degree of opportunism by
the management, who clearly keeps one eye constantly on the cost-benefit trade-off.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays, the products of accounting in one country are used in various other countries
(Nobes & Parker, 2002, p. 73). This has come about with the rapid development of
international financial markets, as reflected by the increasing number of cross-border listed
companies, the importance of transnational mergers and acquisitions, and the power wielded
by institutional investors.
Given the constant pressure for more transparency in information disclosure by listed
companies, we might naturally expect to see further intemational accounting harmonization.
However, each country does not play an equal role in this harmonization process. Although
the Intemational Accounting Standards Committee (lASC), now the Intemational Accounting
Standards Board (lASB), has seen its importance grow over the past 20 years, it has had little
visible direct effect on companies in Anglo-American countries, mainly because these
companies have been required to use domestic rules (Nobes & Parker, 2002, p. 85).
In this context, it would be logical to expect that large French companies might
increasingly adopt intemational (lASB) or American accounting standards in order to
compete with their American or British counterparts on intemational capital markets. The
trend toward these alternative accounting standards encompasses two different types of
harmonization. The first is forced harmonization: a non-American company adopting U.S.
GAAP so as to be quoted on a U.S. stock market, or the European Union imposing IAS on all
listed European firms fi"om 2005. The second is voluntary harmonization: a company fi^eely
choosing to refer to intemational or American accounting standards, independent of any
regulatory obligation. Our study focuses on the second type of harmonization.
In France, this voluntary submission to standards fi-om beyond national boundaries is made
possible by the nonexistence before 1985, then the subsequent flexibility, of the regulations
conceming consolidation. The first examples of French companies adopting alternative
practices can be traced back to the early 1970s: Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson first published
consolidated financial statements according to the intemational (at the time, essentially
American) accounting principles in 1971, following the merger between Saint-Gobain and
Pont-a-Mousson (Cairns, 1997).
Annual reports usually state that the financial statements are prepared in compliance (or in
accordance) with a given set of standards, and our study takes a closer look at this choice. In
practice, apart from the French GAAP, three sets of standards are referred to: IAS,
"intemational principles" (see explanations below), and U.S. GAAP. In the rest of this
paper, we will group these sets of standards together under the concept of "alternative"
standards, a term already used by Zambon and Dick (1998/99). Taking large French industrial
and commercial groups as examples, we shall attempt to understand the changes in the
accounting standards adopted during the last 16 years (1985-2000).
The results of our study confirm that French companies wish to intemadonalize their
consolidated accounting practices. At the same time, we also observed the existence of a
certain degree of opportunism by these groups, and a constant cost-benefit trade-off,
determined not only by developments in French accounting regulations, but also by the
changing power balance between the lASC and the SEC-FASB.
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The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the changes
over the last 16 years in the institutional context in France. Section 3 contains our hypotheses,
our sample, and the statistical results. Section 4 presents our analysis and interpretation.
Section 5 describes some of the limitations of our study and provides some directions for
future research. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Changes in the French institutional context
Before starting to analyze the sets of accounting standards chosen by large French
companies, it is important to understand the changes in the institutional context over the
last 16 years.
2.1. Business funding and capital markets in France
The prevalent types of business organization and ownership differ internationally. Zysman
(1983) identified three main types of financial systems in developed countries: capital market
systems (e.g., United Kingdom or United States), credit-based governmental systems (e.g.,
France or Japan), and credit-based financial institution systems (e.g., Germany).
Traditionally, in France, business financing was the preserve of a closed community and
highly nationally oriented. Many industries were financed by government or through cozy
relationships with local banks. First, the small and medium enterprises, which form the
backbone of the French economy, had often developed from cottage industries. Independence
and security were their two management creeds, and the capital of their enterprise came
essentially from family funding and profit reinvestment (Redis, 1994). Second, the concem
for a stable shareholder base and the security of enterprises were always part of the French
govemment's economic policies. This is why in comparison with the United Kingdom or the
United States, France has a less well-developed financial market (see Table 1). However, the
financial landscape in France has changed tremendously, at least for large companies, since
the privatization waves of 1987.
2.1.1. International listing and cross-border investing
An increasing number of French companies are—or aim to be—listed abroad, mainly in
New York and London. At the beginning of May 2002, 2 1 French firms were listed on the
Table 1
Stock markets in France, United Kingdom and United States
Countries Market capitalization Market capitalization Value traded
(US$ millions in 1999) (percentage of GDP in 1998) (percentage of GDP in 1998)
France 991,484 69.5 40.1
United Kingdom 2,374,273 174.9 86.0
United States 13,451,352 163.4 159.8
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2000): 5.2 Stock markets.
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New York Stock Exchange compared to only four in 1994, and eight French firms are now
listed on the London Stock Exchange.'
The principal motivation for international listing is of course economic because of the
tremendous size of these foreign markets. This kind of listing can lower the cost of capital,
achieving greater marketability for the company's stock, and therefore reducing dependence on
a firm's domestic capital market. However, in addition to economic reasons, major non-
American companies have come to believe that one of the hallmarks of a world-class
multinational is to be traded in New York (Biddle & Saudagaran, 1991). "(Foreign) companies
want not just exposure to U.S. money that a (New York) listing would bring, but the imprimatur
of the NYSE for all it means to investors the world over" (Wall Street Journal, 1998).
Furthermore, there has been a boom over the last few years in cross-border mergers and
acquisitions by French firms. From media giant Vivendi Universal to carmaker Renault SA,
some of France's leading companies are emerging from years of restructuring at home to
pursue global ambitions. With globalization driving consolidation in a host of industries,
executives have realized they either have to become world powerhouses or risk being eaten. It
is thus no coincidence "that since early 2000, French companies have instigated six major
takeovers with a combined value of more than $125 billion
—
plus dozens of smaller deals"
(Woodruff & Delaney, 2001).
2.1.2. Presence of international institutional investors on the Paris Stock Exchange
Back in France, the Paris Stock Exchange has also become more and more intemational. In
the first 8 months of 1999, foreign investment in French stocks and bonds totaled US$71.7
billion, more than in all of 1998 (TagHabue, 2000). The Bank of France estimates that foreign
investors hold 37.5% of the Paris Stock Exchange at the end of 2000." In the 2002 survey of
Georgeson Shareholder, foreign investors control a 42.6% share ofthe 32 top French companies
included in the sample.^ According to Nobes (2002, p. 23), the increased importance of
institutional investors is a reinforcement factor in pressure for disclosure since institutional
investors hold larger blocks of shares and may be better organized than private shareholders.
2.2. Accounting regulations in France
2.2.1. The Seventh European Directive
The adoption of the Seventh European Directive in France in 1986 brought significant
change to the country's accounting environment. First, until that date, publication of
consolidated accounts was not compulsory. Second, due to the nonexistence of fiscal interests
in consolidated financial statements, the French accounting authorities left French companies
many options concerning presentation and valuation methods, paving the way for the use of
alternative accounting standards.
' Source: http://www.iasb.org.uk, http://www.nyse.com/listed/listed.html, and
http://www.londonstockexchange.com.
^ Le Monde, June 15, 2001.
^ Le Monde, June 22, 2002.
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2.2.2. Reform of the French standard-setting process
Traditionally, establishing and enforcing national accounting standards have been the task
of the French government. The National Accounting Plan has been the cornerstone of French
accounting regulations since 1942. However, since 1996, the French standard-setting process
has undergone profound changes and now involves two bodies:
- The National Accounting Council [Conseil national de la comptabilite (CNC)], reformed
by the decree of 26 August 1996 and related implementation texts, is a consultative
organization. Its main objective is to issue opinions and recommendations on accounting
issues.
— The Accounting Regulation Committee [Comite de la Reglementation Comptable (CRCJ]
created by the "Law for the reform of accounting regulations" (6 April 1998) (X, 1998).
Its objective is to prepare accounting prescriptions (rules), which may be general or for a
particular sector of activity. The rules are adopted in conjunction with the National
Accounting Council. The CRC (unlike the CNC) has real regulatory power.
The objectives of this reform were to modernize the French accounting standardization
system and make it more effective, and also to enable quicker adaptation to foreign GAAP,
particularly U.S. GAAP and IAS. Colasse and Standish (1998) asserted that the reform was
an important reorientation of the standardization process, raising the question of the balance
between the various socioeconomic actors directly concemed by the process. This balance
is to some extent illustrated by the two-tier composition of the French standard-setting
body. As a result of the reform, the role of certain actors, primarily the state, was limited,
while the roles of other actors, especially accounting professionals and enterprises, were
strengthened.
In conclusion, although France traditionally has a very politicized accounting regulation
system, recent changes indicate a move towards a model with lower political involvement.
2.2.3. Current regulations regarding the reference to "alternative" standards
2.2.3.1. Regulations currently applicable. The Commission des Operations de Bourse
(COB, equivalent to the U.S. SEC) declared in 1995 that, since there was no set of
international standards adopted at a national level, French companies must prepare their
accounts and financial statements published in France in accordance with French regulations.
Consequently, it decreed that when a French company wants to use a set of international or
foreign (American, in practice) standards for its consolidated financial statements, if the
chosen standards are not compatible with French standards, the company is obliged to present
two sets of accounts (COB, 1995, p. 105).
However, since in many cases French accounting rules are not very different from
international or American standards, the COB later stated that it does not object to companies
including in the notes a statement to the effect that their accounts or financial statements,
prepared in accordance to French standards, are also in compliance with intemational or
American standards (COB, 1998, p. 3).
200 H. Stolony. Y. Ding / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 195-213
2.2.3.2. The Law of 6 April 1998. The Law of 6 April 1998, already referred to above,
addressed another major accounting issue: French companies' rights to use international
standards.
Article 6 of this law waives French-listed companies' obligations to publish two sets of
accounts. This article was a response to the request by groups raising funds on international
financial markets to be allowed to issue a single set of consolidated financial statements,
prepared in accordance with the standards used on the major stock markets. The underlying
reasoning was that publishing two sets of accounts is an expensive process that interferes with
the communication policy and does not benefit investors.
Under the terms of the law, such groups were theoretically exempt from following French
standards, provided their financial statements followed intemational standards that had been
translated into French and formally approved by the CRC (Accounting Regulation Commit-
tee) and complied with E.U. rules.
In fact, the law has never been implemented. Although the translation process has taken
place, the CRC has never formally approved the IAS for many reasons. An "inventory" of
the divergences between European directives and intemational standards was a long time in
preparation and highlights several differences between the European directives and these
standards. The CRC is currently following the E.U. move, referred to in the introduction,
towards adoption of IAS from 2005, and the implementation of Article 6 is no longer a
necessity.
2.2.3.3. Conclusion. Because in France there is no distinction between financial reporting
and tax reporting, individual corporate financial statements are largely influenced by taxation.
Conversely, since there is no tax factor in consolidated financial statements, the French
standard-setting bodies allow more presentation and valuation options for group accounts,
and French groups are entitled to choose alternative practices for their consolidation. As a
result, during the period surveyed as explained just above, French companies were (and still
are) in the situation accepted by the COB. They can refer to "altemative" standards if, in
doing so, they state that these practices are in compliance with French regulations.
3. Hypothesis, sample, and statistical results
3.1. Hypothesis
The hypothesis presented below emerges naturally fi^om the developments in the French
institutional context described above.
Hypothesis: An increasing number of large French companies have opted for altemative
accounting standards during the last 16 years.
All of the characteristics identified in our analysis of the French institutional context
hint at this trend. Firstly, both IAS and U.S. GAAP have significantly gained in
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importance over the last 16 years due to cooperation with the International Organization
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the E.U. as regards IAS, and in the case of U.S.
GAAP, thanks to the attractiveness of the NYSE and Nasdaq. Secondly, more and more
French companies are already or plan to be listed abroad. Even those only listed in Paris
still find themselves encouraged to choose alternative accounting standards by the
internationalization of the Paris Stock Exchange. Thirdly, this trend is also suggested
by recent developments at the European Commission and in the accounting regulation
authorities in France.
Our hypothesis is also consistent with the argument of Alexander and Nobes
(2001, p. 103) who write, "From the early 1990s onward, many large European
companies (notably in France, Germany and Switzerland) have volunteered to use
IAS because they believe that international investors prefer financial statements
prepared that way."
Glaum's (2000) paper compared results fi^om two empirical studies in 1994 and 1997 of
the attitudes of financial executives at large German corporations towards a global
harmonization of accounting principles and the adaptation of German accounting to
Anglo-American standards. He found that their attitude changed fundamentally over a
relatively brief period of time. Managers have now accepted that with the globalization of
financial markets, traditional German accounting rules are no longer adequate. They have
become much more critical of the German rules, and they are much more welcoming to an
opening up of German accounting to the investor-oriented and internationally predominant
Anglo-Saxon accounting standards. Furthermore, the author showed that more than 80% of
managers believed that 5 years from then, the great majority of German fimis would
publish their consolidated financial accounts according to either IAS or U.S. GAAP. It is
logical to expect the same developments in France since both countries belong to the same
continental accounting model.
The regression model we will use in the statistical analysis is therefore a simple linear one:
Total alternative — ao + a\ Year + £
where Total altemative = total number of French companies choosing alternative accounting
standards in the sample.
3.2. Sample
We are interested in the changes in the choice of accounting standards used by French
groups during the last 16 years. It is important to note that our study concentrates on their
consolidated financial statements only (see above). The sample of large French groups used in
this study and the related data are obtained fi-om a survey carried out annually since 1986 by a
group of leading French accoundng firms (X, since 1986). This survey concems financial
information published in annual reports by the 100 largest French industrial and commercial
groups (total reduced to 75 groups for 1999 annual reports and 34 groups for 2000 annual
reports). To ensure comparability with the previous years, we adjusted this sample to obtain the
1
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same 100 group sample as the 1999 survey (based on 1998 annual reports) for 1999 and 2000
annual reports. The period surveyed is thus 1985-2000. However, no data are provided for the
years 1986 and 1987 as the split among lASC, international, and U.S. standards was not
detailed in the annual surveys concerned.
Our sample concentrates on domestic financial reporting by French firms in order to
examine their voluntary harmonization measures only. This restriction also neutralizes the
impact that international listing can have on reporting for certain French firms: a New
York-listed company must publish a set of accounts (or the 20-F form) in U.S. GAAP
but can still remain on French GAAP for its domestic reporting (as France Telecom
does); while a Paris-only-listed company can also publish in France its accounts in U.S.
GAAP (as is the case for Clarins).
The sample is determined mainly based on the criterion of consolidated sales and
from the listings published by the French business press. Some corrections have been
made to include groups with high value added and to exclude state-owned enterprises
and nonlisted companies. It is also important to note that only industrial, commercial,
and service sectors are included in the survey; banks and insurance companies are
excluded.
The composition of the sample remains relatively stable fi^om 1 year to another.
However, every year, several modifications are necessary because of performance fluctua-
tions, merger and acquisition operations, and privatization plans (see Appendix 1 for the
composition of the 1999 survey sample based on 1998 annual reports).
For each year, in a manner that remains consistent over the period, the survey (and our
complement for years 1999 and 2000) identifies the companies in the sample that makes
reference to non-French sets of standards. It distinguishes between (1) lASC, (2) International
principles, and (3) U.S. GAAP
Companies never define the concept of "intemational principles," as seen fi-om the
following extracts from annual reports. In its 1999 armual report, Accor mentioned in
Note 1—Accounting Principles that "the Consolidated Financial Statements of the Accor
Group are established in accordance with French regulations presently in force. Due to
the intemational nature of the Accor Group's activities, it adopts methods that are
generally accepted internationally, whenever possible." Other companies (e.g., L'Air
Liquide, Lagardere) talk of "generally accepted accounting principles at an intemational
level."
Table 2 provides a detail of the altemative accounting standards adopted over the period by
the companies surveyed, and Table 3 presents the basic statistics in value.
For the purpose of our statistics, we have treated IAS and "intemational principles" as a
single category, assuming that companies consider "intemational principles" to be closer to
IAS than to U.S. GAAP
It should be remembered that Table 2 does not list the whole of our sample as listed in
Appendix 1 . It includes only those companies that referred to altemative standards for at least
1 year during the observation period. Bold characters indicate a change in the standards
adopted. Bold, itahc characters mean that the change is due to the company entering or
leaving the sample.
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Table 2
Detailed data by company
Companies 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Accor IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP
Aerospatiale-Matra F F IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS F F IAS
(Aerospatiale)
Air France F IAS IAS IAS IAS LAS IAS IAS IAS IAS LAS LAS IAS F
Aventis US US US US US US US US US US US US US US
(Rhone Poulenc)
Bongrain F F IAS LA.S LA.S IAS LAS LAS IAS IAS IAS IAS F F
Bull US US US US US US US US US US US US US F
Canal+ Out Out IAS IAS IAS L\S LAS IAS IAS IAS IAS LAS F F
Cap Gemini Out IAS IAS IAS LA.S LA.S IAS LAS IAS IAS IAS IAS F F
(Cap Gemini Sogeti)
Camaux Metalbox F F IAS LAS LAS IAS IAS LAS Out Out Out Out Out Out
(CMB Packaging)
Carrefour US US US US US US US US US US US US US US
Chargeurs US US US US US US US US US US US US US US
(Chargeurs International)
Clarins Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out US US US US US
Coflexip Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out US US US US US
Cie Generale de Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out F US US US US
Geophysique
Danone (BSN) US US US US US US US US US US US US US US
Dassault Systemes Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out F US US US
DMC F IAS IAS LA.S IAS IAS LA.S IAS IAS L\S IAS IAS IAS IAS
Eridania Beghin-Say F IP IP IP IP IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS F F
(Beghin-Say)
Essilor F IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS L\S IAS IAS IAS
Faurecia (Bertrand Faure) Out FFFFFFFFFFUS
Fives Lille OutFFFFIPFFFFFF
Hermes Out Out Out Out Out Out Out IP IAS IAS IAS F
L'AirLiquide IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP
Lafarge (Lafarge Coppee) F IAS L\S IAS IAS L\S LAS LAS LAS L\S IAS IAS
Lagardere-Matra Hachette F IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IAS IAS
Legrand US US US US US US US US US US US US
Lesieur LAS Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out
LVMH Out IAS IAS LAS IAS LA.S IAS LA.S LA.S IAS IAS US
Merlin Gerin F F F IAS LAS Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out
Moulinex F F F F IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS LA.S IAS LA.S F
Norbert Dentressangle Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out IAS IAS IAS IAS LAS
OCP Out Out Out Out F IAS IAS Out Out Out Out Out Out Out
Ortiz Miko Out Out Out Out Out F IAS Out Out Out Out Out Out Out
Pathe Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out
Pechiney L^S IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS LAS
Pmault Printemps-Redoute Out Out Out IAS IAS F F F
(Pinault)
PSA-Peugeot Citroen US US US US US US US US US US US US US US
(continued on next page)
F
US F
F F
F F
US US
F F
F F
US US
Out Out
US US
Out US US US F F
US US us us US US
F F F F F F
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Table 2 (continued)
Companies 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Publicis
Remy Cointreau
Renault
Saint-Gobain
Saint-Louis
Sanofi-Synthelabo
(Sanofi)
Schneider Electric
(Schneider)
Seb
Technip
Telemecanique
Thomson-CSF (Thomson)
Total
Total Fina Elf (Elf)
Usinor (Usinor Sacilor)
Valeo
F IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP F
Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out IAS IAS IAS IAS F
IP IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS
IAS IAS IAS IAS LAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS F F
F IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS Out Out Out Out
Out Out Out F F F IP IP IP F F F F F
IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IP US US US US US
IP US US US US US US US US US US US US F
Out Out Out Out Out F F IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS F
Out IP IP IAS IAS Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out Out
IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS F F F
F IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS F F F F Out Out
US IP IP IP IP US US US US US US US US US
F F F F IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS F F
F F IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS
F=French standards, IP=intemational principles, IAS=intemational accounting standards, US=U.S. GAAP,
Out=excluded from the sample.
Bold characters=change of standard (year of change).
Bold, italic characters=first inclusion or departure from the sample with alternative standards.
This table includes only companies in the sample that have at least 1 year with a non-"F."
Table 3
Basic statistics in value
Years lASC International "International" U.S. Total Total
principles
(2)
total
(3)=(l)+(2)
GAAP
(4)
companies
(5)=(3)+(4)
sample
(1) (6)
1985 4 4 8 8 16 100
1988 12 7 19 8 27 100
1989 18 7 25 8 33 100
1990 21 6 27 8 35 100
1991 23 6 29 8 37 100
1992 22 5 27 9 36 100
1993 23 5 28 9 37 100
1994 21 7 28 9 37 100
1995 19 5 24 10 34 100
1996 21 4 25 14 39 100
1997 21 3 24 15 39 100
1998 17 3 20 18 38 100
1999 9 2 11 18 29 100
2000 5 1 6 15 21 100
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Fig. 1. Evolution of the number of "alternative" references.
3.3. Statistical results
Fig. 1 below shows changes in the number of groups using ahemative standards during the
period.
The graph above does not show a clear increase in the behavior in question. From 1985 to
1 99 1 , a rising number of French companies in our sample opted for alternative accounting
standards. However, this number then stagnated and has even declined since.
The statistical test (linear regression) confirms this observation: the R" of our linear
regression model is only .046 with a significance level of .462.
We therefore reject H: Among the 100 largest industrial and commercial companies in
France, although the number of French companies referring to alternative accounting
standards increased in the late eighties, the number subsequently stagnated at between
30% and 40% before falling to only 21% in 2000.
In this case, a quadratic regression model, with R^ of .802 and significance level of .000
(see Fig. 2), would be more suitable to describe this development.
4. Analysis and interpretation
The results we obtained here are rather surprising since they (appear to) contradict
existing literature. In this section, we will try to reach an in-depth understanding of this
situation by using an analytic approach. First of all, we note that among companies using
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the linear and quadratic regression.
alternative standards, the trends are different for those preferring IAS/international principles
and those choosing U.S. GAAP. Columns No. (3) and (4) in Table 3 and Fig. 3 show this
difference.
We analyzed these two trends with a simple regression over time. The change in the
number of companies choosing U.S. GAAP from 1985 to 2000 is statistically significant
e 20
1 15
1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Fig. 3. "International" versus U.S. standards.
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{R^=.779, significance=.000) but the change in the number of "international" adopters is not
{R-=062, significance=.392).
The reahty is that after a period of stagnation before 1995, the number of French groups
choosing U.S. GAAP has increased steadily; while the number of those preferring IAS/
international principles increased from the beginning of our observation period to reach a
peak in 1994 and then decreased.
4.1. Turning point of 1994-1995
The years 1994-1995 were a real turning point for developments in both subgroups,
in terms of both the international situation, i.e., the advances made and setback
suffered in the lASC's work, and the domestic situation for French national regu-
lations.
During its first few years, the lASC had little impact on countries with significant
securities markets. There were two main reasons for this: first, at that time, the existing
IAS required only minimal disclosures and allowed multiple options, including those
accepted in the United States and the United Kingdom. Second, international accounting
harmonization was not an important issue in most major financial markets.
In January 1989, the lASC took an important initiative in publishing E32, "Compar-
ability of Financial Statements," with the aim of eliminating 23 optional treatments
allowed by 13 IAS. This soon attracted the attention of IOSCO, and the result was a
joint project launched by the two bodies in 1993. Through this project, the lASC sought
endorsement by the IOSCO of a set of core accounting standards. Once endorsed, these
standards would be submitted for the approval of national regulators with a view to
facilitating cross-border offerings and listings by multinational issuers. However, the
lASC suffered an embarrassing setback in 1994. Contrary to earlier indications that its
intention was to judge the standards in stages, the IOSCO announced that it was putting
off endorsement of any further standards until the entire core set of 24 standards was
completed to its satisfaction.
As far as French groups are concerned, from 1985 to 1992, the choice of LASC or
international principles did not generate any major change in accounting principles, given
the options included in the French Law of 1985 and the IAS. There was an aspiration
among French groups to refer to an international set of standards in order to compare
results more easily with foreign groups. Till 1991, there was a clear trend in favor of
LASC or international principles. In 1993, the lASC published a first group of revised
standards: IAS 2, 8, 9, 11, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 23. These standards were applicable
after 1 January 1995. Each standard includes only one benchmark treatment, with the
exception of some standards allowing one altemative treatment.
Until the publication of the revised standards, only rarely did a divergence exist that
could prevent a French group from adopting IAS. The revision of IAS reduced this
flexibility.
This situation may explain the stability observed between 1992 and 1994. In 1995, as
we mentioned previously, the COB forbade French companies from adopting inter-
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national or foreign standards if the rules were not compatible with the French rules. This
led to a sharp increase in the exceptions to the sets of standards adopted (U.S. or
lASC). This increase also appears to be linked to the implementation in 1995 of the
revised IAS.
The behavior of French groups in these circumstances followed economic reasoning:
because of the increasing costs involved in referring to IAS in 1995, some, like Total or
Sanofi, stopped using IAS, while others preferred to shift to U.S. GAAP, considered more
attractive to their U.S. investors (e.g., Schneider and Pechiney). This tallies with the
situation for Swiss companies as described by Zeff (2001), who believes that one or more
major Swiss companies might adopt U.S. GAAP if the lASB were to become more
restrictive than the FASB.
4.2. Significant drop in the number of companies choosing IASfrom 1998 to 2000
The most outstanding development during the observation period is the significant
drop in the number of companies choosing IAS from 1998 to 2000. This drop can once
again be explained by the international and national context.
In March 1999, the lASC published its interim standard on financial instruments,
thereby substantially completing the key components of the core standards work program.
In May 2000, the IOSCO decided to endorse IAS, while still allowing individual
regulators to require certain supplementary treatments (Enevoldsen, 2000).
On 16 February 2000, the U.S. SEC unanimously approved and issued for pubhc
comment a concept release regarding the use of International Accounting Standards
(LAS). This release affirmed the quality superiority of U.S. GAAP over LAS and urged
IAS to converge towards American standards. For foreign companies listed in the
United States but not adopting U.S. GAAP, a note reconciling income statement and
balance sheet items to U.S. GAAP is still required by regulation of the U.S. SEC.
American companies must follow U.S. GAAP. This refusal by the American
authorities to accept IAS substantially reduced their usefulness for French companies
wanting to attract American investors, and accordingly certain French groups aban-
doned IAS that had no impact on their market value (e.g., Aeropatiale) (Bemheim,
2000).
Another reason for this decline is presumably the stricter policy now imposed by the
lASC, under which a company can claim to be in accordance with IAS only when it
respects the whole set of standards. The revised IAS 1, Presentation of Financial
Statements, paragraph 11, states that: "Financial statements should not be described as
complying with IAS unless they comply with all the requirements of each applicable
Standard and each applicable interpretation of the [International Financial Reporting
Interpretations Committee]" (lASC, 1997).
In 1999, eight groups ceased to refer to IAS or international principles, mentioning
only French standards (Bongrain, Canal+, Cap Gemini, Eridania Beghin-Say, Lafarge,
Lagardere, Saint-Gobain, Usinor). The same decision was made by six other finns in
2000: Air France, Essilor, Moulinex, Publicis, Remy Cointreau, and Technip. The only
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exception to this trend is the decision by EADS (Aerospatiale) to adopt IAS for the first
time in 2000.
Finally, one other possible explanation lies in the fact that French companies hope that
the initial application of international financial accounting standards (IFRS) will be made
easier for "first-time adopters" than for companies, which already declared compliance
with IAS.
4.3. Future developments
Although it arose after our observation period, it is impossible to finish our paper
without mentioning the recent accounting development in the European Union.
"In the mind of not a few Europeans, the lASC represented a fortress against U.S.
accounting imperialism—a fear that U.S. GAAP would come to dominate world
accounting" (Zeff, 1998). That is why the European countries have been participating
actively in LASC task forces since the very beginning. Furthermore, in 1995, the
European Commission announced that it was abandoning the idea of creating a
European accounting standard-setting body and would support the lASC."^ According
to Flower (1997), the European Commission reasoned that if it was to permit the major
European multinational companies to draw up their consolidated accounts using the
IAS, then this would probably largely solve these companies' problems occurring from
their cross-border listings and would certainly check the movement towards U.S.
GAAP.
The European Commission proposed in a communication dated 13 June 2000 to
require all listed E.U. companies to prepare their consolidated financial statements in
accordance with LAS fi-om 2005 onwards at the latest. This communication was followed
by a proposal for a regulation in February 2001 including the same requirement. The
regulation has been officially adopted on June 7, 2002. To attain its objective, the E.U.
has founded an Accounting Regulatory Committee, which will decide whether to endorse
IAS on the basis of commission proposals, and a European Financial Reporting Advisory
Group (EFRAG), which will provide technical expertise on the subject. Furthermore, the
existing accounting directives are to be modernized in the course of 2002-2003
(European Commission, 2000, 2001).
This decision will certainly have a positive impact on accounting practices in France,
at least conceming listed companies, since the IAS are widely viewed as reflecting a
largely common-law approach of "transparent" timely disclosure (Ball, Kothari, &
Robin, 2000). The survey by Salter and Roberts (1996) also confirmed this viewpoint.
They found that the final outcome of the comparability project in 1989 was
significantly associated with practices in countries with a culture that is high on Gray's
(1988) professionalism dimension, with auditors having considerable influence in the
European Commission. (1995). Accounting harmonization: A new strategy vis-d-vis international
harmonization. Communication from the Commission Internal Document, COM95 (508).
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ultimate objective of financial-reporting practices and controlling entry into their
profession. Those countries significantly associated with practices selected in the project
were also relatively optimistic in their measurement practices and regulated their
financial reporting system using a common law/precedent-based system rather than a
code law system.
5. Limitations and directions for future research
Several limitations to our survey should be pointed out. First, a certain number of groups
declare that they comply with the lASC set of standards, or U.S. GAAP, then add that they
do not apply certain specific standards. Companies rarely disclose what motivated them to
adopt alternative standards. Their reasons, when mentioned, include the intemational nature
of the group's activities (Accor, Danone), its intemational location (Chargeurs), the practices
of the oil sector (Elf), the desire for accounting principles that are more suitable to the
intemational context of the business and the type of shareholders (PSA-Peugeot Citroen), a
group's important position in the North American market (Pechiney), cross-border listing
(Compagnie Generale de Geophysique), and the need for principles, which facilitate
comparability with other intemational engineering and building companies (Technip).
Regarding a change in the altemative standards referred to or the retum to French domestic
standards, the only example of an explanation we found was by Bull. In its 2000 annual
report, the company mentioned: "The adoption of generally accepted accounting policies in
the United States of America as a standards base was abandoned at the December 31, 2000,
year end, primarily for reasons of clarity of communication and due to the increasing
complexity of retaining a dual standards base. This change did not have a material impact on
the accounts. In effects, transactions potentially generating differences in accounting
treatment under French and U.S. GAAP are on the whole limited and their impact on the
2000 financial statements is minor."
Second, comparison is sometimes difficult to assess and should be treated with caution
because of changes in the sample. For example, in 1996, the number of groups referring to
"altemative" standards has increased, but there has been a modification in the sample. With
the same sample, the figure would have remained identical to the previous year (34, see
Table 3).
But the major limitation of our study is that we only studied companies' own claims that
they applied a certain set of accounting standards without investigating whether they actually
follow the whole or only a part of the entire set. There is a possible gap in this field of
research. The paper by Street and Bryant (2000) examines the extent to which the disclosure
requirements of the lASC have been complied with or have been exceeded by companies
claiming to use IAS. It showed that among companies claiming to use IAS, the real
compliance with lASC-required disclosures is only 84% for those with U.S. listing or filing
and 76% for those without U.S. listing or filing. For several standards, such as those
concerning borrowing costs, financial reporting in hyperinflationary economies, or joint
ventures, the degree of compliance is only slightly more than 50%. In his Intemational
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Accounting Standards Survey 2000, Cairns (2000) also studied various aspects of the
financial reporting of 165 IAS companies: their approach to IAS and domestic GAAP, the
level of compliance with IAS, IAS lite—exceptions from full compliance, audit reports on
IAS financial statements, and audit opinions and IAS lite.
In fiiture research, it would be interesting to look further into the question by identifying
the fields that cause most of the divergencies between the requirements of IAS and/or U.S.
GAAP and the accounting practices of French companies. It would also be useful to carry out
the same study in other European countries for a better understanding of this harmonization
issue at a European level.
6. Conclusion
Our research studied the changes over the last 16 years in the choice to refer to a given set
of accounting standards by large French companies. Our belief is that the main factor driving
French firms to choose international or American standards is the requirement of capital
market actors for more transparent accounting disclosure. Even in their study contesting the
existence of an Anglo-Saxon accounting model, Alexander and Archer (2000) recognized
that "the one characteristic that is common to the United States and the United Kingdom (and
to other English-speaking countries), as well as to the Netherlands, is an expressed concern
for the quality of accounting information fi^om the perspective of capital market actors."
Ashbaugh (2001) also found in her study that non-U. S. firms were more likely to disclose
IAS or U.S. GAAP financial information when their shares are traded on more equity
markets.
We showed that although there is no clear trend covering the whole group of companies
choosing alternative references during the observation period, the number of firms preferring
U.S. GAAP has increased since 1995, which confirms the change in the power balance
between the lASC and the SEC-FASB. Our analysis has also shown that thanks to the
flexibility of French regulations on consolidated accounts, French firms have the option to
choose their set of accounting standards in order to suit their specific financing needs after a
cost-benefit trade-off.
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Appendix A. List of French groups included in the sample in 1999 (annual reports 1998)
Accor
Aerospatiale
Air France
Alcatel
Alstom
Altran technologies
Andre
Atos
Bel
Bic
Bollore
Bongrain
Bouygues
Bull
Canal+
Cap Gemini
Carbone Lorraine
Carrefour
Casino
Castorama
Cea-Industrie
Chargeurs
Cie Generale de
Geophysique
Ciments Fran^ais
Clarins
Club Mediterranee
Coflexip
Communication &
Systemes
Damart
Danone
Dassault aviation
Dassault systemes
De Dietrich
Dmc
Dynaction
Eiffage
Elf
Eramet
Eridania Beghin-Say
Essilor
Faurecia
Fives-Lille
Framatome
France Telecom
Galeries-Lafayette
Geodis
Havas Advertising
Hermes
Imerys
L'Air Liquide
L'Oreal
Labinal
Lafarge
Lagardere
Legrand
Legris Industries
Lvmh
M6
Michelin
Moulinex
Norbert Dentressangle
Pathe
Pechiney
Pernod Ricard
Pinault Printemps-
Redoute
Plastic Omnium
Primagaz
Promodes
PSA-Peugeot Citroen
Publicis
Remy Cointreau
Renault
Rhone-Poulenc
Royal Canin
Sagem
Saint-Gobain
Sanofi
Schneider
Seb
Seita
Sge
Sidel
Skis Rossignol
Snecma
Sodexho
Sommer Allibert
Strafor Facom
Suez Lyormaise des Eaux
Taittinger
Technip
TFl
Thomson-Csf
Thomson Multimedia
Total
Usinor
Valeo
Vallourec
Vivendi
Worms & Cie
Zodiac
Source: L'information fmanciere 1999: 100 groupes industriels et commerciaux, p. 673.
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This paper provides an overview of the current regulatory framework for financial reporting and
auditing in the United Kingdom. The framework remained stable for 10 years following significant
reforms in 1990-1991. A ftirther process of change is now taking place. These changes arise from three
sources: refinements in the UK's regulatory framework, the European Commission's drive for a single
capital market, and political interest in accounting regulation following the Enron collapse. The present
position is explained and the fiiture implications of recent and impending changes are considered.
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1. Introduction
After a relatively stable period of 10 years, the regulatory framework for financial reporting
and auditing in the United Kingdom is going through a period of significant change. There are
three principal things driving change: UK domestic law and regulation, EU law and regulation,
and the impact of the Enron collapse accompanied by the break up of Andersen and the
ensuing market turbulence. Those changes are in various stages of development and
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implementation. In this position paper we provide an overview ofthe current framework in the
United Kingdom as of 3 1 January 2003, including the reforms announced by the UK Secretary
of State on 29 January 2003. We first review recent and proposed changes which were initiated
before the Enron collapse and then set out the present position for financial reporting and
auditing, highlighting key developments over the last 10 years. Finally, we describe the
outcome of the current politically motivated post-Enron reviews.
2. Recent and proposed changes to the UK framework
2.1. UK domestic law and regulation
Three changes to domestic law and regulation have already taken place. First, the London
Stock Exchange, which was self-regulatory, is no longer the Listing Authority in the United
Kingdom. This responsibility was taken over by UK Listing Authority (UKLA), a body which
is part of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), a government agency. Second, a new private
sector regulator, the Accountancy Foundation, has recently been set up by the UK accountancy
professional bodies to provide independent oversight of their regulatory activities, auditing
and ethical standards, and conduct disciplinary investigations. Third, new regulations were
issued in July 2002 with respect to directors' remuneration disclosures (Statutory Instrument,
2002).'
A further major domestic change in progress but not yet completed is a rewrite of UK
Company Law." A government white paper "Modernising Company Law (2002)," was issued
in July for final consultation;^ and a new Companies Act is expected within the next 2 years. In
addition to the white paper, the FSA also issued discussion papers about investment research
(FSA, 2002a) and about proposals to reform the UK Listing Rules (FSA, 2002b), which have
remained fundamentally unchanged for 10 years.
2.2. European Commission
Significant changes are also being introduced by the European Commission as part of the
initiative to strengthen the capital markets in the European Union by creating common
standards of listing and reporting for all member states. A regulation was recently passed by
the European Union Council of Ministers that all listed companies should adopt International
' These regulations require quoted companies to prepare, gain shareholder approval for, and file on public
record an audited directors' remuneration report. This applies to year-ends after 31 December 2002.
~ The principal recommendations cover: simplification of the regime for small companies, shortening of the
filing period for all companies, codification in law of the responsibilities and duties of directors, greater
transparency in the behaviour of institutional investors, a compulsory Operating and Financial Review for all
listed and other large companies, recommendations for tightening criminal law to facilitate pursuing wrongdoing
(including a criminal offence of failing to disclose information to an auditor), and a rationalisation of the standard
setting and legal requirements for financial reporting under a successor body to the ASB.
^ The overall consultation process for the Company Law Review has taken place over 3 years.
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Accounting Standards (lAS)"^ for their group accounts by 2005 (lASB, 2002). It is also hoped
that the audit of these groups should follow International Standards of Auditing (ISAs) from
the same date"^ (Co-ordinating Group on Auditing and Accounting Issues [CGAA], 2002). A
ftirther development is the plarmed introduction of a common form of prospectus and annual
registration document for member states, to be accepted by all capital markets throughout the
European Commission (FSA, 2002b).
The European Commission also issued a Recommendation on auditors' independence in
May 2002 (EC, 2002). Adoption ofthis Recommendation is not compulsory for member states,
but its progress will be reviewed by the European Commission in 3 years. In the post-Enron
environment in the United Kingdom, the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales (ICAEW), which regulates the auditors of most public interest entities in
the United Kingdom, adopted this recommendation in June 2002, to be regarded as best
practice from 1 October 2002 until being written formally into the regulatory framework.^
2.3. The Enron collapse
Following the collapse of Enron and the turbulence in the UK markets that followed, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer^ ordered a review of financial regulation in the United
Kingdom, covering auditor independence, corporate governance, regulation of the account-
ancy profession, financial reporting and auditing standards, company law reform and
accountability of audit firms. This review has been taken on by a combined group of
regulators,^ and an interim report was issued with a designated work program in July 2002
(CGAA, 2002). In addition to this, the House of Commons Treasury Committee'^ is
^ The International Accounting Standards Board (lASB) has redesignated its standards International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) but this term is not yet in common parlance. In this paper, therefore, we have
continued to use the term IAS.
^ The EC is working with member states to facilitate the adoption of ISAs thioughout the EU by 2005. As yet
there are no agreed auditing standards across the EU.
*' The major changes to the current UK framework which this Recommendation will bring are further
restrictions on the provision of certain nonaudit services, mainly financial information technology services and
internal audit, a requirement for all key audit principals to rotate every 7 years (not just the engagement partner)
and a ban on key audit principals taking up management positions with a client within 2 years of leaving the firm.
Definitive guidance on UK implementation of the Recommendation was approved by the ICAEW Council in
October 2002. The implementation date was deferred to year-ends beginning on or after 1 November 2002 with
the exception of the provisions for partner rotation. These were amended in response to the CGAA's interim report
(CGAA, 2002) to make the rotation period 5 years for the audit engagement partner, and the implementation was
deferred until year-ends beginning after 1 January 2003, to give firms time to make the appropriate arrangements.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer is the second most powerful politician in the United Kingdom. He heads
the Treasury, which is responsible for the state of the UK economy.
The membership of this group comprises two senior politicians and representatives of the key regulatory
bodies, bemg the DTI, the Financial Services Authority, the Financial Reporting Council, the Accounting
Standards Board, the Accountancy Foundation Review Board, and the Auditing Piaclices Board.
The House of Commons Treasury Committee is an independent committee of back-bench Members of
Parliament. Such committees can make recommendafions to government but do not have executive authority to
force implementation of their proposals.
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conducting its own inquiry into the arrangements for the regulation of pubhc Hmited
companies (PLCs) in the United Kingdom. Its first report was also issued in July 2002
(House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2002). Key concerns relate to auditor rotation,
nonaudit services, the responsibilities of audit committees, ensuring quality in audit and
financial reporting, the fi-agmentation of regulatory responsibilities, and the implications for
competition of there now being just four major audit firms in the United Kingdom. A final
concern for the United Kingdom is the full extra-territorial impact of the US Sarbanes/Oxley
Act (One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America, 2002). This has yet to
be resolved, and discussions continue between regulators in both countries. The concern for
UK companies with a US listing and for UK auditors of subsidiaries of US companies is the
cost and disruption of having to comply with two different regulatory regimes in their
domestic territory.
The rest of this paper comprises six more sections. Two sections set out the UK fi^amework
for financial reporting and auditing before any changes are introduced. These are followed by a
description of the changes already planned before the Enron collapse. We then summarize the
UK government's interim statement on further reform post-Enron and follow this with a
description of the final package of reforms announced on 29 January 2003 and a short
conclusion.
3. The regulatory framework for financial reporting in the United Kingdom
3.1. UK domestic companies
The Department ofTrade and Industry (DTI) is responsible for overall policy with respect to
company law, including financial reporting and auditing in the United Kingdom. As well as
UK domestic provisions, European Union (EU) Directives are introduced through company
law. There are approximately 1.4 million active registered domestic companies, ofwhich 2175
are listed on the London Stock Exchange.'^
All UK domestic companies are required to comply with UK company law, a fiindamental
principle of which is that all companies, regardless of size or ownership structure, are subject
to the same legal regime; i.e., "one size fits all." The legislation covers a wide range of
corporate activity and is laid down in Acts of Parliament, mainly various Companies Acts.
Extra provisions apply as appropriate to special category companies, e.g., listed companies,
banks, insurance companies. These additional provisions may be contained in company law or
other forms of regulation.
All UK companies are required by company law to prepare financial statements for their
shareholders. These accounts are the legal responsibility of the directors and must comply with
UK GAAP and company law. The 1 985 Companies Act includes a requirement for accounts to
show a true and fair view and comply with law and accounting standards. The true and fair
'" All the data about listed companies in this paper were provided by the UKLA on 8 March 2002.
S. Fearnley, T. Nines / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 215-233 219
view can be used, where it can be justified, to override other legal requirements and accounting
standards.
'
'
All UK companies are required to file their financial statements on public record at
Companies House, a DTI agency. With the exception of very small companies, their accounts
must be audited by a UK registered auditor.'" Small private (i.e. not public) companies or
groups'"' are permitted to file abbreviated accounts (although this may change with the revised
Companies Act), which contain very little information, but must still prepare full accounts for
their shareholders. Ninety-five percent of all UK companies fall into this category. In order to
relieve the preparers of small company accounts from having to deal with the increasing
number and complexity of accounting standards, a single standard, the Financial Reporting
Standard for Small Entities (FRSSE), which is based on existing UK GAAP, has been
developed by the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB) for use by companies which qualify
for the small company filing exemptions. The exemptions do not apply to Public Limited
Companies (PLCs)'"^ or other special category companies. Subsidiary companies must also
prepare and file legal accounts. Private limited companies must file their financial statements
within 10 months of the year-end. PLCs must file within 7 months.'" There are accumulating
fmes for directors who fail to file their accounts on time.
The DTI also has wide powers to investigate companies, whether listed or unlisted, where
fi^aud or misconduct is suspected, where shareholders have been denied reasonable informa-
tion or where there is a public interest justification. The Secretary of State may take action to
stop a company trading, disqualify directors for periods of up to 15 years, and prosecute
offenders. Companies and directors may also be warned and instructed to rectify faults (DTI,
1999).
UK accounting requirements are currently found in both company law and accounting
standards. Until 1991 the setting of accounting standards was delegated to the accountancy
profession. Accounting standards were flexible and creative accounting was rife (Griffith,
1996). Furthermore, there was no effective enforcement mechanism against directors or
" S226 (5) 1985 Companies Act reads 'If in special circumstances compliance with any of those provisions is
inconsistent with the requirement to give a true and fair view, the directors shall depart from that provision to the
extent necessary to give a true and fair view. Particulars of any such departure, the reasons for it and its effect shall
be given in a note to the accounts'.
'' Companies or groups which qualify for the small company filing exemptions and which do not exceed two
of the following criteria are exempt from audit: turnover: £1 m; balance sheet total: £1.4 m; employees: 50. This
change was introduced in May 2000. The previous level for turnover was £350,000. The recently issued White
Paper "Modernising Company Law (2002)" indicates no intention of changing this level of exemption.
'' Companies or groups which do not exceed two or more of the following criteria qualify for these public
filing exemptions: turnover: £2.8 m; balance sheet total: £1.4 m; average number of employees: 50. "Modernising
Company Law (2002)" indicates an intention to simplify reporting for small companies.
'"* A PLC must have a minimum authorized capital of £50,000 and may offer its shares to the public. Private
companies may not offer shares to the public and the minimum authorized capital requirement does not apply.
Listed companies are required to produce accounts on a faster timetable to comply with the UKLA rules.
Full accounts must be produced within 6 months of the year-end, but preliminary announcements obviously
precede the issue of the accounts. "Modernizing Company Law" indicates an intention to shorten the filing
periods for all companies.
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auditors who lent their names to creative accounting practices, or even those whose accounts
failed to comply with the existing standards. Regulators only became interested in cases of
corporate collapse. As a result, UK financial reporting and auditing lost credibility.
In order to restore credibility in UK accounting, after a lengthy consultation process
instigated by the DTI (Combined Committee of Accounting Bodies [CCAB], 1988), the
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) was set up. The FRC is an independent private sector body
funded by the accountancy profession, the DTI and City institutions. It has a small permanent
staff, and its committees are served mainly by volunteers representing various stakeholder
groups. The FRC has three subsidiary bodies: the Accounting Standards Board (ASB), which
has a ftiU-time chair; the Urgent Issues Task Force (UITF), which opines on emerging
accounting issues for which no standards exist; and the Financial Reporting Review Panel
(FRRP) which is responsible for enforcement.
The FRRP was an innovation in the UK ft^amework. Its remit covers the accounts of listed
companies. PLCs and large private companies. (The majority of cases have been listed
companies.) The FRRP is a reactive body and takes up cases arising fi^om complaints, referrals
ft-om other regulators or press reports. Its primary objective is to secure remedial action, in the
form ofrestatement or correction where accounts are found to be defective. It has legal authority
to apply to the courts to force remedial action on directors if they refuse to correct deficiencies
voluntarily. In the first 10 years of its existence, no such applications have been made to the
courts; all defects have been voluntarily remedied. When remedial action is agreed upon by the
directors, the FRRP issues a notice to the financial press and, if the company is listed, the
Regulatory News Service (RNS), explaining the defect and the remedial action taken. The
FRRP has no authority over auditors, but auditors are encouraged to attend when the Panel
meets with directors to discuss problems. When a defect is found, the FRRP refers the matter to
the auditors' regulatory body if an unqualified audit report was attached to the defecdve
accounts. Disciplinary action has been taken against auditors in some of these cases. Fearnley,
Hines, McBride, and Brandt (2000) provide a review ofthe first 10 years ofthe FRRP's activity.
3.2. UK domestic listed companies
Companies whose shares or other securities are listed on the London Stock Exchange are
required to comply with the regulafions issued by the UKLA (FSA, 2000)."' On 1 May 2000,
the role of the London Stock Exchange as the listing authority for the United Kingdom was
transferred to the FSA, a company limited by guarantee, accountable to the UK Government
Treasury,''' and funded by regulatory fees. The UKLA is a division of the FSA.
"^ The UK Listing Rules and interpretation guidance were first issued by the UKLA in May 2000. Regular
updates are issued.
'^ The FSA was established in order to rationalize the regulation of all financial institutions and financial
advisors in the UK. it took its name in October 1997, but it was not until 1 December 2001 that the final stage of
the amalgamation of all the regulatory bodies was legally achieved, under the provisions of the Financial Services
and Markets Act 2000. The penalty regime applies to breaches of the financial services regulations and breaches of
the UKLA Listing Rules. Included in these provisions were powers to impose fines and other penalties on
directors for market abuse and other forms of misconduct.
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A key guiding principle of the UKLA is to balance access to the market with an
appropriate level of protection for investors. The UK Listing Rules'^ require annual reports
and accounts to be prepared in accordance with the issuers' national law'*^ and in all material
respects in accordance with UK GAAP, US GAAP, or IAS. (Countries within the EU may
file under their own domestic GAAP.) Accounts must be independently audited under
recognized auditing standards (UK, US, or ISA). Group accounts must be prepared where
there are subsidiary undertakings and published as soon as possible after the accounts are
approved or, at the latest, 6 months after the year-end. As all UK domestic companies have to
comply with UK Company Law, all their accounts are prepared in accordance with UK
GAAP and audited under UK auditing standards by a UK registered auditor. The Listing
Rules include additional requirements for domestic companies and others which are
mandatory under EU Directives. The additional disclosures are mainly concemed with
information about directors and corporate governance. These include directors' remuneration,
interests in shares and contracts and changes to these interests, related party transactions,
dividends and interest waived, service contracts and incentive schemes. Additional historical
data are required, and each company must disclose the extent to which it has complied with
the provisions of the Combined Code for Corporate Governance (FSA, 2000)."^ The Listing
Rules also cover procedures and requirements surrounding the issue of preliminary
announcements, half-yearly statements,"' and other communications to shareholders. The
UKLA supervises and approves initial public offerings and other capital raising activities.
Detailed procedures for this are set out in the Listing Rules and accompanying guidelines.
Once their securities are listed, copies of annual accounts and all other documents issued to
shareholders must be provided to the UKLA, where they are kept on public record in various
forms (mainly electronic) for varying periods of time, and may be accessed through the
RNS.^^ Key accounting data are currently passed to a commercial organization that stores it
in a database for use by the UKLA. Commercial users of this database are charged a fee.
There is no comprehensive system that stores each company's history, such as the SEC's
Edgar system. The whole area of information storing and retention is under review by the
UKLA.
Before UK securities are admitted to listing, the documents are carefully vetted following
laid down procedures. Checks are performed on a sample of regular filings, which mainly
Detailed regulations for financial information are contained in Chapter 1 2 of the UK Listing Rules.
This regulation forces all UK domestic companies to file under UK GAAP.
The Combined Code for Corporate Governance was issued in 1998. It combines codes for corporate
governance and directors" remuneration disclosures which were developed in the United Kingdom between 1992
and 1998. It was incorporated into UK Stock Exchange Listing Rules for year-ends 31 December 1998 onwards
and is attached to the UK Listing Rules (2000) but is not part of them. The Combined Code does not currently
form part of UK Company Law.
' Quarterly reporting is not required for most companies on the UK Stock Exchange. Certain innovative high
growth companies, whose earnings are prospective and which are without a 3 -year track record, may be required
to report quarterly under Chapter 25 of the UK Listing Rules.
Up to April 2002, the Stock Exchange has a monopoly of the RNS. Other service providers have been
recognized by the FSA from this date (FSA website, visited 8 March 2002).
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focus on compliance with the Listing Rules, as the UKLA is not primarily responsible for
compliance with company law and accounting standards. An overview check is carried out on
this information. Where the UKLA's overview checks identify deficiencies in accounting, or
deficiencies are drawn to its attention, the UKLA refers the company accounts to the FRRP.
Pre-clearance advice may be given by the FSA on compliance with the Listing Rules, but not
on compliance with company law and accounting standards. Regulatory pre-clearance on
company law and accounting standards is currently not available in the United Kingdom.
When a breach of the Listing Rules is identified, the first priority of the UKLA is to correct the
breach.
On 1 December 2001, the UKLA acquired wide powers (see footnote 17) to pursue
directors, former directors, issuers or sponsors for market abuse, insider dealing"" or other
forms of dishonesty.""^ The UKLA's primary target for enforcement is the company, as
directors cannot be pursued unless a breach of the Listing Rules is established. In addition to
suspension or delisting, which may be damaging to the interests of investors, private
wamings may be given, which remain part of a disciplinary record. Other possible actions
include public censure of companies and individual directors, fines, and restatement of
defective information. Where there is evidence of misleading accounting information, the
UKLA and the DTI are expected to work together to decide how best to pursue the
offenders.
The Listing Rules were taken over from the Stock Exchange and were subject to some
amendment before reissue by the UKLA. A comprehensive review of the Listing Rules has
been announced (FSA, 2002b). Further changes to the Listing Rules may be introduced. It is
unclear how wide-ranging such changes may be. The chairman of the FSA has already caused
some consternation by expressing a view that it may be appropriate for the Listing Rules to
pronounce on matters concerning auditors (Accountancy Age, 2002), an area previously
believed to be within the remit of the DTI.
5.3. Overseas registrants'^
In all there are 708 overseas companies with a primary listing on the London Stock
Exchange."*^ Of these, 500 are specialist debt issuers, and 160 have a primary listing for equity.
The debt issuers may have a primary listing for their equity on another market. The market for
Eurobonds is mainly in London or Luxembourg, and this may explain the relatively high
number of specialist debt issuers. There are 370 overseas companies with a secondary listing.
^^ This was previously the responsibihty of the DTI.
*"* The London Stock Exchange had powers to reflise hsting, suspend, or dehst, but not to take legal action
against directors. It could issue public reprimands. It was a private sector body but was ultimately accountable to the
Treasury.
"" Detailed regulations for overseas registrants are contained in Chapter 17 of the UK Listing Rules.
'
' An overseas company, which has a branch or trades in the United Kingdom, is classed as an oversea company
under UK company law and is required to comply with the Companies Acts, subject to defined exemptions.
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of which 213 have an equity Hsting. Accounting information may be provided by registrants
under UK GAAP, US GAAP, or IAS without reconcihation, but the accounts must comply
with domestic law in the registrant's country of origin. Companies resident in the EU may file
under their own domestic GAAP. UKLA has discretion to accept information prepared under
other accounting regimes and is more inclined to do this where the security is specialized debt
rather than equity.
Where a primary listing is sought by an overseas company and there is no listing elsewhere,
registrants must comply with UK regulatory requirements, but they also may prepare accounts
under UK GAAP, US GAAP, or IAS. Such a company must also comply with the legal
requirements of its country of origin. Compliance with the Combined Code is not required for
any overseas company. There are relatively few overseas companies with a sole primary listing
in London,"^ as the more accepted route is to set up a UK resident company and seek the listing
through a UK resident vehicle.
Overseas registrants with a dual primary listing—i.e., where securities are actively traded
on more than one country's exchanges—are expected to comply with the highest standards of
reporting of both countries' regulatory requirements.
Where the level of trading and interest in the securities issued by overseas companies is
limited to knowledgeable investors (e.g., financial institutions), a 'light touch' or caveat
emptor approach may be adopted for specialized securities (e.g., bonds and other forms of
secured debt) once the security has been accepted for listing. In some circumstances, limited
information in a language other than English may be accepted. Very few complaints or
problems currently emerge from this market sector despite its size.
Where there are concerns about an application for listing from an overseas registrant, the
application is refiased. The extent of monitoring of an application can vary according to the
type of security and the rigor of the overseas lead regulator. Where problems subsequently
emerge, the UKLA's approach is initially the same as for a UK company (i.e., to remedy
the defects expeditiously and keep the market informed). The approach may differ
according to the nature of the security and the interests of the investor. If the listing is
secondary, the UKLA will normally approach the lead regulator if further action against the
company or the directors is under consideration. In the case of a primary listing, the UKLA
will take the action itself but will liaise with regulators in other countries where the
company had securities listed. Only in serious and very urgent cases will unilateral action
be contemplated. The UKLA can only pursue individuals for breaches of the UK Listing
Rules.
There can be some difficulties in pursuing directors of overseas companies for wrongdoing
if they are not resident in the United Kingdom. The same problem applies to overseas
directors of UK or oversea companies (see footnote 26) whom the DTI may wish to pursue
for breaches of UK Company Law.
II
" Anecdotal evidence from practitioners and regulators suggests that overseas resident companies seeking a
primary listing in the United Kingdom without any listing in their own country would be viewed with some
suspicion by the markets.
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4. The regulatory framework for audit
4.1. The regime for audit regulation and standard setting
Until 1991, holders of a legally recognized accounting qualification and a practicing
certificate issued by a recognized professional body were entitled to carry out audits."^ This
situation was changed by the EU 8th Directive, which was incorporated into UK Company
Law in the 1989 Companies Act. One objective of this directive was to harmonize audit
qualifications throughout the EU in order to achieve mutual recognition in all member states.
Auditors in all member states are licensed and a public register maintained in each country.
Because of the loss of confidence in financial reporting and auditing which had arisen in the
UK in the 1980s, the DTI took the opportunity to introduce a monitoring procedure for
auditors, which went beyond the requirements of the Directive. After a consultation process
(DTI, 1986), it was agreed that the DTI would delegate responsibility to the recognized
professional bodies for licensing, monitoring, and disciplining auditors. They would also
maintain the public audit register. From the outset, the process was fi"agmented. ICAEW,
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS), and Institute of Chartered Accountants
in Ireland (ICAI) combined resources, developed regulations for approval by the DTI, and set
up a monitoring unit which would inspect all their practices. They also set up a Joint Ethics
Committee. The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) developed separate
regulations and its own ethical rules. The DTI approved both sets of regulations and the
licensing and monitoring regimes started in 1991. Each year the ACCA and the Institutes of
Chartered Accountants report to the DTI on their regulatory activities.
Compliance with this new regime imposed considerable cost on small audit firms and small
companies. As a result, exemptions fi*om the audit requirement were introduced for smaller
companies (see footnotes 12 and 13).
Professional bodies can only take action against their own members; therefore, although the
three Institutes of Chartered Accountants had joined forces to monitor audit practices, each
body still takes action separately against its own members and its own registered firms. This
problem of fragmentation had been recognized some years earlier with respect to major public
interest investigations, where the accountants involved could be members of different bodies
and there was a problem of a duplicated and fi-agmented investigation. In order to expedite
investigations into major public interest cases where accountants involved could be members
of more than one professional body, a separate scheme, the Joint Disciplinary Scheme (JDS)
was set up in 1979 by ICAEW, ICAS, and ACCA. The ACCA eventually withdrew fi-om the
JDS because, despite contributing to the costs, none of its members had ever been under
investigation. Despite the fact of the fragmentafion problem being recognized, the professional
bodies were still allowed by the DTI to continue dealing individually with their own members
and registered firms as well as developing two monitoring regimes and two sets of ethical
standards. The law and regulations make no distinction between the auditors of listed
^^ These bodies are: ICAEW, ICAS, ICAI, and ACCA.
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companies and the auditors of small companies. The only difference is the frequency of
monitoring visits (CGAA, 2002).
Auditing standards, however, apply to all auditors and are set by the Auditing Practices
Board (APB). Since 1991, the Board's membership comprised 50% auditors and 50%
nonauditors. Nonauditors may be qualified accountants. This is now changing to 60%
nonauditors and 40% auditors."^
4.2. Market structure
For the year-ended 3 1 December 2000, there were 8626 firms of auditors registered with
ICAEW, ICAS, and ICAI (ICAEW, 2001),^° 88% of which have four partners or less. One
hundred and two firms audit listed companies. Seventy-six percent of listed company audits
are carried out by 16 firms with more than 51 partners. The 100 largest listed companies in the
United Kingdom (generally referred to as the FTSE 100, being the top companies as listed by
the Financial Times) are audited by Big Five (now Big Four) firms.^' ICAEW regulates all the
major audit firms in the United Kingdom.
Also for the year-ended 3 1 December 2000, ACCA has 3242 'Registered Auditor Entities'
(ACCA, 2001). This number duplicates some ofthe firms registered with the other bodies, as it
includes firms which ACCA does not regulate. ^"^ However, there are in the UK over 10,000
firms of registered auditors. It is unlikely that ACCA regulates any listed company auditors,
but confirmation of this information is not easily obtained.
The figures quoted are unlikely to reflect the impact on small audit firms of the DTI's
decision to raise the audit exemption level to £1 m turnover in May 2000 (see footnotes 12 and
13). It is possible that some smaller firms will no longer continue their audit registration.
4.3. Background to the establishment of the Accountancy Foundation
By 1996, some problems were emerging for the accountancy bodies' regulatory activities,
concerning small practitioners, disciplinary procedures, and the JDS.
The introduction of audit regulation, while being generally recognized as improving
standards of work (Bidmead, 1992), was not popular with many small practitioners, who
did not like the monitoring visits and objected to being fined by their professional body for
regulatory breaches. It was less of a problem for the large firms (Lindsell, 1993), who also saw
the alternative of direct regulation by the state as less attractive. There was much debate about
feasibility of a professional body (particularly the ICAEW) taking on the dual role of a
members' organisation and as a regulator on behalf of the state.
^^ Under the rules of the Accountancy Foundation, the reformed APB has 60% of its member's nonauditors.
^° As the three bodies, ICAEW, ICAS, and ICAI submit a joint report, the data have been taken from the
ICAEW report. It could equally have been taken from the ICAS or ICAI reports.
^' From 1 August 2002, Andersen UK has joined with
^^ Where an audit firm has partners who are members (
the ACCA's numbers although regulated by another body.
Deloitte and Touche UK.
ofACCA and the other bodies, this firm is included in
}
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The DTI did not approve of the ACCA's withdrawal from the JDS because this left the
scheme no longer representative of all UK auditing bodies. A further problem arose for the
ICAEW: there was public outrage because an ICAEW member, who had resigned his post as a
government minister on suspicion of corruption, was considered to have been leniently treated
by the ICAEW disciplinary committee.^^ There was also concern about the independence of
the APB as it was felt to be too close to the profession. (The APB actually resided in the
ICAEW headquarters in London.) The position of the professional bodies as regulators was
believed to be under threat, and the bodies, particularly the ICAEW which regulates the large
firms, were keen to retain it. A scheme for an independent body to oversee the professional
bodies' regulatory and disciplinary activities was initiated by the ICAEW. This body would
also take ownership of the APB and a replacement body for the JDS would be established. It
was realised, however, that to be credible, an independent oversight body would have to
include all the UK accountancy professional bodies. The intention of the new arrangement was
for the professional bodies to demonstrate both to the public and to their own members that
they were working together and their regulatory activities were both fair and effective.
A consultation paper was issued by the DTI (1998) and agreement was reached in 1999
about the structure of the Accountancy Foundation. An Ethics Standards Board (ESB) was
also included at the behest of the DTI.^'* The Accountancy Foundation is funded by all the
accounting bodies in the United Kingdom. ^^ It has four subsidiaries: the Review Board is
responsible for oversight of the effectiveness of the regulatory and disciplinary activities; the
APB; the ESB oversees the setting of ethical standards for the profession; and the
Investigation and Discipline Board (IDB) investigates the role of accountants and auditors
in major cases of public interest and is the successor body to the JDS. Key provisions are that
no member of the Board of the Accountancy Foundation may be an accountant. No member
of the Review Board may be an accountant in public practice, and there are only two qualified
accountants on the Review Board, although its constitution does not disbar others.
Membership of the other boards must be 60% nonaccountants (in the case of the APB
60% nonauditors).
The Accountancy Foundation was set up in 2000. The Review Board, APB and ESB were
set up in 2001. The terms of reference of the IDB, particularly for cases which are in the
process of being investigated by the JDS, are still being agreed and this board may not be
operational until later in 2003. An outline of the new system was issued by the Foundation in
January 2002 (Accountancy Foundation, 2002).
Tim Smith, who was a government minister, was admitted accepting cash from Mohammed al Fayed, the
Chairman of Harrods, in return for raising questions in the House of Commons. He failed to disclose the interest in
the Register of Members' Interests. He was fined by the ICAEW but was allowed to stay in membership.
^'* Previously, the three Institutes of Chartered Accountants, ICAEW, ICAS, and ICAI, had operated the
Chartered Accountants Joint Ethics Committee (CAJEC) and the ACCA had operated separately. Because of the
importance of ethics to auditor independence, it was felt that oversight of ethics should be part of the Foundation's
remit.
^^ The bodies are: ICAEW, ICAS, ICAI, ACCA, Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA),
and Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA).
If
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5. Developments in progress before the post-Enron reforms
Significant changes were already in progress in the United Kingdom before the impact of
the Enron collapse and the demise of Andersen. These are set out below.
5.1. Securities regulation
The UKLA, a division of the FSA, is now the competent authority in the United
Kingdom for securities regulation. The UKLA is responsible for the contents and the
implementation of the UK Listing Rules and is accountable to the UK Treasury. However,
responsibility for oversight of financial reporting and auditing rests with a different
govemment department, the DTI. The UKLA now has (since 1 December 2001) statutory
powers to impose penalties on companies and directors and has taken responsibility for
regulation of insider dealing. The Chairman of the FSA has already stated publicly that the
UK Listing Rules could be a vehicle for imposing auditor rotation, re-tendering of audits or
restriction of nonaudit work (Accountancy Age, 2002). This has created uncertainty about
the future scope of the UK Listing Rules, and how the Listing Rules fit with Company Law
and the current regime for the regulation of auditors, including the Accountancy Founda-
tion. The UKLA is currently considering the results of a consultation process on the UK
Listing Rules (FSA, 2002b). This regime is recognized as being fi-agmented. A fiirther
complication is that the UKLA is the United Kingdom's representative in the global and
European forums for securities regulators, despite having no control over the regulatory
framework for financial reporting and auditing (other than additional disclosures in the
Listing Rules). Nevertheless, as more directives come from EU and as the EU moves
towards a single capital market, the UKLA's influence in the United Kingdom is likely to
increase.
5.2. Reforms ofcompany law
The Company Law Review and subsequent White Paper has generally been welcomed,
particularly the plans to define director's duties and responsibilities more clearly and to
introduce a penalty for withholding information from (in addition to refusing to supply
information to) an auditor. The present market turbulence is likely to accelerate the introduction
of a new Companies Act.
5.3. The conversion to IAS
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the reaction to the introduction of IAS in the UK varies
according to the interest groups. The large listed companies will comply, and plans are already
being made for conversion. IAS is not expected to be a problem for larger audit firms. They
can look forward to extra fees in assisting with the conversion and providing training for the
clients' staff. Introduction of LAS is unlikely to cause much disturbance to overseas registrants
on the London Stock Exchange, who have flexibility in filing already. However, no one
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underestimates the effort that will be needed to achieve a smooth changeover (Fearnley &
Hines, 2003).
The major issue in the United Kingdom with the IAS conversion lies with the smaller
companies. The DTI is consulting on this issue. The Chair of the UK ASB has already
indicated the Board's intention that all new accounting standards issued by the ASB will be
compatible with IAS, and that the long-term existence of two different forms ofGAAP in the
United Kingdom is unacceptable. The intention is that UK GAAP will eventually be identical
to IAS.
A concern is emerging in the United Kingdom that if lASs, as they are developed, converge
too closely with US GAAP, which is not popular in the United Kingdom because of its plethora
of rules, smaller companies and smaller audit firms will find compliance too costly and
burdensome (Fearnley & Hines, 2003).
Enforcement of compliance with IAS is recognized as a major issue within the EU, but is
not viewed as a serious problem in the United Kingdom. The combination ofthe FRRP and the
powers the UKLA has acquired since 1 December 200 1 against directors, combined with the
audit regulation regime, provides a framework for deterring noncompliance. The UK's post-
Enron reforms are expected to strengthen the enforcement regime.
The position regarding the transfer of auditing from UK auditing standards to International
Standards of Auditing is less certain and dependent on the level of progress made with the
latter.
The EU plans for a common prospectus document are proceeding. Discussions are still
taking place as to its final contents and where the responsibility for oversight will lie.
6. The government's interim post-Enron report
The CGAA's interim report issued in July 2002 (CGAA, 2002) sets out key areas of
potential change to the regulatory framework for companies and for auditors.
The potential changes for companies are: a more proactive regime for monitoring accounts
by the FRRP; improved disclosure of the nature and value of nonaudit services purchased by
the company; and development of the Combined Code for corporate governance in relation to
the role and responsibilities of nonexecutive directors, with a particular focus on the
relationship between the audit committee and the auditors.
To inform the corporate governance changes, two separate inquiries were set up. The first, to
consider the role and responsibilities ofthe nonexecutive director, was set up by the Secretary of
State in February 2002, alongside the establishment of the CGAA. A second inquiry, which
specifically focussed on the role of the audit committee, was set up by the FRC in July 2002.
The development of proposals for proactive monitoring of accounts and disclosure of nonaudit
services was left to the FRC and DTI to develop. The discussions also involved input from the
UKLA, as the FRRP's focus is primarily on the accounts of listed companies.
The potential changes for auditors are: a reconsideration of the permissibility of certain
nonaudit services where there is incompatibility with the underlying principles of auditor
independence; fiirther consideration of mandatory audit firm rotation; a requirement that an
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audit engagement partner should rotate every 5 years, rather than the 7 years set out in the EC's
Recommendation (2002) on auditor independence; an early review of the arrangements for
regulation of the accountancy profession and the fiinding arrangements; a review of the
ownership of the monitoring process for the auditors of listed companies; an expectation of
more openness and transparency by audit firms about their processes, procedures, accounts,
and international networks; and, a requirement that the DTI and the Treasury should discuss
with the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) whether there are any competition implications of the
high concentration in the market for audit services. Resulting from these interim proposals, the
DTI set up an additional inquiry to review the regulatory regime of the accountancy profession
and further discussions were held with the OFT.
7. The UK government's post-Enron reforms
In January 2003, four reports were issued by UK regulators. The two corporate governance
reports (FRC, 2003; Higgs, 2003) came first, thus enabling the CGAA to make reference to
their findings in their final report (CGAA, 2003). The CGAA report and the DTI's Review of
the Regulatory Regime of the Accountancy Profession (DTI, 2003) were issued together with
an endorsement from the Secretary of State. The package of reforms covers the following
areas: corporate governance, enforcement of compliance with accounting standards, changes
to the regulatory regime of the accountancy profession, auditor independence, audit firm
fransparency, and competition implications of the UK market concenfration.
7.1. Corporate governance
The two corporate governance reports contain few surprises and bring together issues which
have been debated in the United Kingdom and other countries since the Enron collapse. Higgs
(2003) makes recommendations about appointment, remuneration, resignation, independence,
tenure, and time commitment for nonexecutive directors generally. Only two recommenda-
tions from this report have proved contentious. The first is that a chief executive should not
become chairman of the same company.^^ There are concerns that this will deprive companies
of knowledgeable chairmen. The second is that a senior independent director should be
appointed who is available to shareholders if they are concerned that contact through the
normal channels of chairman or chief executive has failed to resolve. There are concerns that
this could be divisive.^^"^^
^^
It has been accepted best practice in the United Kingdom and is included in the existing Combined Code
that the roles of chairman and chief executive should be split.
^^ Most UK boards are unitary, i.e., the nonexecutive directors and the executive directors meet together for
management and strategic direction purposes. It is feared that mandating a senior nonexecutive director to address
shareholder concerns will threaten the unity of the board.
^^ There have been many press reports and comments about these issues. One example is a leader in the
Financial Times, of 11 February, 2003, 'A backlash from the boardroom', which supports the recommendations
despite the criticisms made.
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Structures, and financial information. If the voluntary disclosure is not considered adequate,
then legislation may follow.
47
7.6. Competition implications of the UK market concentration
The high level of concentration in the market is recognized; but following the recommen-
dations of the Office of Fair Trading, the CGAA makes no recommendation for regulatory
intervention.'^^
8. Conclusion
As can be seen from the changes introduced by the CGAA to the UK framework, there is no
desire to introduce extensive legislation; and regulators wish to remain engaged with the
professional bodies and continue to delegate regulation to private sector bodies and support
voluntary codes ofpractice wherever appropriate. Legislation and extensive rules are seen as a
backstop only to be applied where all else fails. Principles based frameworks continue to be
supported.
The additional post-Enron reforms combined with the proposed changes to UK Company
Law, the changeover to international accounting and auditing standards, increasing legislation
from the EU, and possible changes to the UK Listing Rules present a major and potentially
costly implementation challenge to UK companies, auditors, and regulators.
A final unresolved issue is the extent ofthe impact on the UK regulatory environment ofthe
US Sarbanes/Oxley Act. About half the top hundred UK companies have securities listed in
the United States, and the possibility that US regulators may involve themselves in the
oversight ofUK companies and audit firms is not a popular one, either with UK regulators, the
European Commission, or the business community, particularly when viewed in the light of
the many other changes the UK is currently absorbing.
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Comparative International Accounting
by Christopher Nobes and Robert Parker, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow (UK), 2002,
seventh edition, xvii + 593 pp.
This textbook addresses undergraduate and postgraduate courses on comparative and
international accounting. Given the important changes that have taken place in the
international realm, this seventh edition has been thoroughly revised and updated, which is
one of the main features that makes it so useful for students, teachers, and lecturers. The
textbook is oriented to readers who are familiar with the Anglo-Saxon system of accounting;
most of the comparisons are made by reference to UKGAAP, USGAAP, or International
Accounting Standards (IAS). Nonetheless, because of the latest developments in intemational
harmonization worldwide, this seems to be the proper way to tackle the issues under study
and at the same time reach a wider readership.
The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents a broad overview of the context of
intemational accounting. It comprises six introductory chapters, dealing with the causes of
accounting diversity, the main differences in financial reporting, the classifications of
accounting systems, and the efforts at achieving accounting harmonization. Chapter 5 on
the intemadonal harmonization of accounting has been substantially changed because of the
latest developments in the intemational realm and the recent restmcturing of the Intemational
Accounting Standards Committee's (lASC) Board into the IAS Board.
Chapter 6 is one of the novelties in this edition because a growing number of companies
and countries are using the IAS. The editors felt that a new chapter was needed to examine
their contents and requirements.
As in the previous edition. Part II contains eight chapters on country studies. Part III is
devoted to examining four particular financial reporting issues: liabilities, consolidations,
foreign currency translation, and segment reporting. It should be noted that a new Chapter 15
has been added to this edition to address the treatment of various types of liabilities, whereas
the chapter on inflation accounting in previous editions has been deleted because inflation is
no longer an issue in most countries. Finally, Part IV includes four chapters on intemational
analysis and management issues, such as intemational financial analysis, intemational
auditing, intemational aspects of corporate income taxes (with a new introduction on
intemational tax planning), and managerial accounting. The textbook offers a glossary of
abbreviations, suggested answers for the first two questions proposed at the end of each
chapter, an index of the authors cited in the end-of-chapter references, and an index organized
by subjects.
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Not only has this new edition improved the contents of the book by providing information
on the current developments in international accounting in the countries under study and by the
lASC itself, but the contents are also presented in a more user-friendly format for the reader.
For instance, new sections of contents and objectives are now presented at the start of each
chapter; at least seven questions are presented at the end, following an itemized summary of
the chapter, together with updated references and Web sites of interest. Moreover, Part II of this
edition has been definitely improved by the effort that has been put into shaping all of the
chapters on the different countries in a similar and coherent way. The addition of a section on
differences from IAS for each country under study is most illustrative and useful for readers,
which demonstrates that the new chapter on IAS was really needed.
From the point of view of teachers and lecturers, this edition has the advantage of offering
Internet material to support classroom use of the book. It includes outline answers for the
remaining questions proposed at the end of each chapter as well as multiple-choice questions
and suggested answers. In addition, it provides some ofthe tables from the text for the purpose
of making overhead transparencies. An appendix with real examples from annual reports can
also be downloaded together with a related set of proposed questions. The suggested answers
are also available fi*om the Internet. This is very helpfiil for students because it allows them to
apply the contents derived from the analysis of the chapters, and teachers and lecturers will
surely find it easier to offer their students new real-life examples and propose new exercises.
To my knowledge, this edition is one of the pioneering books in regard to online material. The
authors and editors should be congratulated for having succeeded in such an innovative
initiative. Hopefully, competing textbooks will also improve in order to keep in pace with
advances in information technology.
As in previous editions, the book is coedited by Christopher Nobes (who is also the author
of nine chapters and coauthor in three chapters) and Robert Parker (author of four chapters and
coauthor of three chapters). The other authors or coauthors are academics or practitioners with
local knowledge of the different countries or institutions examined. Their experience in
teaching and research or their expertise as partners in international audit firms and as members
of regulatory bodies gives this book a well-founded approach to every topic.
Even though this new edition of the book has been thoroughly updated and revised, there is
still some scope for improvement that may be explored in fiiture editions. For example, given
the important changes that worldwide convergence of accounting standards may bring about.
Part I should pay more attention to de jure harmonization. Recent research looks into new
methodological approaches to measure formal harmonization among different countries or
across time or even looks into the correlation between substantive and formal declaration of
harmonization. These studies open new avenues for research that are worth mentioning
because, in light of the recent pronouncements by accounting regulators, worldwide efforts
will shortly be made in the area of formal harmonization.
As regards Part II, although the editors carefully explain and discuss their choice of
countries for study and the order in which they appear in the book (UK, USA, Netherlands,
France, Germany, and Japan as well as a chapter on nine diverse countries and another chapter
on central and eastern Europe and China), some worthwhile information on other countries is
missing. At least, a general overview should be given of the accounting situation in Latin
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American countries, especially Mexico, formeriy a member country represented on the lASC
board, and Argentina or Brazil, given their economic importance in the region and the fact that
many multinational companies have substantial investments there. Perhaps this broad
overview should also be extended to developing countries in Africa and Asia. These
geographical areas deserve another section within one of the multicountry chapters or at least
in an appendix with a brief summary or table setting forth the main influences from foreign or
international GAAP. In this way, the reader will gain a wider vision of what the accounting
situation is in most parts of the world.
As regards Part III, the contents of the chapters on liabilities and consolidations could be
illustrated by simple numerical examples, as with the excellent examples provided in the
chapter on foreign currency translation, so that the students can more easily understand how
the different valuation methods work, together with their impact on companies' financial
reports.
Finally, regarding Part FV, real examples of qualified audit reports should be included in the
text (in addition to those available online), and the bibliographical references on international
audit should be updated. The chapter on managerial accounting seems to be too focused on
research studies and perhaps should be given a more pragmatic approach in order to make it
more attractive to students.
In short, this is an excellent textbook on comparative international accounting. It provides a
strong theoretical and conceptual background in Part I and covers a wide range of subjects:
country studies in Part II, specific accounting issues in Part III, and a more general examination
of analysis and management issues in Part IV. Each topic is clearly explained and very much
up to date. Those looking for an in-depth knowledge of specific areas can find the
bibliographical references to the latest research relating to each topic. This book is highly
recommended not only for undergraduate and masters' courses but also for general research
purposes, including gaining a first conceptual or theoretical picture of the area under study and
finding references to related articles recently published in scholarly journals.
Ana Zorio
Comptabilitat, Facultad de Economia,
Universitat de Valencia, Valencia, Spain
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Regulation of Corporate Accounting and Reporting in India
By Bhabatosh Banerjee, World Press, Calcutta, 2002, xv+220 pp.
This book is a product of a research report written by the author in 1999. Its stated objective
is to analyze the state of accounting regulation, past and present, to point out the emerging
dimensions of accounting regulation having regard to the changes in economic policy in India
and to suggest suitable improvements in keeping with the global trend.
Consisting of nine chapters, the book provides detailed coverage of accounting regulation.
The reader will learn not only about accounting in India, but will also find detailed
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comparisons with UK, U.S., and then lASC standards. Although the book is not intended to
provide a history, it traces concerns about financial reporting in 1881 to current practices.
Chapters 1 and 2 mainly provide the setting for the book and highlight the need for
regulation. The author discusses various perspectives on the role of accounting regulation and
relates this to India. Chapters 3-5 are concerned with corporate legislation, professional
regulation, and the role ofgovernmental and voluntary bodies on financial reporting. Chaptei 3
offers a detailed comparison of the Companies Acts of 1882, 1913, 1936, and 1956, which
provide the basic rules and guidelines for preparation of financial statements and their
disclosure in India and the Companies Bill of 1987, evaluating the stipulations in respect of
(i) maintenance of books of accounts, (ii) annual accounts, (iii) audit of accounts, (iv)
directors' reports, and (v) maintenance of cost records and audit of cost accounts. (In India,
selected companies are required to keep cost records and have them audited by a qualified
person.)
Professional regulation is the subject of Chapter 4, which discusses the role of the Institute
of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) in setting accounting standards, outlines the salient
feature of the 27 accounting standards issued by the ICAI, and provides some comparison
between those and the LASC standards. The content of the standards is not underpinned by a
conceptual fi^amework, and it has been largely influenced by external factors, such as the
LASC. Although compliance with the ICAI accounting standards is mandatory, as yet, there is
no enforcement mechanism (such as the UK Financial Reporting Review Panel or the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission). The author thus argues for the development of a
conceptual fi-amework for developing countries and for the better enforcement of accounting
standards.
Although the Companies Acts and ICAI standards primarily underpin financial reporting
in India, governmental and professional bodies (the subject of Chapter 5) also exert some
influence. The Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) requires public enterprises to prepare
accounts and report economic information on a uniform and comparable basis. They are
required to comply with ICAI standards, subject to some "additions and amplifications"
issued by the DPE. Stock Exchanges and the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI),
through the listing requirements, also have an impact on financial reporting in India. The
SEBI requires, for example, the publication of a Corporate Governance Report, certified by
the auditors, giving information about the composition and responsibilities of the board,
details of the audit and remuneration committees as well as the shareholders' committee
(whose purpose is to deal with complaints from shareholders). Other voluntary bodies also
identified as making a useful contribution to the development of financial reporting include
the Indian Chamber of Commerce, Indian Commerce Association, and Indian Accounting
Association and its Research Foundation.
Chapter 6 describes the regulatory framework and accounting developments in the UK, the
United States, and Japan. The nature of the standard-setting process, their enforcement, and
the roles of various governmental and professional bodies (such as the FASB, SEC, and
AICPA in the United States and the ASB, UITF, and FRRP in the UK) are discussed in some
detail. Following a review of practices in these countries, the chapter discusses reasons for
diversity in financial reporting and presents a framework for analyzing change in accounting
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systems. The framework is used to study accounting changes in India. Important events that
took place in India before and after independence from Britain in 1947 are discussed under (i)
corporate legislation, (ii) professional developments, (iii) financial developments, and (iv)
other (political and economic) developments. A table provides a usefiil summary of these
developments from 1882 to 2001. The chapter sheds some important insights into accounting
developments: various changes to the Companies Act in response to changing societal needs,
for example, the provision of a Cost Audit since 1965; pressures from the capital market
leading to the issuance of some 12 standards by the ICAI; the role of the govemment in
regulating central public enterprises (which account for more than 60% of the corporate
economy), whose reporting practices are generally better than those in the private sector; the
SEBI's requirement for listed companies to publish an audited cash flow statement in their
annual report; the pressure exerted by the SEBI, which led the ICAI to make segmental
reporting mandatory for specified companies.
Chapter 7 presents an analysis of current reporting practices of two groups of companies:
(a) 25 companies that are ranked in the top 500 by the Economic Times according to market
capitalization and (b) another 25 ranked outside of the top 500. The results show that both
groups equally comply with statutory disclosure requirements, but companies outside the ET
500 lag behind on voluntary disclosure, particularly in respect to the Corporate Governance
Report and the management discussion and analysis statement. Some examples of good
reporting practices (such as Economic Value Added) are included in the chapter. Overall,
there is evidence of greater compliance with mandatory and recommended practice and
increased voluntary disclosure of financial information in annual reports.
Chapter 8 reports the findings of a questionnaire survey of users' perceptions of financial
reporting. The sample of 200 "users" was drawn from the membership of the Indian
Accounting Association (and its Research Foundation), and the respondents included 39
academics and 14 professional accountants. Overall, the survey findings conclude that both
academics and professionals (i) agree with the need for regulation through Companies Act or
professional bodies, (ii) are undecided about desirability of self-regulation, (iii) believe that
general purpose financial reporting does not serve the aims of all user groups, and (iv) do not
consider the present system of reporting useful for investor/creditor decision making. Both
parties agree with the need (i) to define the objectives of financial reporting in India, (ii) to have
a conceptual framework, (iii) for fiiture-oriented information to be included in the directors'
report, and (iv) for independent standard setting and the enforcement of accounting standards.
Chapter 9 provides a summary and suggestions for the regulation of accounting in India.
These include prescribing a format for the profit and loss account, revamping the standard-
setting process by making it independent of the accounting profession and of the govemment,
and enforcing financial reporting regulation through the DPE (for central public enterprises),
SEBI (for listed companies) and the Department of Company Affairs (for nonlisted
companies).
Complementing Richard Mattessich's 77?^ Beginnings of Accounting and Accounting
TJwught and Claire Marston's Financial Reporting in India, this book makes a valuable
addition to the literature. Overall, it is well written, and it will be of interest to students and
researchers of intemational accounting. Written by an established author, a major strength of
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the book is its comparative approach to the study of accounting in India. As a contribution to
the review of financial reporting practices for pubHc poHcy formulation, the book is very
informative and should be useful to researchers and regulators interested in accounting in
developing countries.
Dr. Mahbub Zaman
School ofManagement & Business,
University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK
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Earnings management and initial public offerings:
Evidence from the Netherlands
Peter Roosenboom^*, Tj ailing van der Goot^, Gerard Mertens^
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Abstract
This paper presents one of the first studies of earnings management by initial public offering (IPO)
firms in a European country. Using a sample of 64 Dutch IPOs, we investigate the pattern of
discretionary current accruals (DCA) over time. We find that managers manage their company's
earnings in the first year as a public company but not in the years before the IPO. We also examine the
impact of earnings management on the long-run stock price performance of IPOs. We find a negative
relation between the size of the DCA in the first year as a public company and long-run stock price
performance over the next 3 years. A number of additional tests support these findings.
© 2003 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: G14; G32; M41
Keywords: Initial public offering; Earnings management; Financial reporting
1. Introduction
At the time of initial public offering (IPO), managers have private information about fiiture
cash flows, investment opportunities, and their own managerial skills. Investors, on the other
hand, are uncertain about the prospects of the IPO firm. Because of this information
asymmetry, IPO firms are required to publish a prospectus containing audited financial
statements. These financial statements may help investors to determine what price they are
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +31-10-408-1255; fax: +31-10-408-9017.
E-mail addresses: proosenboom(§ifbk.eur.nl (P. Roosenboom), vdgoot(a;fee.uva.nl (T. van der Goot),
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willing to pay for the IPO shares. For example, Kim and Ritter (1999) document a significant
and positive relation between financial statement numbers and offer prices for IPOs in the
United States. However, these financial statements report asset and liability valuations as well
as revenue and expense recognition reflecting discretionary choices allowed under generally
accepted accounting principles [GAAP] (Neill, Pourciau, & Schaefer, 1995). The use of
financial statement data in the market-price setting process, combined with accounting
discretion, provides managers with both the incentives and possibilities to manage their
company's earnings at the time of the IPO.
Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) define earnings management as "...judgement in
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers." An important
element of financial reporting systems is that cash flow from operations plus accruals
determine accounting earnings. Accrual decisions affect the reported net income by shifting
the recognition of transactions and events to periods other than those in which the related cash
flows occur. When increasing accruals in the current period, managers of IPO firms can
therefore, without violating accounting rules, borrow income from other periods to manip-
ulate the current period's income.
An important characteristic of accrual-based earnings management, however, is that
accruals will total zero over the long run because the sum of earnings must equal the sum
of cash flows over the life of business. As a result, any higher-than-normal accruals in one
period must be offset by lower-than-normal accruals in other periods so that managers of
firms with poor prospects cannot overstate eamings over longer periods of time without being
detected. It is therefore expected that if these IPO firms exercise accounting discretion, they
will at least do so in the financial statements related to their IPO as these statements will have
the largest impact on the decisions made by market participants. Nonetheless, facing the
decision to enhance short-run eamings are long-term costs. Since managers are forced into
reversing accruals in subsequent periods, it is unlikely that they will be able to sustain inflated
eamings numbers indefinitely. This implies a greater likelihood of reversal for poorly
performing firms, since firms with good performance are likely to have improvements in
cash flows without any need for further overreporting. As a result, we expect that the
detection of eamings management leads outside investors to review their perception of future
eamings quality and to downwardly adjust their valuation of IPO firms that engage in accmal-
based eamings management.
Several studies have documented the use of eamings management related to securities
offerings in the United States. Friedlan (1994) shows that IPO firms make income-increasing
accmals in the most current statements included in the prospectus. In contrast, Aharony, Lin,
and Loeb (1993), find little, if any, manipulation in the periods preceding the IPO. Magnan
and Cormier (1997) report that Canadian IPOs take deliberate steps to move reported eamings
numbers in the first year as a public company toward their voluntary forecast made at the dme
of the IPO. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) observe that finns that report positive accmals in
the first fiscal year as a public company experience poor stock price performance over the
next 3 years.
p. Roosenboom et al. / The International Journal oj Accounting 38 (2003) 243-266 245
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to examine earnings management by
IPO firms in a European country. We use a sample of 64 IPOs on Euronext Amsterdam
between the years 1984 and 1994. Accounting standards in the Netherlands are broadly
formulated, which is in contrast to more descriptive and explicitly detailed formulation of
accounting standards in other countries (Vergoossen, 1997). These interpretative accounting
standards provide Dutch companies with considerable discretion in their use of accruals.
Several institutional differences between Dutch GAAP and International Accounting Stand-
ards (IAS) motivate our study of Dutch IPOs as discussed in the following section. The focus
of our paper is how managers use accruals before and after the IPO. Like Teoh et al. (1998),
our paper compares the long-run stock price performance of IPOs that aggressively use
accrual-based earnings management to the performance of those firms that do not appear to
engage in that activity in order to assess the long-term effects facing the decision to increase
short-run earnings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the main
characteristics of Dutch GAAP. Section 3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4 describes the
data. Section 5 discusses methodology. Section 6 examines how managers use accruals both
before and after the IPO. Section 7 investigates the relationship between earnings manage-
ment and long-run stock price performance. Section 8 checks the robustness of our results.
Finally, Section 9 concludes and compares the results to related findings in the United States.
2. Dutch accounting in an international perspective
Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) show that the impact of accounting principles on the
valuation of assets and liabilities and recognition of costs and revenues differs widely across
countries. A common classification made between international accounting systems is that of
the Anglo-Saxon model versus the Continental model. Under the 'true and fair view' doctrine
of the Anglo-Saxon model, managers may exercise discretion when determining the firm's
financial position and earnings. The codified reporting requirements of the Continental
model, such as those observed in Germany result in conservative accounting through the use
of secret reserves and provisions.
Nobes and Parker (2000, Chap. 8) and Radebough and Grady (1997, Chap. 5) conclude
that the Dutch reporting requirements and practices are in many ways similar to those used in
the United Kingdom and the United States. Dutch accounting is described as being more
subjective and less rule-oriented than the Continental model, although Dutch company law
also codifies reporting requirements.' For example, one aspect of the Dutch GAAP is that
' In the Netherlands, the Civil Code, Book 2 {Burgerlijk Wetboek, Boek 2) stipulates most of the legal
framework for financial reporting by companies. The Council on Annual Reporting (Raad voor de
Jaarve?-slaggeving) interprets the sections of the Act. The Annual Reporting Guidelines promulgated by the
Council on Annual Reporting are intended to have an impact on accounting practice. It is neither mandatory for
companies to adhere to these guidelines nor obligatory for auditors to qualify their reports if the guidelines are not
followed.
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accounting policy changes occur frequently and that the diversity of adopted accounting
principles is high (Vergoossen, 1997). Additionally, Dorsman, Langendijk, and van Praag
(2003) document a widespread use of discretionary accounting by Dutch firms in an attempt
to improve the accuracy of qualitative earnings forecasts.
Hoogendoom (1995) and Van Rooijen (2002) show that, when compared to IAS, Dutch
GAAP offers flexibility in areas relating to foreign currency translation, classification of
exfraordinary items, intangible fixed assets (i.e., the freatment of goodwill and research and
development costs), and the use of provisions." Van Rooijen (2002, p. 154) identifies a
number of major items that allow for managerial discretion within Dutch GAAP. These are
(1) tangible fixed assets including financial fixed assets, (2) intangible fixed assets (expenses
related to share issues, R&D, intangible rights, and goodwill), (3) current assets (i.e., stocks,
work in progress, accounts receivable, and securities), (4) provisions (pension, taxation, and
other provisions), (5) shareholder's equity, (6) accounting policy changes, and (7) exfraor-
dinary items.
With respect to tangible fixed assets, Dutch GAAP allows for valuation on the basis of
either historical cost or current cost. This also entails revaluation of fixed assets, thereby
creating a revaluation reserve (part of the equity account). Current cost accounting is still used
by some companies in the Netherlands. Regarding intangible fixed assets, Dutch GAAP
allows the capitalization of costs related to share issues, which is particularly relevant in the
case of IPO firms. Discretion also includes capitalizing or expensing R&D, as well as the
treatment of goodwill. The latter may be expensed immediately in the income statement,
charged against owner's equity, or capitalized and amortized over its usefiil life. It has been
common practice for Dutch companies to charge goodwill against owner's equity, hence,
profits were not affected (in the current and future years)." Intangibles also may incorporate
start-up expenses, membership rights, frade names, and software. Provisions present a major
discretionary part of income determination. Under Dutch GAAP, provisions should meet two
conditions: they must be identifiable and the specific risks or events these risks refer to must
have existed prior to the balance sheet date. Risk identification is very subjective and
therefore allows substantial discretion. Estimating the amount of the provisions is also a
highly subjective matter. An example of a specific provision often used by Dutch firms to
exercise discretion is the provision for reorganization. Other examples of provisions include
maintenance provisions and warranties provisions."^ Finally, the definition of exfraordinary
^ Casual observation indicates that Dutch IPOs use the flexibiUty offered by Dutch GAAP. One telling
example is that of Text Lite Holding, which used its accounting discretion to conceal its poor operating
performance. The firm showed €4.5 million of sales without either delivering the goods or receiving any
payment. According to such inappropriate recognition of revenues, the firm reported a small profit of €60,000.
Since the auditor withheld its approval. Text Lite Holding had to revise its annual accounts, uncovering a sizeable
loss of €2.4 million.
Similar to IAS, current Dutch GAAP requires goodwill to be capitalized and amortized.
Maintenance provisions are created to anticipate future costs associated with the periodical maintenance of
certain fixed assets. Warranties provisions are related to warranties deriving from the sales of a product or service.
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items under Dutch GAAP is broader than the IAS definition and therefore allows Dutch
companies more discretion in classifying transactions as extraordinary.
In summary, the items mentioned here are not an exhaustive list of all discretionary items
of the Dutch financial reporting system, however, they represent the major areas of flexibility
offered by Dutch GAAP in comparison to IAS. Hence, Dutch GAAP holds a unique position
in international accounting systems. It combines the managerial discretion of Anglo-Saxon
accounting with the codified accounting rules of the Continental European model. Apart from
the requirements stemming from the Dutch GAAP, companies that want to access public
capital markets have to meet certain listing requirements set by Euronext Amsterdam such
that only qualifying enterprises are allowed to access public capital markets. Specifically,
Euronext Amsterdam requires that prospectuses disclose 3 years of annual accounts and
include a discussion of the expected development of turnover, staff, investments, financing,
and profit-eaming power. However, if disclosure of these items of information is contrary to
public policy or would cause serious harm to the company, they can be omitted from the
prospectus. Therefore, Dutch listing requirements do not stress disclosure and transparency to
the same extent as in the United States.
3. Hypotheses
Arguably, the lack of information about IPO firms makes financial statement disclosures
carry more weight with investors than is typical for non-IPO companies. This offers managers
both the incentives and opportunity to engage in eamings management. IPO firms are
presented with two altematives regarding the timing of eamings management. The first
alternative involves managers using income-increasing accruals before the IPO. If investors
rely heavily on financial statement disclosures in pricing IPO shares, managers may resort to
income-increasing accruals to achieve higher offer prices. This predicts that managers tend to
use income-increasing accruals prior to going public to increase the offering proceeds. Friedlan
(1994) reports companies that publish an interim report before the IPO manage eamings in the
interim report and not in the full year financial statements prior to the IPO. He argues that
managers engage in eamings management in the most recent financial statement to increase
the offer price at the time of the IPO. Aharony et al. (1993), on the other hand, find little
eamings management in the years before the IPO. Hence, we hypothesize,
Hypothesis la: Discretionary accruals are more income-increasing in the period before the
IPO than in later periods.
The second timing option is related to using income-increasing accruals during the first year
as a public company in order to support high stock prices after IPO." Accrual-based eamings
management may benefit managers as they have entered into lock-up agreements with
Throughout this paper we use the 'first year as a public company' and the 'IPO year' as synonymous.
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underwriters that prevent them from seUing shares for a specified length of time (typically 1
2
months in the Netherlands). Managers who wish to sell their shares at the end of this lock-up
period have an incentive to support the stock price of the firm in the first year after the IPO.
Another reason to manage earnings in the first financial year as a public company is that firms
are under considerable pressure to meet earnings forecasts issued at the time of the IPO. This is
particularly relevant for those companies that experience an unexpected decline in cash flows
in that same year For example, Magnan and Cormier (1997) show that Canadian IPOs engage
in eamings management in their first year as a public company in order to meet their voluntary
forecasts made at the time of the IPO. The survey results of Von Eije, de Witte, and van der
Zwaan (in press) show that this may motivate eamings management by Dutch IPOs as well.
They find that 17 out of 25 CEOs at Dutch IPO firms indicate that the planning and control of
company eamings increased after the IPO. Hence,
Hypothesis lb: Discretionary accruals are more income-increasing in the first year as a
public company than in later periods.
Chaney and Lewis (1995) develop a theoretical model of firm valuation under information
asymmetry. Their model predicts that users of financial statements require more than reported
eamings to recover all the value-relevant information from these financial statements. The
information about accmals may be useftal to gradually arrive at a more accurate valuation of
the firm over time. In the case of IPOs, the misalignment of incentives between management
and potential investors may lead managers to manage eamings opportunistically in the
financial statements surrounding the IPO. Whenever market participants fail to understand
this transitory nature of the improved eamings due to accmals, these firms will initially trade
at overvalued prices. However, facing the opportunistic decision to enhance short-mn
eamings are long-term costs.
Given that managers are forced into reversing accmals in subsequent periods, it is unlikely
that poor-quality firms will be able to sustain inflated eamings numbers indefinitely. This
implies a greater likelihood of a subsequent decline in eamings for poor-quality firms, since
high-quality firms with good performance are likely to enjoy genuine improvements in cash
flows with little need for further overreporting. In other words, for poor-quality firms that
engage in eamings management, cash flows are likely to be insufficient to mitigate the impact
of these reversing accmals. As a result, the detection of eamings management leads outside
investors to review their perception of future eamings quality and to downwardly adjust the
value of the shares. This is consistent with the investor sentiment model of Barberis et al.
(1998). They argue that investors naively extrapolate the growing trend in eamings resulting
in overvaluations in the short mn. Because eamings follow a random walk, such overreaction
is exposed by friture eamings, leading to the reversal of long-term retums. Accordingly, Teoh
et al. (1998) show that eamings management is associated with poor stock market
performance of U.S. IPOs. Thus,
Hypothesis 2: IPO firms in which managers engage in eamings management experience poor
long-term stock price performance.
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4. Sample selecrion and data
Our original sample consists of 80 firms that went public on Euronext Amsterdam between
January 1984 and December 1994. IPOs from the banking and financial sectors (nine firms)
are excluded from the sample since the financial reporting requirements for these firms are
different from industrial firms. Furthermore, companies with financial statements not based
on Dutch GAAP (two firms), having a change in financial year-end (one firm) or which were
in the development stage (one firm) are also removed from the sample. In addition,
privatizing firms (three firms) are excluded from the sample. After omitting these cases
from the sample, the study consists of 64 IPO firms with a total of 353 firm-year
observations. Of these 64 sample firms, 27 firms are listed on the Official Market, and the
remaining 37 companies are listed on the Parallel Market.^
Financial statement data for the years prior to going public are hand-collected from
prospectuses. Accounting data concerning the years after the IPO are obtained either from
annual reports or from the publication Yearbook of Dutch Companies. Datastream is the
source used for stock return data. These returns are adjusted for rights issues, stock splits,
cash and stock dividends (assumed to be reinvested in the same stock). There is no distinct
clustering of IPOs in industries. A range of industries is represented in the sample in which
manufacturing ( 1 1 firms), wholesale trade (9 firms), computer services (8 firms), electronic
equipment and components (5 firms), business services (5 firms), transportation (4 firms), and
building construction (4 firms) dominate.
Table 1 presents summary statistics. Several features of the sample are worth mentioning.
To start, Dutch IPOs display less underpricing compared to the underpricing that occurs in
other countries. Table 1 shows that IPOs in The Netherlands experience an average
underpricing of about 4% compared with an average underpricing of 15% reported for the
United States (Loughran, Ritter, & Rydqvist, 1994). This can be explained by the use of
auctions as a selling mechanism for Dutch IPOs in the earlier part of our sample period
(auctions were used until 1990). IPOs priced through auctions (23 firms) show an average
underpricing of 1.5%. The average underpricing for fixed-price offerings (41 firms) amounts
to 5.1%. Furthermore, pure secondary offerings (26 firms) are more frequent than pure
primary offerings (6 firms) in the Dutch IPO market. Under pure secondary offerings, no new
shares are issued at the IPO. The other IPOs (32 firms) consist of both a primary and a
secondary component. On average, the split between primary and secondary shares is 28-
72% of the offering. As a result, the larger part of the funds raised in IPOs on Euronext
Amsterdam go to pre-IPO owners. This differs from the United States, where IPOs tend to
largely consist of newly issued shares. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) find that the average U.S.
IPO is comprised by 80% of newly issued shares.
In 1982, a second tier of Euronext Amsterdam (the "Official Parallel Market") was created. No material
differences existed between the listing requirements of the first tier ("Official Market") and the Parallel Market,
except for a less stringent free float requirement of 10% on the Parallel Market. The Parallel Market was closed in
1994, and was later replaced by a new intermediary tier (the "New Market") in 1997.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
Mean Median S.D. Maximum Minimum
Market value (€ million) 177.80 43.56 447.78 3099.28 11.31
Proceeds (€ million) 50.23 12.29 104.12 567.19 2.14
Total assets (€ million) 205.16 46.90 523.71 3333.39 3.61
Sales (€ million) 289.21 65.72 621.57 3330.62 5.08
Age (years) 35.23 19.00 34.70 152.00 1.10
Underpricing (%) 3.82 0.82 12.62 70.00 -31.24
Primary offering (%) 27.81 18.98 32.85 100.00 0.00
This table shows the summary statistics for 64 firms that went public on Euronext Amsterdam between January 1984
and December 1994. Market value is computed as the number of shares outstanding after the offering times the
closing price on the first day of trading. Proceeds are defined as the number of shares offered multiplied by the offer
price. Total assets and sales figures pertain to the financial year prior to going public. Age is the number ofyears the
company was in existence prior to listing. Underpricing is defined as the percentage difference between the closing
price on the first day of trading and the offer price. Primary offering is the number ofnewly issued shares divided by
the number of shares offered. All monetary amounts are expressed in constant 1 998 prices using the GNP deflator.
Table 1 also shows Dutch firms of a wide range of sizes go public. The median book value
of assets prior to listing is €46.9 million with a minimum of €3.6 million and a maximum of
€3,333 million. This is much larger than the US$5.8 million median book value for U.S.
IPOs, reported by Mikkelson, Megan Partch, and Shah (1997). Market value and sales prior
to listing show a similar picture. Dutch IPO firms also vary considerably in years of operating
history at the time they go public with an average age of about 35 years. In contrast, the
average age of U.S. IPO firms is about 10 years (Megginson & Weiss, 1991).
5. Methodology and variable measurement
5.1. Measuring earnings management
Jones (1991, p. 207) defines total accruals as the difference between earnings and
operating cash flow. Her accrual approach is based on the idea that information on
operational cash flow presents a more objective measure (i.e., one less subject to
manipulation by management) of real economic performance than earnings. Although
most accounfing researchers employ the Jones (1991) definition of total accruals to test for
earnings management, Dechow (1994) and Teoh et al. (1998) show that most of the
variation in total accruals is driven by current accruals.'' Our study therefore derives its
^ Companies can manage their earnings through voluntary changes in accounting procedures, through the
timing of real investment or financing decisions and through the discretion of accruals. Changes in accounting
procedures, extraordinary items or timing financial and investment decisions are not appropriate for our study
since these transactions are highly visible and could probably be easily detected by investors. On the other hand,
accounting accruals are less visible and the information required to adjust their income effects might not be readily
available.
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measures of earnings management from working capital accruals or current accruals.
Current accruals are revenues and expenses that firms include in a period's net income
although the cash flows associated with these revenues and expenses take place in earlier
or later periods. Current accruals consist of changes in current assets and current
liabilities, where current assets are corrected for changes in cash and current liabilities
are adjusted for changes in maturities of long-term debt.^ In particular, current accruals are
determined as {current assets — cash} — {current liabilities — current maturities of long-
term debt}.
These current accruals can be broken up into nondiscretionary and discretionary parts.
Whereas nondiscretionary current accruals (non-DCA) are constrained by rules, institu-
tions, and economic circumstances, only discretionary current accruals (DCA) are subject
to management. The method chosen for separating discretionary from non-DCA is a
crucial measurement issue, as each model differs in its assumptions and implications
about the behavior of nondiscretionary accruals. To measure accruals-based eamings
management, we conduct two different tests. The first approach involves an extended
estimation procedure. Jones (1991) advocates a cross-sectional technique regressing
current accruals on the change in revenues to control for changes in nondiscretionary
accruals, thereby allowing the nondiscretionary accruals to vary from period to period.
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) argue that revenues are not completely without
discretion. They propose to adjust the change in revenue by subfracting the change in
accounts receivable. The refinement is intended to remove the effects from managerial
discretion over credit sales from nondiscretionary accruals, thereby improving the
likelihood of detecting revenue-based eamings management. We construct an estimation
sample of 1715 seasoned firm-years. '^ A seasoned firm is defined as a firm trading on
Euronext Amsterdam at any time between January 1981 and December 1997 that did not
have an IPO in the previous five years. We estimate year-by-year regressions for the
period (1981-1997) using this estimation sample. '° The year-by-year regression model is
specified as follows:
TA/.,_i TA/-.,_i TAy.,_
where j is the seasoned firm index (we estimate each year-by-year regression using about
100 seasoned firms), t is the time index (/=1981,. .., 1997), CA represents current
Since the tax accrual is rather difficult to determine within Dutch GAAP, the changes in taxes payable,
included in the current liabilities, are used as a proxy for the actual income tax paid.
Abe de Jong generously provided the data set of seasoned firms.
"* Note that the year-by-year regressions would require estimating Eq. (1) per industry (generally known as the
cross-secfional Jones, 1991 model). Unfortunately, the small size of the Dutch capital market prevents us fi-om
estimatmg the model on an mdustry basis (this would reduce the amount of seasoned industry peers to less than 10
for most year-by-year regressions). We are thus forced to aggregate over all industries. In unreported tests, we
have included industry dummies in the year-by-year regressions to capture some of the industry variation in
nondiscretionary accruals. We obtain qualitatively similar results.
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accruals, TA stands for lagged total assets, and AREV is the change in revenues." The
nondiscretionary component of current accruals of IPO firms is determined through
multiplication of their inverse of total assets and their change in revenues (corrected for
changes in their accounts receivable) with the appropriate coefficients of the year-by-year
regressions for the estimation sample of seasoned firms. The discretionary part of their
current accruals is then calculated as the difference between their current accruals and
nondiscretionary accruals:
DCA.^^A^_^^^_^AREV,,-AAR.
where i is the IPO firm index {i=l,. . .,64), t represents the fiscal year relative to the offering
(r= — 2,. . .,3),'" DCA denotes discretionary current accruals, and AAR is the change in
accounts receivable. A significant and positive level of DCA is viewed as earnings
management.
The second approach to separate non-DCA and DCA assumes that non-DCA are
constant such that the cumulative effect of DCA equals the change in current accruals
(DeAngelo, 1986). This procedure uses current accruals fi-om an earlier period as a
measure for normal accruals such that the first difference in current accruals is viewed as
the amount of current accruals that are at managerial discretion. A significant positive
change in current accruals is interpreted as indicative of income-increasing DCA. However,
an important reason as to why firms go public may be that they experience rapid growth.
Such growth may give rise to nondiscretionary accruals that are not stationary. Therefore,
adjustments are made to reduce the chance that the measure of DCA is due solely to
growth (Aharony et al., 1993). The adjustment involves dividing the first differences by
the average of total assets in the period instead of lagged total assets as suggested by
DeAngelo (1986), such that:
DCA ^^'^ C^'-t-^ (2)
" (TA,, + TA,,_i)/2 (TA,,_i + TA,,_2)/2 ^ ^
Total assets at the beginning of the period are an appropriate book measure of the investment base used to
generate earnings. Alternative deflators were also considered, including the market value of equity and the book
value of net assets. Each of these deflators introduces complications. Obviously, market value of equity is
unavailable for the years preceding the IPO. Book value of the net assets is problematic because it can take on
values that are negative, producing economically meaningless figures. We also estimated the cross-sectional Jones
(1991 ) model using the average total assets during the period as a deflator. This reduces the chance that growth in
accruals proportionate to growth in assets would be interpreted as an increase in discretionary current accruals
(Aharony et al., 1993). Nonetheless, qualitatively similar results are obtained as with lagged total assets.
'" The time index pertains to the second (coded — 2) and the first fiscal year (coded — 1 ) prior to going public,
the first financial year as a public company (coded 0), as well as the second (coded 1), third (coded 2), and fourth
fiscal year (coded 3) as a publicly traded firm. Fig. 1 shows our timing convention in more detail. For instance,
consider Helvoet Holding, which went public in May 1990. At its financial year's end at December 31, the
prospectus contains the annual accounts for 1988 (coded - 2) and 1989 (coded - 1 ). The IPO year includes 1990
(coded 0), whereas the subsequent three fiscal years are 1991, 1992, and 1993 (coded 1,2, and 3).
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where / is the IPO firm index (z= 1,. . .,64), t represents the fiscal year relative to the IPO
(?= — 2,. . .,3), DCA denotes discretionary current accruals, CA represents current accruals,
and TA stands for total assets.
5.2. Measuring long-term stock price performance
Stock returns are measured using compounded buy-and-hold returns, inclusive of
dividends and other distributions. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are calculated
using the corresponding return on four different benchmarks. The use of different
benchmarks makes it harder to dismiss our long-horizon tests as a consequence of test
misspecifications. Barber and Lyon (1997) show that test statistics based on abnormal
returns may be misspecified because of new listing, rebalancing, and skewness bias. To
correct for these biases, they advocate computing a benchmark portfolio by matching the
sample firms to control firms of similar sizes and book-to-market ratios.
The particular benchmarks we use in this study involve (i) a value-weighted market
index (CBS total-return general-price index), (ii) an equally weighted market index, (iii)
size benchmark portfolios, and (iv) book-to-market benchmark portfolios. Appendix A
discusses the formation of the benchmarks. We match the date of return measurement
with the date of availability of accrual information that is hypothesized to influence stock
price performance. This corresponds to the return measurement of Teoh et al. (1998).
Hence, month is defined as 4 months after the closing of fiscal year (0) and is
assumed to be the month when the publicly traded company releases its first annual
report. Benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated for an after-market period up to 36
months after month where post-IPO fiscal year-end event months are defined according
to the time line depicted in Fig. 1.
Fiscal year (-1) Fiscal year (0) Fiscal year (+1)
IPO date
Fiscal year
end -2
Fiscal year
end -I
Fiscal year
endO
Fiscal year
end+1
Time
4 month
reporting lag
First annual report as a
listed company becomes
available
Stock returns
(typically I to 3 years)
Fig. 1. Timeline.
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For IPO firms that are delisted before the 36-month holding period, the aftermarket period
is truncated, ending with the last listing in the newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad}^ The
BHAR for finn / is defined as:
min(r. delist) min( /".delist)
BHAR,r= n (1 +''•')- n (1+^^-') (4)
1=0 t=Q
where min(r, delist) is either the delisting date or month 36 (whichever comes first), r, , is the
raw return on firm / in month t, and r^ , is the raw return on the particular benchmark over the
same period. The average holding period total retums are measured as:
1 "
BHARr - -y BHAR/ t (5)
" i=0
where n is the number of firms in the portfolio. This captures the total return from a buy-and-
hold strategy where a stock is purchased in month and held until (i) its 36-month
armiversary, or (ii) the company's delisting date, whichever comes first.
6. The use of accruals before and after the IPO
Table 2 shows the mean and median net income and cash flows fi^om operations'"^ during
the years before and after the IPO. Net income and operating cash flow are scaled by lagged
total assets. The earnings and cash flow patterns suggest that IPO firms experience more
favorable economic circumstances prior to going public than afterwards. It is important to
note what happens in year (0) (i.e., the first financial year as a public company) compared to
year ( — 1) (i.e., the last financial year included in the prospectus). The operating cash flow of
the average IPO firm declines fi"om 17.5% to 8.6% of lagged total assets. However, the
decline in net income in that period is much smaller; fi-om 13.5% to 12.9% of lagged total
assets. There also exists a decline in net income from year (0) to year (+1) (i.e., the second
financial year as a public company). In that period, net income declines from 12.9% to 8% of
lagged total assets. This shows that the decrease in net income lags the decline in cash flows
for one year.
' The average holding period is 34 months. Firms were dehsted because of takeover (seven firms) and
financial distress (two firms).
Since most IPO firms in the Netherlands do not adopt the cash flow format, operating cash flow needs to be
estimated from other financial statement data (Van der Goot, 1997). Consequently, our study determines cash flow
fi'om operations using the so-called indirect method. We use the procedure of the Annual Reporting Committee
(guideline 4.20 on cash flow statements) and the International Accounting Standard Committee (IAS 7 on cash
flow statements). The cash flow from operations is derived after adjusting net income for (i) changes in working
capital components during the year, (ii) noncash items like depreciation, and (iii) all other items for which the cash
effects are investing or financing cash flows.
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Table 2
Net income, cash flow from operations, and DCA over time
Year ( - 2) Year (- 1) Year (0) Year (+1) Year ( + 2) Year ( + 3)
Panel A: Net income
Mean 8.52 13.50 12.85 7.96 7.96 7.90
Median 7.44 9.75 9.17 8.37 7.35 6.80
Standard deviation 12.52 11.87 12.64 12.64 8.40 6.75
Maximum 41.43 68.84 73.20 37.60 30.17 25.01
Minimum -57.49 1.84 -22.57 -36.12 - 10.69 -7.73
Panel B: Cash flows
Mean 14.53 17.50 8.58 11.69 10.97 9.64
Median 12.28 11.20 10.25 11.32 9.03 8.90
Standard deviation 16.37 22.15 16.95 13.61 13.09 9.96
Maximum 62.58 105.44 55.48 64.58 43.82 37.23
Minimum -25.58 - 12.82 -38.82 -29.10 -46.86 - 16.43
Panel C: Discretionaty current accnials
Mean -1.54 0.21 6.55 -4.24 -1.94 -0.25
t value -0.85 0.14 3.8r -4.29" -1.44 -0.19
Median -0.26 1.02 3.85 -4.38 -0.63 0.42
z value -0.92 0.56 3.34" -3.98" -1.15 0.20
Standard deviation 13.32 12.03 13.77 7.34 10.35 10.15
Maximum 36.57 24.25 64.22 16.98 17.21 30.86
Minimum -37.27 -41.30 -16.01 -25.06 -54.79 - 34.60
Number of observations 53 61 64 61 59 55
This table reports on the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum of net income, cash flows
from operations and discretionary current accruals. All values are expressed as a percentage of lagged total assets.
Net income is the bottomline earnings figure. Cash flow from operations is computed by adjusting net income for
(i) changes in working capital components during the year, (ii) noncash items like depreciation, and (iii) all other
items for which the cash effects are investing or financing cash flows. This matches the cash from operations
definition outlined in Dechow (1994). DCA are determined using the cross-sectional Jones (1991) method. The
year of the IPO is labeled year (0).
" Indicates significance at the 1% level, using the parametric t test for the means and the Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test for the medians.
How does the average IPO firm use current accruals over time? We estimate the cross-
sectional Jones (1991) model in order to determine DCA over time (Eq. (2)). We present
the results in Panel C of Table 2. The average DCA, which are — 1.5% of assets in
year ( — 2), increase to 0.2% in year (—1), and increase to arrive at 6.5% in the first
financial year as a public company (0). Although amounts vary, other studies generally
document similar earnings management ranging from 1.5% to more than 5% of lagged
total assets (see Magnan & Cormier, 1997; Teoh et al., 1998). If any earnings
management is to be reported in the years before the IPO, it relates to insignificant
income-decreasing, as opposed to significant income-increasing discretionary accruals. We
argue that the timing of the IPO may limit firms' ability and need to make income-
increasing accruals in financial statements preceding the IPO. However, our results
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Strongly support the expected use of income-increasing DCA during the IPO year (0)
(Hypothesis lb).
Table 3 presents the average changes in scaled net income, cash flows, current accruals,
and provisions. The changes have been calculated as the first differences of the respective
variables deflated by the average of total assets during the period (see Eq. (3)). Next to the
average changes. Table 3 also reports the median change for each of the variables. We use
parametric t tests to ascertain whether the average change from year to year is different
from zero, whereas Wilcoxon signed-ranks statistics are calculated to determine whether the
median change is significantly different from zero. The results presented in Panel A of
Table 3 show that the only significant increase in net income is reported during the year
{ — 21— 1) prior to the IPO. There is a significant decline in net income in the year (0/+ 1).
Panel B of Table 3 shows that only the IPO year (0/ — 1 ) yields a significant negative cash
flow change.
Panel C of Table 3 shows the results using the second method to determine DCA. This
approach involves using accruals from a prior period t—\ as a measure for normal accruals
such that the first difference in current accruals is viewed as the amount of accruals that are at
managerial discretion. A significantly positive change in accruals is indicative of income-
increasing discretionary accruals. The results indicate significant income-increasing current
accruals during the first financial year as a public company ( — 1/0) for 66% of our sample
firms. The average (median) change in current accruals amounts to 6. 1% (4.5) ofthe average of
total assets. During the following year (0/+ 1), the accruals are (partially) reversed for 62% of
firms. There is no significant accrual change during the year prior to going public { — 21— 1).
The results presented on the level of current accruals support Hypothesis lb, which
states that discretionary accruals of IPO firms are more income-increasing in the year of the
IPO (i.e., the first financial year as a public company). Contrary to Hypothesis la, we
report insignificant income-increasing accruals during the year prior to going public { — 21
— 1). In addition, Table 3 uncovers a potential motivation for earnings management. In
general, IPO firms experience an adverse cash flow change during the IPO year (— 1/0).
Managers are thus confronted with a choice between reporting an earnings decrease or
enhancing eamings with the help of accounting accruals. However, earnings management
provides only a temporary solution. In the following year (0/+ 1), managers are forced to
report an eamings decrease as recovering cash flows are insufficient to offset the
unavoidable reversal of accounting accruals. This implies that the effect of accrual-based
eamings management is transitory. This is consistent with the findings of Bradshaw,
Richardson, and Sloan (1999), that U.S. listed firms with unusually high current accmals
are more susceptible to declines in subsequent eamings performance. We also investigate
the behavior of provisions over time. As argued in Section 2, Dutch companies can
exercise a great amount of discretion over provisions compared to companies in other
countries. Although provisions are less useful to manage short-term eamings than current
accmals, we find that managers do use provisions to increase net income in the post-IPO
years (0/+ 1) and (+ 1/ + 2). In particular, managers reduce provisions in these 2 years by
1 .2% of average total assets in an attempt to partially mitigate the effects of the reversal of
current accmals on net income in year (0/ + 1 ).
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Table 3
Changes in net income, cash flow from operations, current accruals and provisions over time
Year ( - 2/ - 1 ) Year (-1/0) Year(0/+1) Year (+1/ + 2) Year ( + 2/ + 3)
Panel A: Net income
Mean 4.33 -0.25 -4.29 -0.15 -0.49
/ value 2.74^ -0.39 - 2.80" -0.12 -0.83
Median 1.81 0.19 -0.88 -0.17 -0.24
z value 4.78" 0.09 - 2.94" -1.18 -0.60
Standard deviation 11.48 4.96 11.97 9.61 4.35
Maximum 79.69 12.87 33.31 43.89 9.58
Minimum -9.81 -25.71 -52.52 -23.31 -15.78
Panel B: Cash flows
Mean 3.45 -6.59 2.25 -1.18 -1.56
/ value 1.44 -2.23" 1.02 -0.68 -0.99
Median 2.30 -3.30 2.17 -0.37 -1.17
r value 1.46 -1.96'^ 1.04 -0.83 -1.28
Standard deviation 17.49 23.03 17.24 13.33 11.63
Maximum 51.80 36.35 64.85 37.05 45.29
Minimum -35.66 - 80.20 -48.26 -52.97 -27.09
Panel C: Cwrent accruals
Mean 0.51 6.10 -6.19 1.26 1.38
t value 0.21 2.04'' -2.77" 0.68 0.86
Median 0.53 4.54 -3.70 1.11 1.80
z value 0.36 1.95'-' -2.59" 0.45 1.54
Standard deviation 17.49 23.35 17.47 14.37 11.95
Maximum 39.47 88.70 30.81 53.72 27.50
Minimum -42.75 - 34.95 -75.25 -33.54 -57.08
Panel D: Provisions
Mean 0.19 -0.06 -0.40 -0.83 0.52
/ value 0.54 -0.20 -1.18 - 2.24'' 1.27
Median 0.00 -0.22 -0.59 -0.35 -0.09
z value 0.01 1.08 - 2.92" 2.71" 0.19
Standard deviation 2.59 2.21 2.63 2.82 3.05
Maximum 7.19 8.08 10.14 6.24 10.75
Minimum -5.17 -4.89 -4.62 -13.17 -3.98
Number of observations 53 61 61 59 55
This table reports on the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum of changes in net income,
cash flows from operations, current accruals, and provisions. Provisions include maintenance provisions,
warranties provisions, pension provisions, taxation provisions, and provisions for reorganization. All values are
expressed as a percentage of average total assets. We employ the DeAngelo (1986) method. The year of the IPO is
labeled year (0).
" Indicates significance at the 1% level, using the parametric t test for the means and the Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test for the medians.
'' Indicates significance at the 5% level, using the parametric t test for the means and the Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test for the medians.
'^ Indicates significance at the 10% level, using the parametric t test for the means and the Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test for the medians.
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7. Long-run stock price performance
Section 3 argues that managers are unlikely to be able to support the inflated earnings
numbers indefinitely and therefore firms that make extensive use of accruals are likely to be
the ones that perform the worst. We measure long-run stock price performance as discussed in
Section 5.2. To test Hypothesis 2, the sample of 64 IPOs is split into three groups. Given that
eamings management in our sample takes place in year (0) (i.e., the first year as a public
company), we use current discretionary accruals fi"om this year as the cutoff variable to form
three equal-sized groups (top tier, middle tier, and bottom tier). We measure stock retums for a
period of 3 years after the publication ofthe first annual report as a public company. Panel A of
Table 4 shows the BHARs when we use the level ofDCA using the Jones (1991) method for
forming our three groups.'^ Consistent with the second hypothesis, the long-run under-
performance of IPOs is largely centered in the top-tier group of 22 IPO firms with the highest
use of DCA in year (0). Depending on the benchmark used, the average long-run stock price
performance of the top tier group ranges fi"om — 36.5% to — 57.1%. The median long-run
stock price performance ranges fi"om —50.9% to —71.2%. This shows that the under-
performance of the top-tier group is not due to a few outliers or the choice of benchmark. The
bottom-tier group does not experience any significant underperformance. The average long-
run stock price performance of this group varies from +0.1% to —23.2%. These long-run
retums are not significantly different from zero. We also use the DCA using the DeAngelo
(1986) method for forming three equal groups (top tier, middle tier, bottom tier). Results are
shown in Panel B of Table 4. Again, we find that the top-tier group, with the highest positive
change in current accruals in the first year as a public company ( — 1/0), has the worst stock
price performance. The bottom-tier group, with lowest positive change in current accruals in
the first year as a public company ( — 1/0), shows substantially less stock retum under-
performance. Overall, our resuhs show that using accruals to increase short-run eamings leads
to long-run stock price underperformance.
To frirther analyze the relation between eamings management and long-run stock price
performance, we have estimated cross-sectional regressions. We use the BHARs from month
through month 36 as the dependent variable. To correct for size effects, the natural logarithm of
the initial market capitalization (In SIZE) is included. ISSUE refers to a dummy variable
indicating whether the IPO firm raises any fiinds at the IPO by selling newly issued shares. We
include the natural logarithm ofone plus company age [In (1 + AGE)] to confrol for differences
in ex ante risk. Two industry dummies (INDl and IND2) are incorporated to control for
industry effects related to technology and manufacturing. To control for time effects, the
regression model features a set of year dummies. The model is specified as:
BHARo.36./ = /?o + /?iDCA, -j- /?2lnSIZE, + /^.USSUE, + /i4ln(l + AGE),. + /JsINDl,
+p(,lND2i + year — dummies + £, (6)
'^ Depending on the benchmark used, the average long-term stock price performance for all 64 IPO firms
ranges from - 13% to -30%. This compares to the negative stock-returns found for U.S. and U.K. IPOs.
Espenlaub, Gregory, and Tonks (2000) report 3 -year stock price performance of - 8% to - 28% for U.K. IPOs,
while Ritter (1991) reports underperformance of up to - 29% over the first 3 years for U.S. IPOs.
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Panel A of Table 5 shows the results when we measure DCA using the Jones (1991)
method. We fmd that the estimated coefficient for the change in current accruals is
significantly negative across all specifications. Using a two-tailed / test, the coefficient on
the DCA is significant at the 10% level. Given that we have a specific prediction of the
relationship between long-run stock price performance and earnings management, we also
assess significance using the one-tailed t test. Using the one-tailed t test, the coefficient
on the DCA is significant at the 5% level or better. In particular, a one standard
deviation increase in the change in current accruals is associated with a decrease in
BHAJRo 36 of 15.8% when using the size-adjusted returns and 27.5% when using the
value-weighted market index adjusted returns as a benchmark. Panel B shows the results
using the change in current accruals from year ( — 1 ) to year (0) from the DeAngelo
(1986) method as our alternative measure of earnings management. Again, we observe
that the estimated coefficient on the DCA is significantly negative for all specifications.
The significance level is at 10% or better using the two-tailed t test and at 5% or better
using the two-tailed t test. A one standard deviation increase in the change in current
accruals is associated with a decrease in BHARoj^ of 10.7% when using the size-
adjusted retums and 23.6% when using the value-weighted market index adjusted returns
as a benchmark. Overall, the regression results support Hypothesis 2.
In unreported tests, we also examine the relation between the buy-and-hold retums for
shorter intervals (12 and 24 months). It is difficult for investors to exactly distinguish
between the motivation underlying eamings management ex ante, especially given the
lack of historical financial information about the IPO firm. When do investors incorporate
the information about discretionary accruals in the stock price? Using the Jones (1991)
method, we find that initially there exists no significant relation between the size of the
DCA in the IPO year and the retums during the first 12 months after the first annual
report as a public company becomes available, but the measure of DCA is significantly
related to 24 and 36 months retums. At that time, the accrual reversal has occurred and
investors have identified poorly performing firms for which cash flows have not
sufficiently recovered. These results show that it takes some time before investors
incorporate the information about eamings management in year (0) into stock prices.'^
'^ Discretionary accruals can also be used to smooth income over time and signal firm quality to the market
(Chaney & Lewis, 1995, 1998). This makes it difficult for investors to at first determine whether a high use of
discretionary accruals in the IPO year is bad. However, time will catch up with poor-quality firms that have used
eamings management in the IPO year. They have borrowed from future income, and their cash flows do not
improve sufficiently to undo the negative effect of the reversal of accruals on net income. As a result they report an
eamings decline. This would allow investors to distinguish between good- and poor-quality eamings managers. A
preliminary analysis shows that eamings management in that year is not significantly associated with income
smoothing. We use the income smoothing index, developed by Chaney and Lewis (1998) to ex post determine
whether the firm has smoothened income over time. We find that there is no significant correlation ( — .03)
between income smoothing and the use of discretionary accmals in the IPO year using the cross-sectional Jones
(1991) model. This suggests that income smoothing is, on average, not a major motivation for firms to manage
earnings in the IPO year in our sample.
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Table 4
Long-run returns and earnings management
Top tier Middle tier Bottom tier
Panel A: measuring earnings management using the Jones (1991) model
VW market adjusted BHAR (%)
Mean -36.50
t value -1.74^'
Median -50.91
z value - 2.66^^
EW market adjusted BHAR (%)
Mean -57.04
t value -2.77''
Median -71.23
z value -2.92^
Book-to-market adjusted BHAR (%)
Mean -43.97
t value -2.14''
Median -59.37
z value -2.69^
Size adjusted BHAR (%)
Mean - 50.70
t value -2.28''
Median -61.21
z value - 2.69'
Number of observations 22
-1.78
-0.08
-18.08
-0.31
- 10.57
-0.57
-21.48
-0.63
5.09
0.27
-4.93
-0.28
-18.11
-0.96
- 10.05
-0.87
21
0.10
0.01
17.69
0.21
-23.15
-1.25
-29.30
-1.59
-10.13
-0.51
-20.47
-0.73
-20.35
-1.03
- 32.00
-0.90
21
Panel B: Measuring earnings management using the DeAngelo (1986) model
VW market adjusted BHAR (%)
4.92
0.190
- 12.93
0.00
-5.07
-0.22
-4.08
-0.35
-3.68
-0.16
-17.16
-0.39
-6.71
-0.30
-2.16
-0.39
18
Mean -34.13
t value -1.55
Median -59.70
z value -2.21''
EW market adjusted BHAR (%)
Mean -54.56
t value - 2.69"
Median -68.37
z value -2.6P
Book-to-market adjusted BHAR (%)
Mean - 36.03
t value - 1.74'
Median -36.02
z value -2.18"
Size adjusted BHAR (%)
Mean -51.27
t value -2.37"
Median - 63.90
z value - 2.82"
Number of observations 22
3.20
0.18
17.69
0.07
- 17.44
-1.08
- 16.23
-0.97
2.49
0.14
16.74
0.03
-14.13
-0.83
7.50
0.45
21
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In the initial 24-month period [i.e., the time when the second annual report as a public
company becomes available in year (1)], the size of the DCA in the IPO year is
significantly and negatively related to stock price performance. We argue that investors
get a better idea about the motivation behind earnings management when they observe
the sudden decline in net income at the poorly performing companies that have resorted
to earnings management in the year before. As a final point, we investigate the relation
between 3-year BHARs and the change in provisions from year (—1) to year (0). In
unreported tests, we do not find a statistically significant relation between the change in
provisions and long-term returns.
8. Robustness checks
We conduct several checks for robustness. For reasons of brevity, these results are not
tabulated. First, we re-weight the sample in order to exclude outliers. The re-weighting
procedure involves truncating the distribution of current accruals at the 5th and 95th
percentiles. Our analysis yields qualitatively similar results. A second sensitivity test relates
to the robustness of our proxy for earnings management. Notwithstanding the arguments in
favor of current accruals, we also extended our analysis to include depreciation. However, the
estimated discretionary long-term accruals amounted to only 0.22% in the fiscal year
surrounding the IPO {t value = 1.243). Hence, current accruals seem to be more important
than depreciation for earnings management.
Third, we examine whether the type of auditor used by the IPO firm reduces the
information asymmetry problem between management and investors. We distinguish
between high-reputation auditors (KPMG, Moret Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche,
and PricewaterhouseCoopers) and other auditors. We find that the average DCA in year
(0), using the Jones (1991) model, equals 3.5% for 41 IPO firms with high-reputation
auditors compared to 11.9% for 23 IPO firms with other auditors {t value for
difference = 2.42). High-reputation auditors may therefore limit the excessive use of
Notes to Table 4:
This table shows the BHARs, in percentages, using four different benchmarks. We split the sample into three equal
groups using the level of discretionary current accruals in year (0) in Panel A and changes in current accruals from
year ( — 1 ) to year (0) as a cutoff variable in Panel B. The cutoff points thus correspond to the 33.33 percentile and
66.67 percentile of the distribution of the cutoff variable. In Panel A, DCA are measured using the cross-sectional
Jones (1991) model. In Panel B, we use the DeAngelo (1986) method. BHARs capture the total return from a buy-
and-hold strategy where a stock is purchased at the closing price in month and held until (i) 36 months, or (ii) its
Met Financieele Dagblad delisting date, whichever comes first. The table reports the means and median values.
^ Indicates significance at the 1% level, using the parametric t test for the means and the Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test for the medians.
^ Indicates significance at the 5% level, using the parametric t test for the means and the Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test for the medians.
^ Indicates significance at the 1 0% level, using the parametric t test for the means and the Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test for the medians.
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accruals by IPO firms. We also included a dummy variable for high auditor reputation in
the long-run return regressions. However, we find that this dummy is insignificant across
all specifications.
Neill et al. (1995) show that accounting method choice can also be used to increase
earnings. As a final robustness check, we also investigate two typical accounting policy
choices available to Dutch firms. We first examine the choice between historical and current
cost accounting. We find that 15 firms apply current cost accounting. When a firm uses
current cost accounting to value fixed assets, depreciation charges are increased, which in
tum reduces net income. We therefore expect firms in the top-tier group of DCA to use
current cost accounting less often. Accordingly, we find that four IPO firms (18.2%) in the
Table 5
Cross-sectional regression results for earnings management
Independent Dependent variable
variables VW market EW market Book-to-market Size adjusted
adjusted BHAR adjusted BHAR adjusted BHAR BHAR
Panel A: Measw ing earnings management using the Jones (1991) model
Intercept 4.771 (2.788)' 1.443 (0.923) 2.758 (1.739)" 1.193 (0.767)
Discretionary -1.994 (-1.989)'' -1.422 (-1.678)'^ -1.860 (-1.823)" -1.146 (-1.716)"
accruals
Initial market -0.271 (-3.232)" -0.117 (- 1.515) -0.172 (-2.256)" -0.104 (-1.373)
capitalization
Issuing dummy 0.188 (0.809) 0.310(1.498) 0.243 (1.122) 0.345 (1.577)
Company age 0.100(0.878) 0.146(1.509) 0.137 (1.317) 0.146 (1.408)
Technology -0.164 (-0.451) -0.371 (-1.044) - 0.223 ( - 0.643) -0.424 (-1.114)
dummy
Manufacturing -0.194 (-0.757) -0.026 (-0.110) -0.207 (-0.831) - 0.058 ( - 0.244)
dummy
Adjusted R~ .365 .253 .272 .255
F value 3.26^ 2.332'' 2.474" 2.350''
Panel B: Measw ing earnings management using the DeAngelo (1986) model
Intercept 5.085 (2.613)'^ 1.795 (1.008) 3.286(1.927)" 1.571 (0.916)
Discretionary - I.0I0(- 1.722)" -0.663 (- 1.732)"' -0.971 (- 1.699)" -0.458 (-1.695)"
accruals
Initial market -0.282 (-2.775)" -0.130 (-1.399) -0.194 (-2.193)'' -0.112 (- 1.239)
capitalization
Issuing dummy 0.105 (0.439) 0.239(1.132) 0.149(0.671) 0.263 (1.228)
Company age 0.075 (0.603) 0.124(1.152) 0.112(1.000) -0.091 (-0.861)
Technology -0.296 (-0.779) - 0.460 ( - 1 .274) -0.345 (-0.982) -0.538 (- 1.390)
dummy
Manufacturing -0.192 (-0.698) -0.021 (-0.081) -0.212 (-0.794) -0.020 (-0.079)
dummy
Adjusted R' .364 .242 .284 .234
F value 3.145" 2.196'' 2.488" 2.145''
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top-tier group use current cost accounting versus five IPO firms (23.8%) in the middle-tier
group and six IPO firms (28.6%) in the bottom-tier group.
Second, we investigate the accounting treatment of share issue costs. Dutch companies can
choose between charging share issue costs against owner's equity (i.e., profits are not affected
in the current and future years) or expensing these share issue costs immediately in year (0),
i.e., the year of the IPO. We expect firms in the top-tier group to charge share issue costs
against owner's equity more often to avoid the reduction of net income in year (0). We find
that six IPO firms (27.3%) of the top-fier group charge share issuing costs against owner's
equity versus four IPO firms (19%) of the middle-tier group and three IPO firms (14.3%) of
the bottom-tier group. Although none of these differences are statistically significant, it
provides suggestive evidence that firms in the top-tier group use more income-increasing
accounting policies than finns in the middle-tier and bottom-tier group. We interpret this as
evidence that the estimate of DCA works reasonably well in identifying those firms with
intent to overreport.
9. Conclusions
This study has examined the role of discretionary accruals in the Dutch IPO market. We
show that the average IPO firm resorts to accruals-based earnings management in the first
year as a public company and not in the years before the IPO. In post-IPO years, managers
reduce provisions in an attempt to mitigate the negative effect of the reversal of current
accruals on reported net income. This is consistent with earlier findings of U.S.-based
research. Aharony et al. (1993) find little, if any, evidence of IPO firms in the United States
using income-increasing discretionary accruals in the years before the IPO. Teoh et al. (1998)
also document earnings manipulation in the first year as a public company.
Notes to Table 5:
This table shows the results for the cross-sectional regression model BHAR, = /3^o + /^iDCA, + /32ln SIZE,+
ftlSSUE, + /i4ln (1+ AGE), + /55lNDl, + /36lND2, + year dummies + £,. The dependent variable BHAR, is the
buy-and-hold abnormal return, measured from month to its 3 -year anniversary or its Het Financieele Dagblad
delisting date, whichever comes first. DCA, denotes the discretionary current accruals in the IPO year (0)
according to the the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model in Panel A and the DeAngelo (1986) method in Panel
B. In SIZE, is the natural logarithm of the initial market capitalization, measured as the number of postoffering
shares multiplied by the closing price on the first day of trade. ISSUE, is a 0,1 dummy variable that equals 1 if
the IPO firm raises funds at the IPO. In (1 +AGE), is the natural logarithm of one plus company age. fNDl, is a
0,1 dummy variable coded 1 if a technology firm, otherwise. rND2, is a 0,1 dummy variable coded 1 if an
industrial firm, otherwise. A complete set of year dummies is included yet not reported. The year dummies
refer to the historic calendar years of going public; 1984, 1985, etc. In parentheses are the t statisfics using
White (1980) heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors.
In Panel A, the number of observations equals 64. In Panel B, the number of observations equals 61.
^ Significance at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
^ Significance at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
^ Significance at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
264 P. Roosenboom et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 243-266
Our results are robust to a number of additional tests. For example, we find that our
measures of earnings management to some extent correlate with the use of income-increasing
accounting policies.
We document that IPO firms, which managers tend to overreport earnings in the first year
as a public company, subsequently suffer poor returns. When regressing buy-and-hold returns
on discretionary accruals, the estimated coefficient of discretionary accruals is statistically
negative across different specifications. This adds Dutch evidence to the findings of Teoh et
al. (1998), who show that the aftermarket performance of U.S. IPOs is negatively related to
the size of discretionary accruals in the IPO year.
Barberis et al. (1998) argue that investors naively extrapolate the growing trend in
earnings, resulting in overvaluations in the short run. Because earnings follow a random
walk, such overreaction is exposed by future earnings, leading to the reversal of long-term
returns. Our results are consistent with their model of investor sentiment. On average, IPOs
experience an adverse cash flow change in their first year as a public company. These IPO
firms can choose between reporting an earnings decrease or an earnings increase with the
help of accounting accruals. If firms choose to do the latter, they face long-term costs.
Since current accruals tend to reverse in the future, they are betting that future cash flows
will improve. However, on average, cash flows do not improve sufficiently in the following
year to offset the reversal of current accruals for the average IPO firm. In the following
year, especially poor-quality IPO firms are forced to reflect the unavoidable reversal of
current accruals in their earnings number. The detection of earnings management leads
outside investors to downwardly adjust their valuation of IPO firms that engage in accrual-
based earnings management.
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Appendix A. Benchmark formation
Whereas the value-weighted market index (CBS total-return general-price index) was
available from Datastream, the latter three benchmarks were computed following the
procedure outlined in Barber and Lyon (1997). To do so, we took universe of all stocks
which at any point in time were trading at Euronext Amsterdam from January 1984 through
June 1998 and who did not have an IPO in the previous 5 years. For each firm, monthly
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returns data were collected from Datastream, including both capital gains and dividends
(assumed to be reinvested in the same stock at ex-dividend date). So as to derive the
equally market index, we computed an equally weighted average of monthly stock returns
during each of the months in the aforementioned time period. In order to determine size
benchmark portfolios, we used the same universe of stocks and measured each firm's size
in June of each year as the market value of common equity (common shares outstanding
multiplied by the June closing price). Size rankings based on market value in year t were
then used from July of year t through June of year /+ 1. Subsequently, non-IPO firms were
sorted in their appropriate size quintile based on their size. We then calculated the monthly
retum, including both capital gains and dividends, for each of the five size portfolios, by
averaging monthly returns across all securities in a particular size quintile (about 20 firms
in each quintile). Since we rank firms in June each year, firms are allowed to change size
quintiles at the beginning of June each year when new portfolio assignments are available.
As a final step, each IPO firm is then matched with its appropriate size quintile in June
every year. The returns on the five book-to-market portfolios were calculated analogous to
the five size portfolios. We measured a firm's book-to-market ratio using the book value of
common equity reported on the balance sheet at fiscal year-end divided by the market value
of common equity at calendar year-end. We used the most recent fiscal year-end book value
of equity, as long as it was no later than the calendar year-end. Again, rankings based on
book-to-market ratios are used from July of each year t through June of year r+1. The
calculation of book-to-market ratios antedates their use for ranking purposes by several
months to allow for delays in the reporting of annual accounts.
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auditor's qualification using a multicriteria decision aid classification method (UTADIS—UTilites
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1. Introduction
References to qualified audit reports have increased in frequency over the last few years. All
European Union (EU) member states have some type of corporate legislation that prescribes
the form and content of the auditors' annual reports. The way in which professional standards
are applied, however, has an impact on both the form and content ofthe audit report. Greece, as
a member of the EU, applies the Fourth Directive on Company Law, which imposes the
requirement of giving "a true and fair view" on financial reporting. Two components should
be present in the annual reports from companies within the EU. First, the financial accounting
framework used in the preparation and presentation of the financial information should be
consistent with the concept of true and fair view. Second, the auditor's report should include an
expression of opinion on whether the financial statements give a true and fair view.
The qualification of financial statements as well as the detection of falsified financial
statements have been recently in the limelight in Greece because of the increase in the number
of companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (and raising capital through public
offerings) and the attempts to reduce taxation on profits. The years 2000-2002 were very
difficult for the Greek stock market; the stock market in Greece suffered from stagnation both
in terms of share prices and liquidity. The market's decline along with the increase in the
number of qualified audit reports has piqued the interest of regulators. Stock Market
authorities, the Ministry of the Economy, individual and institutional investors, and the
banking sector. In Greece, the public has been consistent in its demand for qualified opinions
as warning signals of business failure. There is increasing demand for greater transparency,
consistency, and more information to be incorporated in the financial statements. The
increasing demand and the absence of studies for audit opinions in Greece motivated us to
consider the Greek case.
The focus of this study is the development of models that consider client performance
measures, including financial information and other indicators such as client litigation, to
explain qualifications of audit reports of publicly traded Greek companies. Researchers can
use empirical models to assess the extent to which a qualification could be expected based on
publicly available data (Dopouch, Holthausen, & Leftwich, 1987). The outcomes of such
models are an estimation of the likelihood of a company receiving a qualified opinion. Bell
and Tabor (1991), as well as Chen and Church (1992), note that auditors can use the output of
such models to plan specific auditing procedures that can be applied to achieve an acceptable
level of audit risk. These models can also be used as a quality control tool in the review or
final stage of an engagement and for contingency analyses on how changes in specific
variables could add or detract from the probability of obtaining a qualified opinion (Kleinman
& Anandarajan, 1999). Our approach also examines the extent to which auditors' opinion is
affected by the performance of the firms. The analysis in this paper is based on a
nonparametric multicriteria decision aid classification method, the UTADIS (UTilites
Additives Discriminates) method (Zopounidis & Doumpos, 1999). The use of nonparametric
classification techniques (e.g., neural networks, mathematical programming, machine learn-
ing, fuzzy sets, rough sets, etc.) in business, finance, and accounting has rapidly increased
during the past 20 years (Duda, Hart, & Stork, 2001; Gehrlein & Wagner, 1997; Zopounidis
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& Doumpos, 2002), mainly due to their flexibility with regard to the model development
process and the form of the models developed.
The analysis, using UTADIS, focuses on two main issues: (1) investigate the relationship
between client performance measures and the auditors' qualification decisions; and (2)
investigate the performance of the resulting classification that is, detecting firms that receive
qualified reports in comparison with models developed using linear discriminant analysis
(LDA) and logistic regression (LOGIT). The results indicate that there is negative relationship
between client performance measures and the likelihood that a firm receives a qualified audit
report; high performance (healthy) firms are more likely to receive a nonqualified (clean)
report compared to low performance firms. Furthermore, an extensive bootstrapping exper-
iment shows that models developed using the UTADIS methodology provide superior
classification performance (predictive ability) as compared to traditional statistical classifica-
tion models. This result suggests that the classification models of the UTADIS method are able
to explain more accurately the auditors' decisions to qualify their reports. The UTADIS
method was also used in an earlier study (Spathis, Doumpos, & Zopounidis, 2002) to model
detection of management fraud related to the falsification of financial statements (FFS) in
Greece. Using a random sample of 76 Greek firms (a different sample from the one used in the
present study), a Jackknife analysis for model validation was performed and a strong
relationship was found between FFS and the financial characteristics ofthe firms. In particular,
the ratios of total debt to total assets, inventories to sales, net profit to sales, and sales to total
assets were found to be strong predictors of FFS. The present study complements the earlier
one on FFS detection, thus contributing to an integrated analysis of the accounting practice in
Greece covering the analysis of audit reports and the detection of FFS.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews previous
research on qualified audit reports. Section 3 outlines the method and the sample data used in
the study. Section 4 describes the empirical results. Finally, the Section 5 provides the
concluding remarks.
2. Previous research
2.1. Audit qualification opinion
Several models have been developed to explain qualifications of audit reports. The general
consensus of these models has been that financial and nonfinancial factors affect the audit
opinion decision. Dopouch et al. (1987) developed a probit model to investigate the extent to
which models based on financial and market variables predict auditors' decisions to issue
qualified audit reports. Their results showed that the most significant variables in qualification
prediction are current year loss, industry rate of return, and the change in the ratio of total
liabilifies to total assets. Keasey, Watson, and Wynarzcyk (1988) used logistic regression based
on 12 financial and nonfinancial variables to explain audit-report qualification for small
companies. They showed that the likelihood that a company receives a qualified audit report
increases if (a) a large accounting firm audits the company; (b) the company has few directors;
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(c) few nondirector shareholders; (d) a secured loan; and (e) if there was a long lag between the
auditing year-end and the signing of audited accounts.
Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) considered audit opinion models by incorporating economic
tradeoffs that arise in the auditor's litigation risk, the extent of outsider ownership, the relative
importance of the client in the auditor's portfolio, and future growth as important factors in the
audit opinion decision. In modeling the auditor's opinion decision for financially distressed
companies, Mutchler, Hopwood, and McKeown (1997) concluded that qualitative variables
involving good and bad news items had no incremental explanatory power relative to financial
variables. Laitinen and Laitinen (1998) used logistic regression analysis based on 17 financial
and nonfinancial variables to explain qualifications in large companies in Finland. Their
results showed that the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit report is higher with low
growth rate, low equity/total assets, and small number of employees.
Casterella, Lewis, and Walker (2000) developed an opinion prediction model introducing a
bankruptcy resolution variable, a proxy ofthe auditor's prognosis ofthe ultimate disposition of
the soon-to-be-bankrupt company. They found that auditors are less able to predict either
bankruptcy filing or resolution. The model suggests that auditors are less likely to issue a
modified opinion when the financial prospects of the company are not clear and when auditors
are faced with incentives to delay or avoid issuing a modified opinion. Some studies on
auditor's going-concern assessment have also focused on hybrid approaches such as those
used in Lenard, Alam, Booth, and Madey (2001). They combined a decision support system
with a statistical model that predicts bankruptcy as a component of the auditor's decision to
show that bankruptcy prediction is an important component of the going-concern decision.
Amold, Collier, Leech, and Sutton (2001) present a theoretical framework ofthe audit decision
process that consists of four broad-based components within the overall audit environment: (a)
the auditor, (b) evidence gathering and analysis, (c) auditor/audited contracting, and (d) social
contracting. Finally, Reynolds and Francis (2001) found that Big Five auditors do not treat
large clients more favorably than smaller firms.
Most prior studies used qualitative variable(s) in developing audit opinion models.
However, qualitative indicators of potential solvency problems indicate bad news character-
istics such as client lifigafion. While Kida (1980), LaSalle, Anandarajan, and Miller (1996),
and Mutchler, Hopwood, and McKeown (1997) argue that this type of specific information
cues may not necessarily be sufficient to trigger the qualified audit report, and may cause the
auditor to focus more extensively on whether a qualified report should be issued.
2.2. Client litigation
The effects of client (firm) litigation on the type of audit opinion have not been considered
but disclosure issues have been examined. Skinner (1997) provides evidence on whether
managers can reduce stockholder litigation costs by disclosing adverse earnings news early. He
found that voluntary disclosure occurred more frequently in quarters that result in litigation
than in quarters that did not. Managers' incentives to predisclose earnings news increased as
the news became more adverse, presumably because of the expected reduction in the cost of
resolving litigation. Hughes and Sankar (1997) analyzed the impact of expected litigation-
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related costs on discretionary disclosure. Using data from lawsuits, Karpof and Lott (1998)
found that press coverage of punitive lawsuits led to statistically significant decreases in the
market values of defendant companies. Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson (2001) provided direct
evidence on the relation between the legal environment and voluntary disclosure ofgood news
in high-technology industries. Evans and Shridar (2002) found that under certain circum-
stances potential shareholder litigation can interact with the influences of capital and product
markets to make voluntary disclosures more credible.
2. 3. Greek auditor s report
The accounting and auditing standards in Greece represent a blend of governmental and
professional involvement. The codified Roman law system is a more rigid system and may
impact auditing characteristics by requiring more reliance on the stated legal objectives of the
auditing profession. The accounting standards are closely related to taxation and corporate
legislation. In particular, accounting standards are based mainly on established corporate laws;
the standards were established by the Ministry of National Economy, the interpretations were
issued by the National Accounting Standards Board (ESYL) and the Greek General Chart of
Accounts (Institute of Certified Auditors of Greece, 1999). Greek accounting standards differ
from the International Accounting Standards (IAS) due to the absence of specific rules on
recognition and measurement. Recently, the European Commission ruled that all companies
operating within EU prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with IAS
from 2005 onward. Therefore, accounting standards in Greece will soon comply with those of
IAS. In addition, the European Commission's fourth directive and the increase in global capital
market activity are expected to increase harmonization in auditors' reports. Greek auditors'
reports to this point have been harmonized de jure and de facto with International Standard on
Auditing (ISA) 13. Greece is also influenced by both the United States and the EU with regard
to the form and content of auditors' reports.
The auditing standards that are being applied by certified auditors have been published in
the Official Government's Gazette (the issue 1 1 19/B/18.12.1979 specified the basic standards
and fieldwork standards, while the issue 126/B/5.3.1993 specified the Auditor's report
standards). The auditor's report on the annual financial statements is addressed to the entity's
SA shareholders (e.g., audit assignors). The auditor's report contains:
(a) Identification of audited and attested financial statements.
(b) Compliance with the provisions of article 37, Law 2190/20 and the auditing procedures
considered appropriate within the framework of auditing principles and policies.
(c) Specific information and confirmations as required by the existing legislation.
(d) Any observations (notes) on the part of the auditor on material matters taken into account
by the auditor to support his conclusions, whenever these contain some qualificafion,
adverse opinion, or disclaimer of opinion.
(e) The auditor's opinion on the financial statements.
(f) Any necessary clarifications on the part of the auditor.
(g) Place and date of the report, with full name and signature of the issuing auditor/s.
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In addition, existing legislation required that the auditor's report refer to:
(a) Information necessary for the audit.
(b) Knowledge of full accounting reports of entity branches.
(c) Appropriate accounting for production cost.
(d) Application of the appropriate accounting plan.
(e) Modification of valuation method as related to the preceding financial year.
(f) Verification on consistency between the contents of the director's report and the relevant
financial statements.
(g) Information contained in the notes on the accounts.
The auditor qualifies his audit report whenever he thinks that one of the following
circumstances is concurrent: (a) there exists material influence on specific items or on the
overall picture of the financial statement attested, and (b) there has been a limitation in his
possibility to formulate a sufficient opinion on one or more items and other disclosures that
are included, or should have been included in the financial statement attested. In the opinion
paragraph of the report, the auditor expresses with clarity his professional opinion that is
classified as: (a) unqualified, (b) qualified, (c) adverse, or (d) disclaimer of opinion. The
incidents of adverse opinion and disclaimer of opinion are rare. On the other hand, empirical
evidence obtained from certified auditors in Greece indicates that about 50% of the firms
receive qualified reports. While this figure is surprisingly high, it should be emphasized that
until recently audit reports in Greece were not given much attention and consequently firms
did not have any major motivation for preparing appropriate financial reporting. Recently, the
attention paid to audit reports has increased, and consequently, the number of finns that
receive qualified reports is soon expected to decrease.
3. Methodology
3.1. Sample
The sample used in this analysis involves 100 Greek firms. Certified auditors have checked
all the companies included in the sample. All public limited companies (societies anonyms) and
limited liability companies are obliged to submit to a certified auditor's control when they ftilfill
two of the following three criteria: (a) total revenues are over € 2.9 million, (b) total assets are
over € 1.5 million, and (c) the average number of employees is over 50 (Caramanis, 1997).
According to data availability over the past few years (1997-1999), 50 firms were included
in the sample having received qualifications such as the ones noted in Table 1 . The number of
qualified opinions over the period of analysis is: 12 for 1997, 18 for 1998, and 20 for 1999.
Qualificafions can be characterized based on inappropriate accounting method, inadequate
disclosure, and scope limitation. The audit qualifications have to do with accounting events
where the Greek Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) were not followed. For
example, certain expenses were not recognized, or Greek GAAP was incorrectly applied, or
the tax accounting rules and regulations were followed instead ofGAAP for external reporting.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics on the number of qualifications for the main categories used in qualified audit reports (n = 50)
Items Qualifications
Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Total qualifications per audit report
Inadequate depreciation
Understatement of bad debt expenses
Nonrecognition of severance payments
Overstatement of the long-term investments
Inaccurate estimation of the taxes payable and
other reasons for audit qualifications
5.46 5.00
0.80 1.00
0.88 1.00
0.88 1.00
0.86 1.00
2.04 2.00
2.52 2
0.64
0.82
0.39
0.88
1.54
24
2
4
2
4
20
Issuing audit opinions of serious doubts as to the correctness of the accounts of financial
statements is sufficient to classify the report as "qualified." These are typically for firms that
reftise to recognize (i.e., incorporate in the accounts and the financial statements certain
accounting events) or disclose certain events. A qualified report includes explanatory para-
graphs and examples of events that discuss these doubts (cf Appendix A). The items disclosed
in the opinions of qualified audit reports and descriptive statistics for the audit reports are
presented in Table 1
.
The median value for the total number of qualifications in the audit reports for the sample
firms described below is 5. Qualifications for bad debts, redundancy payments, inadequate
depreciation, and participation in other companies were not as frequent as qualifications
involving inaccurate estimation of the taxes payable and other qualifications. A comparison
sample of firms with clean (nonqualified) reports was selected by matching to reduce the
effects of other factors such as industry sector, fiscal year-end, and company size. The sample
does not include financial firms because ofthe specialized nature oftheir accounting standards.
Some of the characteristics of the qualified and nonqualified samples of companies are
presented in Table 2. Although the mean value of total assets for qualified firms is € 30.4
million and € 34.3 million for nonqualified firms, the difference is not statistically significant
(r = 0.376, /)=. 708). There is a statistically significant difference between average profits of
qualified firms, with losses averaging at € 0.2 million, and nonqualified firms, profit averaging
€3.1 million (t = 2.695, p=.OOS). The difference in the equity of qualified firms and non-
Table 2
Characteristics of firm's means and / tests
Characteristics Nonqualified Qualified t test
Total assets
Equity
Sales
Net profit
34,324
18,401
32,537
3143
30,357
13,564
19,419
-208
0.376
0.815
1.367
2.695**
The amounts are reported in thousand Euros.
t test: df=9S (two-tailed).
** Significant at the 5% level.
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qualified firms is also statistically nonsignificant with € 13.6 million and € 18.4 million,
respectively (/ = 0.815,/7= 417).
3.2. Variables
A set of 20 variables served as the initial set, this choice benefited by previous studies and
considered client litigation, financial distress, and other publicly available financial informa-
tion (i.e., financial ratios).
3.2.1. Client litigation
The client litigation variable is coded as 1 if a company had litigation in the year preceding
the audit opinion, and as otherwise. A company is considered to have litigation in the
following cases (Skinner, 1997): (a) a lawsuit has been filed in a Greek court; (b) there has
been an allegation of common stock price fi^aud; (c) there has been an allegation of stock
exchange violation under the Greek law, i.e., when the suit alleges some misstatement or
omission of material information. This procedure provides a sample of 21 lawsuit filings. The
information on the above cases was obtained from the available financial press (newspapers
and magazines).
3.2.2. Financial distress
Clients with a high probability of bankruptcy are more likely to receive qualified opinions
because their ability to continue to operate is in greater doubt (Bell & Tabor, 1 99 1 ; Krishnan &
Krishnan, 1996; McKeown, Mutchler, & Hopwood, 1991; Reynolds & Francis, 2001). A
proxy for the probability of bankruptcy is the Altman z-score (Altman, 1983), although it has
some limitations because it was developed under a different time period, under different
economic conditions, and in a different country (USA). It is, nevertheless, used in many
studies, especially since a generally accepted model has not been established for Greek
companies (Doumpos & Zopounidis, 1999; Theodosiou, 1991).
3.2.3. Financial information
Auditors give qualifications when there are uncertainties about material events that
management would not or could not explicitly provide in financial statements. The material
uncertainties will usually be reflected in one or more components representing the financial
position and performance of the company. Since the financial soundness of a company is
represented in its financial statement variables, many researchers have used financial variables
in the last 20 years to formulate audit opinion expectations (Dopouch et al., 1987; Francis &
Krishnan, 1999; Kida, 1980; Krishnan & Krishnan, 1996; Mutchler et al., 1997; Laitinen &
Laitinen, 1998; Sundgren, 1998; Reynolds & Francis, 2001).
However, fi"om a practical point of view, developing an auditor's opinion model that
considers a large number of variables poses problems to the use of the model by the auditor.
This is because the application of the model requires that the auditor collect all necessary data,
which leads to increased time and cost for data collection and management. Furthemiore, the
consideration of a large number of variables in a multidimensional context raises multi-
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collinearity concerns. This may lead to the development of models that are sample-based,
unstable, and difficult to interpret (Morrison, 1967). For these reasons, we have adopted an ad
hoc variable selection process considering both the correlation of the variables and their
statistical significance measured through a univariate test. In particular, indicators that were
highly correlated were dropped to reduce the effects of multicoUinearity. The retained
variables relate to profitability, solvency/liquidity, and managerial performance (Courtis,
1978). Except for the correlation analysis, the statistical significance of mean differences
between the indicators for the two groups of finns in the sample was also calculated using the
Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 3).
This combination of correlation analysis and Kruskal-Wallis test led to the selection of a
limited set of eight financial ratios, one dummy variable (the client litigation), and the z-score
(the selected ratios are marked in Table 3 in italics).
3.3. Method
The method used to develop the qualification identification model in this study is the
UTADIS Multicriteria Decision Aid Method. The UTADIS method aims at developing an
Table 3
Means and Kruskal-Wallis test of variables
Qualified Nonqualified \'
CLIENT LIT Client litigation 0.380 0.000 17.246*
DEBT/EQ Debt/equity 1.582 1.821 0.411
SAL/TA Sales/total assets 0.653 1.074 15.822*
NP/SAL Net profit/sales - 0.308 0.059 8.343*
REC/S.AL Receivable/sales 1.930 0.461 9.327*
NFA/TA Net fixed assets/total assets 0.310 0.279 0.534
INV/SAL Inventories/sales 0.278 0.277 0.931
INV/TA Inventories/total assets 0.158 0.200 2.692
CASH/TA Cash/total assets 0.072 0.079 0.320
LOG.TA Logarithm of total assets 8.639 8.616 0.000
LOG.DEBT Logarithm of debt 7.964 7.723 0.438
Z.SCORE Z-score ofAltman 0.904 1.935 28.618*
NP/FA Net profit/fixed assets -0.112 - 1.348 15.549*
TD/TA Total debt/total assets 0.551 0.483 1.422
NP/TA Net profit/total assets 0.001 0.070 17.975*
CA/CL Current assets/current liabilities 1.434 2.752 3.942**
WC/TA Working capital/total assets 0.105 0.218 4.450**
QA/CL Quick assets/current liabilities 1.053 1.752 2.492
GP/TA Gross profit/total assets 0.146 0.294 23.487*
LTD/TA Long term debt/total assets 0.074 0.043 1.961
Italics denote the selected variables.
* Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
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additive utility model for the classification of a set of alternatives in predefined homogeneous
groups. In this case, the alternatives correspond to the firms, whereas the classification
involves two groups, i.e., the firms that receive a qualified audit opinion and those that receive
a clean opinion.
The method operates on the basis of a nonparametric regression-based framework that is
similar to discriminant analysis, logit, probit, etc. Using a training sample, the classification
model is developed using linear programming techniques. If the classification accuracy of the
model in the training sample is satisfactory, then it could be applied to any other sample for
extrapolation and decision-making purposes. The form of the developed classification model,
its interpretation, and its advantages over traditional classification techniques, are outlined in
Appendix B. A detailed description of the method can be found in Zopounidis and Doumpos
(1999).
4. Results
4.1. Bootstrap methodology and main findings
A bootstrapping approach is employed in applying the UTADIS method to investigate the
relationship between corporate performance and the likelihood of issuing a clean or a
qualified audit report and in evaluating the performance of the method for classifying firms.
Most often the predictive ability of models developed from past data is tested on a holdout
sample. However, data availability problems make it impossible to collect the appropriate
data for such a sample. Thus, resampling techniques such as bootstrapping (Efron &
Tibshirani, 1993) and cross-validation (Stone, 1974) provide an alternative. Bootstrapping
is used in this study because it provides estimations with moderate bias and low variance
(Efi-on & Tibshirani, 1997).
The bootstrap analysis in this study enables the assessment of the predictive performance of
the models developed for discriminating between firms that receive qualified or nonqualified
audit reports. The bootstrap analysis is performed by constructing 200 bootstrap samples at
random with replacement. Each sample consists of 100 firms (i.e., the bootstrap samples are of
the same size as the complete sample for firms). According to Efi-on and Tibshirani (1993,
1997), 50 bootstrap samples are generally adequate for estimating the error rate of a
classification/regression model, while more bootstrap replications are required to investigate
the stability of the parameters of the model. Since this analysis involves both the examination
of the significance of the selected indicators and the analysis of the classificafion perfomiance
of the UTADIS method, an increased number of 200 bootstrap replications are considered.
Each bootstrap sample is used as a training sample for the UTADIS method in order to
construct a model for the distincfion between the firms that receive qualified audit reports and
those that receive clean reports. The model is then used to classify the firms not included in the
bootstrap sample.
Using this process, two different bootstrap experiments are performed, considering two
slightly different sets of financial ratios. The first experiment considers all the indicators
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selected through the procedure described in Section 3.2, including the r-score, which is a
linear combination of some financial ratios. Thus, it can be argued that the consideration
of the z-score implies an "overuse" of financial information by the developed models.
Therefore, in a second stage, the analysis is also performed without the z-score as an
independent variable.
For both sets of independent variables, statistics of robustness are summarized in Table 4.
This table illustrates the significance of each financial ratio in the discrimination between firms
that receive a qualified audit report and firms that do not, according to the models developed
through UTADIS.
The results clearly indicate that receivables/sales are the most crucial factor in the UTADIS
model for the classification of the firms. Net profit/total assets and working capital/total assets
are also found to be significant in both cases, with the assigned weights being higher than 10%.
In particular, the analysis showed that high receivables/sales, low net profit/total assets, and
low working capital/total assets characterize qualified firms. Reynolds and Francis (2001)
argue that companies are more likely to receive a qualified report if they are financially
distressed and the financial statements were qualified in prior periods. The z-score has a
moderate weight (8.75%) in the model developed using the complete set of ratios, but its
importance cannot be overlooked. In examining empirical evidence of auditor's opinion
decisions, Mutchler et al. (1997) found that companies with qualified reports displayed a low
degree of financial distress (as evidenced by high discriminant scores). They explained this
unexpected result by suggesting that, in these situations, "contrary information" (bad news)
was the driving factor in the auditor's decision. The most significant differences in the weights
of the financial ratios involve the ratios of sales/total assets, net profit/fixed assets, and current
assets/current liabilities. The latter ratio is found to be the most important factor when the z-
score is excluded from the analysis, whereas in the case where all the ratios are considered, its
weight is rather moderate. In contrast, Lenard et al. (200 1 ) found that the ratio ofcurrent assets/
current liabilities is a significant variable for explaining an assessment of going concern
Table 4
Statistics on the weights (%) of the financial ratios according to the UTADIS method (200 bootstrap replications)
z-score considered r-score not considered
Averag i weight Standard error Average weight Standard error
CLIENT LIT 5.61 0.48 7.63 0.95
SAL/TA 12.86 0.67 4.70 0.67
NP/SAL 9.00 0.36 7.19 0.53
REC/SAL 14.87 1.38 16.39 1.26
Z.SCORE 8.75 0.37 - -
NP/FA 6.93 0.91 16.10 1.34
NP/TA 14.23 0.60 10.14 0.93
CA/CL 7.09 0.46 19.25 1.12
WC/TA 11.37 0.46 10.54 0.79
GP/TA 8.66 0.28 7.71 0.87
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because the owners of the firms that receive the quahfied opinions face higher risk and lower
returns than the owners of firms receiving the clean opinions; they are more likely to sue
auditors in the event of bankruptcy. Auditors are therefore compelled to warn stockholders as
well as other users that the situation is worse than it appears since certain events with adverse
economic consequences may not have been fully recognized.
A comparison with the results of the previous study on FFS detection (Spathis, Doumpos &
Zopounidas, 2003) shows that the factors that describe qualified audit reports differ from the
ones found useful in detecting FFS. In particular, Spathis et al. found that the total debt, total
assets, inventories sales, net profit-to-sales ratio, and sales total assets ratios contribute
significantly to explain FFS. In this study, the first two ratios (total debt to total assets,
inventories sales) are not considered in model development because they were not statistically
significant in the first step of the analysis (Kruskal-Wallis test; cf Table 3). The net profit-to-
sales ratio was found statistically significant, but its contribution to explaining qualified audit
report models is below 10%. Finally, the sales/total assets ratio was found to be significant for
the complete set of ratios with an average weight of 12.86%.
4.2. Classification results
Table 5 summarizes the classification results for the two bootstrap experiments obtained
using the UTADIS method. For comparative purposes, the results ofLOGIT and LDA are also
reported as benchmarks for the UTADIS results.
The presented results are for the overall error rate, as well as for Type I and Type II error
rates. The Type I error refers to the classification of firms that receive qualified audit reports as
receiving clean reports. Similarly, the Type II error refers to the classification of firms that
Table 5
Classification results (error rate estimates, 200 bootstrap replications, in %)
Error types Estimators UTADIS LDA LOGIT
z-score considered
Type I ErT<"-"» 20.68 30.38 25.58
Err'" 24.57 34.10 32.33
Type II Err(^32.) 20.17 19.46 22.89
Err"> 23.76 22.64 24.58
Overall E^(632.) 21.17 25.66 25.30
Err"> 24.17 28.37 28.47
z-score not considered
Type 1 Err«'32.) 21.59 30.58 25.79
Err'" 24.84 34.41 29.16
Type II Err<^32., 21.38 21.30 24.28
Err'" 24.52 23.21 25.61
Overall E^,632.) 22.05 26.48 25.39
Err'" 24.68 28.81 27.39
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receive clean audit reports as receiving qualified reports. The overall error rate is the average of
the Type I and Type II errors. These three types of errors are summarized in Table 5. This table
reports both the leave-one-out bootstrap error rate estimator Err'", as well as the 632+
estimator Err'^'" ' (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993, 1997). Err*" measures the expected classifica-
tion error rate estimated from firms not included in the bootstrap samples; thus, it is expected to
be an upwardly biased estimator of the true error rate. On the other hand, the apparent error rate
(err) calculated from the whole sample of firms (re-substitution error) is a downwardly biased
estimate. To address these bias issues in the estimates of classification performance, Efron and
Tibshirani (1997) proposed the Err*^ ~~' estimator that considers both Err* ' * and err in order to
provide an unbiased error rate estimate.
The comparison of the methods on the basis of the overall error rate shows that the UTADIS
method outperforms LDA and LOGIT in terms of the Err*^^~^* and the Err* ' * estimators, both
when the complete set of ratios is considered, as well as in the case where the r-score is
excluded from the analysis. The differences between UTADIS and other statistical methods
according to the Err*^"'"~* estimator are larger compared to those measured according to Err* '
',
because Err*^^~~* considers both Err* ' ' and the apparent error rate erf. The classification models
developed through UTADIS have increased degrees of freedom compared to the models of
LDA and LOGIT, which require only the estimation of the discriminant coefficients.
Therefore, the apparent error rate erf is lower for UTADIS than for LDA and LOGIT. For
instance, when the complete set of ratios is considered, the apparent estimate for the overall
error is 14% for the UTADIS method as opposed to 19% and 17% for LDA and LOGIT,
respectively. (The same figures are 16% for UTADIS, and 21% for LDA and LOGIT when the
2-score is excluded).
Bearing in mind these remarks, it is interesting to note the pattern of differences between
the UTADIS method, LDA, and LOGIT for the Err* ' * estimates of the overall error rate, the
Type I and Type II errors. In particular, when the complete set of ratios is considered, the
differences in the Err* ' ' estimates of the overall error rate are statistically significant at the
5% level (t values -2.054 and -2.410 for UTADIS-LDA and UTADIS-LOGIT,
respectively). The superiority of the UTADIS method is mainly due to its superiority in terms
ofthe Type I error rate (24.57% for the UTADIS method, as compared to 34. 10% for LDA, and
32.33% for LOGIT). The differences of the methods in terms of the Err* ' ' estimates are highly
significant (t values -5.227 and -5.468, for UTADIS-LDA and UTADIS-LOGIT,
respectively). On the other hand, the differences between the methods in terms of the Type
II error rates are not significant.
There are small changes in the error rates when the z-score is excluded from the analysis, but
the ranking of the methods does not change. In particular, the performance of UTADIS and
LDA is slightly inferior compared to the results with the z-score, whereas the performance of
LOGIT is slightly improved. In terms of the overall error rate [Err* ' * estimate] the differences
between UTADIS (24.68%), LDA (28.81%), and LOGIT (27.39%) are significant at 10% (t
values - 1.975 and - 1.718 for UTADIS-LDA and UTADIS-LOGIT, respectively). Once
again, these differences are due to the superiority of UTADIS in terms of the Type I error (t
values - 5.222 and - 3.780 UTADIS-LDA and UTADIS-LOGIT, respectively), whereas
for Type II error all methods perform almost equally well.
280 C. Spathis et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 267-284
These results show that the superiority of the models developed through UTADIS over
the models of LDA and LOGIT is due to the higher ability of the UTADIS models to
describe correctly the fimis that receive qualified audit reports. It is also interesting to note
that on the basis of the acceptable classification results of the UTADIS method [the overall
error rates according to the unbiased Err*^^~^* estimator are approximately 20%], the
assumption that there is a positive relationship between the performance of firms (as
perceived by the auditors) and the likelihood that they receive a clean report seems to be
valid.
5. Concluding remarks
The primary objective of this study was to develop a model that identifies factors associated
with qualified audit reports and predicts whether firms will receive qualified or clean reports.
To achieve this goal, a sample of qualified and nonqualified firms was considered. Univariate
tests were employed to select the appropriate explanatory variables and a multicriteria decision
aid classification method (UTADIS) was used. The results were compared to well-known
multivariate statistical techniques, namely, logistic regression and discriminant analysis. Ten
variables (eight financial ratios, one dummy variable, and the 2-score) were selected to explain
qualified audit reports. These variables appeared to be important in prior research and
constituted ratios derived fi*om published financial statements. The variables selected by the
above techniques as possible useful indicators were: the receivables/sales ratio, the net profit/
total assets ratio, the sales/total assets ratio, and the working capital/total assets ratio. The
UTADIS method was found quite effective in predicting qualified/clean reports, providing an
estimated classification accuracy of approximately 80%. This result suggests that there is
potential in identifying pre-engagement factors associated with qualified audit reports through
analysis of publicly available financial statements.
The results are encouraging in that we believe we have developed a reliable model for
assessing the likelihood of identifying qualified audit reports of businesses in Greece. The use
of the proposed methodological framework could be of assistance to professionals who are
interested in the financial health of the firms they follow.
Alternative methods for the identification qualified audit reports such as adaptive logit
networks and neural networks can be used. Furthermore, there are several publicly available
variables which are worth considering in for ftiture research. These variables include the firm's
standing within industries, long-term trends, corporate governance, and auditor independence.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of The International Journal of
Accounting for their valuable comments and suggestions. An early version of this paper was
presented at the 24th Congress of the European Accounting Association held in Athens,
Greece on April 18-20, 2001.
C. Spathis et al / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 267-284 281
Appendix A. Main explanatory paragraphs and examples of events used in qualified
audit reports
1. Inadequate depreciation
The depreciation charged to the Profit and Loss account was not in accordance with the
law ... the rate of depreciation was lower than the one required by the tax authorities for
those assets for the amount . .
.
2. Understatement of bad debt expenses
There was no provision for bad debts for the amount of . .
.
3. Non recognition of severance payments
There was no provision for redundancy payments for the amount of . .
.
4. Overstatement of the long-term investments
The value . . . of the investment in other companies which are not listed at the Athens Stock
Exchange cannot be verified.
The value ... of the investment in other companies which are not audited cannot be
verified.
5. Inaccurate estimation of the taxes payable and other reasons for audit qualifications
There are tax liabilities overdue for the amount of . .
.
The company accounts have not been examined by the tax authorities for the tax years. .
.
therefore the tax liabilities are not confirmed.
There was no asset revaluation in accordance with the law.
The shareholders' funds are negative and amount to 50% of the share capital. It is therefore
essential that capital reconstruction and increase must follow.
The Profit and Loss account is not debited with losses arising from the valuation of bonds
(or financial instruments, shares in other companies).
Repairs of assets for the amount of . . . have been capitalized.
Appendix B. Outline of the UTADIS method
The use of the UTADIS method in this study aims at the development of a model that
classifies a set of n firms a], a2, ., a„ into two groups Cj (firms with clean reports) and C2
(firms with qualified reports). Details for the general multigroup case can be found in
Zopounidis and Doumpos (1999).
The first major distinguishing feature of the method over traditional statistical
techniques (e.g., discriminant and logit analysis) is that the groups are defined in an or-
dinal way, assuming that the firms of group C\ have higher overall performance compared
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to the firms of group C2. This assumption imphes a positive relationship between the
overall performance of the firms, as perceived by the auditors, and the likelihood that a
firm receives a clean report. The use of the UTADIS method and the ordinal definition of
the groups enable the investigation of the validity of this assumption. Should the
classification results be satisfactory, then this will indicate that the above assumption is
valid.
Within this context, the overall evaluation of the firms and their classification in the two
groups is considered as a monotonic function of the partial performance of the firms on
each evaluation criterion (client performance measure). This monotonic relationship is
modeled through an additive utility function \g denotes the criteria vector, i.e., g={g\, g2,
• •, g,n)]-
III
^(^) = E^.^Kg.) e [0, 1] (1)
where Pi>0 is the weight of criterion g, (p\+p2 + . . .+p,„ = l) and w,(g,) is the
corresponding marginal utility function normalized between and 1. The criteria weights
indicate the contribution (significance) of each criterion in estimating the overall performance
of the firm (the higher the weight the more significant is the criterion). The marginal utility
functions W/(g/) provide the partial performance of the firms for each individual criterion g„
measured on a scale ranging between and 1 . The higher the marginal utility of firm on a
criterion, the higher is its performance as perceived by the auditor. Generally, the marginal
utility functions are monotone fiinctions defined on each criterion's scale. These functions are
increasing for criteria, which are positively related to the performance of the firms (the ratios
SAL/TA, NP/SAL, NP/FA, NP/TA, CA/CL, WC/TA, GP/TA, and the zeta score), and
decreasing in the opposite case (CLIENT LIT and REC/SAL ratio). Nevertheless, there is no a
priori specific fiinctional definition of the marginal utility functions. Instead, these are treated
as unknown parameters of the model and they are estimated during the model development
process. This special feature of the UTADIS method adds flexibility to the developed
classification model, which may take a linear or nonlinear form depending on the sample data
under consideration. This flexibility of the classification models developed through UTADIS
is a major advantage over models developed through the statistical and econometric
techniques such as discriminant and logit analysis, which have a well-specified and less
flexible functional form.
Conceptually, the global utility U{gj) of a firm fly, as defined in Eq. (1), is an aggregate
index measuring the overall performance of the finn on the basis of all criteria. The global
utility measures the value (overall performance) of the firm as perceived by the auditor
during the examination of its financial characteristics (financial ratios). The higher the
global utility, the higher the overall performance of the finn (as perceived by the auditor)
is. Considering the aforementioned assumption on the positive relationship between
corporate performance and the likelihood that the firni receives a clear report, it can be
concluded that the higher the global utility of a firm, the more likely that the firm will
receive a clean audit report. Therefore, the following simple classification rule is used to
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distinguish between firms that receive clean reports (group C\) and the ones that receive
quahfied reports (group C2).
U[gi) > u, ^ a, G C, ]
> (2)
U{gj) < i'\ ^ «/ e C2 J
All the parameters of the additive utility model (criteria weights, marginal utilities, cutoff
point U\) are estimated using linear programming techniques in order to minimize the
violations of the classification rule (Eq. (2)) for a training sample of firms.
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Abstract
This study examines market reactions to two different approaches to reduce income shifting in an
intemational setting. The two methods are described and event studies are performed using stock
market data from Canada and Austraha. Samples of companies from both countries are partitioned into
firms predicted to be affected versus unaffected by each country's event. Australia's regulation taxes
profits arising in low-tax subsidiaries at Australian rates. Canada's method defines acceptable transfer
prices (arm's-length transactions) and describes enforcement and audit policies. We find evidence of
stock market reactions on some of the event dates for Australian and Canadian firms affected by these
two approaches.
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1. Introduction
This study investigates market responses to two different approaches aimed at minimizing
the tax effects of income shifting. We contribute to accounting research on tax-motivated
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income shifting by describing the responses of governments located in high-tax countries to
potential income shifting by multinational corporations (MNCs). Harris, Morck, Slemrod,
and Yeung (1993, p. 277) suggest that income shifting takes place to reduce the overall tax
burden that occurs through the use of artificial transfer prices and by concentrating debt
financing in highly taxed subsidiaries. Consequently, two types of tax policies governing
income shifting have increased in prevalence. The first method taxes worldwide profits in a
manner that minimizes any tax advantages for locating increased profits in countries with low
tax rates. An advantage of this type of regulation, from a firm perspective, is that it does not
limit the ability of firms to use internal transfer price policies to maximize profits. The second
approach defines the prices at which goods and services may be transferred between related
parties. A disadvantage of this method is that it limits firms' abilities to use transfer prices to
align goals internally.'^ It also ignores any income shifting through financing decisions.
This paper describes the problem of taxation, transfer price policies, and income shifting
and undertakes empirical tests of the cash flow implications of the two approaches to
determine the perceived effectiveness of each individual approach. Using an event study
methodology, sample firms are selected from Australia and Canada, two countries with
different approaches. During the time period covered in this study, Australia's regulatory
response was to tax profits arising from subsidiaries in low-tax domiciles through legislation
of confrolled foreign corporation (CFC). In contrast, Canada defined the criteria that transfer
prices had to meet, specifically, prices equivalent to those used in arm's-length transactions.
Further, Revenue Canada described enforcement and audit policies.
Information gathered from Australian financial statements is used to partition the
Australian sample into three groups: firms with divisions in low-tax countries and reporting
transfers between divisions (LT firms), firms with divisions in low-tax countries and reporting
no transfers between divisions (NT firms), and domestic firms or firms with divisions in high-
tax countries (HT firms) only. The results indicate a statistically significant negative market
reaction to the first announcement (May 26, 1988) of impending regulation for LT firms. No
evidence of a market reaction is found for the unaffected firms. This methodology confrols for
possible cross-sectional correlation due to synchronous stock-price movements within one
country. In addition, these findings provide evidence that the market differentiated between
firms potentially affected and unaffected by the CFC legislation.
Testing for a reaction in the Canadian sample firms was more difficult because the
government introduced the guidelines over time. The first drafts of the information circular
were sent by mail to Canadian firms. Therefore, regression analysis is performed using both
daily and monthly data on a sample of Canadian firms partifioned into two groups: finns with
international operations and domestic firms. The use of daily returns limits the analysis to
only two dates for the event study and results in no significant reactions. Using monthly data
for firms with international operations, we find negafive and significant market reactions to
the introduction of the new transfer price guidelines in October of 1984. In addition, we find
In our discussion with controllers of U.S. international tlnns, we found that firms develop a system of
internal "credits" when transfer price policy is limited by government regulation.
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negative and weakly significant market reactions on March 1 986 when the last draft of the
information circular was released and on February 1987 when the guidelines and policies
stated in the circular were finally implemented. No evidence of a negative market reaction is
found for the unaffected firms.
This research contributes to intemational accounting research literature in several ways.
Few researchers have used data from intemational stock markets for empirical tests on
intemational issues. Recent studies analyze the responses of U.S. multinationals to excess
foreign tax limitations (for example, Collins, Kemsley, & Lang, 1998) and U.S. multina-
tionals' use of interest deductions to source income in different jurisdictions (Newberry &
Dhaliwal, 2001). Mills and Newberry (2002) analyze tax payments and income from foreign-
controlled corporations located in the United States to detect income shifting. Our study
complements this literature by reaching beyond the United States and analyzing firms
domiciled in Australia and Canada. Our paper also complements the research literature
about the effects of tax law changes on security prices by testing whether the market
differentiates between firms expected to be affected and others expected to be unaffected by
the legislation. This research highlights two approaches aimed at controlling potential abuses
in intemational income shifting. In recent years, there appears to be widespread discontent
with the use of arm's-length transfer pricing policies in the United States and Canada (see for
example, Boidman, 1995; Mazerov, 1994). Information about alternative approaches is
potentially useful to policy makers and others interested in these issues.
Four sections follow. Section 2 contains a review of the relevant literature and outlines the
conflict between MNCs and govemments over intemational income shifting and provides
details about the two approaches. The research methodology and results are presented in
Section 3, and the final section concludes the paper.
2. Income shifting
As firms have become increasingly intemational, their ability to shift income across
national borders has also increased. When goods, services, and intangible assets within one
firm are traded across national borders, opportunities arise to use these transfers to manage
income to reduce the overall tax burden (Harris et al., 1993). While income shifting may
benefit tax-haven countries, govemments in countries with higher tax rates may suffer fiscal
shortfalls (Rugman & Eden, 1985). Govemments are also concerned about factors such as
control over host-country resources. MNCs are in a unique position to use transfer prices to
reallocate resources, within limits, and redistribute profits among countries. Govemments
with high tax rates may view this control as undesirable because national output, employment
levels, consumer prices, factor incomes, and the balance of payments are affected (Rugman &
Eden, 1985). Acting on these views, govemments have established regulation to tax profits
arising in low-tax domiciles or regulation that precisely defines acceptable transfer prices.
Policies to limit income shifting have been proposed since the early 1960s. A 1979 report
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) formally defined
an arm's-length standard, globalizing the whole issue of transfer pricing. The OECD report
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described generally accepted practices in determining transfer prices for taxation purposes.
Germany introduced tax legislation relating to intrafirm transfer-pricing rules in 1983. The
United States addressed transfer pricing through the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In July 1994,
the U.S. Internal Revenue Service released additional guidelines for transfer price policies.
Japan set forth ground rules in 1986. Revenue Canada issued a circular regarding
international non-arm 's-length transactions in 1987. The European Community (EC)
countries reached agreement on proposals for the harmonization of direct taxes in Europe
and issued a draft convention on transfer-pricing arbitration in 1992 to resolve transfer-
pricing disputes between member countries (Tang, 1992). At the end of July 1995, the OECD
issued new transfer price guidelines encompassing the traditional transaction methods for
setting transfer prices and including two profit-splitting methods: transactional profit methods
and global formulary apportionment methods. These policies attempt to limit income shifting
by defining how transfers should be valued. Altematively, in 1990, Australia introduced
regulation to levy additional taxes on income arising fi^om subsidiaries in low-tax domiciles.
In 1976, New Zealand had enacted similar legislation, as did Sweden in 1990.
A struggle has developed between firms and governments over how and when taxes
should be assessed on income earned through foreign operations. If firms are declaring
income in low-tax domiciles and avoiding taxes in high-tax domiciles, tax monies may be
escaping fi"om the high-tax domicile. Effective regulation reduces a firm's ability to shift
income to avoid taxes and therefore has cash-flow effects. Cash will be diverted from the
MNC to the domestic government enacting the legislation. Due to this increase in cash
outflow, the expected market reaction to successfiil regulation would be a reduction in share
price for the affected MNCs.
2.1. Two approaches to reducing income shifting
In this section, we describe the CFC regulation used by Australia and the arm's-length
pricing policies, which are used by Canada. While we cannot directly compare the empirical
results from these two regimes, a complete understanding of each type provides a more
complete picture of the complexities of this issue.
Australian legislation, implemented in 1990, emphasizes CFC regulations."^ A firm is
subject to CFC regulation if the Australian resident company has an interest of 10% or more
in a foreign company (subsidiary) or if the foreign subsidiary meets certain control tests. The
strict control test is satisfied when five or fewer residents, together with their associates, own
or are able to acquire or control an interest of 50% or more in a company (Price Waterhouse,
1991). There are several de facto control tests as well, which essentially demonstrate that a
specified number of residents acquire or effectively control at least 40% of a foreign
company. If a firm is subject to CFC regulation, then an analysis of the sources of foreign
income is undertaken. Income arising in subsidiaries located in countries on the "white list"
"* While the 1990 regulations included both CFC and arm's-length legislation, emphasis was placed on the
CFC regulation. Although Australia enacted additional tax legislation and finalized tax treaties with several other
countries, the CFC regulations have remained intact since 1 990.
I
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is not taxed. Countries on the "white list" have tax rates similar to those of Australia.^
However, income is taxed at Australian rates (with a credit for foreign taxes paid) when it
arises in subsidiaries located in countries that are "unlisted," (i.e., low-tax countries). Where
any exempted country offers tax breaks that enable a foreign entity to pay less than what
would be collected under the Australian tax system, the income qualifying for the tax break is
treated as if it arose in Australia and is subject to Australian rates.
An alternative to the Australian approach is for a government to establish a transfer price
that reflects the value of the transfer to unrelated firms. Rugman and Eden (1985, p. 2)
suggest that
In many nations, transfer prices are regulated to conform to an idealized "arm's-length
standard," i.e. the market price that would have been negotiated by unrelated parties
bargaining at arm's length.
This arm's-length principle specifies that intemal transactions take place under terms and at
a price one could reasonably expect in similar circumstances if the parties were dealing with
each other at arm's length. Arguably, the best known arm's-length standard is the U.S. Tariff
Act, Sections 402 and 402(A) and Section 482 of the Intemal Revenue Service Code, which
specify arm's-length (market based) prices for intracorporate transfers for both domestic and
intemational transfers.
In 1987, Revenue Canada specifically addressed transfers between Canadian taxpayers and
non-arm's-length nonresidents in Information Circular 87-2, "Intemational Transfer Pricing
and Other Intemational Transactions." This circular applies to intemational non-arm's-length
transactions involving a Canadian taxpayer and describes Revenue Canada's approach to the
tax treatment of intemational transfer pricing and other related issues. The information
circular does not create new law but is a statement of the government's view and enforcement
practices regarding proper intercompany pricing guidelines (Boidman, 1987a). The circular
(paragraph 12) suggests that firms rely on comparable uncontrolled prices (Lawlor, 1987). If
these are not available, then a cost-plus, resale price, or other secondary method is used to set
prices. Paragraph 8 of the circular suggests that taxpayers adopt the OECD recommendation
to separate product transfer prices from management fees and to price them independently.
The circular also addressed Revenue Canada's enforcement and audit policies around transfer
prices. Although Revenue Canada released an information circular in 1995 providing
guidelines for the resolution of tax treaty disputes, the arm's-length standard continues to
govem transfer prices for Canadian-based firms.
Many countries' intemational tax policies include both approaches, but usually one approach
is more emphasized. The choice of an approach is probably affected by several factors. For
example, regulators in Australia decreased the overall corporate tax rate. As a quid pro quo for
this reduction, they introduced CFC regulation as part of a stricter tax regime based on
improving the equity and efficiency ofthe Australian income tax system. "Although Australian
^ Sixty-one countries are "white listed." In another 20 countries, the tax recognition varies according to the
type of business conducted.
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tax law requires goods and services transferred between related corporations to be valued at fair
market value, it is difficult to verify the transfer-pricing policies and financial arrangements
between related corporations and thus enforce the fair market value principle. Often there are no
well-established markets for such goods and services and the task of pricing them is highly
subjective. The proposed approach [CFC regulation], by ensuring that all income earned by
Australian multinationals is taxed at rates comparable to that in Australia, will greatly reduce the
incentives for the manipulation of transfer pricing. At the same time, it will improve the
competitiveness of Australian companies engaged in genuine international business operations
relative to companies whose activities are subsidized by transfer pricing and tax-avoidance
activities" (Taxation of Foreign Source Income, 1988, p. 4).
Canada's decision to clarify its transfer price policies may have resulted, in part, fi^om the
1986 U.S. tax reforms that included stricter interpretations of arms-length rules for MNCs. In
addition, the United States is Canada's largest trading partner, and having similar policies in
place would reduce confiision and transaction costs for those firms trading primarily in the
United States. The first draft of the information circular referenced U.S. Internal Revenue
Service's Section 482 on multinational pricing, but this was omitted in the final draft although
the influence remained (Boidman, 1987b).
3. Research method and empirical results
To test whether either of the two regulations noted above was effective, this research uses
an event-study methodology. A maintained assumption is market efficiency in the semistrong
form: the market will react quickly and in an unbiased manner to new public information
(Foster, 1980). Since the events in our study are related to a political process, there may be
problems in identifying the event dates. We therefore used two types of event dates to capture
the effects of both deliberation and announcement periods. Another issue we must address is
that our events occur at the same time for all companies in each country. The standard event
methodology assumes that the event windows of the sample firms do not overlap in calendar
time. This assumption allows us to calculate the variance of the aggregated cumulative
abnormal returns without regard to the covariances between abnormal returns of each sample
stock because the covariances would be zero. However, the event windows for all sample
firms in each country are the same in our study, resulting in nonzero covariances between
abnormal returns (MacKinlay, 1997). Schipper and Thompson (1983), in the context of
merger-related regulatory changes in the United States, handled "clustering" by analyzing
abnormal returns without aggregation. We follow their approach by performing multivariate
regressions using dummy variables for the event dates.
The following equation is the basic regression model we run for each of our samples
(Australia and Canada):
Ri, = tti + bnRnu^ I + bi2R,„i + hi^R„u+ \ + c,yDel, + r,yAnn, + //,,. ( 1
)
The market and firm-specific variables are: a, = intercept for firm /, /?„ = return on security / in
period /, R„„
\
= market return in period ^ — 1 , /?,„, = market return in period t, and
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Rf„f+ 1 = market return in period t+\. Three daily marlcet returns (R„„ _ i, R„,t, and R,„t+ ^ are
employed to adjust for possible nonsynchronous trading (Scholes & Williams, 1977).
The event-related variables are:
Del,= 1 if day / is a deliberation announcement date and otherwise (discussed in the next
sections), and
Ann, = 1 if day t is a date for the actual introduction or establishment of the regulation and
otherwise.
Australian firms are selected because ( 1 ) the regulation defines certain foreign income as
taxable at Australian rates, (2) data are available for Australian domestic and multinational
firms, and (3) there are no obvious competing and potentially confounding events during the
event window.^ Canadian firms are selected because (1) the circular defines transfer prices to
be the same as if an arm's-length transaction were taking place and delineates enforcement
and audit policy, (2) the data necessary for analysis are available, and (3) there are no
competing events during the event window.
Because we are able to differentiate firms that transfer goods fi-om firms that do not, we
believe this empirical methodology is most appropriate. If we set up portfolios based on
foreign sales or income, we could not discriminate those firms that both make and sell
products in a foreign country from those firms that make goods domestically and then sell
them in a foreign country. In addition, our sample contains a diverse mix of industries and, in
many cases, we have firms within the same industry that are categorized as expected to be
affected by the change as well as firms expected to be unaffected by the change. This helps
reduce the effects of potentially confounding events on our results.
3.1. Australian sample, event dates, and results
Of the largest 100 Australian firms (assets in 1985), 44 firms were eliminated because they
lacked data over the entire sample period primarily due to merger or reorganization.''
Geographic segment information in the financial statements provided transfer price policies
for the remaining 56 firms. Thirteen of these firms reported having subsidiaries domiciled in
low-tax countries throughout the sample period and either definitely disclosed that transfers
took place among these subsidiaries or were silent regarding transfers (LT firms). Another 1
5
firms reported having subsidiaries in low-tax countries but disclosed that there were no
transfers between their subsidiaries (NT firms). The remaining 27 firms were either domestic
^ While the Economic Statement (1988) contained tax reforms other than the proposed CFC regulation, the
other major tax changes (including the reduction in corporate tax rate) had been "telegraphed" by the government
and had received extensive media coverage prior to this date. The CFC regulation, on the other hand, was issued
on this date as a public discussion paper and had not received prior media coverage.
The initial sample of 100 firms represents 62% of the total market capitalization in Australia at that time.
When we analyze firms beyond the top 100, the companies become relatively small very quickly and are
increasingly unlikely to be multinational. Hence, our sample size is limited.
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firms or reported having operations only in liigher-tax countries (HT firms). We use 1985
segment reports to determine a firm's classification for 1986, then 1986 reports for
classification in 1987, and so on. One firm was eliminated because it changed categories
during the sample period, leaving a total of 55 sample firms. ^"
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample firms. In Panel A, the NT firms are
largest in terms of total revenue and percentage of foreign revenue. HT firms are substantially
smaller for both. The business classification in Panel B indicates that mining and other
resource-based industries account for 38% of LT firms, 20% of NT firms, 52% of HT firms,
and 40% of the total sample. The remaining firms are spread throughout other industries.
On the evening of May 25,1988, Australia released an Economic Statement (1988) that
proposed CFC legislation. On May 26, 1988, the Australian Financial Review (1988)
released an article discussing the government's position in the statement. This appears to
be the first public notice of the impending CFC legislation. Businesses objected strenuously
to the proposed legislation, indicating that Australian companies would move offshore to
compete in global markets. Subsequently, on June 9, 1989, Business Review Weekly (1989)
released an article that stated,
Equally important, the government has watered down its initial thinking about an accruals
tax. It has dropped the idea of indiscriminately applying full Australian taxes to all
companies reporting profits from tax havens.
On July 24, 1989, an article in the Australian Financial Review suggested that the impact
of the CFC legislation would be "felt across the spectrum of Australian businesses." On
September 14, 1990, the legislation was formally introduced. News of this was released in the
Australian Financial Review on September 14th and the regulation took effect in June of
1991. Therefore, these dates are incorporated into the empirical model:
Del] = 1 if date is May 26 or 27, 1988, and otherwise,
Deh = 1 if date is June 8 or 9, 1 989, and otherwise, and
Ann= 1 if date is September 13 or 14, 1990, and otherwise.
To eliminate the potential of confounding events, we chose a 2-day event window that
included the day of the event and the day after, unless the event day was Friday, in which case
we used the prior trading day (Thursday).
Several covariates were considered as control variables, including size, industry, and
percent foreign sales. While size may affect market returns, intuitively there is no link
These partitions reflect firm operations to the extent that audited segment information reflects actual segment
operations and that firms reporting no transfers do not transfer among subsidiaries. If there was any doubt, firms
were classified conservatively to bias against finding results.
Over the time of this study, Australian companies were required to disclose a listing of all subsidiaries, their
location, and their contribution to profit. This listing was used to confinn that the HT firms did not report material
operations in low-tax countries.
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Table 1
Sample of firms—Australia'^
Panel A : Descriptive statistics of sample firms
Classification Number Mean Median S.D. Minimum Maximum
of firms
LT firms 13
Revenue (in millions)
Percentage of foreign
revenue
NT firms 15
Revenue (in millions)
Percentage of foreign
revenue
HT firms 27
Revenue (in millions)
Percentage of foreign
revenue
Panel B: Number of sample firms by business classification
3855.85 1770.00 4425.94 132.00 14,119.00
19.54 24.00 10.78 1.00 35.00
5233.73 4483.00 4710.90 208.00 15,177.00
37.93 36.00 21.59 2.00 76.00
962.30 491.00 1213.25 4.00 5717.00
4.19 0.00 9.27 0.00 35.00
Primary line of business LT firms NT firms HT firms
Mining 2 1 5
Oil and gas 2 1 4
Solid fuels 4
Diversified resources 1 1 1
Chemicals 1
Building materials I 3
Miscellaneous industrial 1
Diversified industrial 1 1 1
Banks and finance 3
Insurance 1
Investment and financial 1
Property trust 1
Developers and contractors 1 1
Engineering 2
Transport 2
Miscellaneous services 1 1
Media 1
Retail 2
Food and household 1 1
Alcohol and tobacco 1
Entrepreneurial investors 2 1 1
Total 13 15 27
Total revenue and percentage of foreign revenue was obtained fi-om the geographic segment data presented in the
1990 annual reports of the sample firms.
1985 Australian Stock Exchange line of business classifications was used.
LT firms: firms with segments in low-tax domiciles with intersegment transfers reported (n= 13).
NT firms: firms with segments in low-tax domiciles with no intersegment transfers reported (n= 15).
HT firms: domesfic firms (n = 2l) or firms with no segments in low-tax domiciles (« = 6).
^ The sample firms are taken Irom the largest 100 Australian firms (by assets) at the end of 1985.
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between the size of a firm and how it might be affected by the regulation. Nevertheless, log of
sales is included as a control variable for size in the regression. Since the sample is small and
firms are representative of many different industries, there is no control for an industry effect.
Percent of foreign sales is considered in later tests. The first regression equation is thus
specified as:
Ri, = Qi + bi\R„„-\ + baRnu + baRnu+\ + ^/4log(sales) + CjiDeli + Ci2Del2
+ Ci3Ann + Wit. (2)
Next, the sample is partitioned into two groups to determine whether investors were able to
differentiate the effects of the regulation on different types of firms. The first group consists
of finns with segments in low-tax countries that transfer products or services among the
segments (LT firms). These firms are the most likely to have reduced cash flows and be
negatively affected by the regulation. Accordingly, the following are predicted: a negative
market reaction to the announcement that regulation was pending (Deli), a positive market
reaction (but less than the Delj reaction) to a softening of the regulation (DeU), and a fiirther
negative reaction to the announcement of the actual regulation (Ann) if the actual regulation
was more restrictive than expected. The second group consists of the two types of firms that
may not experience a negative reaction: firms with segments in low-tax countries reporting no
intrasegment transfers (NT firms) and domestic firms or firms with segments only in high-tax
countries (HT firms). The coefficients on the interactive terms reflecting these partitions are
expected to be insignificant, reflecting no expected market reaction for the unaffected
(HT + NT) firms. Since the event dates for the HT and NT firms are interacted with zero-
one dummy variables, the second regression equation is:
Ri, = Qi + bi\Rnu~\ + biiRnu + bi2,R„„+\ + Z)/4log(sales) + c/iDeli + f/2Del2 + c,3Ann
-^c,4Del, (HT + NT) + c,-5Del2(HT + NT) + Q6Ann(HT + NT) + Uj,. (3)
For sensitivity analysis, the same model is estimated using three partitions (LT, HT, and
NT). Again, the event dates are interacted with dummy variables reflecting the nonaffected
firms. Accordingly, the model is:
Ra - Ui + b,\R„u \ + biiRnu + bii,R,„,^\ + Z)/4log(sales) + C/|Deli + <r/2Del2 + C/3Ann
-hc,4Del, *NT + c,5Del2*NT + c>,Ann*NT + cvDei, *HT + c„sDel2*HT
-Kc/9Ann*HT + w,v. (4)
Daily data from the Australian Stock Exchange are used. The market return is proxied by
the Australian all ordinaries index assuming reinvestment of dividends. The regressions are
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Table 2
Regression results for Australian firms
Variable Expected
sign
Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (4)
Intercept .046*** (3.20) .046*** (3.20) .046*** (3.20)
Rmr- l.( -.015* (-1.75) -.015* (-1.75) -.015* (-1.75)
'^ml,i .999*** (114.95) .999*** (114.96) .999*** (114.96)
Rm/ + 1 ,/ -.030*** (-3.54) -.030*** (-3.54) -.030*** (-3.54)
Log of sales .00002 (0.304) .00003 (0.30) .00003 (0.26)
Ann (September 14, 1990) - .002 (0.89) -.001 (-0.12) -.001 (-0.12)
Del, (May 26, 1988) - -.004 (-1.42)* -.014*** (-2.61) -.014*** (-2.61)
Del, (June 9, 1989) + -.001 (-0.24) .004 (0.56) .004 (0.56)
(HT + NT)Anni + .004 (0.61)
(HT + NT)Del, + .013*** (2.20)
(HT + NT)Del2 - - .006 ( - 0.77)
HT X Ann, + 0.005 (0.70)
HT X Del, + .009* (1.44)
HT X Del2 - -.010(-1.15)
NT X Ann, 0.002 (0.323)
NT X Del, + .020*** (2.85)
NT X Del, - .000 (0.01)
Adjusted R~ .254 .245 .246
The t statistics are given in parentheses.
The estimation period is June 1, 1987, to September 30, 1990.
* F<.10, one-tailed tests where predictions are made.
*** P<.01, one-tailed tests where predictions are made.
run on daily market returns over the period of trading days from June 1, 1987, to September
30, 1990, for the Australian sample.
'°
Regression results for Eqs. (2)-(4) are presented in Table 2. None of the event dates is
significant when Eq. (2) is estimated. A possible explanation for these results is the tendency
for stock prices within any one country to move synchronously (Morck, Yeung, & Yu,
2000). However, the market likely expects these firms to be differentially affected.
Accordingly, when the sample is partitioned into two groups (Eq. (3)), evidence of a
significant reaction is obtained on the coefficient for May 26, 1988, when the Australian
Financial Review first released news of the government's intention to introduce controlled
foreign company legislation. As predicted, the market reaction is significantly negative
(Del] = — .014, /'< .01) for firms with transfers to subsidiaries in low-tax countries (LT). The
positive coefficient on (HT + NT)Deli (.13, P<.05) can be added to - .014 to yield - .001,
which suggests that there was no significant market reaction for the unaffected firms. Since
it is possible to partition the sample even more finely and identify firms that will be
differentially affected (thereby increasing the power of our test), Eq. (4) is estimated with
dummy variables for each of the three groups. The coefficient for LT firms does not change.
The model is also run from June 1, 1986, to September 30, 1990, since returns may have been abnormal
through the market crash period in 1987. Results were similar to those reported.
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The coefficient for the firms with subsidiaries in low-tax domiciles reporting no transfers
(NT X Dell) is significantly positive (.020, P<.01), and the coefficient for domestic firms
and firms with subsidiaries in high-tax countries (HT x Deli) is positive but only weakly
significant (.009, P< .10). These findings are consistent with our expectation that the HT and
NT groups would experience similar market reactions. Contrary to our expectations,
significant reactions to other dates (Del2 and Ann) are not observed in any of the regressions
for any of the sample groups.
The lack of an observed reaction to DeU and Ann may be due to a selection bias." To
test this, firms are classified as LT only when they definitely report having transfers
between segments, reducing the LT sample to seven firms. Findings for this group are
similar to those presented. To increase the goodness of fit, four firms whose first-stage
regressions have very low goodness of fit statistics are also eliminated. ' ~ The results of this
regression are similar to the reported results, but significance levels are stronger. We also
ran a similar regression in which we interacted the size variable (log of sales) with the
dates. Since there were no significant changes in the coefficients, these results are not
reported in a table.
Since firms with foreign sales are potentially more affected by the regulation, foreign
sales are also used as a control to test the robustness of our results. When the model is
estimated without partitions, a negative and significant coefficient is obtained for Deli x
percentage of foreign sales (not reported in a table). This provides further evidence that the
market discriminated between firms potentially affected and unaffected. When the LT, HT,
and NT dummies are interacted with percent foreign sales, a problem with multicollinearity
arises since there is little variation in foreign sales within each partition. The VIF factors and
eigenvalues are at levels indicating large amounts of collinearity between the event-date
dummies (Ann, Deli, and Deh) and the control variables (event dates x partition group x
rank of foreign sales). '^ This limitation of the data results in large variances, and
consequently no significance. Further robustness analysis was performed using univariate
tests of average raw retums on the event dates between the two partitions (LT vs. HT + NT).
The difference in average raw retums was weakly significant ( P < . 1 0) and in the expected
direction.
Additionally, LT firms' before-tax and after-tax incomes throughout the sample period are
examined to identify any firms operating in a net loss position. This is a very crude attempt to
control for the marginal tax rate. None of the LT firms incurred losses during this period.
Thus, these firms are potentially affected by any changes in tax legislation.
'
' We may not have identified firms that transfer between subsidiaries within the same segment. While firms
generally report intersegment transfers, they rarely report intrasegment transfers. For example, where Segment 1
includes Australia and Segment 2 includes both the United States and Hong Kong, a firm may have transfers
between the United States and Hong Kong yet legitimately report no intersegment transfers.
'" The adjusted R~ on the SUR model is .0001. Because the number of observations is quite large (42,793),
noise is introduced, which reduces the goodness of fit. An adjusted R' of .25 is obtained when a one-stage model
including all variables is run. The same coefficients are significant, with stronger t statistics.
'^ To mitigate potential bias from outliers, we ranked firms on foreign sales.
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3.2. Canadian sample, event dates, and results
The Canadian sample is comprised of 72 firms (40 MNCs and 32 domestic firms). We
drew this sample from the Financial Post Cards. These cards from the Financial Post
(Canada's business newspaper during this period) report key items from historical accounting
statements for large corporations in Canada and allow identification of firms with any foreign
subsidiaries. A firm is classified as MNC if it had foreign subsidiaries as of December 1984.
When availability of stock market retum data was considered, the final sample size was
reduced to 72 firms. Table 3 reports sample descriptive statistics on annual revenues and
percent foreign revenues and the sample firms' industry classifications.
The following events led up to the 1987 release of the information circular that defined
transfer prices and described how they would be enforced. In October 1984, the first draft of
the circular was released with wide circulation and criticism. Only Revenue Canada reviewed
a second draft in February 1985 and only Revenue Canada again reviewed a third draft in
April 1985. In September 1985, a fourth draft was released for wide circulation and criticism.
Finally, in March 1986, the last draft was released. February 27, 1987, marks adoption of the
regulation, which had changed very little from the March 1986 draft.
In addition to the above periods, there was an article in the Globe and Mail (Canada's only
national newspaper at the time) on November 18, 1985. This article described the early drafts
as containing a lot of "saber rattling" (i.e., tough language). This article also speculated that
the circular might not be released. The March 1986 draft had much less aggressive language
about both the transfer price definitions and the enforcement methods. Using the date, the
circulars that were mailed may not capture the market reaction since information was released
over time rather than at one point in time. The regressions are run using two types of market
data, daily and monthly returns. The model estimated over the entire sample of 72 Canadian
firms using daily returns is:
Rit = ai + biiRmi-] + bizRna + biiR„u^\ + ^^loglsales) + c^Del + c/2Ann + w/,. (5)
Because many of these periods involved the release of circulars through the mail and
receipt of the circular happened over a period of weeks when daily data is used, the event
dates are restricted to the following two (the newspaper article and the final release of the
circular):
Del= 1 if date is November 18 or 19, 1985, and otherwise, and
Ann= 1 if date is February 27 or March 2, 1987, and otherwise.
We spoke to Revenue Canada in an effort to increase the number of event dates used in the
regressions. Unfortunately, they were unable to give us any other dates to analyze. A negative
reaction is predicted for November 18, 1985, and a negative reaction if the legislation released
on February 27, 1987, was more stringent than anticipated. The daily retum on the Toronto
Stock Exchange 300 Index (with dividends reinvested) is used as the market retum, and stock
retums are obtained from the Toronto Stock Exchange/Westem database.
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Table 3
Sample of firms—Canada'
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of sample firms
Classification Number Mean Median S.D. Minimum Maximum
of firms
MNC firms 40
Revenue (in millions)
Percentage of foreign
revenue
Domestic firms 32
Revenue (in millions)
Percentage of foreign
revenue
Panel B: Number of sample firms by business classification
553.3
50.5
1261.2
50
3094.9
29.9
72.7
5
11,149.0
95
923.7
22.0
523.7 1367.1
32.8
9.7 6139.0
95
Industry MNC firms Domestic fums
Appliances
Brewery/distillery
Broadcasting
2
1
1
2
Building materials 1
Computer
Construction
1 1
2
Diversified industrials 3 2
Electronics 3
Food products
Forest products
Holding companies
Industrial manufacturing
3
4
4
4
3
3
3
Insurance and investment 3
Management companies
Mining
Oil and gas
Paper products
Retail
6
2
3
I
1
2
2
Steel 4
Telecommunications
Textiles
2
1
Transportation
Total
1
40
1
32
" Total revenue and percentage of foreign revenue for 1990 were obtained from the Canadian Disclosure CD-
ROM database.
Next, we partition the sample into MNCs and domestic firms (Dom takes the value of 1 for
domestic firms and for MNCs) and estimate the following model:
Ri, = a, + h,\R„u--\ + hiiRna + b,A,+ i + /)/4log( sales) + c,\Dd + o^Ann
+ cv3Del*Dom + cv4Ann*Dom + u„. (6)
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In Table 4, which displays regression results for Eqs. (5) and (6), we find no market reaction
on these dates.
One problem with this method is that firms (and market participants) received copies of the
proposed circular by mail. There were few announcements in the press about the drafts.
Therefore, monthly data are also used and the number of dates is increased. In Eqs. (7) and
(8), the following event dates are analyzed:
Dell - 1 if month is September 1985 and otherwise,
Del2 = l if month is November 1985 and otherwise,
Del3 = 1 if month is March 1986 and otherwise,
Amii = 1 if month is October 1984 and otherwise, and
Ann2= 1 if month is February or March 1987 and otherwise.
The first model using monthly returns is hence specified as:''*
Rit = fl, +bi\Rin, + Z)/2 log (sales) + c/iDel] + c/2Del2+C/3Del3 + c/4Anni + <:/5Ann2 + w,/.
(7)
As before, we partition the sample into MNCs and domestic firms, with the resulting
model as:
Rit = Qi + bi\R„u + ^/2log(sales) + C/iDeli + C/2Del2+c/3Del3 + C/4Anni + c/5Ann2
+<:,6Del] *Dom + c/7Del2*Dom + c/8Del3*Dom + c/gAnni *Dom
+c/ioAnn2*Dom + w„. (8)
Following are predictions for the coefficients reflecting the affected firms. A negative
reaction is predicted for Del] because the September 1985 draft was widely criticized by
different groups as being either "too specific" or "too general." A negative reaction is also
expected for Del2, the negative newspaper article. A negative reaction is predicted for Del3
since this draft would likely be published the next summer as the final version, ending
speculation that the circular would never be published (Lawlor, 1987). A negative reaction is
predicted for Ann], the initial introduction of the regulation. A negative or no reaction is
predicted for Ann2, the final establishment of the regulation.
Table 5 reports results for Eqs. (7) and (8) above. No significant results are found when Eq.
(7) is estimated on the entire sample. However, when we partition the sample into affected and
unaffected firms in Eq. (8), we obtain negative and significant coefficients for Del] ( — .051,
P < .0 1 ) and DeN ( — .03, P < . 1 0). These results suggest that the regulation had negative impact
The potential nonsynchronous problem associated with daily data is unlikely to happen with monthly data.
We therefore drop the market returns in the months immediately prior to and following the event month.
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Table 4
Canadian regression results using daily returns
Variable Expected sign Eq. (5) Eq. (6)
Intercept -.002*** (-3.26) -.002*** (-3.27)
Rm/ - 1 .134*** (5.30) .136*** (5.30)
R/nr .8643*** (24.18) .643*** (24.12)
^ml* 1 -.004 (-0.14) .004 (-0.14)
Log (sales) .0003*** (3.57) .0003*** (3.59)
Del (November 18, 1985) - -.002 (-0.75) -.003 (-1.16)
Ann (February 17, 1987) - -.002 (-1.12) -.002 (-0.75)
Del X Dom + .004(0.91)
Ann / Dom + -.0007 (-0.17)
Adjusted R^ .03 .03
TTie / statistics are given in parentheses.
The estimation period is from September 1, 1985, through March 31, 1987.
*** P<.01, one-tailed tests where predictions are made.
on share prices of the MNCs in our sample. Positive and significant coefficients result for
Del, xDom (.061, P<.01) and DeK x Dom (.035, P<.\0). These coefficients on the
interactive terms reflect the incremental effect of the market reaction for domestic firms. The
coefficients are added to the coefficients for Del
i
and Del2 to assess the impact on domestic
firms. From the summation, it is apparent that little or no market reaction is obtained for
domestic firms. Although the significance level for the coefficients on Del2 and DqU x Dom is
weak (P<AO), overall these findings suggest that the transfer-pricing regulation had a negative
effect on MNCs but did not affect domestic firms. ''^
To test the robustness of the results for Canadian firms, foreign sales are incorporated into
the model. Multicollinearity is introduced when percent of foreign sales enters the model and
the coefficients are no longer significant. The event-date dummy variables and their
interaction terms with the rank of percentage foreign sales are highly correlated. To minimize
the problem, these variables are orthogonal ized and then their orthogonalized residuals
(which are uncorrelated with one another by construction) are used to repeat the regressions.
These regression results are not materially different and are not reported here. We also ran the
model including one-digit SIC codes to see if industry effects have any impact on our results.
The coefficients were very similar to those reported.
These results provide some evidence of a potential redistribution of wealth from the MNCs
to the government. However, other researchers have examined estimates of tax changes in
response to heightened tax regulation. Manegold and Karlinsky (1988) compare their
estimate of taxes raised to the Treasury estimates. No similar data are available for the
Canadian .sample.
"^'
We also ran a similar regression in which wc interacted the size variable (log of sales) with the dates. Since
there were no significant changes in the coefficients, these results are not reported in a table.
'^' Tax data for a smaller sample (15) of MNCs were available. Mean taxes paid in 1987 were significantly
larger than those paid in 1986. Since the sample size is small, these results are not reported in a table.
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Table 5
Canadian resressions usins monthly reuims
\ariable Expected sign Eq. (7) Eq. (8)
Intercept -.023*** (-2.85) -.023*** (-2.93)
Rm; .938*** (14.59) .938*** (14.60)
Log (sales) .004*** (3.22) .004*** (3.30)
Del, (September. 1985) - -.016 (- 1.12) -.051*** (-2.33)
Del: (NoN ember. 1985) + -.011 (-0.78) -.030* (-1.47)
Del., (March. 1986) - -.005 -(0.33) -.011 (-0.509)
Ann, (October. 1984) - -.015 (- 1.05) -.018 (-0.86)
Ann. (Februar>'. 1987) - .001 (0.123) -.013 (-0.95)
Del, X Dom + .061** (2.11)
Del; X Dom - .035* (1.31)
Del3 \ Dom + .011 (0.39)
Ann, X Dom + .006 (0.21)
Ann2 X Dom + .028* (1.51)
Adjusted R' .13 .13
Numbers in the parentheses are f ratios.
The estimation period is from October. 1983. through September 1987.
* P<.\0, one-tailed tests when predictions are made.
** P<.05, one-tailed tests when predictions are made.
*** f<.01. one-tailed tests when predictions are made.
The Canadian legislation attempted to regulate managers" use of transfer prices to avoid
taxation by defining specific values (market based) that could be used for transfer price
policy. While limited e\ idence of a market reaction is found, it appears the market did not
believe this method would succeed. And indeed, it has not. Canadian courts have recognized
the substantial difficulties in applying a legal standard based on a facts-and-circumstances test
(Boidman. 1995). hi disputes over taxes, MNCs have rarely had to increase their payments
because of transfer price policy abuses.
4. Conclusions and implications
We consider the efiTects of two different t\'pes of tax regulation designed to curtail income
shifting by MNCs to avoid taxes. Under CFC regulation, Australia taxes income arising in
low-tax countries as if it had arisen in the country of the parent corporation, in contrast.
Canadian policy defines acceptable transfer prices as those that would be used if the
transaction were an ami's-length transaction—usually market-based prices.
The Australian sample is partitioned into two groups of fimis: those potentially affected by
the regulation (fimis with subsidiaries in low-tax areas to whom goods and services are
transferred) and those unaffected (finns with no transfers to low-tax subsidiaries, domestic
firms, or fimis w ith subsidiaries in high-tax areas). With news of the introduction o( CFC
legislation (May 26, 1988), the stock market perceived that fimis affected by the regulation
would suffer, and firms that were unaffected might gain or at least not suffer.
302 L. Eldenburg et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 285-303
According to an article in the Sydney Morning Herald (1995), several firms in the affected
group have restructured since the CFC regulation went into effect. Some of these firms have
been subject to special tax audits because the restructures are presumed to be a strategy to
avoid the provisions of the CFC legislation. Firms appear to be moving capital away fi^om
nonlisted foreign countries (low-tax domiciles) to listed countries. Of the 34 firms targeted for
special tax audits, eight of the firms used in this study were named in the article. Of these, five
were in the "affected" partition and three were in the "unaffected" partition.
Canada issued a draft of new guidelines and policies about transfer prices in October 1984
that stipulated arm's-length transaction (usually market) prices. Using monthly data, a
negative and significant market reaction is found for affected firms on one event date, and
negative and weakly significant reactions are found on two other event dates. Weakly positive
or no reactions were found for the unaffected firms on the event dates. Evidence is provided
of increased taxes paid by the sample of MNCs when a comparison is made between taxes
paid the year before and the year after the regulation took place.
The implications of this study are important for policy makers. Although evidence of stock
market reaction does not imply that regulation is effective, regulators may infer that many
well-informed investors believe there will be some wealth redistribution because investors
react to new information in an efficient manner.
Governments in Australia and the United States are auditing transfer price policies within
MNCs to determine whether firms are complying with the regulations in place. Examination
of the market reaction to news releases that detail the stringency of the audit standards and
penalties for noncompliance would be an appropriate follow-up to this study.
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1. Introduction
Eldenburg, Pickering, and Yu (2003) examine the effects of regulatory action intended
to reduce tax-motivated international income shifting on the stock prices of firms expected
to be affected by such regulation. They conduct two separate event studies. First, they
investigate whether the introduction of controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules by
Australia adversely affected the stock prices of Australian firms with subsidiaries in low-
tax countries relative to other Australian firms on key dates during the May 1988 to
September 1990 timeframe. Second, they investigate whether the clarification of Canada's
transfer-pricing regulations adversely affected the stock prices of Canadian muhinational
corporations relative to domestic Canadian firms on key dates during the October 1984 to
March 1987 timeframe. My comments focus on the study's motivation and research
design.
2. Motivation
What important question might this study answer? Tax-motivated income shifting is an
important concern of governments with relatively high income tax rates because it tends to
erode their tax bases, while potentially increasing the tax bases of the low-tax countries to
which the income is shifted. In their introduction, Eldenburg et al. (2003) state that they
undertake "empirical tests of the cash flow implications of [CFC rules and transferring
pricing restrictions] to determine the perceived effectiveness of each individual approach" in
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restricting tax-motivated income shifting. If stock prices of affected firms decrease on key
dates associated with the introduction of these rules, then one might conclude that investors
believe these rules will effectively decrease income shifting and increase corporate tax
payments.
Nevertheless, there are two problems with this motivation. First, there is no competing
explanation for why investors might believe that these rules would not increase the tax
liabilities of the firms at which they were directed. The Australian and Canadian tax rules that
are the subject of this study are modeled after existing rules of other countries and, therefore,
have a known degree of likely success. Because the governments of Australia and Canada are
incurring some costs to implement these rules, it is safe to assume that the rules will likely
increase tax revenues and, therefore, decrease the cash flows of some corporations. Similarly,
the authors offer no explanation as to why investors would not differentiate between firms
expected to be affected versus those unaffected by value-relevant changes in tax rules.
Second, failure to detect a significantly negative effect cannot be interpreted as evidence that
the rules are ineffective. Rather, a lack of significant results could be easily attributed to
weaknesses in the research design and inherent limitations of the empirical data. Thus, the
contribution of this study in terms of the motivation described above depends critically on
finding evidence of a negative stock-price effect on the key event dates. These two problems
create a dilemma in the study's motivation. If the authors find the proverbial needle in a
haystack, then the result is in some sense obvious, and if they fail to find the needle, it is only
because the haystack is too big. Unfortunately, this dilemma is not uncommon in accounting
research.
Contrary to the impression given by the study of Eldenburg et al. (2003), CFC and
transfer-pricing rules are not "alternative approaches" for reducing income shifting. Rather,
each set of rules is designed to limit a different type of income shifting. For example, consider
an Australian parent corporation with one wholly owned subsidiary domiciled in the United
States, a listed country, and a second wholly owned subsidiary domiciled in Bermuda, an
unlisted country. Assume that the corporations' marginal tax rates in Australia, the United
States, and Bermuda are 39%, 34% and 0%, respectively. Also, assume that the United States
is a significant market for the Australian parent corporation's products, which it sells
exclusively through its U.S. subsidiary, and that the Bermudian subsidiary owns patents
used by its parent and hold notes issued by its parent. Accordingly, the Bermudian subsidiary
receives royalty and interest income from the Australian parent corporation. Because the U.S.
tax rate is lower than the Australian tax rate, the parent can reduce its overall tax burden by
using below market transfer prices for products shipped to its U.S. subsidiary. Transfer-
pricing rules are necessary to prevent this type of income shifting. On the other hand,
requiring the Australian parent to use arm's-length pricing with respect to the royalty and
financing contracts with its Bermudian subsidiary would not eliminate the incentive or
opportunity to shift income from Australia to Bermuda. However, subjecting the Bermudian
subsidiary to the Australia's CFC rules does eliminate this opportunity. From this simple
example we can see that both transfer pricing rules and CFC rules are necessary elements of
any worldwide income tax system. Transfer pricing is necessary whenever there are cross-
border transactions. CFC rules are necessary so long as sovereign tax-haven nations exist. In
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fact, both Australia and Canada regulate transfer prices and both countries have their own
form of CFC rules.'
With this background in mind, it is important to understand what questions cannot be
answered by this study. First, this study cannot determine whether transfer-pricing rules are
more or less effective than CFC rules in restricting income shifting because, as described
above, these rules are designed to prevent different types of income shifting. Second, this
study cannot assess the effectiveness of one tax rule in the absence of the other. Australia
introduced CFC rules during the time period examined in this study, but already had transfer-
pricing rules in effect. Similarly, Canada clarified its transfer-pricing rules, but already had
CFC rules in effect. Although a country's current regulatory actions may pertain to one tax
rule more than another, such actions do not mean that one rule is any less critical to its overall
system of taxing multinational corporations.
3. Research design
3.1. General issues
Eldenburg et al. (2003) use pooled time-series/cross-sectional regression models to test for
share price effects of tax-regulatory events. The general form of their models is:
R\x — a^- b\Rm\-\ + ^2-^1111 + ^3^mt+i + ciEvent, + C2Event, x Unaffected, + Wjt (1)
Simultaneously regressing raw returns {R^^ on market returns (7?m) and event-indicator
variables (Event and Event x Unaffected) is an atypical approach for an event study and leads
to three concerns. First, much of the explanatory power of these regression models derives
fi*om the correlation between firms' raw returns and the market return. For example, in the
Australian analysis (Table 2) the coefficient on /?„-,, is essentially 1.0 and has a / statistic of
115! The effect of the experimental variable is, therefore, not highlighted.
Second, the approach of Eldenburg et al. (2003) forces the relationship between raw
returns and the market returns to be constant across firms. In contrast, a standard market-
model approach would permit firm-specific estimates of the relation between raw returns and
market returns.
Third, in all cases this model is estimated over a very long period relative to the length of
the event window. For example, in the Australian study, the regression is estimated using
daily returns for approximately 830 trading days between June 1, 1987, and September 30,
1990. Consequently, a relatively small sample of 55 Australian firms and six event days (i.e.,
two-day windows for three events) is transformed into a very large sample of over 45,000
observations for purposes of estimating the regression model. The size of this sample could
' Canada's tax rules for "controlled foreign affiliates" (CFA) are conceptually similar to Australia's CFC
rules.
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affect the results of Eldenburg et al. (2003) in two ways. On the one hand, estimated standard
errors decrease in sample size, thereby increasing statistical power. On the other hand, the
variation in stock returns over such a long period may swamp the event-period effects. In
sum, I think a simpler and more standard test would be more compelling.
3.2. Issues specific to the Australian study
In general, Australia defines a CFC as a foreign corporation in which 50% or more of its
interests are held or controlled, directly or indirectly, by five or fewer Australian residents
(Bureau of National Affairs, 2002). Eldenburg et al. (2003) attempt to identify Australian
corporations with CFCs using geographical segment information from the firms' financial
statements. There are likely two problems with this approach. First, the segment information
does not appear to differentiate branch operations from foreign-domiciled subsidiaries. Only
the later category could potentially qualify as a CFC. Second, segment data does not provide
enough information to apply the "50% control" test described above. Thus, geographical
segment information provides at best a noisy indicator of whether the firm actually has a
subsidiary that is a CFC.
Australia's CFC rules cause the income of a CFC to be attributed to its Australian parent if
and only if the CFC is not taxed in a country with tax rates comparable to those of Australia
(i.e., listed countries). Eldenburg et al. (2003) classify firms into three groups based on the
countries in which they operate and whether or not transfers are made between the Australian
firm and its foreign segments. Firms with operations only in listed countries are classified as
HT (high-tax) firms. Firms with operations in unlisted countries are classified as LT (low-tax)
firms if transfers were made between the firm and its foreign segment, and as NT (no-
transfer) firms if no intrasegment transfers were made. Eldenburg et al. argue that LT firms
are most likely to be negatively affected by passage of Austraha's CFC rules, whereas NT and
HT firms should be unaffected. However, Australia attributes a CFCs income to its
Australian parent whether or not there are transfers between the two companies. Consider,
for example, a CFC in an unlisted country that generates interest income fi^om an investment
portfolio. Prior to the effective date of Australia's CFC rules, this income would escape
Australian tax until the CFC made a dividend distribution to its Australian parent. After the
effective date of the CFC rules, this interest income is attributed to the Australian parent
whether or not there is a dividend distribution. To avoid double taxation, if attributed income
of a CFC is later distributed to the parent, then the distribution is exempt from Australian tax.
Thus, transfers between a CFC and its parent are not necessary to trigger application of the
CFC rules and, if transfers represent dividend distributions to the parent, would even negate
the effect of these rules. The distinction between LT and NT firms may be either irrelevant or
could have an effect opposite that predicted by the authors (i.e., the CFC rules could affect
NT firms more negatively than LT firms).
How do these predictions stack up against the empirical results in Table 2 of Eldenburg et
al. (2003)? The only significant results relate to retums on May 26 and 27, 1988 (i.e., Dell).
The estimated daily abnormal return over this two-day period is — 1 .4% per day for LT firms,
0.6% for NT firms, and — 0.9% for HT firms. These estimates are not entirely consistent with
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the tax story which, according the Eldenburg et al., holds that LT and HT firms should
experience the most dissimilar returns or, in the alternative explained above, that NT firms
might be the most negatively affected.
Is there an alternative explanation for these results? First, it is important to recognize that
Australia's CFC rules were proposed simultaneously with a host of other tax provisions,
many of which would seem to be more consequential than the CFC rules. Other proposals
included lowering the corporate income tax rate from 49% to 39%, removing accelerated
depreciation benefits, and substantially reducing tax benefits for research and development
(R&D) expenditures (World Tax Report, 1988). Importantly, because of limits on foreign tax
credits, Australian multinational firms would not fully benefit from the proposed decrease in
Australian tax rates to the extent that their foreign income is being taxed at more than 39% by
foreign governments. Thus, the proposed tax-rate decrease could differentially affect firms in
the LT, NT, and HT groups. Effects of the proposed depreciation and R&D rules are likely to
differ across industries, but industry effects are not controlled for in this study. Second, given
that there are only 1 3 LT firms, it would have been a relatively simple matter for the authors
to examine the returns for this two-day period on a firm-by-firm basis. Did all 13 firms
experience negative returns on these days, or are the negative returns confined to a subset of
firms? If the later, then are there firm-specific events that would explain the negative returns
for these firms on these particular days?
3.S. Issues specific to the Canadian study
Eldenburg et al. (2003) also attempt to investigate whether various announcements and
deliberations leading up to the issuance of Information Circular 87-2 (hereafter IC 87-2),
which explains how Revenue Canada will apply the "arm's-length" transfer-pricing standard,
adversely affected Canadian multinational corporations relative to Canadian corporations
without any foreign subsidiaries. I have four concems with this analysis.
First, the authors provide no a priori reason to expect a significant market reaction to this
series of events. As a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Canada already had implicitly adopted the OECD's 1979 guidelines
for transfer pricing based on the "arm's-length" standard and acceptable methods for
adhering to this standard (e.g., comparable uncontrolled price method). Furthermore, most
related-party intemational trade by Canadian firms is with U.S. affiliates, and the preexisting
tax treaty between the United States and Canada already imposed the "arm's-length"
standard. Eldenburg et al. (2003) need to show that investors expected a material difference
between accepted transfer-pricing practices before and after IC 87-2.
Second, companies do not publicly disclose the transfer prices they use for tax-reporting
purposes. Suppose that, prior to IC 87-2, some firms used tax-minimizing transfer prices that
did not reflect arm's-length prices, while other firms used fransfer prices based on the arm's-
length standard. How could investors distinguish between these two types of firms?
Eldenburg et al. (2003) implicitly assume that all multinational firms are noncompliant
and, therefore, would be adversely affected by IC 87-2. However, they offer no evidence to
support that assumption.
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Third, even if IC 87-2 adversely affected the stock prices of all Canadian multinational
firms, it would be very difficult to detect this effect because of the lengthy time period over
which it may have been impounded (i.e., from initial release in October 1984 to final release
in February 1987). Because stock prices tend to be highly variable, successfiil event studies
require material price effects and precise event dates. Neither requirement is present in this
study. Eldenburg et al. (2003) find no significant price effects in their analysis of daily returns
for which the event dates are well specified (Table 4). The only significant result for the
Canadian study is based on the analysis of monthly returns (Table 5), which, as discussed
below, might easily be attributable to other causes.
Fourth, the analysis of monthly returns data essentially tests whether Canadian multina-
tional firms experienced more negative returns than Canadian domestic firms during any of
five specified months. This is a very blunt test for which results could be easily influenced by
correlated omitted variables. According to the regression estimates, Canadian multinational
firms experienced returns during September 1985 that were 6.1% lower than those
experienced by domestic firms for that month, but did not experience returns significantly
different from domestic firms in any of the other four months." The estimated magnitude of
this effect is huge, but can it be attributed to the release by Revenue Canada of its fourth draft
of IC 87-2? One would expect the cause of such a significant decline in stock values to be
discussed in Canada's leading newspapers. However, after applying numerous search terms to
the Lexis-Nexis database for the month of September 1985, I found no articles on Revenue
Canada's proposed guidance on transfer pricing. Instead, I found several articles expressing
concern over declining Canadian exports (Canadian Press, 1985) and the increasing U.S.
sentiment toward protectionist trade policies (Goodspeed, 1985) in response to its own
growing trade deficit. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that concerns about future exports
were a much more likely cause of the observed difference.
4. What can we learn from this study?
As discussed above, the research question addressed by Eldenburg et al. (2003) is whether
investors believe that tax rules intended to restrict international income shifting are effective
and, therefore, will decrease the stock values of affected firms. Unfortunately, this study
provides no convincing answer to this question.
Perhaps the most important lessons we can learn from this study are the inherent
difficulties in conducting event studies of the effects of tax regulations in foreign countries.
In addition to the normal problems encountered in any event study (e.g., isolating the event of
interest and teasing out its effect on what are typically noisy stock-return data); there are the
added difficulties of understanding and explaining the tax rules of another nation. In concept,
studies like Eldenburg et al. (2003) could be very usefiil because the adoption of unique tax
rules by one country might serve as a natural experiment fi"om which we could learn about the
The Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Index registered a 6.7% decline during September 1985 (fiom 2820 to
2632). This overall market return is presumably controlled for in the regression analyses.
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effects that rule might have if adopted by another country. Researchers contemplating such an
investigation would be well advised to read this study.
References
Bureau of National Affairs (2002). Business operations in Australia. Tax management foreign income portfolio
951
-2nd, part VIII-D.
Canadian Press (1985, September 10). Exports plunged to 5-year low in July. Toronto Star, Dl.
Eldenburg, Pickering, L. J., & Yu, W. (2003). International income shifting regulations: Empirical evidence from
Australia and Canada. The International Journal of Accounting, i5(3), 285-304.
Goodspeed, P. (1985, September 21). America starts circling the wagons. 77?^ Toronto Star, B4.
World Tax Report (1988, June 1). Mini-budget. London, England: Informa Publishing Group.

The
_ International
Pergamon journal of
The International Journal of Accounting Accounting
38(2003)313-314 ^^=^^^=
Reply to Discussant's Comments
International income shifting regulations: empirical
evidence fi*om Australia and Canada
L. Eldenburg^'*, Joanne Pickering*^, Wayne W. Yu^
^Department ofAccounting, University ofArizona. McClelland Hall 301, P.O. Box 210108,
Tuczon, AZ 85721-0108, USA
^Department ofAccounting H04, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
'^Department of Accountancy!, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong
1. Motivation
We did not intend to compare the types of government regulation but were simply
documenting the market's reaction to the perceived effectiveness of different types of
regulation in different countries. We feel that different legal, institutional, and cultural
environments could easily result in tax rules that are successful in one country but
unsuccessful in another country. While countries use both types of regulation, emphasis is
usually placed on one in promoting new regulations. We quote from the Australian
govemment's introduction to the CFC legislation presenting their view of the effectiveness
of transfer price regulation. The article suggests that transfer price regulation may be
ineffective in Australia and implies that the CFC is an alternative approach.
If it were true that tax rules can be assumed to succeed simply because governments incur
costs to implement regulation, every tax rule set by every government would increase tax
revenue every time. There is no research evidence suggesting that the political process of
setting tax rules always results in the expected increase in tax revenues, this is an empirical
question. Tax rules, such as the CFC in Australia, are not static from the time they are first
proposed to the time they are actually enacted—so they are not "perfect" in their initial form.
Governments would not continually modify tax rules and introduce new ones if the existing
regulation worked in the way the government had intended. So one cannot simply assume a
new tax rule will reduce cash flows of some corporations as stated in the commentary.
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Tax rules should not be expected to affect all firms equally. Investors would want to
differentiate firms affected from those unaffected. Our intent was to use publicly available
information to detennine whether investors could differentiate these firms successfully. Yes,
we agree that investors would want to differentiate firms—the question is, are they actually
able to do that? Failure to detect hypothesized results can always be attributed to poor
research design or data. We feel that a strength of our research design is our ability to
differentiate firms (i.e., partition on affected and unaffected firms).
2. Research design
There are five areas in the commentary that we wish to address, namely, (1) the regression
model used, (2) the partitioning of firms using geographic segment data, (3) other coinciding
tax changes in Australia, (4) the Australian foreign tax credits, and (5) industry effects.
1. In earlier versions of the paper, we used firm-specific estimates of the relationship between
raw returns and market returns and found similar results to those reported in the paper. We
chose to report the results as we did because they are easier to present and interpret.
2. Geographic segment data were supplemented using the list of subsidiaries and their
location (see footnote 7). This list is of subsidiaries, not branch operations, so we were able
to distinguish between the two. In addition, the 50% rule for consolidation of subsidiaries
was in effect during this time period, so we can assume that these subsidiaries were 50% or
more owned by the reporting parent company.
3
.
Footnote 4 acknowledges that there were other tax changes and also states that information
about the other major changes was widely disseminated prior to May 25, 1988. For
example, an Australian newspaper article discussed the numerous hours spent by
accountants prior to May 25 in setting up corporate affairs to relieve any impacts from the
new depreciation rules.
4. There were limits on foreign tax credits (up to the Australian corporate tax rate), but
Australia was reducing its corporate tax rate to match rates in other countries. Even at the
reduced rate of 39%, there were likely to be few countries with higher rates.
5. Industries are relatively equal across our partitions. It is unlikely that industry effects are a
problem.
We hope this assists in clarifying our position with regard to the discussant's comments.
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Abstract
This study examines the effects of legal regime on the patterns of stock returns surrounding the
earnings announcements of American Depositary Receipt (ADR) programs. My results indicate
that the properties of accounting earnings associated with the local legal regime of an ADR
program spill over to U.S. GAAP reconciled earnings. In particular, I find that the market reacts
significantly to the earnings announcements of the ADR programs from common law countries
whose accounting earnings are known to be more conservative and timely, but not to those of the
ADR programs from code law countries where the eamings are known to be less conservative and
timely.
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1. Introduction
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishney (1997) compare external finance across
49 countries as a function of the origin of their laws, the quality of legal investor protections,
and the quality of law enforcement. They find strong evidence that the legal environment has
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large effects on the size and breath of capital markets across countries. Extending their
finding. Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) (BKR hereafter) have shown that differences in the
demand for accounting income in different institutional contexts cause the properties of
accounting income to vary internationally. They find that the timeliness and the degree of
conservatism of accounting data depend on international institutional differences. In partic-
ular, they find that the accounting earnings of common law country enterprises are more
timely and conservative than those of code law country enterprises. They attribute the higher
level of conservatism in the common law country accounfing numbers to the use of
accounting income in common law arm's-length debt and equity markets and especially
common law litigation.
Extending their finding, this study examines whether the properties of accounting
earnings associated with legal regimes spill over to non-U. S. firms cross listed in the
United States, i.e., American Depositary Receipt (ADR) programs. The spillover hypoth-
esis tested in this study refers to the possibility that the accounting earnings of non-U. S.
firms cross listed in the United States, reported in compliance with the U.S. reporting
standards, demonstrate similar properties observed in their local earnings prepared under
local GAAR
There are at least two potential explanations for why the spillover may occur. The first one
that focuses on the supply effect is that the underlying economic conditions are ftindamentally
"untranslatable" under a uniform reporting standard (Baumol & Malkiel, 1993). Chan and
Seow's (1996) empirical evidence, which shows that the U.S. stock returns associate more
with local GAAP earnings than the U.S. GAAP eamings, lends support to this conjecture. Yet
another possibility is that the spillover may be observed if the market participants are
functionally fixated to the properties of accounting eamings associated with the local legal
regime of the cross-listed firms.
In this study, I use the market's reaction around the eamings announcement dates to
investigate this issue based on the premise that an observed revision of stock prices associated
with the release of the eamings figures would provide evidence on the information content of
eamings, which would be affected by the quality of the released eamings numbers (Ball &
Brown, 1968).' Following BKR (2000), an ADR program whose local economy is situated in
Australia or the UK is classified as a common law ADR, and the one in France, Germany, or
Japan is classified as a code law ADR.
To the extent that accounting disclosure reduces a finn's cost of capital and increases firm
value by increasing liquidity (see for instance. Diamond & Verrachia, 1991) and that
timeliness and degree of conservatism represent unique dimensions of disclosure quality,
the spillover hypothesis predicts that the market's reaction will be larger for the common law
ADRs whose home country eamings are known to be of higher quality on the two
Specifically, "usefulness" refers to the decision usefulness of accounting numbers (such as relevance and
reliability of eamings figures), which would be affected by both the content and timing of existing eamings
numbers. However, the link between value relevance, conservatism, and market reaction is less obvious and thus
can be viewed as an open empirical question.
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dimensionsr" Such evidence would indicate that the reconciled U.S. GAAP earnings of
ADR programs from different legal regimes have differential information content in the U.S.
market and suggest that the current reporting requirement fails to produce comparable
earnings figures between the two groups of firms.
The current SEC policy for cross-listed firnis requires that they either complete Form 20-F
that reconciles foreign GAAP with U.S. GAAP or fiilly comply with the U.S. GAAP. Two
critical assumptions underlying this policy, as Chan and Seow (1996) note, are the following.
First, a disclosure system that allows foreign firms to use home country GAAP would put
U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage due to their greater disclosure costs. The second
assumption is that the information disclosed by foreign firms under home country standards is
inferior to the information disclosed by U.S. firms, and as a consequence the two types of
information are not directly comparable. In brief, the current policy aims at leveling the
playing field between the United States and intemational firms cross listed in the United
States by producing more comparable accounting numbers through the reconciliation.
By examining whether the effects of intemational institutional factors spill over to ADR
programs, this study primarily relates to two streams of research. First, this paper contributes
to the growing literature on ADR programs (Alford, Jones, Leftwich, & Zmijewski, 1993;
Amir, Harris, & Venuti, 1993; Frost & Pownall, 1994). In particular, this study examines a
sample of ADRs that conform to the U.S. GAAP. Second, this study contributes to the
literature on the effects of intemational institutional factors on the properties of accounting
eamings (see for instance, Ali & Hwang, 2000; BKR, 2000; Hung, 2001; Joos, 1998; Leuz,
Nanda, & Wysocki, 2001). In light of the growing importance of ADR programs in the
United States and the global economy, the question I examine, i.e., whether the effects of
intemational institutional factors spill over to ADR programs, is both timely and relevant to
academics and policy makers alike.
Consistent with this prediction, my evidence indicates that the market reacts significantly to
the eamings announcements ofcommon law ADR programs but not to those ofcode law ADR
programs. These results indicate that even after 20-F reconciliation, the properties of
accounting numbers associated with the local legal regime of a non-U.S. firm cross listed in
the United States have influence on the properties of the U.S. GAAP eamings of the ADR
programs.
The next section provides some institutional background on the ADR programs and a brief
overview of the related literature. In Section 3, I describe the sample. In Section 4, I explain
the methodology and discuss the findings. In Section 5, I perform the sensitivity test. I
conclude in Section 6.
" For instance, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 (Financial Accounting Standards Board,
1980) states that timeliness is an ingredient of primary quality (relevance) of accounting information.
Ball and Brown (1968) argue that "a message is said to convey information if it causes a change in the
receiver's probability distribution of the concerned random variable. Such a change in the probability distribution
(beliefs) will trigger an action; hence, if an action (reflected in stock price, for instance) can be attributed to
specific information, such information is considered usefiil." Although I am not aware of a particular study that
establishes a clear link between the degree of conservatism in eamings and information content, I believe that it is
reasonable to posit that more (less) timely eamings would have higher (lower) information content.
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2. Institutional background and related literature
ADR is a U.S. security issued by a U.S. agency (e.g., a bank) for a non-U.S. firm cross
listed under the U.S. securities act of 1934. It was created in 1972 by J. P. Morgan as a
measure for U.S. investors to participate in the London Stock Market (Miller, 1999). It is a
negotiable security, which is issued by a U.S. commercial bank backed by equity shares of the
non-U.S. firm. As of February 2000, ADR programs represent approximately one tenth of the
total U.S. shares, and their size has been growing rapidly at the rate of 30-40% annually.
They trade on major stock exchanges (NYSE, ASE, or NASDAQ) or over-the-counter (OTC)
market in U.S. dollars and pay dividend or interest in dollars. They also settle, clear, and
transfer according to standard U.S. practices. They have gained popularity in recent years as a
means of global diversification within an investor's portfolio.
Currently, there are four major levels ofADR programs available—Level I, Level II, Level
III, and 144a. Level I ADR programs trade on the OTC market, and they are subject to home
country accounting standards. Levels II and III trade on major stock exchanges such as
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, and firms that issue these levels ofADR programs must meet
full SEC disclosure requirements and meet the listing requirements of the U.S. exchange
where they choose to list. Both Levels II and III programs require the firm to complete Form
20-F (and a semiannual Form 6-K) that reconciles foreign GAAP earnings with the
corresponding U.S. GAAP figure or altematively to file a 10-K report. While these three
types of programs are traded publicly, the last type of program called "144a" is placed
privately to qualified institutional investors. As a result, the 144a (also referred to as
PORTAL) does not require compliance with U.S. GAAP. Due to these reasons, it has been
pointed out that the listing and reporting requirements for ADR programs are in general less
stringent than those for U.S. firms (Alford et al., 1993).
Amir et al. (1993) provide evidence that eamings and shareholders' equity reconciliation to
U.S. GAAP included in 20-F statements are value relevant. They further find that individual
items of reconciliation such as goodwill and asset revaluations are also value relevant. Alford
et al. (1993) report the value relevance of financial accounting data from 16 countries
available on Global Vantage Database. They find that consolidated eamings, as reported in
20-F reconciliation, are more value relevant than unconsolidated eamings. Frost and Pownall
(1994) examine intemational firms cross listed in the United States and the United Kingdom.
Their finding suggests that the immediate usefulness of accounting information is conditional
on characteristics (such as liquidity) of the capital market.
Joos (1998) examines some institutional characteristics of three European countries, i.e.,
the UK, France, and Germany. He finds that the estimated coefficients on book values are
reliably higher in Germany and France than in the UK, but the eamings multiple estimated in
the price regressions is not rehably different in the UK than in the other two countries.
La Porta et al. (1997) show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by
both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and
narrower capital markets (i.e., both equity and debt markets). BKR (2000) find that
intemational differences in the demand for accounting income predictably affect the
timeliness and the degree of conservatism of the accounting numbers. They partition their
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sample into two groups based on the institutional difference (common law vs. code law) and
find that common law earnings are more timely and conservative.
Ali and Hwang (2000) explore the relation between measures of value relevance of
financial accounting data and several country-specific factors. They find that the value
relevance is lower for continental model countries than for British-American model
countries, and that the value relevance is lower when tax rules significantly influence
financial accounting measurements. Hung (2001) finds that the use of accrual accounting
(versus cash accounting) negatively affects the value relevance of financial statements in
countries with weak shareholder protection. Leuz et al. (2001) find that the degree of investor
protection across countries affects the practice of earnings management.
3. The sample
The sample consists of ADR programs that use U.S. GAAP as their primary reporting
standard with required data available between 1990 and 1997. A list of currently available
ADR programs as of February 2000 was identified fi^om the Depositary Receipts Directory
administered by the Bank of New York (2000)."^ Following the list, necessary data are
collected fi^om Compustat and CRSR Specifically, the sample consists of firms that (1) are
listed in the Bank ofNew York ADR Directory (2000); (2) have their local economy situated
in one of the five countries—Australia, France, Germany, Japan, and the UK; (3) have annual
earnings announcement dates available in Compustat; and (4) have required retum data on
CRSP excess retums tape. To reduce the effects of outliers, I eliminate observations whose
retum figures fall outside of three standard deviations firom the mean retum. One firm-year
observation is dropped fi^om the sample based on this criterion. The final sample consists of
79 firm-year observations that meet these requirements."
Tables 1-3 provide summary characteristics of the ADR programs included in the sample.
The UK, followed by Japan, has the largest number of firms represented in the sample. The
common law sample that includes ADR programs whose local economy is situated in
Australia and the UK have approximately twice as many firm-year observations (« = 54) than
the code law sample that consists ofADR programs fi"om France, Germany, and Japan (« = 25).
The sample firms represent 16 different industries and there seems to be no clear pattem in the
industry distribution of firms in the two samples (i.e., the common law and the code law).
Table 2 reports a correlation matrix for selected variables. The institutional factor (legal
regime) dummy variable is set as one (zero) for the common law (code law) sample. The
'* This data source is used to identify the Ust of ADRs since the local economy can readily be identified from
this source.
^ A conversation with Compustat representative has revealed that, prior to year 2000, Compustat collected and
reported the earnings announcement dates of non-U. S. firms cross listed in the United States that released earnings
through various newswires. The sample size in this study is comparable to that of other studies that examine ADR
securities. For instance. Frost and Pownall (1994) had 110 observations and Barth and Clinch (1996) had 85
observations.
320 T. Kang / The International Journal of Accounting 38 (2003) 315-328
Table 1
A summary of the countries represented by the ADR programs included in the sample
Panel A: country distributions
The number of ADR programs The number of firm-year observations Legal regime
6 Common
3 Code
1 Code
21 Code
48 Common
79
Panel B-1: industry distribution (entire sample)
Australia 1
France 3
Germany
Japan
United Kingdom
Total
1
5
14
24
Industry Number of firms
Airlines 1
Automobile 1
Beverage 2
Chemicals 1
Consumer electronics 2
Construction 1
Electrical equipment 2
Machinery 1
Food 1
Mining and minerals 1
Multi-industry 1
Oil and gas 2
Pharmaceutical 3
Printmg and publishing 1
Software 1
Telecommunication 3
Panel B-2: industry distribution (common law and code law samples)
Industry Common law ADRs Code law ADRs
Airlines 1
Automobile 1
Beverage 2
Chemicals 1
Consumer electronics 1 1
Construction 1
Electrical equipment 2
Machinery 1
Food 1
Mining and minerals I
Multi-industry I
Oil and gas 1 1
Pharmaceutical 1 2
Printing and publishing 1
Software 1
Telecommunication 3
Industry classification is based on the Bank of New York Global Investors' Guide (2000).
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Table 2
Correlation matrix (Pearson)
Legal regime Size News (earnings surprise)
Legal regime
Size
News
1.0000
.0788
.0457
.0000
.1947 1.0000
Industry classification is based on the Bank of New York Global Investors' Guide (2000). Size is measured as the
log of market value of equity (Compustat Annual Item #199 multiplied by Item #25). News (earnings surprise) is
measured as change in annual EPS (this year's EPS — last year's EPS) deflated by the beginning of period price.
correlation between legal regime and size is negative, indicating that the code law ADR
programs are, on average, larger than the common-law counterparts.
Table 3 reports firm characteristics. Consistent with Table 2, it shows that firms in the code
law sample are slightly larger than those in the common law sample. However, the common
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the ADR programs included in the sample
Mean Median S.D. Max Min
Entire sample (n = 79)
BM ratio 0.5222 0.4945 0.3155 1.2889 0.01480
EP ratio -0.0071 0.0123 0.1158 0.0608 -0.9546
Ln (size) 9.4860 9.6874 1.1696 11.1914 4.5652
3-Day CAR 0.0061 - 0.0004 0.0331 0.0998 -0.05665
5-Day CAR 0.0052 -0.0027 0.0451 0.1236 -0.1059
7-Day CAR 0.0057 0.0033 0.0465 0.1018 -0.II77
Common law ADR sample (n = 54)
BM ratio 0.4138 0.4049 0.2764 1.1625 0.0148
EP ratio -0.0159 0.0135 0.1401 0.0470 - 0.9546
Ln (size) 9.3697 9.5716 1.2639 11.1914 4.5652
3-Day CAR 0.0117 0.0038 0.0360 0.0998 -0.0378
5-Day CAR 0.0129 0.0041 0.0474 0.1235 -0.0880
7-Day CAR 0.0117 0.0069 0.0492 0.1019 -0.1177
Code law ADR sample (n = 25)
BM ratio 0.7495 0.7509 0.2716 1.2889 0.2376
EP ratio O.OllI 0.0107 0.0172 0.0608 - 0.0204
Ln (size) 9.7278 9.9556 0.9204 10.4521 6.0816
3-Day CAR -0.0055 - 0.0043 0.0227 0.0291 -0.0566
5-Day CAR -0.0108 -0.0150 0.0360 0.0741 -0.1059
7-Day CAR - 0.0065 - 0.0075 0.0385 0.0800 -0.1008
BM is common equity (Compustat Annual Item #60) plus deferred tax (Compustat Annual Item #74) divided by
size, EP is earnings per share (Compustat Annual Item #53) over fiscal year-end price (Compustat Annual Item
#199), and size is measured as market value of equity (Compustat Annual Item #199 multiplied by Compustat
Annual Item #25). CAR refers to cumulative abnormal return computed using size-adjusted excess return available
in CRSP. Two firm-year observations that do not have BM and size variables available are excluded from this part
of analysis. The results are qualitatively similar when they are included.
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law ADR programs have lower book-to-market ratio, indicating that there are more growth
firms in the common law ADR sample than in the code law ADR sample.
4. Method and results
The market's reaction to an earnings announcement is measured using a 3-day (Day — 2 to
Day 0), 5-day (Day — 2 to Day + 2), and 7-day (Day — 2 to Day +4) window. The market's
reaction is measured by the size-adjusted excess retum available on CRSR^ BKR's (2000)
results indicate that the accounting earnings of firms in the common law countries are more
conservative and timely than those in the code law countries, suggesting that the eamings of
firms in the common law countries are of higher quality than those of firms in the code law
countries on these two dimensions.^ If such properties spill over to ADR programs (the
spillover hypothesis), a greater market reaction around an eamings announcement is expected
for a common law ADR program than for a code law ADR program. However, if the cun-ent
reporting requirement, i.e., 20-F reconciliation, effectively eliminates such differences in the
properties of local eamings, one should not observe a systematic difference in the market
reaction around the announcements. These results are reported in Table 4.
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the market on average reacts significantly to the eamings
announcement of a common law ADR program but not to that of a code law ADR program.
In the common law sample, average cumulative abnormal retum (CAR hereafter) is
significantly different from zero (P<.1) in all three windows, while there is no significant
reaction in the code law sample. Consistent with the spillover hypothesis that predicts
different degrees of market reaction between the two groups ofADR programs, the difference
in 3- and 5-day CAR between the two groups is statistically significant (P<.1).
In Panel B and C of Table 4, I partition the sample based on the direction of news and
size. This analysis is motivated by previous studies that document an association between
these two variables and the pattems in stock retums around eamings announcements
(Atiase, 1985; Collins, Kothari, & Raybum, 1987; Nwaeze, 2000). Nwaeze (2000) finds
that the market's reaction to an eamings announcement is inversely related to the direction
of news, i.e., a greater reaction to a bad news firm at the time of announcement. Atiase
(1985) and Collins et al. (1987) document that the magnitude of the market's reaction to an
eamings announcement is inversely related to firm size. I define the direction of news as
change in annual EPS, deflated by the beginning-of-the-period price, and size as the log of
market value of equity.*^
Using beta-adjusted retums yields qualitatively similar results.
To the extent that the usefulness of accounting eamings could be impaired by deficiencies in timeliness, it is
expected that the market will react more to timely eamings report.
I define eamings surprise in this manner instead of using the analysts' forecasts from I/B/E/S to preserve the
sample size. Using the median consensus analysts" forecasts available in 1/B/E/S results in a smaller sample size,
but the results remain qualitatively similar.
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Table 4
The market's reaction to the earnings announcements of ADR programs
3-Day CAR 5-Day CAR 7-Day CAR
Panel A: the entire sample and the common law versus the code law ADR sample
The entire sample 0.00614 (1.6262) 0.00525 (1.0193) 0.00576 (1.0860)
The common law ADR sample (« = 54) 0.01174(2.3496)** 0.01296(1.9743)* 0.01166(1.7089)*
The code law ADR sample (/! = 25) - 0.00549 (- 1.2093) - 0.01081 (- 1.5009) - 0.00650 (- 0.8435)
Difference' 0.01723 (2.1873)'
Panel B: good ne^vs versus bad ne^vs ADR sample
The good news sample (n = 33) 0.00554 (0.9 1 70)
The bad news sample (n = 38) 0.0032 1 (0.6460)
Difference'' 0.00232 (0.2990)
Panel C: large versus small ADR sample
Large firm sample (n = 40) 0.00271 (0.5922)
Small firm sample (« = 38) 0.00867 (1 .4265)
Difference' - 0.00597 ( - 0.7893)
0.02377 (2.2179)'
0.00392 (0.5099)
0.00109 (0.1708)
0.00282 (0.2810)
0.00246 (0.4204)
0.00608 (0.6959)
0.00362 (-0.3474)
0.01816 (1.6203)
0.00585 (0.7562)
0.00117 (0.1565)
0.00467 (0.4333)
0.00210 (0.3391)
0.00762 (0.8630)
0.00553 (-0.5163)
The 3-, 5-, and 7-day windows are measured using Days — 2 to 0, +2, and + 4, respectively. Earnings surprise is
measured as change in annual EPS (this year's EPS — last year's EPS) deflated by the beginning of period price.
CAR is computed by cumulating daily size-adjusted excess return available on CRSP. T statistics are in
parentheses. Two firm-year observations that do not have BM and size variables available are excluded ft"om this
part of analysis. The results are qualitatively similar when they are included.
^ This refers to the difference in the means between the common law and the code law sample (common law
minus code law).
This refers to the difference in the means between the good news and the bad news sample (good minus bad).
* Significant at 10% level using two-tailed test.
** Significant at 5% level using two-tailed test.
The results suggest that the patterns in stock returns after an earnings announcement in the
sample are associated with neither firm size nor the direction of news in the sample.^ Overall,
these results suggest that the hypothesized association between the legal regime of local
economy and the information content of accounting information of the cross-listed firms is
not subsumed by either the direction of news or firm size.'°
5. Sensirivity tests
Unequal sample size between the code law sample and the common law sample can be a
concern. This is because the earlier results could have been driven by the fact that the
Some plausible explanations for the weak explanatory power of the direction of news are predisclosure
period information leakage and inaccuracy of earnings expectation model, among others.
"^ For completeness, I partition the sample based on the institutional factors and then on the direction of news
and on firm size (the results not reported). The market's reaction is insignificant in all cases, consistent with the
earlier finding in the Panel B and C of Table 4. I also three-way split the sample based on the institutional factors,
size, and then on the sign of earnings. The results are similar to those of the two-way split (the third partitioning
does not provide additional insights).
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Table 5
Matched sample characteristics
Code law Common law U.S. sample
sample sample
Number of firm-year 90 1 1
observations each year 91 4 4 5
92 5 5 6
93 1 1 1
94 1 1 1
95 3 3 3
96 5 5 6
97 5 6 4
Finn Mean 9.535 9.701 9.625
Size Median 9.925 9.575 9.473
Market's reaction (P values) 3-Day CAR .0004 (.961) .0142 (.025)** .0129 (.006)***
5
-Day CAR _ .0064 (.448) .0140 (.098)* .0120 (.018)**
7-Day CAR - .0026 (.756) .0130 (.177) .0150 (.029)**
The matched samples are formed based on year and firm size. Firm size refers to the natural logarithm of the
market value of equity at fiscal year end. CAR is size-adjusted excess return obtained fi-om CRSP excess return
tape. The U.S. sample is constructed from a list of Fortune 500 companies. To be included in the sample, a firm
must have available data in Compustat (market value of equity and earnings announcement date) and CRSP (size-
adjusted excess return). Each group has 26 firm-year observations. P values are in parentheses.
* Significant at 10% level.
* * Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
common law sample contains more firms than the code law sample and therefore had more
statistical power. To alleviate this concern, I perform a match sample test in this part of
analysis. In doing so, I also construct a U.S. firm matched sample as a reference. Given that
ADRs tend to be large firms, a selection of Fortune 500 firms is used to form the U.S.
matched sample. Firms are matched by year and firm size and then chosen randomly to
provide a control for year-wide macroeconomic factors and information environment the
firms are subject to.
Summary statistics of the matched samples are provided in Table 5. The observations are
fairly evenly spread out through the sample years. The median firm sizes are also very
similar: 9.53 in the code law sample, 9.70 in the common law sample, and 9.63 in the U.S.
sample. The market's reaction is strongest in the U.S. sample and weakest in the code law
sample. In Table 6, I test for the difference in CARs using both parametric t statistic and
nonparametric z statistic (obtained from Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test proce-
dure). ' ' For brevity, only P values are shown.
The results indicate that while the difference in CAR is significant between the code law
sample and the other two (i.e., the common law sample and the U.S. sample) under both tests,
'
' This statistic does not require strict distributional assumptions such as nomiality of the error terms.
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Table 6
Return difference in the matched samples
Code law Common law U.S.
sample sample sample
Difference in 3-day CAR {P values) Code law sample .1219 .0796 *
Common law sample .0912* .8656
U.S. sample .0399 * .8689
Panel B: difference in 5-day CAR
Difference in 7-day CAR (P values) Code law sample .0701 * .0548 *
Common law sample .0912* .9511
U.S. sample .0490* * .9899
Panel B: difference in 7-day CAR
Difference in 7-day CAR {P values) Code law sample .2109 .1343
Common law sample .1742 .8956
U.S. sample .1373 .8889
Above/below the diagonal shows P values from parametric / test and nonparametric z test.
Shown below (above) the diagonal are P values from parametric (nonparametric) t test (Wilcoxen sign-rank test)
that tests for the difference in CARs over 3-, 5-, and 7-day windows.
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
the difference between the common law sample and U.S. sample is insignificant in all cases.
They also show that although the difference is most significant at the conventional level over
a 5-day window, most of the difference disappears over 7 days. These results complement my
earlier findings and show that the market's reaction to common law (code law) ADR eamings
announcements are quite similar (dissimilar) to its reaction to U.S. eamings announcements.
Next, given the results reported in Panel C of Table 4, which could be due to change in
annual eamings being an imperfect proxy for news in my sample firms, I perform an
Table 7
The market's reaction to the eamings announcements of ADR programs (the squared return metric)
3-Day CAR 5-Day CAR 7-Day CAR
The entire sample .00111 (5.0896)* * * .00206 (5.3368)* * * .00219 (5.7986)* * *
The common law ADR sample (n = 54) .00138 (4.5246)* * * .00238 (4.6647)* * * .00253 (5.2819)* * *
The code law ADR sample (« = 25) .00052(3.4575)*** .00136(2.6957)** .00146(2.5042)**
Difference^ .00086(1.8570)* .00102(1.2364) .00106(1.3116)
The 3-, 5-, and 7-day windows are measured using Days - 2 to 0, +2, and +4, respectively. Eamings surprise is
measured as change in annual EPS (this year's EPS — last year's EPS) deflated by the beginning of period price.
CAR is computed by cumulating daily size-adjusted excess retum available on CRSP. T statistics are in
parenthesis.
^ This refers to the difference in the means between the large frnn and the small firm and the small firm sample
(large minus small).
* Significant at 10% level using two-tailed test.
** Significant at 5% level using two-tailed test.
*** Significant at 1% level using two-tailed test.
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additional test to alleviate the concern that the main results reported in this study are due to
the fact that the common law sample contained more good news firms than the code law
sample. To achieve this objective, I take a square of returns and repeat the analysis. This
procedure can be viewed as an alternative means to control for the direction of news because
it eliminates the effects of the direction of news and measures only the magnitude of the
market's reaction.
These results are reported in Table 7. The results are qualitatively similar to the earlier
results and show that the market's reaction to the common law earnings announcements is
larger than to that of the code law announcements even when the direction of news effects is
minimized by using the squared return metric. Over 3 days around the announcements, the
difference in the reactions is statistically significant (P<.1).
6. Conclusion
This study provides evidence that the effects of international institutional factors spillover
to ADR programs. Extending BKR's (2000) finding that the earnings of enterprises in the
common law countries are of higher quality (more conservative and timely) than those of
firms in the code law countries, I find that the market reacts significantly to the earnings
announcements of common law ADR programs but not to those of code law ADR programs.
This finding suggests that the usefulness of U.S. GAAP disclosure made by cross-listed firms
is systematically affected by the institutional factors of the home country economy and that
the current reporting requirements for the cross-listed firms fail to produce comparable
accounting figures.
In closing, this study has some limitations. For instance, I did not control for the effects of
local earnings announcements. This is a concern if the market has already reacted to the local
earnings that had been announced prior to U.S. GAAP earnings, or if the market's reaction
was due to the local earnings that were released simultaneously with the U.S. GAAP earnings
rather than the U.S. GAAP earnings themselves. The first issue is unlikely to be a serious
concern in light of the finding of Amir et al. (1993) that the two earnings are usually known
simultaneously to the U.S. investors.'" However, the degree to which the second issue affects
my inference is hard to determine at this point.
Second, future research may extend this study and investigate factors that may lead to
cross-sectional differences in the information content of earnings reports. For example, given
that insider trade laws are likely to be weaker in the code law countries, news may already
have been impounded into prices when their earnings are announced. In this regard, the
degree of preemption (and the information content thereof) of earnings when they are
released to the market may differ across the two samples.
* In their sample, these two earnings were published simultaneously in the Wall Street Journal and Financial
Times in over 80% of the cases. Thus, for instance, assuming these dates as U.S. earnings announcements dates
may be more descriptively valid for British firms than Japanese firms.
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Yet another potential limitation of this study is external validity. Since Compustat collects
and reports only the earnings figures of non-U. S. firms cross listed in the United States
released through the newswires, my sample may not be representative of all ADRs currently
trading in the United States.'"^
Finally, this study does not explain why the spillover takes place. As pointed out by Pownall
and Schipper (1999), the evidence presented in this study does not enable us to distinguish
whether the spillover is due to the demand effect, i.e., functional fixation of investors on the
properties of local eamings associated with the legal regime, or to the supply effect, i.e., the
economic conditions of firms operating in different environments are fundamentally "un-
translatable" (Baumol & Malkiel, 1993). I leave this question for future research.
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Abstract
When compared with its prior performance, the year 2001 is not one of the best years for the Neuer
Markt. The Neuer Markt's reputation has been marred by the practice of several companies on the
exchange that have published misleading information in the form of incomplete annual and quarterly
data. In this study, we examine the quality of Neuer Markt quarterly reports by concentrating on the
disclosure level of 47 Neuer Markt companies' reports for the third quarter of 1999, 2000, and 2001.
To enable making comparisons, we have established four disclosure indexes that measure each report's
compliance with the Neuer Markt Rules and Regulations (NM Rules and Regulations) as well as with
International Accounting Standards (IAS) and U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S.
GAAP) interim reporting standards. We then attempt to find typical attributes of Neuer Markt
enterprises that provide high or low level of disclosure accounting information in their quarterly
reports. The results demonstrate that the level of disclosure has increased over time, partly in response
to additional enforcement. In this regard, the quarterly reports standardization project of Deutsche
Boerse is an important landmark in satisfying investors' information needs.
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1. Introduction
Despite the recent market turndown, Germany's Neuer Markt, launched in March 1997,
was considered to be the most successful stock market for growth companies in Europe in
terms of both market capitalization and number of listings (Deutsche Borse, 2001a). This
success can primarily be accounted for by its substantially stricter disclosure and listing
requirements compared with other German market segments. ' However, even if the Neuer
Markt already boasts some of the tightest regulations in Europe, the general sell-off in
technology and Internet stocks, a string of profit warnings, insider-dealing investigations, and
insolvencies have shaken investors' confidence and prices have fallen by more than 90%
from its peak reached in March 2000 to its all-time low in 2002 (Wall Street Journal Europe,
2000). This sharp setback in stock prices was a shock not only to many inexperienced retail
investors who have for the first time realized a massive loss exposure (Benoit, 2001) but also
to institutional investors who seem to be surprised by the free fall of prices.
In troubled financial markets, people are eager to seek out plausible explanations, and in
some cases, people even find scapegoats. One viable starting point for this quest is
questioning what type of information was available for investors and whether or not a better
quantity or quality of information could have enhanced investors' decisions.
Quarterly reports are important sources of information, and companies listed on Neuer
Markt are required to publish such reports and to prepare their accounts in accordance with
either the International Accounting Standards (IAS) or the U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) [7.1 Neuer Markt Rules and Regulations (NM Rules
and Regulations)]. However, quarterly reports of several Neuer Markt companies were
criticized as failing to meet investors' information needs (Maier & Herr, 2000). Important
information was either missing or of poor quality. One major criticism is that, even if the rules
are heavily influenced by regulation of Nasdaq and the U.S. Securities Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), they lack a comparable enforcement mechanism. In fact, the Neuer Markt listing
requirements are set in a rulebook that clearly spells out requirements for the issuer."
Deutsche Boerse acts as both the standard setter and the enforcement institution at the same
time, and there is no government-based supervisor responsible for assuring the quality of
quarterly reports. Moreover, Glaum and Street (2002) show that there was considerable
noncompliance with IAS and U.S. GAAP disclosure rules in the year 2000 financial
statements of 100 Neuer Markt companies.
' See Financial Times (2001). The NM Rules and Regulations can be downloaded at http://www.deutsche-
boerse.comynm. For the analysis, we take the NM Rules and Regulations as of May 21, 2001.
" The shares are admitted under public law to the Second Segment (Geregelter Markt) with relatively low
publication requirements like half-year summaries. Additionally, for the admission under private law to the trading
segment "Neuer Markt," the rules and regulations must be accepted by the issuer. The Executive Board of the
Deutsche Boerse can reject the application if the admission criteria of registration conditions are not fulfilled.
Moreover, it can terminate the admissions to the Neuer Markt if the issuer does not adhere to the requirements
connected with the admission. See Deutsche Boerse Information Folder, Section 2.1, version January 1, 2001. In
connection with the new delisting rule, the Frankfurt court stated that the NM Rules and Regulations could be
interpreted as general trade conditions, but they showed some particularities. See LG Frankfurt, decision from
August 15, 2001—3-13 O 110/01 (nrkr).
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In this study, we concentrate on the disclosure level of quarterly reports of 47 Neuer Markt
companies for the third quarter of 1 999, 2000, and 200 1 . We begin by briefly describing in
Section 2 the interim reporting standards of the Neuer Markt, IAS, and U.S. GAAP. Section 3
discusses certain approaches that measure the quality of interim reports by disclosure levels.
We then compare disclosure indexes that measure the report's compliance with the NM Rules
and Regulations as well as with IAS and U.S. GAAP interim reporting standards. Next, we
try to discover typical attributes of Neuer Markt companies that provide high or low level
accounting information in their quarterly reports by investigating the correlations between the
disclosure level and certain criteria like market capitalization and the time of existence in the
Neuer Markt.
Section 4 demonstrates that the level of disclosure has increased over time. An additional
enforcement mechanism added in 2000 has especially improved reporting quality. In this
regard, the quarterly reports standardization project of Deutsche Borse (2001b) is an
important landmark in satisfying investors' information needs. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Interim reporting standards
2.1. NM Rules and Regulations
Four years after its launch in March 1997, more than 340 companies were listed on Neuer
Markt, 56 of which were headquartered outside Germany.^ The NM Rules and Regulations
require the publication of quarterly reports that follow either IAS or U.S. GAAP (d'Arcy &
Leuz, 2000). In both cases, Neuer Markt-listed companies are required to publish quarterly
reports in both German and English. These reports must contain financial statements and a
notes section, the most important components of which are income statement, cash flow
statement, and net income or loss per share.
For each figure, the previous year's comparative figure for the corresponding period shall
be given (7.1.2 NM Rules and Regulations). The following notes are to be made in the
explanatory section, each with comparable figures from the previous year (7.1.3 NM Rules
and Regulations):
1. breakdown of revenues,
2. remarks to the order situation (order backlog),
3. presentation of the development of costs and prices,
4. R&D activities,
5. specification for the investment activities,
6. presentation of personnel changes in the company's Board of Management Directors or
supervisory bodies,
7. explanations of shares held by the company and subscription rights of officers and
employees.
^ See Deutsche Borse (2001a). See also Leuz (2003, pp. 450-452) for a brief description of the Neuer Markt.
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8. explanation regarding distribution of interim dividends,"* and
9. number of employees.
If a Neuer Markt-listed company published its preceding annual report on a consolidated
basis, then the quarterly report consisting of the financial statements and the explanatory
notes are to be prepared on a consolidated basis too (7.1.4 NM Rules and Regulations).
In Article 7. 1 .7 of the NM Rules and Regulations, it is stated that the quarterly report has to
be transmitted immediately following its completion and within at least 2 months of the end
of the relevant reporting period. In this case, we analyze the Neuer Markt-listed companies
that have electronically submitted the quarterly report within the prescribed period.'
Furthermore, at the request of the company, Deutsche Boerse may, under some circum-
stances, permit a reconciliation of national accounting principles to IAS or U.S. GAAP (7.3.2
NM Rules and Regulations). Deutsche Boerse comments that this reconciliation statement
must in its material aspects have the format of the U.S. GAAP reconciliation statement. From
the viewpoint of Deutsche Boerse, this reconciliation statement can be regarded to be the
minimum reporting to be presented.
2.2. Interim financial reporting according to IAS 34
IAS 34 sets detailed rules for interim reporting in order to make sure that investors are
informed of the latest financial news of a company. Quarterly reports should preferably focus
on new activities, events, and circumstances that have occurred since the publication of the
latest annual financial statements. Thus, IAS 34 has softened the presentation of quarterly
reports compared with annual financial statements (Epstein & Mirza, 1999, p. 651). A
quarterly report in accordance with IAS 34 must contain financial statements and explanatory
notes. The standard mandates that the following financial statements components be
presented either in full (LAS 34.5) or in a condensed format,^ each with comparable figures
for the previous year (IAS 34.20): balance sheet, income statement, EPS (basic/diluted) (IAS
34.11), cash flow statement, and statement of changes in stockholder's equity.^
"* In some countries, it is allowed to distribute interim dividends, whereas this is forbidden to German public
companies. See Section 59 AktG. For this reason, only non-German companies were analyzed whether this
specification was given or not.
The publication period postulated in the NM Rules and Regulations does overrule neither the IAS
recommended 60-day period [IAS 34.1 (b)] nor the U.S. GAAP required 45-day period (Form lO-Q, General
Instructions A.l.) because it is to be regarded as special rule of Neuer Markt-listed companies.
If a company presents its quarterly report in a "condensed fomiat," then IAS 34.10 requires that, at a
minimum, those "condensed financial statements" should include each of the headings and the subtotals that were
included in the company's most recent annual financial statement.
According to IAS 34.8c, the companies can choose between the presentation of a statement of changes in
stockholders' equity and a statement of comprehensive income. None of the Neuer Markt-listed companies chose
the possibility of showing a comprehensive income statement. Thus, we only examine these companies whether
they present the statement of changes in stockholders' equity or not.
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The explanatory notes that accompany financial statements state the minimum disclosures
to be made, as outlined below (IAS 34.16):
1. a statement that the same accounting policies and methods are applied in the quarterly
report compared with the most recent annual report,
2. comments about seasonality or cyclicality of interim operations,
3. nature and magnitude of significant items affecting interim results that are unusual
because of nature, size, or incidence,
4. nature and quantum of changes in estimates, if affecting the actual report,
5. issuance, repurchases, and repayments of debt and equity securities,
6. dividends paid,
7. revenue and operating results for business segments or geographical segments, which
represent the company's primary mode of segment reporting: If a company is obliged to
prepare a "complete set of financial statements," then it shall follow IAS 14 (Price
Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), 1999, p. 5).
8. significant events occurring subsequent to the end of the reporting period,
9. changes in the composition of companies to be consolidated, and
10. changes in contingent liabilities or assets.
IAS 34.14 requires consolidated financial statements if the preceding annual financial
statements were presented on a consolidated basis.
2.3. Interim financial reporting according to U.S. GAAP
The basic objective of the U.S. GAAP interim reporting is to provide investors and others
with timely information as to the progress of the enterprise. The timeliness of presentation
may be partially offset by a modification in detail in the information provided (APB 28.9 and
30) (Epstein & Mirza, 1999, p. 757). As a result, using APB 28 as a guideline allows a
company to present quarterly reports either in a "summarized form" or as a "complete set of
financial statements." APB 28 represents the general guideline among other SFAS, FASB
Interpretations, and for certain practical aspects the regulation S-X (Delaney, Epstein, Adler,
& Foran, 2000, p. 757).
If a Neuer Markt company has decided to prepare its quarterly report according to U.S.
GAAP, it would have to show the following financial statements components, each with
comparable preceding year's figures (APB 28.2 and 33): balance sheet, income statement,^
cash flow statement, segment report (for condensed form ovei'view only) (APB 28.30), and
statement of changes in stockholders' equity.^
^ APB 28 requires for the income statement the presentation of significant items only. To close this
interpretative gap, the NM Rules and Regulations requires explicitly an entire income statement. This was also
clarified by the Deutsche Borse by the market circular on Structured Quarterly Reports.
For 1999 and 2000, none of the Neuer Markt-listed companies chose the possibility of showing a
comprehensive income statement. Thus, we only examine these companies whether they present the statement of
changes in stockholders' equity or not.
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The type and scope of the complete set is determined by the most recent annual report.'^
For both formats, the following disclosure should be reported as a minimum (APB 28.30)
(Kieso & Weygandt, 2001, p. 1397):
1
.
sales or gross revenues,
2. provisions for income taxes,
3. extraordinary items,
4. cumulative effect of a change in accounting principles or practices,
5. net income,
6. EPS (basic),
7. EPS (diluted),
8. seasonal revenue, costs, or expenses,
9. significant changes in estimates or provisions for income taxes,
10. disposal of a segment of a business and extraordinary, unusual, or infrequently occurring
items,
1 1 contingent items,
12. changes in accounting principles or estimates, and
13. significant changes in financial positions.
Quarterly reports according to U.S. GAAP shall be based on the same accounting policies
and practices used by the company in the preparation of its most recent annual report. Three
companies of our sample are dual listed on the Neuer Markt as well as on Nasdaq. They use
the Form 10-Q instead of a quarterly report, which was accepted by Deutsche Boerse.
3. Methodology and research data
3.1. Methodology: developing disclosure indexes
Corporate finance theory predicts that companies endogenously optimize disclosure policy
in order to maximize firm value. This choice involves trading off the reduction in the
information asymmetry component of the cost of capital that results from increased disclosure
quality (see Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Verrecchia, 1983; for an empirical literature overview,
see Core, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001). For firms with low growth opportunides, a minimum
disclosure may be of sufficiently high quality because those finns have no need for external
finance and therefore are not influenced by the cost of new equity capital." For firms with
high growth opportunities—like Neuer Markt companies—information asymmetry is high
and some reduction through voluntary disclosure would seem optimal (Core, 2001, pp. 2-3).
"^ This is the interpretation ofKPMG regarding Neuer Markt-Hsted companies preparing the quarterly reports
under U.S. GAAP. See also KPMG (1999. p. 181).
'
' However, there is some empirical evidence that disclosure quality also influences the cost of debt
(Sengupta, 1998).
A. d'Arcy, S. Grabensberger / The International Journal oj Accounting 38 (2003) 329-346 335
Accordingly, a number of empirical studies suggest a link between cost of equity capital and
disclosure (Botosan & Plumlee, 2000, p. 3).
To accept this connection, we first have to define the disclosure level as an indicator
for reporting quality. Recent empirical disclosure literature suggests that mandatory
disclosure is enforced and therefore does not have to be included in a disclosure quality
index. This assumption does not hold for the Neuer Markt because one major criticism
concentrates on the noncompliance of some issuers with existing rules. Furthermore, the
companies have to report in accordance with the NM Rules and Regulations as well as
those of either IAS or U.S. GAAR Accordingly, we have to consider different systems.
We find a related research question in the comparison of national accounting systems by
disclosure levels.
In the 1970s, Barrett (1975, 1976, 1977) developed an "index of disclosure," which
measured the complexity and adequacy of accounting information for certain national
accounting systems by investigating the disclosure of several annual reports. The presence
of 17 "items of information" in each report determines the index. As a result, companies,
especially American and British ones, show high values, whereas the continental European
firms indicate relatively low degrees with France at the bottom.'" Also, in the 1970s, Choi
(1973a, 1973b, 1974) published three studies about the relation of external environmental
factors to the capital market influence on accounting and the quality of financial reporting
practices. Similar to Barrett's method, Choi measures the degree by a "level of
disclosure" that is based on 36 "items of information." Belkaoui (1983) uses a partly
related concept that evaluates national accounting systems by a "reporting and disclosure
adequacy index" based on the Price Waterhouse (1979) database on accounting practices.
The index is calculated by summing the ordinal categories of all items for each country,
which includes disclosure as well as measurement practices. The enclosed test of
significance does not prove a strong relation between this index and several environmental
factors. Furthermore, Belkaoui and Maksy (1985) test the relation between the "reporting
and disclosure adequacy index" and the concept of the "welfare of the common man."
As in the earlier study, they did not verify the existence of a significant dependence.
Nowadays, several databases of annual reports provide information on whether or not
several disclosure items are included.'^ The most recent study from Glaum and Street
(2002) on the compliance with the disclosure requirements of Neuer Markt companies
derived the dependent variable from a checklist that coded disclosure items as disclosed,
not disclosed, or not applicable. Glaum and Street calculated a disclosure compliance
index for each company by dividing the total number of required disclosures by the
number of applicable disclosures.
The above-noted studies define the disclosure level by adding up the number of disclosure
items. Similarly, we establish disclosure levels by defining items of information that should
' In his analysis from 1975, Barrett makes use of the reports of the 15 biggest enterprises for each country
only. In the later studies form 1976 and 1977, the database considers 103 reports from the financial years
1963-1972.
''' See, for example, the AIMR reports (http://www.aimr.org).
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be included in the interim report following the related standards as described in Section 2. For
each level, we compute 1999, 2000, and 2001 numbers to investigate developments.
a. The first index, FINANCIALS, is noted by one if all parts of an interim report are present,
namely the income statement, the balance sheet, the cash flow statement, and the earnings
per share figure, each with comparable preceding year's figures. This measure is
independent from type of accounting standards employed.'"^
b. The second index, NM, indicates compliance with explicit disclosure regulations of the
Neuer Markt as described in Section 2.1.
c. The third index, IAS, scales the compliance with IAS 34 disclosure rules for companies
that follow IAS.
d. The fourth index, US, shows the conformity with U.S. GAAP interim reporting standards
as described in Section 2.3.
e. Finally, we establish the index ALL, which describes the overall disclosure level for all
companies under review on a percent basis. The indexes FINANCIALS, NM, and either
L\S or US are accumulated while eliminating duplicate information, e.g., earnings per
share figures that are part of FINANCIALS and US.
3.2. Limitations
We are aware of the limitations of this research approach. The indexes are defined as
simple sums. Because all items of information are equally weighted, important items may be
swamped by trivial ones. Consistent with other approaches, we measure how well the reports
conform to the related standards. This method may not provide a strong indicator of the
quality of accounting numbers that are not public information. Although we view disclosure
quality in a narrow sense, the results offer an opportunity to gain new insights into the level of
information that companies publish on a quarterly basis. Thus, these results cannot be
interpreted as a complete measure of compliance with interim reporting standards. Although
Glaum and Street (2002) differentiate between "not applicable" and "not disclosed" data and
calculate an overall compliance index, they also use publicly available information and are
therefore not able to differentiate between missed disclosure and not satisfying certain
criteria. Thus, a disclosure index can be interpreted only in a relative sense, and we have
established a 3-year comparison to analyze possible developments.
3.3. Research data
We use only a sample of the 1 74 companies listed on the Neuer Markt at the end of
October 1999 that were required to submit quarterly reports.'"^ Only companies that published
''* We do not include the statement of changes in stockholders' equity in this figure because it is not required in
all cases. However, FINANCIALS do not provide us the full information on the compliance regarding the
components of an interim report for companies that tend to follow IAS.
'^ All Neuer Markt-listed companies that receive listing authorization during the accounting period are obliged
to provide a quarterly report. This is implicitly stated in 7 NM Rules and Regulations.
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Table 1
Accounting standards used and usage of reconciliation
Full Reconciliation Total
1999
2000
2001
U.S. GAAP 23 5
IAS 13 6
Total 36 U
U.S. GAAP 26 1
IAS 19 1
Total 45 2
U.S. GAAP 25 1
IAS 21
Total 46 1
28
19
47
27
20
47
26
21
47
the six monthly and the third quarter reports for 1999 were selected for the initial sample. We
deleted four firms that we could not identify the accounting regime used, and based on
intemal Deutsche Borse advice, market capitalization was either less than 80 million or
greater than 3 billion euros (Deutsche Borse, 1999).
We further reduce this sample for 2000 by two companies due to insolvency and merger. In
2001, five more companies of the original sample were delisted. We use the sample of 47
Neuer Markt companies to compare quarterly reports of the third quarter of 1 999 with those
of the third quarter of 2000 and 2001.
The accounting standards adopted and the extent of using reconciliation (instead of a ftill
set of financial statements) for the sample of 47 companies is presented in Table 1
.
4. Results
4.1. Disclosure levels
Fig. 1 shows the frequencies for the FINANCIALS index for 1999, 2000, and 2001. In
1999, only 20 companies (43%) show all elements of an interim report with an average of
6.62 out of a maximum of 8 elements shown. Nearly three-quarters of the firms fulfill this
FINANCIALS
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Fig. 1
. Frequencies of FINANCIALS.
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requirement in 2000, with an average of 7.32. The S.D. decreases from 1.38 to 1.12. In 2001,
all companies show the basic elements of an interim report based on the formats required by
Deutsche Borse. It appears that standardization of quarterly reports has succeeded in
enforcing certain levels of disclosure. In 1999 and 2000, the comparable figures in the
preceding year are missing in some cases. One company does not provide a cash flow
statement in 2000 (three in 1999). In 6 cases, the EPS figure is missing in 2000 compared
with 10 in 1999. Six companies do not present a balance sheet in 2000 (11 in 1999). This is
likely to be due to the fact that the 1 999 version of the NM Rules and Regulations did not
explicitly require a balance sheet although it is required by both IAS and U.S. GAAP.
Fig. 2 shows the frequencies that indicate compliance with the NM Rules and Regulations.
Some rules are only applicable under certain conditions, e.g., disclosure about changes in the
boards. It is therefore not surprising that only one company reaches the maximum sum of nine
(in 2001). Relevant information is often missing: eight companies do not show a breakdown
of their revenues in 1999 (only one in 2000); three of the companies that publish their
quarterly reports on Form 10-Q ignored the Neuer Markt disclosure requirements. However,
the index has increased by about 21% from 1999 and 2000 and by 19% from 2000 to 2001.
On average, sample companies show 3.81 items of information (median = 4) in 1999, 4.62
(median = 4) in 2000, and 5.51 (median = 6) in 2001. This change was accompanied by a
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more moderate increase in the S.D. from 1.35 in 1999 to 1.78 in 2001. There is nevertheless
important information that remain undisclosed, e.g., major investments or R&D activities.
Forty-six companies provided disclosure on their own shares in 2001 while there were only
two companies in 2000, whereas no company disclosed own share information in 1999.
The same is true with the IAS index (Fig. 3). Two companies (of 19) in 1999 and one (of
20) in 2000 do not provide even one item of information following IAS 34 requirements.
Segment information was not disclosed for more than the 60% of the companies under
review, although this effect may be traced back to IAS 14, which did not require segment
information in all cases. However, the 1 8 companies that had provided segment information
in 2001 represents a significant increase when compared with 3 in 1999 and 8 in 2000. The
mean index increases from 1.68 in 1999 to 2.45 (with an increasing S.D. from 0.95 to 1.32).
In 2001, the mean reaches 3.19, an increase of 30%, while the median increases from 2 to 3.
The S.D. remains almost unchanged at 1.36.
For the US index (Fig. 4), not all of the 13 items are disclosed by all companies even if
they report according to the detailed SEC regulations Form 10-Q as shown by the high S.D.
of 2.06 in 2000 and 1.95 in 1999, which declines to 1.53 in 2001. The increase of the index
mean from 4.39 in 1999 (4.26 in 2000) to 5.12 in 2001 is not as high as the increase for other
Mean development
FINANCIALS NM IAS
ni999 02000 02001
Fig. 5. Mean development.
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indexes. Essential information, such as basic earnings per sliare figures, are not given by eight
firms for 2000 (six for 1999), whereas all companies provide earnings per share information
in 200 1 ; despite the fact that almost all companies may have a dilutive effect on the earnings
per share figure from their contribution plans, dilutive earnings per share numbers are
presented by 19 companies for 2001, 8 for 2000, and 9 for 1999.
In summary, except for the basic parts in 2001, the disclosure indexes are not as high as
would be expected. However, the relative disclosure levels have been increasing (see Fig.
5) over the 3 years studied. The IAS disclosure level grows at over 30% per year, whereas
the US disclosure level is more constant. These conclusions are confirmed by analyzing the
ALL index for 1999, 2000, and 2001 (see Fig. 6). The overall disclosure level for all
companies increased up from 48.81% to 56.13% and 63.42%, an increase of 15% in 1 year,
while the S.D. remained almost constant. The second year shows an increase of 13% with a
lower S.D. of 0.83.
4.2. Correlations
We looked for correlated patterns to characterize how a company with a high or low
disclosure level can be characterized. The first important attribute may be the accounting
principles used. U.S. GAAP is enforced for three companies in this study because they are
Table 2
ALL IAS and ALL US
ALL IAS ALL US ALL IAS ALL US ALL IAS ALL US
1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001
n 19 28 20 27 21 26
Mean (%) 46.30 50.51 53.26 58.27 63.67 63.22
Median (%) 47.22 48.98 52.78 58.06 66.67 62.22
S.D. 0.0996 0.1057 0.1017 0.1051 0.0912 0.0798
Minimum (%) 24.07 32.04 3 1 .94 35.74 48.15 47.78
Maximum (%) 62.96 71.48 70.37 85.93 77.78 82.96
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Table 3
Influence of full format versus reconciliation
u Mean (%) Median (%) Minimum (%) Maximum {%) S.D.
1999 Full accounts 36 49.94 50.56 24 71 0.10644
Reconciliation 11 45.10 42.78 29 59 0.09154
2000 Full accounts 45 56.53 55.56 32 86 0.10586
Reconciliation 2 47.31 47.31 44 51 0.05369
2001 Full accounts 46 63.53 62.22 48 83 0.08470
Reconciliation 1 58.15 n.a. 58 58 n.a.
listed on a US exchange. By comparing the index ALL in the disclosure level for companies
that follow L\S and those that follow U.S. GAAP, we find the disclosure level of these U.S.
GAAP companies to be higher. However, in 2001, IAS disclosure index surpasses that of
U.S. GAAP. Also, the minimum levels shown under U.S. GAAP are also at relatively low
level of 48% for 2001 and 36% for 2000 (32% in 1999) (Table 2).
The second attribute characterizes companies as providing a full set of financial statements
or only reconciliation. It is plausible that the former, whether following IAS or U.S. GAAP,
comply more with the related disclosure standards. Table 3 shows that for 1999 and 2000 the
disclosure level of companies with fiill sets of financial statements is higher than that of
companies providing only reconciliation. However, the number of firms providing reconcil-
iation decreased fi"om 11 in 1999 to only 1 in 2001.
Moreover, the use of condensed formats versus the fiill report may be interpreted as an
indicator of a lower disclosure level. It seems plausible that presenting fiill format provides
more disclosure. Eighteen companies opted for a condensed format in 1999, which was
reduced to 10 enterprises in 2000 and to 3 in 2001 when the standardization project of the
Deutsche Borse requires a certain format for financial statements (Table 4).
In addition, companies that provide timely reports may present a relatively high disclosure
level in order to lower cost of capital. According to the Neuer Markt Rules and Regulation,
listed companies are required to electronically transfer the quarterly report to Deutsche Borse
without delay after preparation but not more than 2 months after the end of the reporting
period. Fig. 7 illustrates that most of the companies fiilfill this requirement. In both 2000 and
Table 4
Influence of fiall or condensed formats
n Mean (%) Median (%) Minimum (%) Maximum (%) S.D.
1999 Condensed 18 48.00 48.52 24 71 0.10565
Full 29 49.31 47.78 29 69 0.10495
2000 Condensed 10 53.07 51.25 36 76 0.11248
Full 37 56.97 55.56 32 86 0.10360
2001 Condensed 3 57.65 58.15 56 59 0.01901
Full 44 63.81 62.22 48 83 0.08549
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2001, companies provided quarterly financial data, on average, 13 days earlier than required
(median = 15 days) compared with 1 1 days in 1999 (see Table 5). In 2001, only one company
transferred its report with a delay of 10 days (three in 2000 and four in 1999). The longest
delay was 55 days in 1999. The results, however, do not reveal connection between timeliness
and disclosure level.
We also examine whether larger companies are more likely to acquire professional
accounting staff and enhance disclosure. This should in turn enhance the quality of quarterly
reports. Fig. 8 shows the correlation between the disclosure level ALL for the years 2001,
Table 5
Timeliness of reports
1999 2000 2001
Mean
Median
S.D.
Minimum
Maximum
- 10.13
- 11.00
15.06
-39
55
- 13.26
- 13.00
10.80
-50
5
- 12.72
- 15.00
12.03
-51
10
A. d'Arcy. S. Grabensherger / The International Journal of Accounting 38 (2003) 329-346 343
,90
J .60
<
,80
.70 4^" ^
'r
1 .50.^^^
,40
.30
.20
V
^ •
-
V
V
V V
2000 4000 6000 8000
Marketcapitalization in MioEuro
ALL 1999
Marketcap_9_99
V ALL 2000
Marketcap_9_00
X ALL 2001
Marketcap_9_0
1
10000
Fig. 8. Correlation between disclosure levels ALL 1999, 2000, and 2001 and market capitalization 1999, 2000,
and 2001.
,yu
V
X
,80
X X
,70
X
X ^
V
)K
X X
XX V »
V ^ > X ^ V
1
V V X '^ y X X X V X
<
X
X
^v'^'^v X X X
V ^ =^ ^ %W ^>^ "
,50 .
^7 9 X ' V
Xx X ^
,40 V V
,30
V
.20 .
20 40 60 100 120
ALL 1999
NM-Existence
V ALL 2000
NM-Existence
X ALL 2001
NM-Existence
140
Weeks since IPO
Fig. 9. Correlation between index ALL and the time period since listing.
344 A. d'Arcy. S. Grabensberger / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 329-346
2001, and 1999 and market capitalization for 2001 (2000 and 1999).'^ It is evident that a
large number of Neuer Markt companies appear to have neither a particularly high market
capitalization nor a high disclosure level. Pearson's correlation coefficient is not significantly
different from zero (.261 for 1999 and .085 in 2000). The situation has changed slightly in
2001: the weak positive correlation of .180 is consistent with previous research (Glaum &
Street, 2002). It is also noted that Street and Bryant (2000) and Street and Gray (2001) find no
significant association between firm size and level of compliance with IAS or U.S. GAAP
required disclosure.
Another area for analysis is the possible correlation between disclosure ALL indexes for
the years 2001, 2000, and 1999 and the time period since admission to the exchange. We
assume that the longer a company is listed on the Neuer Markt, the more reporting it would
have and the higher degree of quality in their quarterly reports. Fig. 9 shows a positive trend
(Pearson's correlation coefficients of .154 for 2001, .043 for 2000, and .109 for 1999),
suggesting a weak positive correlation between the ALL index and the time period since
admission.
5. Conclusion
The results demonstrate that the level of disclosure has increased over time. The additional
enforcement mechanism has improved quality; the quarterly reports standardization project of
Deutsche Boerse was thus successful. However, our analysis shows that important informa-
tion was not reported. For example, 75% of the companies present all required financial
statements in their 9-month report for the year 2000. In 1999, 42% of the enterprises publish
the full financial statements. This is in confrast with the Glaum and Street (2002) study in
which the majority of sample companies present between 95%) and 42% of the required items.
Basic information was timely reported in all cases for the 3 years studied. Although the
sample companies provided profit information on a regular basis, we did not examine
whether a higher disclosure level would have affected market participants differently.
While analyzing the results, we should be aware that according to the stock exchange
admission regulation in Germany (par. 53-62), companies must have half-year summaries
only. Most DAX companies, the German blue chip index, publish quarterly reports, but many
listed companies do not. Hence, the Neuer Markt disclosure requirements may be seen as an
important landmark in the information environment of listed companies." From 1999 to
2001, there has been a significant improvement in the fiilfillment of specific rules of IAS 34,
although the disclosure level according to U.S. GAAP does not show such an improvement.
Despite this difference, the choice between IAS and U.S. GAAP appears to be of less
importance for the overall disclosure level. The results also show that neither market
'^' The market capitalization was fixed by the end of September 1999, 2000, and 2001 (beginning of October
1999, 2000, and 2001 ) because the identification of the research date started with the beginning of October 1999.
'^ For example, the German index family (DAX. MDAX, and SMAX) requests quarterly reports inspired fi-om
the NM Rules and Regulations.
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capitalization nor time period since admission to the Neuer Markt correlate with the
disclosure level.
One major finding is the increased level of disclosure in quarterly reports. The reasons for
this development are the continuous supervision of quarterly reports since the summer of
2000 and the introduction of standardized formats. Nevertheless, the lack of effective
supervision for the German capital market continues to be a concem; there is no institution
or mechanism that enforces compliance with accounting standards and pursues violations
(d'Arcy, 2001). A recent debate has stressed the need for review of quarterly reports through a
public or private governmental enforcement body. For example, the German Governmental
Commission Corporate Governance (2001) and the European Union (2001) favor the
requirement of a limited review of quarterly reports. However, the response of the German
Government or the European Union will take time. While the Deutsche Boerse still considers
additional steps, whether governmental enforcement should also be established still needs to
be discussed.
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1. Contribution
The objective of the study by d'Arcy and Grabensberger (2003) is to examine whether
over the period 1999-2001 there has been an increase in the information disclosed in the
quarterly reports of firms listed on the Neuer Markt of the Deutsche Boerse. The implicit
assumption of the study is that more disclosure is equivalent to higher quality disclosure,
which may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition. In general, quarterly reports provide
more timely but less reliable financial information than annual or semi-annual reports because
quarterly accounting information has not been verified by independent auditors.
The quarterly information was compiled according to either IAS or the U.S. GAAP. Yet,
the Deutsche Boerse, at some stage in the summer of 2000, decided to require that listed
companies release quarterly information in a standardized format, acting in essence as a
standard setter, because there were incidents of noncompliance with the GAAP selected by
the listed firm.
The empirical findings of the study suggest that over time there has been an increase in the
level of disclosure and this increase is more pronounced for firms that have adopted IAS. The
findings of the study show that in applying IAS, European companies were undergoing a
learning process. This is an important but rarely mentioned issue in Europe, where IAS will
become mandatory for all listed companies of EU countries in 2005. In addition, the study
underscores the importance of the enforcing mechanism in the uniform application of the IAS
standards, another issue that has not been resolved in Europe.
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2. Methodological considerations
The study pays particular attention to the construction of the disclosure index, the
dependent variable of the study, and points out a number of limitations. A general limitation
of this index is that it penalizes firms that do not disclose an item simply because they have
nothing to disclose. A firm, for example, that has no business segments will not report any
information about segments and the disclosure index measure will be lower than that of a firm
that does have segments and reports the relevant information. Hence, the information
disclosed by the former firm is not necessarily of lower quality than that of the latter.
The disclosure index also does not consider the value relevance of the different items, since
it may include both items that are value relevant as well as those not relevant for stock market
participants. Hence, the value relevance of the disclosure index remains an open question and
an examination of the association of the index with the stock returns following the disclosure
of quarterly information would have been an additional dimension needed to substantiate the
study.
The study assumes that the primary benefit of increasing disclosure is a reduction in the
information asymmetry component of the cost of capital. This argument was advanced by
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), who also tested it by using three surrogates for the information
asymmetry component of the cost of capital. The three surrogates were the bid-ask spread,
trading volume, and share-price volatility. Tests relying on these three measures would have
provided evidence whether a decrease in the cost of capital occurs with increased disclosure.
Alternatively, the authors could have measured directly the cost of capital by using a
valuation model as in Botosan (1997) and used the measure from the valuation model to test
whether increasing disclosure results in a reduction in the cost of capital. Either approach
would measure the cost of capital with error but would be able to provide some support for
the main assertion of this study.
A recent trend in empirical research has been to place emphasis on graphs. This study
appears to rely on this methodology to draw inferences. The proponents of this view argue
that "a picture is equivalent to a thousand words," but in building theories and developing
scientific disciplines, the researcher makes probabilistic statements as to whether he/she
rejects or fails to reject hypotheses. The graphs do not provide the researcher with the
opportunity to measure the confidence level he/she places on the findings.
3. Empirical findings
The empirical findings of the study suggest that over time there has been an increase in the
level of disclosure and this increase is more pronounced for firms that have adopted IAS and
less so for firms that have adopted U.S. GAAP. The authors appear to suggest that this
improvement is due primarily to the standardization project of the Deutsche Boerse and not to
reasons such as firm size and "time period since listing," which act as surrogates for the ability
of a firm to provide high-quality information. The reports are also filed timely (i.e., within 2
months following the end of the reporting period), but this appears to be a requirement of the
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Deutsche Boerse rather than a direct effect of the adoption ofIAS or U.S. GAAP. Finally, firms
that provide a full set of financial statements rather than a condensed version or reconciliation
from national GAAP to IAS or U.S. GAAP have higher disclosure levels, although the number
of firms using the condensed version and the reconciliation has drastically diminished over
time. These comparisons between groups of firms are not based on statistical tests but only on
observation of means and medians. Nonparametric statistics, which are appropriate for small
samples, would have increased the internal validity of the findings.
Another important finding is that firms reporting under U.S. GAAP have higher levels of
disclosure than firms reporting under IAS, especially for the first 2 years examined. This is an
issue that the study could have pursued further by providing the profile of each group of firms
on certain dimensions, such as size, debt-to-equity ratio, auditor employed, industry
composition, systematic risk, etc. It appears that these two groups of firms self-select
themselves and one would like to know the reasons that motivate companies to choose
one set of accounting standards over another. The auditors usually play an important role in
the selection of the appropriate GAAP because they know the objectives of their client and
the information that must be disclosed, even in the instances where direct audit work is not
performed, and make appropriate recommendations.
4. The costs and benefits of increasing disclosure
While the study places emphasis on one direct benefit of increasing disclosure, namely, the
reduction in the information-asymmetry cost of capital, it remains silent on other benefits as
well as costs of increasing disclosure. The studies by Bushee and Noe (2000) and Healy,
Hutton, and Palepu (1999) show that institutional investors are attracted to firms with more
forthcoming disclosure. Bushee and Noe also show that improvements in disclosure practices
attract institutional investors that trade frequently and lead to significant increases in stock
return volatility. High stock return volatility is potentially undesirable because it can increase
the perceived riskiness of a firm and the cost of capital (Froot, Perold, & Stein, 1992). Thus,
increasing disclosure could lead to higher cost of capital but the increase in the cost of capital
arises from the behavior of institutional investors that trade frequently.
Additional costs for the firms in the study could arise from a possible loss of their
competitive advantage. Firms that feel the threat of competition have strong incentives,
especially in the absence of auditors or strong enforcement mechanisms, to avoid disclosing
certain items.
Benefits could also arise for managers if their compensation package includes stock
options, as increases in return volatility due to disclosure changes could lead to a higher value
for the stock options. The work of Aboody and Kaznik (2001) indeed shows that managers
make voluntary disclosure decisions to maximize the value of the stock option component of
their compensation package.
Healy et al. (1999) show that increases in disclosure ratings are associated with increases in
analyst coverage. The variable, analyst coverage, provides information on the demand side of
disclosure, while the disclosure index is primarily on the supply side. Analyst coverage attracts
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new investors, increases trading, and facilitates additional equity offerings. Hence, another
benefit of higher disclosure is the ability to have easy access to capital markets. This benefit
can be particularly important if the companies of the sample are young and fast growing.
5. Concluding remarks
The preceding discussion has focused on a number of issues and difficulties that any
researcher could face while conducting empirical research in the area of disclosure. The main
difficulty, however, remains in the absence of a theory of disclosure that could guide the
researcher. These comments do not alter the main finding of the study (i.e., there is an
increasing level of quarterly disclosure over the time period covered in the study by the
companies listed on the Neuer Markt of the Deutsche Boerse).
It is perplexing, however, that the Neuer Markt of the Deutsche Boerse has decided to
cease operations by the end of 2003 although listed companies were disclosing information
according to U.S. GAAP or the IAS.
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Dimitrios C. Ghicas raises concerns about the following issues.
1
.
Statistical tests would have increased the internal validity of the findings.
2. Some dimensions of the study could have been pursued further.
3. The absence of a theory of disclosure to guide the researcher poses a major difficulty to
anyone working in this area.
4. Deutsche Borse has decided to close down the Neuer Markt.
In the following, we will briefly discuss some aspects of these concerns.
1. Validity of statistical tests
We do not believe the application of statistical methods instead of discussion of the graphs
would have increased the validity of our findings due to the very small sample we used.
Statistical tests are helpful and necessary for a mass of data that cannot be analyzed easily.
Even with special statistical methods for small samples, we would not have come to other
conclusions. So we decided to show the patterns of the data instead of presenting statistical
numbers, thus allowing every reader to follow our analysis. We believe that the real findings
of some studies could be obscured by advanced statistical method, which is not appropriate in
these cases.
2. Some dimensions of the study could have been further pursued
We agree that some dimensions of the study could have been pursued further. However,
the analysis of the value relevance of disclosure would have changed the scope of the
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Study. Specifically, the association between stock returns following the disclosure and the
index might not give the right indication of the value relevance because in the observation
period, we explored counter-intuitive market reactions. For example, the worst-ranked
company regarding the timing and quality of quarterly disclosure showed a remarkable
market performance for the period of "bubble economy" in 2000 and 2001. However,
many market participants started to consider the disclosure quality after the dramatic crash
following that period. So a study focusing on a longer time period could certainly give
some indications.
Secondly, Ghicas proposes that we provide more insight on the profile of the groups of
companies with high or low disclosure levels, e.g., on size, debt-to-equity ratio, auditor
employed, industry composition, systematic risk, etc. We offer this study as a first step to
analyze the development of quarterly disclosure quality in the unique setting of the Neuer
Markt and admit that additional research is needed to clarify the reasons for good and bad
quarterly disclosure.
3. Absence of a theory of disclosure
We find the discussion on studies on the costs and benefits of increasing disclosure very
helpful. But we understand these studies not as a contradiction to the cost-of-capital argument
but as the concentration on an aspect that is easier to observe. This is valid, especially for
Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999).
4. Closing down of the Neuer Markt
The technology-focused Neuer Markt, once considered Europe's answer to the technology-
heavy U.S. NASDAQ Stock Market, is coming to an end. The Deutsche Borse announced
that it would close down the 5 1/2-year-old, scandal-plagued market segment by 2003
(Deutsche Borse 2002). In fact, with the switch of the last company in Neuer Markt into Prime
standard the Neuer Markt has closed on June 5, 2003 (Deutsche Borse 2003). The frenetic
phase of Europe's dot-com capitalism is coming to an end and investors now stand before a
heap of ruins, but the critical question for us relates to lessons in formation disclosure. In
announcing the restructuring of the German stock market, the Deutsche Borse indicated that it
would bring some of the Neuer Markt's better ideas to a broader market. The Prime Segment
is to include international companies and requires, as the Neuer Markt did, quarterly reports
either according to IAS or U.S. GAAP. The advantage of the Prime Segment could be that it
will stand on a broader basis and, as a consequence, ex-Neuer Markt companies become
comparable to blue-chip-companies such as DAX companies since they are now listed in the
same segment. However, the conclusion from our study, adherence to disclosure requirements
and their effective enforcement take time and resources, should be taken seriously by standard
setters. The Deutsche Borse does not seem to have heeded this message. In the light of the
impact of the EU regarding IAS Regulation (European Union 2002) to more than 7000
I
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companies, additional steps to improve the quality of financial disclosure from the EU
member states are certainly necessary.
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Abstract
This paper presents preliminary evidence on whether German corporations that issue American
depositary receipts (ADR) experience a change in the level of garbling in earnings as expressed under
German Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). In a shareholder regime, a manager's
objective is to maximize the company's stock price. Past literature suggests that this will lead managers
to follow a policy of more disclosure. In stakeholder regimes, managers have an ill-defined objective
function and their compensation is not typically sensitive to the price of the stock. This literature
suggests that managers in stakeholder regimes will manipulate earnings to satisfy the various
constituents of the firm. By issuing an ADR, a company changes its regime: shareholders become
relatively more important to the manager. To maximize the stock price, managers should minimize the
overall noise in accounting numbers even under local GAAP. The empirical results are generally
consistent with this hypothesis, but a small sample size prevents drawing definitive conclusions.
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1. Introduction
This paper provides preliminary evidence on whether German corporations that issue
American depositary receipts (ADR) experience a change in the level of garbling in their
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earnings expressed in local (i.e., German) Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP). I define garbling as noise in accounting numbers that does not carry any information
about the value of the firm.
The goal of this paper is to study the amount of discretion that managers have to change
the quality' of accounting reporting in response to changes in economic incentives. The
literature often assumes that market demand for information affects the legal structure of
accounting (i.e., how the rules are written). In addition, it typically equates demand with
financial markets, excluding other economic agents such as labor, taxing authorities, etc. Joos
and Lang (1994), for example, state that "accounting standards develop to a large part to
satisfy the needs of those who provide capital." Yet, the demand for accounting information
is broader than the needs of financial markets. The quality of financial statements may be
affected not only by the needs of the users but also possibly by the needs of those who
provide the financial statements (i.e., managers).
From a policy point of view, three things can be done to increase the quality of accounting
information: improvement standards, increase in enforcement of those standards, or change
managers' incentives. The first one is probably the most studied. There is a vast literature on
what should be the optimal accounting rule to treat a particular economic event. However,
improvement in standards alone is not sufficient to improve financial information. For
example, Harris, Lang, and Moeller (1994) find "little evidence of increased explanatory
power of accounting data (in Germany) following the Accounting Directives Law" of 1985,"
which they considered surprising because "many accounting practices in the German
reporting system were thought to be improved." This result is also supported by Joos and
Lang (1994) who find that the significant differences between European countries in financial
ratios and stock market valuation of accounting data have not been reduced by the European
directives. Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) also report that, although Southeast Asian
countries have a common law legal framework, earnings fi^om these countries exhibit
properties similar to those fi^om code law countries. They attribute this fact to weak outside
monitoring. A second option is to improve enforcement of accounting standards. Indeed, in
the United States, two legal rulings in 1983 subsequently led to an increase in accounting
conservatism.^
However, a third approach to improving accounting information is to change the incentives
for the managers who prepare the financial statements. This is, of course, related to the level
of enforcement, because economic incentives are influenced by legal penalties. However, the
two notions are not identical, as the economic incentives could be changed without changing
the legal framework. One scenario is to modify the system of corporate govemance to give
more power to shareholders. I hypothesize that reporting practices not only vary to meet the
' Accounting quality can be measured along many dimensions. For the purpose of this study, high quality is
defined as having low amounts of garbling.
" In the late 1970s and 1980s, the European Community passed several directives aimed at improving
accounting standards in Europe. In particular, the Fourth Directive required additional financial disclosure. The
Seventh Directive required consolidated accounts.
^ See Basu (1997) or Kothari, Lys, and Watts (19X8).
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demands of economic agents such as shareholders, creditors, labor unions, and taxing
authorities but also are affected by the supply side (i.e., the managers' incentives). When a
German firm issues ADR, it changes its economic regime (i.e., the importance of different
users changes, which means that the manager's incentives also change), but it still must report
under local GAAP. There is no change in the accounting standard. Arguably, the enforcement
is stiffer after the ADR issuance because the firm would be subject to the U.S. securities laws
and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). However, the SEC is more concerned with
the accounting informafion published under U.S. GAAP (or the reconciliation with U.S.
GAAP) than with the information released under German GAAP. The study of how
accounting properties change after issuance of ADR provides a natural experiment to see
how much fi^eedom a manager has to modify the quality of accounting numbers under a given
GAAP regime.
It now appears that the literature (e.g., Brummer, 1991) accepted the different goal
phenomenon: the goals of managers are different in shareholder countries such as the United
States or the United Kingdom from such goals in stakeholder countries such as Germany. In a
shareholder regime, the manager's objective is to maximize the company's stock price,
whereas in a stakeholder regime the objective function is not so well defined. Management
compensation is often directly linked to share value in the first regime, but it is not typically
sensitive to stock price in the second one (Murphy, 1999). Past literature suggests that if
managers want to maximize the stock price, they will disclose more information (e.g.,
Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Jovanovic, 1982) and engage less in eamings management
(e.g., Alford, Jones, Leftwich, & Zmijewski, 1993; Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995). However,
managers facing strong stakeholders tend to manipulate infomiation in general and eamings
in particular to satisfy the various constituents of the firm (e.g., Bowen, DuCharme, & Shores,
1995). Thus, the difference in objectives affects not only the general amount of information
disclosed but also the amount of value-irrelevant information incorporated into the account-
ing numbers.
Issuing ADR changes the company's economic regime, and as a result, shareholders
become a relatively more important constituency (i.e., they become more important in the
manager's objective function). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the manager's com-
pensation becomes more closely tied to stock price after ADR issuance. Therefore, firms
issuing ADR, although originating from a stakeholder regime, should behave more like firms
in a shareholder economy: disclosure, and accounting quality should increase.
The hypothesis that accounting garbling declines after ADR issuance leads to three testable
predictions. Specifically, (1) local eamings numbers should become more value relevant, (2)
accruals should be priced at a higher level, and (3) accruals should become better predictors
of future profitability. In testing the first hypothesis, I operationalize value relevance using a
regression of price on book value (of equity) and abnormal eamings. I measure the amount of
information in eamings and book value by considering their respective incremental R". I also
consider the change in the magnitude of the abnormal eamings coefficient. With respect to the
second hypothesis, Subramanyam (1996) finds that, in the United States, discretionary
accruals are positively valued by the market, suggesting that managers of U.S. firms use
accruals to convey useful information beyond that contained in cash flows. If managers in
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Stakeholder economies use discretionary accruals to garble earnings, the market should not
price them. If the reporting becomes more truthful after the ADR issuance, accruals, and
especially discretionary accruals, should be valued significantly and positively. With respect
to the third hypothesis, Subramanyam notes that discretionary accruals are informative in that
they help predict future profitability. If managers start to use accruals to convey more truthfiil
information about valuation, there should be a stronger positive correlation between accruals
and future profitability.
I test these hypotheses using German data. While there is a consensus that the United States is
the archetype of the shareholder regime, Japan and Germany are presented as the typical cases
ofthe stakeholder regime. This may lead academics and practitioners to believe that the German
accounting system leads to lower quality than the U.S. system. For example, past surveys
indicate that a majority of German managers and academics consider U.S. GAAP to be more
informative than German GAAP (Foerschle, Glaum, & Mandler, 1995, 1998). Similarly, Alford
et al. ( 1 993) report that U.S. GAAP has a higher information content than German GAAP, while
Harris et al. (1994) report that the value relevance of financial statements (expressed by the
explanatory power of a regression of price on earnings and book value) is higher in the United
States than in Germany. This study will fiirther investigate this claim.
German GAAP present two additional interesting features that make it worthwhile to study.
First, consolidated accounts have been required since 1985. Second, until April 1998, firms
were required to prepare consolidated financial statements in accordance with German GAAP,
whether or not their shares were traded on a foreign market.^ Thus, the German accounting
regime is different but in some respects is comparable to the American one. To distinguish
hypothesized outcomes from confounding factors arising at the time of issuance, I compare the
results obtained from the sample of German issuers with those obtained from a random sample
ofGerman non-ADR-issuing firms and a sample ofBritish ADR-issuing firms. The first sample
controls for systematic movements in the German economy; the second controls for changes
associated with ADR issuance but not with changes in corporate govemance (because the
British system is typically considered more similar to the American one).
Empirical results are generally consistent with the predictions. However, a limited sample
size precludes performing robust statistical analysis or controlling for self-selection in the
sample. The results should therefore be considered as exploratory and tentative. As
hypothesized, the value relevance tests indicate that the incremental R" due to the inclusion
of abnormal earnings in the regression increases over time. In addition, the magnitude and
significance of the coefficient on abnormal eamings increases for German ADR-issuing firms
but not for either the British issuers or the German nonissuers. The change in the explanatory
power of accruals also supports the hypothesis of a reduction in garbling. In the preissuance
period, the coefficient on accruals is insignificant. In the issuance and postissuance periods,
the magnitude of the coefficient increases and the coefficient becomes significant. A sample
of British firms does not exhibit the same degree of change. Finally, accruals also appear to
become a better predictor of future cash flows. The coefficient on contemporary accruals
* To increase homogeneity in the sample, 1 focus on German firms.
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increases in both magnitude and significance. The R~ of the regression using cash flow
decreases, however, indicating that cash flows may become more difficult to predict after an
ADR issuance.
This paper contributes to our understanding of foreign accounting practices. Specifically, it
adds to the literature by exploring the idea that the alleged lower quality of German
accounting information is not only due to the way the rules (i.e., GAAP) are written" but
also to the way they are implemented by managers. It also links accounting properties with
corporate governance and managers' incentives. In so doing, it shows that the relations found
at the firm level in the United States (Bowen et al., 1995; Warfield et al., 1995) between a
manager's stock price sensitivity or the importance of stakeholder to the manager and
accounting choices are also found intemationally. This paper differs from previous interna-
tional research that typically treats all non-Anglo Saxon countries as one group and ignores
the heterogeneity in corporate governance across countries. By focusing exclusively on one
country, this research establishes a more direct link between institutional structures and
empirical accounting behavior. However, the cost of this approach is to drastically reduce
sample size.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses and
presents the testable implications. Section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 describes the
empirical design and outlines the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Hypotheses development
2.1. Managers' goals in different regimes
2.1.1. Objectives in the stakeholder regime
In stakeholder economies, the manager's objective is to maximize the welfare of the firm
and not necessarily that of its owners. For example, Balz (1999) states that, as a matter of
German law, "management has a fiduciary duty to the company and not directly to the
shareholders." Consequently, managers must balance their actions to maximize the poten-
tially conflicting goals of all constituents of the firm (e.g., employees, customers, suppliers,
creditors, the state, shareholders, or even the environment). For example, they may want to
appear less risky so that creditors will keep extending credit but not look too profitable so that
labor will not ask for high irreversible pay raises (as wages cannot be reduced in bad times
and firing is difficult and costly).
The personal incentives of managers are influenced by these conflicting goals. Executive
compensation is not strongly tied to stock prices. For example. Murphy (1999) reports that
"(U.S. executives) are paid differently than CEOs elsewhere: U.S. CEOs receive a larger
fraction of their pay in the form of stock options and a lower fraction in the form of salaries
(. . .). Indeed, stock options (and other long-term incentives) are absent in 9 of the 23
^ This paper is agnostic on the quahty of the standard themselves.
I360 G. Hilary / The International Journal of Accounting 38 (2003) 355-376
countries surveyed and comprise less than 5% of total pay in 23 countries." In fact, the
main risk for the manager is often to be fired if earnings are lower than expected. Kaplan
(1994) reports that the turnover of the chairman of the management board in Germany is
not related to poor stock performance but to negative earnings. Consequently, in a
stakeholder economy, managers have very limited personal upside benefits arising from
disclosing more good news; they are mostly salaried employees and face personal risks by
disclosing bad news (i.e., the risk of being fired in case of weak accounting performance).*^
They, therefore, have an incentive to garble accounting numbers in order to reach their
conflicting goals.
2.1.2. Shareholder regime and stock price maximization
In a shareholder economy, the goal of managers (abstracting from agency problems) is to
maximize shareholders' value subject to various regulatory or economic consfraints. In
general, poor disclosure lowers stock prices because only the worst companies would choose
not to disclose more information (assuming that there are no disclosure costs) (see Grossman,
1981; Jovanovic, 1982; Milgrom, 1981; Spence, 1973). When a price-maximizing manager
withholds information, investors lose confidence in quality of the investment the manager has
made and they discount its quality to the point where the manager is always better off with a
full disclosure policy.^ Empirical results by Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) support these
predictions.*^ Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) also report that large firms, which are more
likely to issue ADR,^ benefit most by more disclosure."^ In addition. Diamond (1985) also
shows that additional disclosure increases the welfare of shareholders because of explicit
information cost savings (i.e., shareholders do not have to devote resources to acquiring
private information) and improved risk sharing. '
'
^ Empirically, Ball et al. (2000) find that conservatism is stronger in stakeholder countries than in shareholder
ones.
^ Diamond and Verrecchia present an alternative argument. They theorize that revealing public information
reduces information asymmetry. This reduces the firm's cost of capital by attracting increased demand from large
investors due to the increased liquidity of its securities. Finally, Perotti and von Thaden (1998) show that a bank-
controlled firm will disclose less than a shareholder-run firm. Their argument relies on the fact that additional
disclosure will affect competitors' production levels. This will increase the expected value and the variability of
profits and output for the firm that discloses. Therefore, creditor-controlled firms will discourage transparency to
increase the value of the firm's debt, but firms controlled by fully diversified shareholders will encourage
transparency.
^ The authors find a reduction in the bid-ask spread and an increase in trading volume (but not a decrease in price
volatility) after German firms start reporting under U.S. GAAP.
Foerster and Karolyi ( 1 999) indicate that "cross-listed firms tend to be very large with an average capitalizafion
of US$2.5 billion."
The intuition for this result is that the larger the size of the fimi, the more the security price depends on how
broad a market the firm attracts. For large firms, it is important to attract large holdings from institutional investors
who make large trades and are more concerned about future liquidity.
'
' This arises because public information makes traders' beliefs more homogenous and reduces the magnitude of
speculative positions that informed traders take.
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2.2. Accounting implications
2.2.1. Previous empirical findings on financial reporting quality
Although the previous section suggests that managers in a stakeholder regime disclose
more than will managers in a shareholder regime, this does not necessarily imply that the
additional disclosure will be accomplished through higher-quality accounting. However,
Botosan (1997) reports some evidence that "a measure of disclosure level produced by
examining any one aspect of corporate reporting could proxy for the general level of
disclosure provided by a firm."
In addition, the literature suggests that corporate governance and managers' incentives
have implications for earnings properties as well. At the economy level. Ball et al. (2000)
report that properties of earnings vary internationally in response to various institutional
backgrounds. They further claim that the "most important institutional factor influencing
international differences in earnings properties is corporate governance" and that "the
demand for public disclosure is not as great in code law as in common law countries."
Alford et al. (1993) also find that, controlling for the variance of financial markets, U.S.
financial statements are generally more value relevant'" and timelier.'^ At the firm level,
Warfield et al. (1995) establish a link between corporate governance and earnings
properties. They report the following two results:
( 1
)
The explanatory power of accounting earnings for stock returns is systematically related
to managerial ownership. The more managers own stocks (and hence are more concerned
about shareholder value), '^ the more earnings are value relevant. This is consistent with
the assertion that financial reporting is more truthful in shareholder countries, where
managers care more about stock prices.'^
(2) The amount of accruals is systematically related to managerial ownership (the less stock
managers own, the more they manage earnings). Warfield et al. analyze this relation as
the manager's attempt to capitalize on the latitude in reporting accounting numbers to
mitigate contractual constraints. The relation between stakeholders and accounting
choices has also been empirically documented by Bowen et al. (1995). Even in a
shareholder economy, they establish a relation between stakeholders' importance and
' Exceptions are other Anglo Saxon countries (e.g., Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom) as well as
France and Switzerland.
'" They report that only Ireland and the United Kingdom are timelier than the United States.
''^ Murphy (1999) reports that pay performance sensitivities are driven primarily by stock options and stock
ownership and not by other forms of compensation.
"^ American managers typically own a higher percentage of their corporations than their counterparts in
stakeholder countries. Holdemess, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) report that the average percentage of ownership
for American managers has been increasing since the 1930s from 13% in 1935 to 21% in 1995. Short and Keasey
(1999) report a decline from 13.3% in 1988 to 1 1.4% in 1992 in the United Kingdom. Anecdotal evidence seems
to suggest that the gap is even greater in continental Europe.
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accounting choices. For example, they report a negative relation in the United Kingdom
between unionization rate and result-decreasing accounting methods.'^
2.3. Effects of the ADR issuance
By issuing ADR and being traded in the United States, a company moves, at least partially,
from a stakeholder regime to a shareholder regime; hence, the relevance of the different
constituents as well as the manager's compensation are modified.
First, the importance of a firm's different constituents changes for managers. The power of
labor remains essentially the same because labor still has representation on the supervisory
board in Germany. Shareholders become relatively more important and creditors (especially
banks) become less important to management, however. The power of banks decreases for
two reasons. First, ADR may be used to raise capital, which dilutes the banks' share of the
firm's capital. Second, and more important, German banks do not control the ADR votes
through proxies as they do for German shares because they do not act as the custodian. ^^
Baums and Fraune (1999) report that, in their sample, "'"^ German banks control 84% of all
attending votes while owning only about 7% of equity. Most of the banks' controlling power
comes from confrolling proxy votes. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) report an average change in
the shareholder base of 28.8% following an ADR issuance,'^ while Becht and Boehmer
(1999) report that controlling 30% of the votes at an annual meeting of German companies
may be sufficient to sway the decisions. Hence, the capital floating in the United States is
sufficient to limit the banks' influence.
At the same time, shareholders become more important because the company faces a new
clientele of stockholders (in the U.S. markets) who are accustomed to more stringent financial
disclosure, valuation of profitability, and different corporate governance. These new share-
holders may be the marginal investor. For example, Hedvall, Liljeblom, and Nammelin
'^ Even if accounting numbers are becoming more truthful, it is still possible that once the U.S. numbers are
released, the German numbers become totally irrelevant for the investors and therefore would not be affected by
this predicted rise in disclosure quality. For example, if the American numbers were sufficient statistics for the
German statements, investors would rely only on U.S. financial statements. However, the lack of interest in
German GAAP data is not supported empirically. First, Level 1 ADR companies are not required to issue financial
statements in accordance or reconciled with U.S. GAAP. Therefore, U.S. GAAP statements may not be available.
Besides, firms that reconcile typically do not do so in a timely fashion (generally 6 months after the fiscal yearend,
close to the SEC deadline) (Gomik-Tomaszewski & Rozen, 1999). in addition, Chan and Seow (1996) report that
earnings based on foreign GAAP are more closely associated with contemporaneous stock returns than are
earnings reconciled to U.S. GAAP. Conversely, Amir, Harris, and Venuti (1993) report that 20-F reconciliations
are value relevant. These two results suggest that investors use both domestic and U.S. GAAP numbers to evaluate
the company.
' German banks typically receive power of attorney for the stocks for which they act as custodian.
'*^ The sample was composed of 24 of the top 100 listed firms that had more than 50% of their shares widely
held in 1995.
'
' This number is calculated for a sample of ADR from 1 1 different countries in Asia, Canada, continental
Europe, and the United Kingdom.
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(1999) report that, for the Finnish firm Nokia, the New York market has a more dominant
effect on stock price than does the Helsinki market. Hubbard (1992) also finds that in many
instances ADR returns are significantly more correlated with American markets than with
European markets."^ Then, if the managers want to retain these new shareholders,"' they must
either disclose more information or compensate them for taking additional risk associated
with lower disclosure. The disclosure route is likely to be the case because most ADR holders
are institutional investors"" who actively demand increasing disclosure and improving
corporate governance practices.
The manager's compensation is also affected both directly and indirectly by the ADR
issuance. First, although I am unaware of any systematic study, anecdotal evidence suggests
that European managers receive more stock options once their company is listed in the
United States. For example. The Economist states that "Daimler-Benz has listed its shares
in New York, (and started offering) its executives bonuses linked to the share price.
Managerial performance used to be measured by a complicated formula unknown outside
the company. The firm has now replaced that with the shareholder-friendly aim of increasing
return on equity.""" In fact, several German firms initiated a stock option program shortly
after issuing ADR.^"*
2.4. Testable implications
I test whether eamings under German GAAP become more value relevant after ADR
issuance accruals are priced at a higher level and whether eamings become better predictors
of future profitability. A discussion of each test follows.
2.4.1. Value relevance of earnings and book value
I operationalize value relevance using a regression of price on book value and abnormal
eamings (Collins, Maydew, & Weiss, 1997; Dechow, Hutton, & Sloan, 1999). This test
implicitly assumes information efficiency of the German market.
In a world where the firm discloses limited information other than mandatory require-
ments, investors will rely relatively more on book values. Book values should be relatively
less subject to noise than eamings because over the long mn, accmals reverse. Conversely, if
managers decide to reduce garbling in eamings, the noise would be reduced faster in eamings
than it would in book values. I therefore predict that investors would rely more on eamings
His study, however, does not include German companies.
If there is too much discrepancy between supply and demand in the American market and the local market,
ADR are redeemed and the underlying stocks become directly traded in the domestic market again. This process is
known as "flowback."
Velli (1994) reports that retail investors represent only 30% of ADR trading volume.
The Economist, July 13, 1996, "Le Defi Americain, again."
BASF nearly simultaneously issued ADR and created a stock option program {Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, February 2, 1999). Deutsche Bank and RWE issued ADR in 1995 and a stock option program in 1997
(Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1998) and 1998 (Borsen-Zeitung, October 7, 1998).
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after a decrease in garbling. To test the first liypothesis, I consider the incremental R~
attributed to including abnormal earnings in a regression of market value on book value. If
abnormal earnings become more value relevant, the R~ should increase.
2.4.2. Market pricing of accruals
The second prediction concerns the pricing of accruals. The extant literature suggests that
accruals, on average, have incremental information content above cash flows (e.g., Bowen,
Burgstahler, & Daley, 1987). However, managers can either use accruals to convey
information beyond that contained in cash flows or try to manipulate the market or avoid
losses. There exists a long literature on U.S. managers trying to manipulate earnings to meet
various goals, e.g., among other reasons, to avoid losses (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997), to
smooth earnings (DeFond & Park, 1997), and to meet regulatory requirements (Beatty,
Chamberlain, & Magliolo, 1996). Yet, Subramanyam (1996) finds that, in the United States,
discretionary accruals are positively valued by the market and have incremental explanatory
pricing power over both nondiscretionary accruals and cash flows. On the other hand, Bartov,
Goldberg, and Kim (1998) find that in Germany and Japan, earnings are not superior to cash
flows for equity valuation purposes.""
The question arises as to the role of discretionary accruals in a stakeholder regime. If
managers in stakeholder regimes use discretionary accruals to garble earnings and thus add
noise to cash flows, the market would not price accruals before ADR issuance. After issuance
of ADR, managers would be expected to use accruals as in the stockholder economy and
accruals should be priced."^ To test this prediction, I regress market value on book value,
operational cash flows, and operational accruals."^ I predict that the coefficient on accruals
becomes signiflcantly positive after issuing ADR and would also increase in magnitude.
2.4.3. Profitability predictions
The third prediction concerns the power of accounting numbers to predict profitability.
Subramanyam (1996) notes that discretionary accruals are informative insofar as they help to
predict future profitability. He reports that in the United States such accruals are positively
associated with future operating cash flows, nondiscretionary income, and net income.
To test this prediction, I regress future operational cash flows on contemporary operational
accruals (controlling for contemporary operational cash flows) before and after the issuance of
ADR. I predict that the regressions R~ as well as the value and the significance ofthe coefficient
on accruals should increase after ADR issuance. This test has also an additional advantage. One
possible interpretation ofADR issuance is as a signaling device. It is possible that the issuing
^^ There is an exception in their nonconsoUdated Japanese sample.
"'' This test assumes that the market correctly incorporates the information (see Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001).
'''
This test is a test of statistical association and does not claim to be a full-fledged valuation model. As
explained by Francis and Schipper (1999), "the presence of statistical association does not, in or of itself, mean
that the information in question is actually used by the investors in setting prices, only that it is conelated with the
information that is used. (...) This definition of value relevance is measured by the ability of the financial
statement to capture and summarize information that affects share values. This interpretation abstracts from
timeliness and market expectations."
I
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Fig. 1. Date of issuance of German ADR. The following graph summarizes the distribution of the date of issuance
of sponsored ADR. The dates are retrieved from the Bank of New York Web site.
firms have always released high-quality accounting numbers, which increase but were
incapable of credibly signaling this quality to the market. After the issuance, investors would
rely more on accounting numbers, which increases the association between accounting
numbers and stock prices. This reasoning does not explain why some firms would have
higher-quality accounting information. By avoiding the use of any stock prices or returns, this
test circumvents this issue and looks more directly at the quality of eamings.
3. Sample
ADR are identified using the Web site of the Bank of New York.*^^ Thirty-seven German
companies (including six banks or insurance companies) had issued sponsored ADR by the
end of 1999. Out of the 31 different industrial companies, 13 were traded on an organized
market (7 on NYSE and 6 on Nasdaq), 13 were traded OTC, and 5 were traded under the
144a rule. Information about the date of issuance, given in Fig. 1, indicates that the majority
of German ADR were issued after 1994. The industry composition of the sample is presented
in Fig. 2. Heavy industries and industrial goods are the main groups. To improve the
consistency of the sample, companies fi*om the insurance and banking sector are excluded.
Returns and accounting information are retrieved fi^om DataStream."*^ Because DataStream
retroactively modifies numbers, for example, in case of mergers, the numbers used in this
study are not the numbers as released.^°
http://www.bankofriy.com.
"^ DataStream was used instead of other sources such as Global Vantage because it provided a better coverage
of German ADR-issuing firms.
The database is also subject to potential survivor bias. This is, however, not an issue in this study because no
German ADR companies went bankrupt. (This may, of course, weaken the power of the tests.) Also note that firms
that decide to issue ADR are presumably the ones that have lower costs (relative to the benefits) to do so. Thus,
there is a self-selection bias in the sample that may understate the extent of the possible reduction in garbling for
firms reporting under German GAAR
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Fig. 2. German ADR's industry distribution. The following graph summarizes the distribution of ADR by
industries. Data are retrieved from the Bank of New York Web site. Companies from the banking and insurance
sector are excluded from this study.
I divide the sample into three periods: the preissuance period (4 or more years before ADR
issuance), the issuance period (between 3 years before the issuance and the issuance year) and
the postissuance period/^ ^ To fiirther increase the consistency of the analysis, I require that all
firms in my sample have at least one observation in each of the three periods. These
requirements lead to a sample of 10 firms.^"
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. Table 2 provides correlations coefficients. The
sharp increase in market value in the postissuance period is due to strong growth in the
capitalization of one of the companies (Mannesmann). The profitability increases between the
preissuance and the postissuance periods. Consistent with the idea that German managers
consistently smooth eamings and produce conservative book values, the average accruals are
negative and are negatively correlated with both eamings and cash flows. This negative
correlation weakens (but does not disappear) in the postissuance period.
4. Results^^
All results are reported in millions of euros for German companies and millions of pounds
for British firms.
Taking 3 years for the issuance period also ensures that the size of the three samples is comparable. It is
likely that a company that plans to issue ADR starts reducing the garbling several years before the issuance.
Discussions with practitioners indicate that the delay between the decision and the actual issuance may be around
3 years.
"
" BASF, Bayer, Continental, Fresinius, Henkel, Mannesmann, Puma, RWE, SAP, and Veba. Schwartz Pharma
is also included in the last test.
" Following Harris et al. (1994), I do not use a short window approach for several reasons. Due to capital
structure and lax nondisclosure laws, it may be difficult to determine the exact date when financial statements are
released, in addition, from a practical point of view, it may be difficult to find the information itself even if a
precise date were to exist.
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Table 1
Summary and descriptive statistics (in millions of euros)
Mean Overall Preissuance Issuance Postissuance
period period period
MV 7556 3321 5968 17,505
Return 21.71 9.44 34.7 26.97
BV 3816 2940 3550 5506
Earnings 426 274 358 747
Percent of losses 5.3 8.5 5.5
ONE 710 515 513 1269
OCF 1420 1110 1243 2058
OAC -695 -592 -730 -788
n 116 36 30 50
Summary statistics are presented for the following variables: MV = Market value at the end of fiscal year (as
defined in DataStream), Return = unadjusted return over the fiscal year (as defined in DataStream), BV
(DataStream Item 307), Earnings (DataStream Item 175), Percent of losses = percentage of firms that exhibit
negative earnings. Operating net income (DataStream Item 993), and OCF = Operating net income (DataStream
Item 993) plus Operational depreciation and provisions (Item 696) minus change in Current assets (change in Item
376) excluding Cash (Item 375) plus change in Current liabilities (change in Item 389). OAC are estimated by the
difference between operating net income and operating cash flows.
4.1. The value relevance of abnormal earnings
To test the first hypothesis, I run Eq. (1) as a pooled regression
,34
(1)
where MV, = Market value of the firm (as defined in DataStream) 3 months after the closing
of the books, BV, = Book value (DataStream Item 307), and AE, = Abnormal earnings defined
as net income after taxes (DataStream Item 623) minus a charge for capital equal to 12% of
the beginning book value. The rate of 12% is supported by Dechow et al. (1999) but remains
somewhat arbitrary. A sensitivity check is done on this assumption. Results (not reported)
indicate that the analysis is not sensitive to this assumption.
Table 3 contains the results. As seen there, although abnormal eamings are significant in the
preissuance period and both the magnitude and the significance of the coefficient increase over
time. The R^ remains stable between the preissuance period (92.8%) and the issuance period
35(91.3%) but declines in the postissuance period. " To test the significance of the change in
coefficients, I run a pooled regression using the data for the three periods. I include interaction
The size of the data set is insufficiently large to run fime series or panel regressions in a meaningful way.
The pooled specification, however, is not without problems because it forces all firms to have the same coefficient.
Results can therefore be driven by changes in the homogeneity of the sample.
^' To mitigate the possible influence of outliers, I rerun the regression in the postissuance period excluding
Mannesmann. The magnitude of the coefficient on eamings is smaller (9.0 vs. 1 1 .6), but the significance is similar
(? statistics of 2.45 instead of 2.44). The coefficient on book value is larger and more significant. As a robustness
check, 1 also rerun the regressions using eamings instead of abnormal eamings. Similar, or even stronger results
(not reported), are obtained.
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Table 2
Pearson correlation table
MV Return BV Earnings AE ONE OCF
Return .31 (.000)
BV .75 (.000) - .07 (.46)
Earnings .51 (.000) -.03 (.73) .82 (.000)
AE .21 (.031) .04 (.65) .12 (.21) .57 (.000)
ONE .78 (.000) - .04 (.68) .86 (.000) .95 (.000) .54 (.000)
OCF .77 (.000) - .05 (.60) .95 (.000) .90 (.000) .27 (.006) .86 (.000)
OAC - .55 (.000) .05 (.61) - .80 (.000) - .62 (.000) .06 (.57) - .52 (.000) - .88 (.000)
Correlations are presented for the following variables: MV = Market value at the end of fiscal year (as defined in
DataStream). Return = unadjusted return over the fiscal year (as defined in DataStream), BV = Book value
(DataStream Item 307), Earnings (DataStream Item 175), AE = Abnormal earnings (DataStream Item 623 minus a
charge for capital used equal to 12% of previous book value). Operating net income (DataStream Item 993), and
OCF = Operating net income (DataStream Item 993) plus Operational depreciation and provisions (Item 696) minus
change in Current assets (change in Item 376) excluding Cash (Item 375) plus change in Current liabilities (change in
Item 389). OAC are estimated by the difference between operating net income and operating cash flows.
The P-values are in brackets.
terms, the product of a dummy variable for each period with the explanatory variables. The
interaction variables are significant for the book value (at the 1% level) and for the abnormal
eamings (at the 10% level) in the postissuance period. Consistent with Collins et al. (1997), the
variables in the model above are not deflated and are thus possibly subject to heteroskedasticity.
However, when the variables are deflated by total sales, results are comparable. ^^ The data also
potentially suffer from serial and cross correlation. However, due to the small size ofthe sample,
no meaningful corrective measure can be directly implemented."^^
To control for systematic changes in the value relevance of all German firms, I compare the
results of these regressions with a sample of firms that did not issue ADR. I randomly draw
1000 samples fi"om a control group. To be included in the control group, firms must have all
the data (book value, abnormal eamings, and market value) available in DataStream for the
year, be industrial (financial and real estate companies are excluded), and be a German
(subsidiaries or joint venture of foreign groups are excluded) company. In addition, I require
that the size ofthe firms in the control group be in the range of size ofthe ADR-issuing firms. ^^
Both samples (ADR and control) have the same number of observations in a given year.^^
The coefficient on abnormal eamings increases in magnitude and in significance. The significance of the
coefficient on book value decreases. The /?"'s are, however, lower, except in the preissuance period.
In addition, DataStream does not have time series of the number of shares for the German ADR-issuing
firms. This and the fact that the regressions are run undeflated have the practical advantage of avoiding the "scale
effect" described by Brown, Lo, and Lys (1999). However, as explained by Ohlson (2000), using the residual
model on an all-equity basis implies making fairly strong assumptions (i.e., no change in the number of shares and
no new shareholders who derive a net benefit from their capital contribution).
Relaxing the condition on size gives similar results.
" Because DataStream does not report business sectors, matching on industry would require intensive data
collection. In addition, due to the relatively small size of the German market, finding matching firms may not always
be feasible.
>
G. Hilary / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 355-376 369
Table 3
Change in value relevance for German ADR-issuing companies
Before Issuance After
Intercept
t statistics
BV
t statistics
AE
t statistics
Number of observations
217
(0.75)
1.25
(19.97)
2.55
(2.45)
92.8
36
275
(0.43)
1.67
(15.38)
6.60
(3.15)
91.3
30
4035
(2.26)
1.56
(6.46)
11.59
(21.44)
53.3
50
Model: Eq. (1), where MV, = Market value (as defined in DataStream), BV, = Book value (DataStream Item 307),
and AE, = Abnormal earnings (DataStream Item 623 minus a charge for capital used equal to 12% of previous
book value).
The regressions are run three times using German data: the period immediately preceding the issuance period of
the ADR, the issuance period (year — 3 to year 0), and the period following the issuance of the ADR. Issuance
dates are retrieved fi-om the Bank of New York Web site.
Results are reported in Table 4. In the preissuance periods, the population of ADR-issuing
firms exhibits properties close to the nonissuing firms. The coefficient on abnormal
earnings is, however, on average not significant. In both the issuance and the postissuance
periods, the magnitude of the coefficient on earnings in the ADR group is twice as large as
that in the control group. In addition, the coefficient of the control group remains on
average insignificant.
To control for ADR effects unrelated to changes in corporate governance, I also compare
the results fi-om a sample of British ADR-issuing firms. One would anticipate that, because
the British system of corporate govemance is closer to the American one than it is to the
Table 4
Change in value relevance for non-ADR-issuing German companies
Before Issuance After
Intercept
t statistics
BV
t statistics
AE
t statistics
Number of observations
182
(0.99)
1.83
(2.14)
1.57
(0.15)
79
1000
16
(0.07)
2.30
(1.98)
3.38
(0.31)
85.0
1000
37
(0.05)
2.53
(1.41)
7.24
(0.45)
80.0
1000
Model: Eq. (1), where MV, = Market value (as defined in DataStream), BV, = Book value (DataStream Item 307),
and AE, = Abnormal earnings (DataStream Item 623 minus a charge for capital used equal to 12% of previous
book value).
The control sample is formed by 1000 random samples of German firms that have not issued ADR but whose data
are available in DataStream. The random samples are matched on years with the sample of fums issuing an ADR.
Average and / statistics of the various parameters are reported.
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Table 5
Change in value relevance for UK companies
Before Issuance After
Intercept 201 511 804
/statistics (2.47) (1.62) (2.07)
BV 1.61 1.74 1.98
r statistics (23.4) (7.57) (7.89)
AE 3.39 10.33 6.81
/statistics (7.06) (5.88) (5.93)
R- 76.4 57.5 47.0
Number of observations 228 135 299
Model: Eq. (1), where MV, = Market value (as defined in DataStream), BV, = Book value (DataStream Item 307),
and AE, = Abnormal earnings (DataStream Item 623 minus a charge for capital used equal to 12% of previous
book value).
The regressions are run three times using UK data: the period immediately preceding the issuance period of the
ADR, the issuance period (year — 3 to year 0), and the period following the issuance of the ADR. Issuance dates
are retrieved from the Bank of New York Web site.
German, the effect ofADR issuance should be less important. Consistent with this prediction,
results in Table 5 indicate that the magnitude of the coefficient on abnormal earnings
increases after the issuance but that the change for the British group is smaller than in the
German sample. The difference between the two samples, however, cannot be statistically
established. In addition, the significance of the coefficient on abnormal earnings remains
stable, but the R~ value steadily decreases over time.
While these results are consistent with the prediction that changes lead earnings to
become more significant for investors after a German firm issued an ADR, they are
difficult to interpret. For example, the increase in the magnitude of the coefficient could
also be explained by structural changes in the way the firm operates.'*^ To study more
directly the amount of information contained respectively in earnings and book value, I
consider the incremental R~. The value of the eamings incremental R~ steadily increases
over time. In the preissuance period, there is no difference in adjusted R~ between the
fiill model and the model with book value only (92.3% vs. 91.2%), whereas the
difference with a model containing only abnormal eamings is large (92.3% vs. 3.1%).
In the issuance period, the difference in the book value model increases slightly (by
3% 90.6% vs. 87.6%) but is reduced in the eamings model by 78.8% (90.6% vs.
11.8%). In the postissuance period, the trend continues: the difference becomes 5.1%
for the book value model (51.3% vs. 46.2%) but 41% for the eamings model (51.3%)
vs. 9.9%).
^ One possible explanation would be that abnormal eamings become more permanent. Yet, this is
somewhat counterintuitive, because one would expect German companies to move from a stable environment
(i.e., low variability and low returns) to a more volatile one (i.e., high risk and high returns). Consistent with
this analysis, the mean and the standard deviation of the abnormal eamings monotonically increase over the
three periods.
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Table 6
Value relevance of accruals versus cash flows for German ADR-issuing firms
German Preissuance Issuance Postissuance
period period period
Intercept 197 26 2687
t statistics (0.64) (1.01) (1.54)
BV 1.30 2.34 1.28
t statistics (6.11) (3.84) (1.51)
OCF 0.25 2.61 4.71
t statistics (0.40) (2.62) (1.64)
OAC 0.87 3.51 5.24
t statistics (1.35) (2.69) (2.12)
R' 92.0 91.1 61.3
Number of observations 36 30 49
Model: Eq. (2), where MV = Market value at the end of fiscal year (as defined in DataStream), BV, = Book value
(DataStream Item 307), and OCF, = Operating net income (DataStream Item 993) plus Operational depreciation
and provisions (Item 696) minus change in Current assets (change in Item 376) excluding Cash (Item 375) plus
change in Current liabilities (change in Item 389). Operating accruals are estimated by the difference between
operating net income and operating cash flows.
The regressions are run three times using German data: the period immediately preceding the issuance period of
the ADR, the issuance period (year — 3 to year 0), and the period following the issuance of the ADR. Issuance
dates are retrieved from the Bank of New York Web site.
4.2. Pricing of accruals
To test the second hypothesis, I nan the following regression:
MV, = a + ^1 BV, + ^.OCF, + ^3OAC, + £, (2)
where MV, = Market value at the end of fiscal year (as defined in DataStream), BV, = Book
value (DataStream Item 307), OCF, = Operating cash flows, and OAC, = Operating accruals.
Operating cash flows are estimated as Operating net income (DataStream Item 993) plus
Operational depreciation and provisions (Item 696) minus change in Current assets (change in
Item 376) excluding Cash (Item 375) plus change in Current liabilities (change in Item 389).
Operating accruals are estimated by the difference between operating net income and
operating cash flows.
The results in Table 6 indicate that, in the preissuance period, book values explain most of
the changes in the market. The coefficients on both cash flows and accruals are insignificant.
During the issuance period, the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on book value is
reduced but increase for the coefficient cash flows. The coefficient on accruals increases from
0.87 to 3.51, with a t statistic of 2.69. This phenomenon persists in the postissuance period.
The coefficient on OAC is 5.24, with a t statistic of 2.12.'^' Because the standard errors in the
"*' When Mannesmann is excluded from the sample, the coefficient is 4.92, with a / statistic of 2.52, and cash
flows cease to be significant.
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Table 7
Value relevance of accruals versus cash flows for British ADR-issuing firms
Preissuance Issuance Postissuance
period period period
Intercept 72 131 -503
t statistics (0.50) (0.32) (-1.06)
BV -0.27 -0.3 -1.7
t statistics (-1.22) (-0.81) (-3.38)
OCF 12.6 13.87 21.1
t statistics (11.4) (8.82) (17.0)
OAC 11.4 13.9 12.9
t statistics (8.19) (7.01) (9.07)
R- 92.7 69.6 83.9
Number of observations 49 80 113
Model: Eq. (2), where MV = Market value at the end of fiscal year (as defined in DataStream), BV, = Book value
(DataStream Item 307). and OCF, = Operating net income (DataStream Item 993) plus Operational depreciation
and provisions (Item 696) minus change in Current assets (change in Item 376) excluding Cash (Item 375) plus
change in Current liabilities (change in Item 389). Operating accruals are estimated by the difference between
operating net income and operating cash flows.
The regressions are run three times using German data: the period immediately preceding the issuance period of
the ADR, the issuance period (year — 3 to year 0), and the period following the issuance of the ADR. Issuance
dates are retrieved irom the Bank of New York Web site.
regressions are potentially affected by cross correlation or heteroskedasticity, I use bootstrap
estimates that utilize repeated sampling to obtain more robust standard errors (see Efron &
Tibshirani, 1993). The procedure (both in a parametric and in a nonparametric specification)
gives qualitatively similar results to those obtained with OLS.
Table 8
Cash flows predictors for German ADR-issuing firms
Preissuance Issuance Postissuance
period period period
Intercept 88.16 120.04 205.42
t statistics (0.64) (0.90) (1.33)
OCF, 1.38 1.44 1.47
t statistics (7.46) (9.60) (8.29)
AOC, 0.71 0.90 0.97
t statistics (2.49) (3.32) (3.22)
R- 88.9 87.4 80.5
Number of observations 28 33 53
Model: Eq. (3), where OCF = Operating net income (DataStream Item 993) plus Operational depreciation and
provisions (Item 696) minus change in Current assets (change in Item 376) excluding Cash (Item 375) plus change
in Current liabilities (change in Item 389). Operating accruals are estimated by the difference between operating
net income and operating cash flows.
The regressions are run three times using German data: the period immediately preceding the issuance period of
the ADR, the issuance period (year - 3 to year 0), and the period following the issuance of the ADR. Issuance
dates are retrieved fi-om the Bank of New York Web site.
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Table 9
Cash flows predictors for British ADR-issuing firms
Preissuance Issuance Postissuance
period period period
Intercept 33 60 -38
t statistics (2.01) (1.89) (-0.74)
OCF, 1.18 1.20 2.15
t statistics (19.27) (11.29) (12.40)
AOC, 1.38 0.77 2.19
t statistics (9.76) (3.75) (7.17)
R- 93.05 73.6 66.88
Number of observations 31 73 90
Model: Eq. (3), where OCF = Operating net income (DataStream Item 993) plus Operational depreciation and
provisions (Item 696) minus change in Current assets (change in Item 376) excluding Cash (Item 375) plus change
in Current liabilities (change in Item 389). Operating accruals are estimated by the difference between operating
net income and operating cash flows.
The regressions are run three times using German data: the period immediately preceding the issuance period of
the ADR, the issuance period (year - 3 to year 0), and the period following the issuance of the ADR. Issuance
dates are retrieved from the Bank of New York Web site.
Results for accruals in the postissuance period, however, are marginally more significant
(the magnitude of the coefficient increases from 5.2 to 5.9 and the t statistic from 2.4 to 2.9).
The R~ remains stable in the issuance period but, consistent with results reported in Table 3,
drops in the postissuance period. Excluding accruals irom the regressions leads to a minimal
drop in the adjusted R" in the preissuance period (91.0% vs. 91.2%). The difference increases
to about 2.3% in the issuance period (87.8% vs. 90.1%) and 3.4% in the post issuance period
(55.3% vs. 58.7%). The results from Table 7 indicate that there is no large change in either the
magnitude or the significance of the accrual coefficient for a sample of British firms.
4.3. Accruals andfuture profitability
To test the third hypothesis, I run the following regression:
OCF,^i = a + /5iOCF; + ^.OAQ + e, (3)
where OCF = Operating cash flows and OAC = Operating accruals.
If accruals convey more information about future cash flows, the magnitude and the
significance of the coefficient on OAC should increase in the issuance and postissuance
periods. The results in Table 8 are consistent with this prediction. In the issuance and
postissuance periods, the coefficient on accruals increases both in magnitude (from 0.71 to
0.90 and 0.97) and in significance (from 2.49 to 3.32 and 3.22).^" Table 9 indicates that the
accrual coefficient in a sample of British firms does not exhibit the same steady changes. The
A parametric bootstrapping of the data gives slightly more significant coefficients, whereas a nonparametric
procedure gives slightly less significant ones. Results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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R~ also is lower for the British sample. The R~ declines consistently over the three periods.
This might be explained by the fact that the cash flows decline in persistence and are more
difficult to predict.
5. Conclusion
In a shareholder regime, a manager's objective is to maximize stock prices. The past
literature suggests that this will lead managers to follow a policy of higher disclosure and
to reduce the amount of garbling in accounting numbers. In stakeholder regimes,
managers have a more ill-defined objective and their compensation is not typically sen-
sitive to stock prices and tend to manipulate earnings to satisfy the various constituents.
By issuing ADR, a company changes its regime and shareholders become relatively more
important. To maximize stock prices, managers should minimize the overall noise in ac-
counting numbers.
Empirical results are generally consistent with the predictions, but they should only be
treated as exploratory because of the very small sample size. The value relevance test
indicates that the magnitude of the coefficient on abnormal earnings (as well as the
incremental R" due to the inclusion of abnormal earnings in the regression) increases over
time for the German ADR-issuing firms but not for either British firms issuing ADR or
German nonissuing firms. Accruals are not significantly priced before the issuance but
become significant around the time of issuance and thereafter. In addition, the magnitude of
the coefficient increases monotonically across the three periods. The explanatory power of
accruals also supports the hypothesis of a reduction in garbling. As expected, a sample of
British firms does not exhibit the same degree of change. Accruals also appear to become a
better predictor of future cash flows. The coefficient on contemporary accruals increases in
both magnitude and significance. However, the R~ values of the regression decrease,
indicating that cash flows may become more difficult to predict after ADR issuance.
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Abstract
Hilary [Int. J. Account. 38 (3) (2003) 357-378 (this issue)] analyzes the impact of German firms
listing their stock on U.S. exchanges by means of American Depositary Receipts (ADR) on the
noisiness of their accounting numbers, which is interesting. Unfortunately, due to severe sample size
restrictions (i.e., the sample consists of 10 firms), the empirical designs lack the power to provide
reliable evidence about any such impact. Moreover, across a broad set of noisiness measures, including
several not considered by Hilary, the evidence of any ADR-issuance impact is decidedly mixed.
© 2003 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Hilary (2003) undertakes a novel and, in its conception, quite interesting examination ofthe
impact of the decision by German firms to list their stocks on U.S. equity exchanges on the
"quality" of their financial reports. In concept, it provides a useful complement to the existing
literature on cross-country differences in reporting "quality." Specifically, prior studies by
Alford, Jones, Leftwich, and Zmijewski (1993) and Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) document
systematic differences in the informational quality of accounting reports across countries. An
important proposed source of this cross-country variation in quality is whether a country's
governing legal code is code based or common-law based.
Distinct from prior empirical work in the area, Hilary (2003) addresses this question
using a within-country, over-time design rather than a purely cross-sectional, cross-country
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design. The advantage of such a design is that it is highly robust to omitted country-level
variables. That is, findings such as those reported in Alford et al. (1993) and Ball et al.
(2000) may reflect a legal code effect, or they may reflect underlying cultural commonalities
across countries giving rise to common legal codes, corporate governance structures, and
financial-report quality levels. By focusing instead on the intrusion of another country's
legal code structure on the reporting activities of German firms, Hilary's analysis provides a
much stronger causal focus to the question of whether legal code form impacts reporting
quality.
Unfortunately, while Hilary's (2003) analysis possesses conceptual merit, it is empirically
suspect. Its sample size (10 firms) is woefully inadequate as a basis for drawing probabilistic
inferences in a setting where the background noise levels are high and the hypothesized effect
is modest. Hence, the paper's findings are a priori unrehable (see Burgstahler, 1987). hideed, I
question whether it should even have been further contemplated once the initial sample size
limitation became known.
Perhaps as an indirect consequence of its insufficient sample size, Hilary (2003) treats
yearly observation from the same firm as independent observations in much of his
statistical analyses. Clearly, however, for the sorts of variables examined in this paper
there is every reason to expect that the level of within-firm dependence is very high.
Independence among observations is a vital assumption in conventional statistical analyses,
such as those employed in the paper. Violating it renders the study's empirical findings ex
post unreliable.
Finally, an alternative inferential approach that better fits the "indicative and explor-
ative" nature of Hilary's (2003) analysis is to view its findings fi"om a maximum-likelihood
perspective. Under this perspective one simply takes observed statistical estimates as "best
guesses" of true population values. Indeed, if one takes this study's 10 firms as a
population (assuming that the models are correctly specified), then these estimates do, in
fact, represent true population values. A carefiil consideration of how the various estimated
relevant parameters change between the pre- and post-American Depositary Receipts (ADR)
time periods, however, presents a highly ambiguous maximum-likelihood picture of the
impact of ADR-issuance on reporting quality. Hence, in my opinion, this exploration
indicates little, if anything at all, about the impact of ADR on German firms' reporting
behavior.
2. A priori unreliability
Empirical findings appealing to classical probability theory should be evaluated in light of
the a priori likelihood that a proposed design will detect the hypothesized effect if it is, in fact,
present. Absent such a characteristic, then one can place absolutely no credence in the failure to
find an effect and very little credence in any significant findings, an important issue that is not as
well recognized in the applied empirical literature. The reason for this degradation in credibility
in the latter condition in spite ofthe explicitly controlled type I error rate (i.e., the P value) has its
roots in Bayesian statistics. Specifically, if the design lacks power then it necessarily follows
I
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that the hypothesized effect's presence or absence is of Httle consequence to the outcome ofthe
statistical test. That is, chance, not underlying substance, determines test 'Tmdings" in low-
power settings.
An illustrative example of the improbable nature of the "findings" reported by Hilary
(2003) is found in the Table 3 value relevance (VR) analysis. Here, in a conventional
valuation model analysis, the estimated coefficient for abnormal eamings (AE) rises from
2.55 in the pre-ADR-issuance period to 11.59 in the post-ADR period. The discussion that
accompanies Table 3 reports that this coefficient shift is significant at the 10% level.
However, in evaluating this reported significance we must recognize that it is driven
largely by the very substantial shift in the size of the estimated AE coefficient. If the size
of this shift is not credible then its consequence, the statistical test result, is likewise not
credible. In this case I, and I think most individuals reasonably familiar with the literature
on market-valuation models, find impossible to believe that a shift to an ADR-reporting
regime by a German firm would be responsible for a threefold-plus improvement in the
value relevance of its (estimated with gross error) abnormal eamings. Given the lack of
evidence, there is no reason given to change that belief Indeed, I would find the notion
that such a change (or just about any sort of intentional change in reporting strategy
effected by management) caused even a mere doubling of the earnings-valuation coefficient
to be straining creduality. Hence, this "significant" finding seems no more substantive than
one based on drawing a red ball from an urn containing 90 white balls and 10 red ones,
which is also a valid—from a type I error-rate perspective—test of Hilary's coefficient shift
hypothesis.
3. Ex post unreliability
Much of the paper's empirical analysis appeals to notions of statistical significance.'
However, its significance measures are derived from pooled regression analyses in which
the same firm appears multiple times, differing only with respect to year. The two dependent
variables in play here, firm market value and operating cashflow, are certainly related over
time. Indeed, it is plausible to assume that for a given firm they are drawn from a firm-
specific distribution that is stable over time and that associated regression parameters are
constant over time. Such an assumption, in fact, typifies time-series designs. Under these
conditions the inclusion of more than one year's observation for a given firm in a cross-
sectional regression violates the independence of observations assumption ofOLS regression.
This violation is, in particular, critical to the validity of "significance" findings since it
severely compromises both coefficient standard error estimates and residual variance
estimates (when the frequencies with which firms appear in the sample are unequal as is
true here) in a cross-sectional design.
' By my count the paper appeals to the notion of statistical significance at least 27 times, based on a word
covint of the number of times terms such as "significant," "insignificant," "significance," and "significantly"
appear in it.
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As an illustration of the potential severity of a rather modest violation of the independence
condition in very-small sample settings, I performed a market value as a function ofbook value
and an abnormal earnings simulation exercise. In this exercise I simulate firm market values
using the following equation based on Hilary's (2003) Eq. (1):
MVit = ai + ^liBVit + Zj2iAEit + ^it (1)
Where a, ~ N(300, 25); Z) 1 i ~ N( 1 , .3); BVjt ~ N(4000, 250); bl, ~ N( 1 0, 3); AEi^ ~ N(0, 250);
e„~N(0,100);
This equation constrains a firm's book value (BV) and abnormal earnings (AE) coefficients
to be identical over time while allowing BV and AE to vary independently across both firms
and time." Each iteration of the simulation involves an initial random draw of 10 coefficient
sets (i.e., b\\ and b2\, z= 1,2,. . .,10). Each coefficient set is then matched with eight randomly
generated independent-variable and error-term values to form a sample of 80 observations.
The dependent variable is generated for each ofthese observations by means ofthese randomly
generated values and Eq. (1). An OLS regression corresponding to Eq. (1) in Hilary is then
performed using the first four observations for each firm i in order to test the hypothesis that
^1 = 10. This process is repeated 500 times and the null hypothesis that Z)l = 10 is rejected in
over 55% of the repetitions at the (nominal) 10% level.^ That is, the test incorrectly rejects the
true null hypothesis more than half of the time when the advertised incorrect rejection rate is a
mere 10%.
The hypothesis of a directional shift in AE between two time periods (PRE and POST) is
examined in this simulation setting by using all eight firm observations, rather than just the
first four, and estimating the following model:
MVii =ai + Z)1prePRE x BVjt + Z)2prePRE x AE^ + Z)2postPOST x BVit
+ /)2postPOST X AE,t + e,, (2)
where PRE (POST) is randomly set to 1 (0) for four out of each eight firm-level observations.
The true hypothesis that 62pre == Z)2posT is rejected in favor of the hypothesis that this
coefficient is higher in the POST condition 9.2% of the time at the (nominal) 5% level. "^
Moreover, in a further simulation analysis in which the bl coefficient does shift, but
randomly, between the PRE and POST conditions, the hypothesis of equality is rejected 23.8%
of the time at a nominal (5% level) in favor of the hypothesis that it increased in the POST
condition.^
^ Placing firm-specific constraints on BVand AE, while plausibly more realistic, simply worsen the problem of
overstated significance levels.
It is rejected in favor ofbeing smaller than ten 25.8% of the time and ofbeing larger than ten 29.6% of the time.
The hypothesis that the coefficient is smaller in the POST condition is rejected 10% of the time at a nominal
5% level.
^ The hypothesis that the coefficient is smaller in the POST condition is rejected 25.2% of the time at a nominal
5% level.
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Hilary (2003) correctly points out in his conclusion that the limited number of data points
available precludes the estimation of "robust" standard errors.^ Thus, Hilary recognizes the
flaw in his research design and implementation. Unfortunately, this recognition does not alter
the fact that the internal validity of the study is very weak. One positive benefit of this study,
however, is the potential use of the paper in research methodology classes that highlight the
need for high internal validity in any research study.
4. Maximum likelihood ambiguity
The most plausible route to obtaining any sort of interpretation for the empirical evidence
presented by Hilary (2003) is, I believe, to view the reported values as maximum-likelihood-
point estimates (i.e., best guesses). Moreover, ifwe choose to view the 10 firms that comprise
Hilary's sample as a population of interest and further assume that the various empirical
models employed are correctly (fully) specified, then these reported values can be viewed as
exact population parameters, not sample-based estimates of such parameters, and hence free
from (random) error. From this perspective, the various estimates, as portrayed by Hilary, are
broadly supportive of his position that accounting number "noise" declines in the post-ADR
time period.
Panel A of Table 1 lists six metrics that Hilary seems to focus on in making the case that the
"empirical results are generally consistent with predictions." These six metrics are the
abnormal earnings coefficient and percentage-point increase in /^-square from including
abnormal earnings in the VR analysis; the operating-accrual coefficient and the percentage-
point increase in /^-square from including operating accruals in the regression of market value
on book value and operating cashflows (the AVR analysis); the coefficient on operating
accrual and /^-square in the future cashflow prediction (the AFR analysis). Five of these six-
point estimators change in the hypothesized direction between the pre- and post-ADR time
periods. The one exception is the behavior of the 7?-square metric in the AFR analysis, which
declines rather than increases. But, as Hilary (2003) notes, this 7?-square also declines in the
British "control" sample, suggesting that this may reflect broader trends in intertemporal
future cashflow explainability.^
In evaluating Hilary's (2003) findings, however, we must be particularly careful to consider
whether they encompass all of the obviously plausible measures pertinent to his proposition
^ As a disturbing aside I believe it notable that the use of similar multiyear same-firm stacking procedures is
rather common in contemporary studies. Abarbanell and Bernard (2000) and Bushee (2001 ), in particular, propose a
serial-autocorrelation correction as a solution to the within-firm dependency problem that underlies my simulation
findings. This correction, however, seems unlikely to succeed in moving rejection rates to their correct levels in the
simulation since, by construction, the serial autocorrelation in the simulated data is zero.
^ In general, however, coefficients and /^-squares in both the British control and German test samples shift in the
same directions between pre- and postperiods. Hence, while this similar shift in ^-square implies the presence of a
confounding temporal trend, the results taken as a whole suggest that similar temporal trends may account for most
of the other shifts observed in the German test sample.
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Table 1
Summary of stated and supplemental plausible maximum-likelihood predictions for Hilary (2003)
Panel A; Predictions explicitly evaluated by Hilary (2003):
Test/
Model''
Measure of interest Predicted shift in magnitude Prediction
relative to pre-ADR period holds
VR Abnormal earnings coefficient
VR Magnitude of increase in /^-square
from inclusion of abnormal earnings
AVR Operating accrual coefficient
AVR Magnitude of increase in i?-square
from inclusion of operating accruals
AFR Operating accrual coefficient
APR i?-square
Increases
Increases
Increases
Increases
Increases
Increases
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Panel B: Supplemental plausible predictions not evaluated by Hilary (2003):
Test/
Moder
Measure of interest Predicted shift in magnitude Prediction
relative to pre-ADR period holds
\'R Percentage decrease in unexplained variation
achieved by including abnormal earnings
VR i?-square
AVR Percentage decrease in unexplained variation
achieved by including abnormal earnings
AVR ^-square
AFR Coefficient on contemporary cashflows
ERC /^-square
Increases No
Increases No
Increases Yes
Increases No
Does not increase No
(arguably decreases)
Increases No
^ The test/models are: VR, a regression ofmarket value on abnormal earnings and book value; AVR, a regression
of market value on book value, operating cashflows, and operating accruals; AFR, a regression of future operating
cashflows on current operating cashflows and operating accruals; ERC, a regression of returns on eamings.
that a decline in "noise" has occurred. In Panel B of Table 1 I report similar maximum-
likelihood outcomes for six additional measures that I believe to be plausibly pertinent to the
occurrence of a "noise" decline. These measures are the percentage decrease in unexplained
variation achieved from including eamings (calculated as the increase in i?-square from
including eamings divided by one minus the pre-eamings i?-square value) and the overall R-
square for the VR analysis; the percentage decrease in /^-square achieved from including
operating accruals and the overall ^-square for the AVR analysis; the operating cashflow
coefficient in the AFR analysis; the 7?-square in a regression of returns on eamings (ERC). Five
of these six metrics Panel B can be determined from information provided in Hilary. The
sixth, the ERC /^-square, is from a regression analysis ofretums on eamings reported in a prior
version of Hilary provided to me as the discussion document.
Information necessary to determine other pertinent metrics, such as the percentage decrease in unexplained
variation from including the current operating accrual variable in the AFR analysis, is unavailable in versions of
the Hilary paper available to me.
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Unlike Panel A, however, the behavior of the metrics reported in Panel B are largely
unsupportive of the notion that local accounting number ''noise" declined in the post-ADR
time period, /^-squares declined in the VR and AVR analyses, suggesting an overall decline in
the ability of accounting-based numbers to explain cross-sectional variation in market
valuations and predict future cashflows. The improvement in /^-square, measured as the
percentage of unexplained variation that is explained, from including eamings in the VR
analysis declines from 12.5% {(0.923-0.912)/(l-0.912)} to 9.5% {(0.513-0.462)/(l-
0.462)} in the post-ADR period.*^ The importance of operating cashflows, accrual-based
accounting's shadow information competitor, seemingly increases as reflected by the upward
shift in the cashflow coefficient, and eamings explains less of the cross-sectional variation in
returns.
Taken together with the six metrics that Hilary (2003) focuses on, the overall picture
presented in Table 1 could not be more ambiguous. Six metric shifts support Hilary's notion
that ADR-listing decreases noise, another six, however, do not.
5. Conclusion
It is my understanding that this paper is, in part, the product of a summer research paper
requirement that constitutes part of a Ph.D. program of study. The goal of such an exercise is to
provide students with a hands-on self-directed research project experience. A secondary goal is
to provide the student with a publication record prior to graduation. These are laudable
objectives. However, there is a downside to this sort of summer paper requirement.
Specifically, it places great emphasis on starting and completing a single project, often
regardless ofhow unfruitful or unwieldy the initially promising research endeavor proves to be
as it moves toward completion. Consequently, researchers operating in such a regime are
blinded to the notion that some projects are best left undone. Instead, they are instilled with the
belief that completion is everything, and once completed any research effort is publishable
provided it is given the right sort of "spin."
In the case at hand, I believe, we are observing a first-hand case of a real downside of
summer-paper requirements. Once the limited sample size constraint became known, this
project, which is conceptually sound and interesting, should not have been continued. Instead,
it was completed within an environment ripe for opportunistic data analysis and interpretation.
Given the limitations cited above, I do not believe that the paper provides any reliable insights
about the impact of ADR issuance on the noisiness or informativeness of home country
accounting numbers or reports.
Hilary's metric is bounded at the level of unexplained variation, which varies over time. Hence, in the VR
analysis the highest possible score for eamings in the pre-ADR time period is 8.8% (100-91.2%) while in the
post-ADR time period this upper bound for score rises to 53.8% (100-46.2%). It is hardly surprising then that
the metric with the most upside potential tends to come out ahead. My alternative metric is bounded at 100% in
both cases. That is, its potential magnitude is not mechanically related to the level of unexplained variation
present prior to its inclusion in the model.
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Accounting behavior of German firms after an
ADR issuance: A reply
Gilles Hilary*
Department ofAccounting, Hong Kong University- of Science and Technology, Hongkong, China
In his discussion of Hilary (2003), Cready (2003) suggests that the study offers a novel
approach and an interesting conception but criticizes the paper on the grounds that a small
sample size limits the power of the test and potentially biases the standard errors and that
results from alternative metrics lead to ambiguous results.
I certainly concur with the first criticism and this issue is repeatedly mentioned in the
abstract, the introduction, the body, and the conclusion of the text. In addition, let me discuss
another empirical problem, potentially more significant for the analysis, which is also
mentioned in the paper but perhaps not sufficiently stressed. All the tests (as in fact in many
other papers in the literature) assume that the decision to issue an American Depositary
Receipt (ADR) is exogenous. This assumption is, of course, likely to be violated. Issuing the
security is a decision made by the management as opposed to being externally imposed on to
the firm. Thus, the results may be driven by variables not observed in the sample. For
example, the expected cost of improving reporting quality or the possibility of altering the
economic operations of the firm are probably going to be factored into the decision to issue
the ADR. In addition, ex post modification of the operations of the firm and a change in its
accounting behavior could also be endogenous. While the problems of a small sample
disappear asymptotically and biases in standard errors should be correctable in a large sample,
the issue of self-selection and endogeneity potentially leads to more severe biases in the
analysis. Although there are econometric procedures to treat these problems (e.g., Heckman,
1979), they cannot meaningfully be implemented in a small sample. In this context, I agree
with the discussant that the notion of "significance" in the results should be taken with a
certain degree of skepticism.
* Tel.: +852-2358-7579; fax: +852-2358-1693.
E-mail address: acgh@ust.hk (G. Hilary).
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The discussant also proposes alternative metrics to evaluate the empirical results. All but
one are either the overall R~ of the regressions or a direct function ofR~. However, as noted in
2.4. 1 , 1 do not believe those metrics are appropriate as R" can be affected by factors other than
quality of accounting information. For example, suppose that the postissuance accounting
conveys more information about future expected cashflows but that the discount rate becomes
more volatile or more heterogeneous across investors, we would expect a lower R~ in the
regression even though accounting numbers are more informative. The last alternative metric
proposed is the magnitude of coefficient of current cashflows in a regression predicting future
cashflows. However, this coefficient is more a control for the cash-flow structure than a direct
measure of accounting informativeness per se. For example, it is likely that the coefficient
reflects the cashflows volatility. As mentioned above, there might be some endogeneity
between accounting informativeness and cash-flow structure. Thus, the two might be linked,
but the link is likely to be indirect and complex. Therefore, this metric may not be
appropriate, either, at least not without having a clearer understanding of how the two
interact. Hence, ifwe were to choose the "MLE criterion" offered by the discussant, I beheve
the results would still be broadly supportive of the hypotheses. However, even if we use this
approach, it is important to note that the empirical results remain affected by the issue of
endogeneity and should still be treated with caution.
So, where does that leave us? Certainly, the position that only papers where all the
problems have been substantially solved should be published (presumably in a limited set of
journals) has merit and I concur that publishing without presenting the known limitations of
the research undertaken would be counter-productive. However, is there a niche for
preliminary analysis of an important topic where the limitations are clearly stated? Ultimately,
the reader and the editor will judge, but the topic of the accounting quality of European firms
has recently received some considerable attention from practitioners, regulators, and the
press. The discussant suggests that that the analysis undertaken in this paper is interesting in
its conception and helps us side-step some previous research limitations. I believe this study
might be helpful in drawing attention to some research issues mentioned by the discussant,
such as the omitted country-level variables, or to more practical problems, such as the
empirical limitations of the DataStream database. The interest of this paper, if any, probably
lies there more than in the empirical results, which suffer from acknowledged limitations.
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Accounting, Auditing and Taxation in the Russian Federation [An Update] 2001 Study
by Adolf J.H. Enthoven, Yaroslav V. Sokolov, Valery V. Kovalev, Svetlana M. Bychkovy,
Irina M. Smiraova and Maria V. Semenova, The Center for International Accounting
Development, The University of Texas at Dallas (UT-D), USA; St. Petersburg State
University, St. Petersburg, Russia; and East-West Management Institute, Inc., New York/
Moscow, 2001, 160 pp., US$25 (from UT-D)
Since the publication of the previous edition of this book in 1998, Russia has continued its
efforts to reform its systems of accounting and reporting as well as auditing and taxation.
These efforts date back to 1989, when the Soviet Union started to attract foreign investments
through joint ventures. At that time, it became apparent that the reporting needs of foreign
investors were different from those of the state, which was the only user of financial
statements in the USSR. Further economic reforms in the Soviet Union and later in Russia
accelerated the transition to a new accounting system, which reflected the new economic and
business environment of Russian companies as well as the appearance of new users and their
distinctive needs for accounting records and financial reports.
Major steps in accounting reform since 1998 include the setting up of the Interagency
Committee on Accounting Reform. This was recognition of the fact that accounting reform
cannot be achieved solely by accountants, and it ensured the involvement of major parties
affected by changes in accounting regulations. Other developments include the adoption of
two sequential programs on Russian transition to the IAS, the enactment of a number of new
regulations on selected accounting rules that narrowed the gap between Russian accounting
norms and the IFRS (IAS), and some other actions. A number of big Russian companies now
prepare, on a regular basis, additional sets of accounts based on the IFRS (IAS) or US GAAP.
Auditing developments are facilitated by closer cooperation with the International Federation
of Accountants, by a number of actions taken by the Russian Ministry of Finance involving
the development of auditing regulations and auditing profession, and by companies seeking
investments from Westem countries. A number of important changes were introduced in the
area of corporate taxation.
This book presents an overview of the status of Russian accounting, auditing, and taxation
as of 2001. In its main sections, the authors (1) provide a summary of accounting principles
required by Russian regulations, which are supported by briefcomments on the background to
their introduction and on their application in Russia, (2) describe the hierarchy of accounting
regulations, (3) explain in some detail the provisions ofthe current Accounting Law as of 1996
with the amendments approved in 1998, (4) give a detailed explanation of the assets and equity
li
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valuation rules, and (5) provide the layout of the Chart of Accounts and of the financial
statements of Russian companies (followed by detailed attachments). Western readers,
especially those who are familiar with the previous editions of the book, will be interested
to see the significant progress in further transforming Russian accounting and the formats of
financial statement towards Western practices. The book also describes the status of auditing in
Russia, explains the taxation system in the country (with the exception of the Corporation Tax,
because this regulation was enacted by the Russian Government after the book was published),
provides a brief overview of education requirements for accountants in Russia, and gives the
details ofthe accounting curriculum recommended as a base for Russian universities. The book
also contains a chapter on a brief history of accounting in Russia.
Unfortunately, anyone who writes a book these days on the status of Russian accounting
and auditing faces a risk of an immediate failure to reflect the up-to-date situation at any
particular moment because of the very rapid changes occurring in the area. It could be
regarded as a paradox, as Russia is often criticized for a slow pace of accounting reform.
There could be a number of explanations for such a phenomenon but two, both mentioned in
the book, seem to be the major ones: (1) the complexity and pervasiveness of the changes
required to transform "centrally planned" accounting into "market economy" accounting
and (2) the lack of coherency of many of the efforts in this area. Despite all these years of
accounting reform, Russia still lacks an official conceptual fi-amework of accounting and has
not come up yet with the basic definitions of assets and liabilities and the associated
measurement and recognition criteria. A better understanding of the role of accounting in a
market economy and its interrelation with microeconomic, finance, and other areas is still to
come as well as the training and skills to make a professional judgment based on the
economic essence of a particular transaction.
Therefore, a number of the more recent changes in Russian accounting, auditing, and
taxation are not covered in the book. This includes, for example, regulations on accounting
for loans and associated costs, for discontinued operations, for research and development
costs, for income taxation, and for financial investments. As mentioned above, tax legislation
has been amended by the introduction of the famous Chapter 25 of the Tax Code on corporate
tax, which has had a major impact on accounting practice, because it contains detailed
explanations of accounting records for tax purposes. While finally separadng economic and
taxation reporting, this pronouncement could become a detriment to financial reporting for
the sake of compliance with tax accounting rules, because compliance with both sets of
requirements might be too costly and complicated for the majority of Russian companies.
There is a concern that, in the light of a lack of pressure and demand from users as well as
sanctions and incentives within the province of regulators, statutory financial reporting by
Russian companies might be set back. It is also important to point out that, contrary to the
case in previous years, the area of management accounting is attracting a growing interest,
especially ft-om the enterprises and the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development, which
seems to play an increasing role in the field of accounting policy. In view of the fact that the
authors talk about the involvement of Western parties in accounting reform in Russia (French
professional bodies, the UN Centre on Transnational, and ICAR), it also seems worth
mentioning other big projects such as the International Advisory Board (lAB) financed by the
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European Union (1992-1996), the OECD project on the CIS Coordinating Council on
Accounting Methodology (1993-1998), the World Bank Project on National Training
Foundation (1993-1995), and the major recent European Union projects on accounting
and audit reforms. Also, in order to convey a better understanding of audit services in Russia,
it bears mentioning that the statistical data on audit firms in Russia, which are given in the
book, are limited to the firms that opted to provide such data at a time of a survey.
Notwithstanding the above, the book well serves its purpose of providing an overview of
the status of accounting/auditing/taxation at a particular period of time. Combined with
previous studies done by the authors, it could also provide a good basis for an analysis of the
historical evolution of developments in these areas. As with the previous editions, the
discussion is easy to follow; it is logically developed, it offers a number of thought-provoking
opinions, and it is written with an evident attempt to be as faithful to the factual material as
possible. However, some of the authors' statements could be debated, especially relating to
their comparative analysis of Russian accounting regulations with the IFRS, their interpre-
tation of the norms of measurement and of some other accounting principles, and their
interpretation of auditing principles.
The chapter on the history of Russian accounting, as well some of the references made
throughout the book to the development of Russian accounting thought, could be of particular
use to readers. It seems that any reader interested in accounting in general and in Russian
accounting in particular could benefit from reading this book, whether the focus oftheir interest
is on a general understanding ofthe transitional nature ofRussian accounting and audit systems,
the factual status of regulations in the respective fields in Russia or the authors' interpretations
of those regulations, or the educational and historical background of Russian accounting and
auditing. The book could be useful for a wider audience interested in understanding the
transitional nature of the Russian economy and of the business environment in Russia.
Tatiana Krylova
Enterprise Internationalization Section,
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Geneva, Switzerland
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Building Public Trust, the Future of Corporate Reporting
by Samuel A. DiPiazza Jr. and Robert G. Eccles, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York,
2002, xx+188pp.
In Building Public Trust, Samuel A. DiPiazza, Jr., the CEO of PricewaterhouseCoopers,
and Robert G. Eccles, the president of a consulting firm and a "senior fellow" of
PricewaterhouseCoopers, provide their prescription for post-Enron/Andersen reform of
corporate reporting. Anyone expecting tough medicine is likely to be disappointed.
DiPiazza and Eccles deliver a strawberry smoothie—remedies that go down easily and
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inoffensively but fail to address the underlying causes of the ailments that have under-
mined the credibility of both the accounting profession and the corporations that it audits.
Beyond acknowledging the public outcry at the many recent audit failures, DiPiazza and
Eccles engage in no introspection as to how and why both his own firm and the other
major firms managed to dissipate their once-stellar reputations for both competence and
integrity.
DiPiazza and Eccles call for a reexamination and strengthening of the "corporate reporting
supply chain." This comprises company executives, boards of directors, independent
auditors, information distributors, third-party analysts, investors, and other preparers and
users of corporate reports. The chain is supported by standard setters, market regulators, and
enabling technologies.
The key to restoring public trust, according to DiPiazza and Eccles, is a "spirit of
transparency," a "culture of accountability," and "people of integrity. " Their framework for
achieving corporate transparency is a three-tier model, which they depict as a triangle. Tier
one, the base of the triangle, is "global, generally accepted accounting principles." Tier two,
the midsection of the triangle, is "industry-based standards," and tier three, the peak of the
triangle, is "company-specific information."
DiPiazza and Eccles acknowledge that to reach agreement on global standards, national
rule-making authorities and their constituents would have to resolve numerous issues.
Foremost among these is whether accounting standards should be based on "rules" or
"principles." Where do the authors stand on this question? All standards, they say,
should be based on principles. But they must also be supported by rules. The rules, they
assert, need not answer every question, and there need not be a rule for every specific
instance. The rules should, however, "be consistent with the principles on which they are
based, and where particular situations are not covered by specific rules, companies and
auditors should look to the substance of the principle" (p. 41). That position certainly
seems reasonable, but arguably it is little more than a description of current practices.
Obviously, however, it has not worked very well, as both corporations and their auditors
have ignored the principles and looked for ways to circumvent the rules.
Another key issue that must be addressed if agreement on global GAAP is to be
achieved is whether assets should be reported at cost or market. Here, again, the authors'
convictions are underwhelming: "Getting the right balance here will not be easy. The
subject is complicated, requiring much study and debate. Reaching a final answer in the
very near future may not be a realistic expectation, but as new analytical techniques are
developed and as different types of markets merge, what remains difficult to measure at
fair value today could be more easily done in the fiiture" (p. 45). For the shareholders of
Enron, unfortunately, the future will arrive too late.
The proposed tier two, industry-based standards, will go beyond traditional financial
measures. They will require disclosure of the key "value drivers" of the industry, and,
inasmuch as these value drivers differ across industries, they will have to be industry
specific. For the pharmaceutical industry, for example, the standards might require the
disclosure of data relating to market share by therapeutic area, the research and develop-
ment pipeline, and product focus strategy. For the telecommunications industry, by contrast.
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they might be more concerned with network reach, the regulatory environment, and the
customer chum rate.
In the hght of the obvious Hmitations of current financial accounting, the case for
industry-based standards, as set forth by DiPiazza and Eccles, seems compelling. Indeed,
if reliable measures of performance and fiscal health had been developed for the dot-com
industry before the 1990s, trillions of dollars of market capitalization might never have
been created and subsequently lost.
DiPiazza and Eccles emphasize that, initially at least, the industry participants themselves
should develop tier two's industry-based standards, and the standards should be voluntary, not
mandatory. Therein lies the unanswered question. Will companies voluntarily disclose
information about their operations and activities beyond that which is self-serving? Upon
its establishment in 1 984, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board set out to develop
"service efforts and accomplishments" measures and reporting requirements. By their very
nature, govemments are more transparent than businesses, and hence it would appear that
they would be far more acquiescent toward reporting nonfinancial data than their corporate
counterparts. Yet, despite years of research and promotion, the Board has made little progress
in convincing state and local govemments that they should incorporate such measures in their
annual financial reports.
Nevertheless, DiPiazza and Eccles are optimistic that "Truly visionary companies—both
those that foresee the competitive advantage in this process as well as those that simply want to
do the right thing—will pioneer the use of Tier-Two standards and reporting" (p. 77) and that
others will follow in their footsteps. They will do so because either they see it as being in their
self-interest or they simply want to do the right thing. One can only hope that the authors are
correct, but there is little empirical support for the proposition that good reporting drives out
bad. DiPiazza and Eccles cite two apparently successful efforts at developing industry-based
standards. In 2000, the Danish Agency for Trade and Industry published A Guideline for
Intellectual Capital Statements, which, based on the experience of 17 companies, proposed
means of measuring and reporting various intangible assets. Also, in response to a Global
Reporting Initiative, sponsored by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies,
over 110 companies have begun reporting information on the "economic, environmental, and
social dimensions of their activities products, and services" (pp. 73-74). In addition, the
authors name several companies that have voluntarily expanded the scope of their reporting.
These limited efforts at greater transparency, however, may give rise to more hope than promise.
Tier three, company specific information, will be based on the "real" value drivers that
determine effective management. These may include information about strategy, identified
risks, risk management, corporate govemance, and performance measures. Reporting on
these value drivers, say the authors, is the "very meaning of transparency" (p. 82). Yet even
the authors suggest that achieving this degree of disclosure is more of a dream than a
foreseeable reality.
The authors see technology as the great facilitator of expanded reporting. Obviously,
paper is out and the Intemet is in. But the Internet alone is not the answer. More data,
even if disseminated in real time, are no substitutes for better, more organized information.
Enter Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) as the key to next-generation
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reporting. It allows reporting entities to "tag" data in such way that individual users can
readily locate the information that meets customized criteria, to link the data to other
related data, and to authenticate the source and integrity of the data. Further, XBRL can
transcend the boundaries of not only the three proposed levels of corporate reporting but
also those of individual companies, thereby giving investors analytical tools that reach far
beyond the Acrobat-based reports of today.
The new reporting model will add to the responsibilities (and presumably the profitability)
of the auditors. Whereas tier-two disclosures would be based on well-defined industry
standards, they would be subject to examinations that are similar to those of the tier-one
financial statements. Tier-three information, by contrast, is not only company specific but
relates to seemingly nonobjective judgments such as strategy, risks, and performance in
relation to peers. The authors understandably take a pass on how auditors would deal with
this latter type of information, saying only that the auditors will need a great deal of business
experience and an ability to exercise professional judgment.
Building Public Trust is the quintessential corporate vanity book. The authors devote an
entire section to listing 23 "subject matter" experts and linking their contributions to specific
chapters. This is in addition to a separate acknowledgment section that thanks another 100-
plus project participants. Despite (or because of) all these contributors the book is replete with
corporate jargon and hackneyed literary devices (e.g., six reporting objectives all beginning
with the letter "c"). In fact, one expression, "ValueReporting" is not only consistent with
PricewaterhouseCoopers' aversion to spaces between words but even comes with its own
trademark symbol.
Perhaps the ultimate irony of a book on how the accounting profession can take the
initiative to restore public trust is the unusual disclaimer that is included on the copyright page:
The information [in this document] is provided "as is," with no assurance or guarantee of
completeness, accuracy, or timeliness of the information, and without warranty of any kind,
express or implied, including but not limited to warranties ofperformance, merchantability,
and fitness for a particular purpose.
Many investors would no doubt contend that such a warning belongs on corporate
financial statements in lieu of the standard audit report.
Merely improving current accounting standards and adding new levels of disclosures
cannot restore public trust in corporate reporting. Diagnosis is a prerequisite to treatment. In
Building Public Trust, the authors fail to identify the cause of today's public reporting
malady. Hence, they leave us no reason to believe that their prescription will lead to a cure.
Michael H. Granof
The University of Texas at Austin,
Austin, TX, USA
doi : 1 0. 1 1 6/50020-7063(03 )00050-5
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Quality Financial Reporting
by Paul B.W. Miller and Paul R. Bahnson, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2002, xxiv+335 pp.
Miller and Bahnson are on a crusade. Although not the first to call for a financial reporting
revolution, the passion they bring to this idea and book is strong and unmistakable. The
authors believe that it is time for a paradigm shift fi-om the current U.S. reporting system
based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to one they label "Quality
Financial Reporting (QFR)": hence, the title of the book. The majority of the book is devoted
to explaining QFR, and, equally important, to convincing stakeholders that QFR has much to
offer to the world of corporate reporting.
The timing of the book works both for and against the authors. Most of the book was
written before the occurrence of some of the largest reporting scandals—although the authors
did add a last-minute chapter on Enron—and before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the
related spate of state and federal regulations were passed. As such, at times the book reads as
incomplete. However, the good news is that almost everything that the authors recommend is
still relevant, and I speculate that they would argue even more so given what transpired since
completion of the book.
The book details what is wrong with the current reporting system, arguing that a key
problem is an emphasis on supplying more and more information without a critical eye on
the benefits of the information. The authors provide numerous examples of this phenom-
enon. The authors also detail with examples another key structural problem with the current
system. In their opinion, the process of setting reporting rules has become extremely
politicized, generally advancing the interests of auditors and managers over the needs of
users, capital markets, and other key stakeholders. With this backdrop, the authors present
their case for QFR.
The fundamental premise of QFR is that auditors, managers, and regulators, among
others, should place much greater emphasis on the markets' demand for useful, relevant
information. The capital markets' need for information must be reconciled with what GAAP
currently requires and what managers currently provide. And furthermore, the authors argue
that this needs to happen largely on a voluntary basis. Managers need to recognize that
capital markets desire information that is currently not provided by firms. Regulators need
to recognize this as well, and they need to work with firms in an attempt to provide this
information in a meaningful way. The authors provide many examples of QFR to make
their point that high-quality, useful information needs to be the key driver of financial
reporting.
Consider one example they provide. Currently, corporations are required to report
eamings per share. That is, under current GAAP, you must report an EPS number. The
authors recommend that this requirement be eliminated under QFR. However, they
recognize that the capital markets might desire such a calculation and thus, under QFR,
managers would need to provide enough information to let the markets understand what
went into producing the number. Facts about the policies applied to produce the number
—
both the numerator and the denominator—should be provided by the firms. And further-
more, enough information should be provided under QFR so that sensitivity analysis can be
i
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performed by market analysts and others, if so desired. Dozens of other examples are
provided in the book.
As a student of financial reporting for some time, and as one who never thought we
would experience a reporting debacle like we just did, I am convinced that the type of
dialogue the authors present in this book is not only a worthy one, but a crucial one. The
authors want managers to think about what they are doing when they put together financial
reports, when they interact with analysts and the media, and when they respond to
regulators. The authors want the auditors to think about their obligations to investors and
their role in the capital markets. And the authors want the regulators to think about what
standards and rules are appropriate, given the debacle we just experienced. If nothing else,
the authors should be commended for—one more time
—
^placing this challenge in front of
the business community.
The comprehensive nature of the book is especially compelling. The authors do not simply
present the concept of QFR as a "done deal." They discuss its inherent implementation
problems. They also discuss what sceptics have said about it or similar reporting schemes
proposed in the past. The authors are well known and well respected. Thus, there are no egos
to worry about here. The reader has every sense that they simply want all parties involved
simply to give QFR fair consideration.
Unfortunately, much of what has been proposed in the book has been proposed in the
past—with little progress made to date. In particular, the authors note work by Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers in the 1990s and early 2000s that is similar in content and emphasis. The
authors are able to draw on this and other work to present a comprehensive and compelling
argument, however. And equally important, as academics, the authors are independent of any
stakeholders that may make similar (or opposing) points.
However, as I indicate above, the reality is that little progress has been made to date.
Given the proclivity by managers and others to avoid reporting change, it would have
been helpfiil if the authors had suggested a means to the end. How are we going to get to
Point A from Point B? Have they seen any successes to date, particularly in countries
outside of the United States? What role can the newfound clout of the lASB play in any
of this?
Toward the end of the book the authors state, "The practice ofQFR is nearly nonexistent at
present, and it certainly has received little play in the press. However, the economic forces
behind it are very strong and compelling, and sooner or later they will catch up to and then
overwhelm the existing paradigm that leads managers to want to starve the markets of
information and then feed them GAAP statements that convey no usefiil information" (p.
329). I hope the authors are correct—and sooner rather than later—but I must say, I'm
sceptical as to whether this will happen any time soon.
Paul R. Brown
New York University,
New York, USA
doi: 1 0. 1 1 6/80020-7063(03)00049-9
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Abstract
This study develops and tests the hypothesis that firms in the home country have capital market
incentives to cross-border list on foreign stock exchanges that have similar financial reporting with
local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Non-U.S. firms' contracts and the underlying
GAAP are based on the home-country culture and institutional climates. This connection with culture
and institution makes the local GAAP's assessment of the contracts less spurious relative to foreign
GAAP. Ball et al. [J. Account. Econ. 29 (2000) 1] note that contracting with stakeholders in the home
markets is based on local GAAP's numbers, while cross-border listing provides settings in which the
value relevance of local GAAP-based contracts is assessed based on foreign GAAP. Therefore, foreign
investors' assessment of the contracts using foreign stock exchange GAAP or mindset of foreign
GAAP is likely to result in an assessment noise, which is value irrelevant. The level of assessment
noise depends on the differences between foreign and local GAAP. Because of the valuation
implications of the assessment noise, we expect cross-border listing to diminish as the likelihood of
assessment noise increases.
As predicted, we find that assessment noise undermines cross-border listing on U.S. stock
j exchanges. Because U.S. and local GAAPs are based on different cultural and institutional
"environments, assessment noise arises if U.S. investors use the mindset of U.S. GAAP financial
reports to assess local GAAP-based contracts of cross-border firms. The results are robust in the London
Stock Exchange in which assessment noise is induced by interpreting local GAAP contracts as if they
were based on U.K. GAAP. As expected, the influences ofassessment noise on cross-border listings are
Editor's note: It is a source of sadness to know that Professor R.S. Olusegun Wallace passed away on July
i3, 2003. He will be greatly missed.
* Corresponding author. Tel: +1-215-895-2120; fax: +1-215-895-6975.
E-mail address: gordian.a.ndubizu@drexel.edu (G.A. Ndubizu).
)020-7063/$30.00 © 2003 Published by University of Illinois.
ioi:I0.1016/j.intacc.2003.09.010
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more robust in the United States than in the United Kingdom. Our resuhs suggest that harmonization of
financial reporting is critical in attenuating the influences of assessment noise on global capital market
developments.
© 2003 Published by University of Illinois.
Key^vords: Local GAAP-based contracts; Investors' assessment noise; Quality of investor protection in each
country; Cross-border listing of equities
1. Introduction
Cross-border firms' contracts with stakeholders, including government (via taxes), share-
holders (via dividends), managers and workers (via bonuses), and creditors (via interest) are
based on home generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) accounting numbers
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). These contracts and their values are an important element of
the contractual view of the firm (Coase, 1937; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling,
1976). The essence of the contractual theory is that firm valuation depends on the contracts
and on the home (local) GAAP on which the contracts are based. The home GAAPs are
determined jointly by the contracting parties in each country to maximize the value of their
contracts (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). These parties bring into the home GAAP their
culture, market orientation, and regulatory climate. Therefore, a cross-border firm's contracts
and its home GAAP are jointly influenced by institutional and cultural factors in its country of
domicile (Ah & Hwang, 2000; Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Ndubizu, 2001).
In a contracting framework, a firm is viewed as an assemblage of interacting contracts
represented in accounting as assets, liabilities, and equities using the home GAAP. Because of
the cultural and institutional connection between contracts and the home GAAP, the value
relevance of the contracts depends on the GAAP used to translate the contracts into assets,
liabilities, and equities. If the home and U.S. GAAP have different underlying cultural and
institutional climates, then the value relevance of the contracts are likely to be assessed
spuriously using U.S. GAAP. Consequently, using the mindset of U.S. (foreign) GAAP to
assess the value relevance of home GAAP-based contracts is problematic. One obvious
problem is that the assessment is more likely to include a noise that is induced by systematic
differences in the cultural and institutional climates across countries. Therefore, spuriousness
in contract valuation appears to occur when cultural and institutional climates are different
between countries and not when they are similar. Cross-border listing on foreign stock
exchanges provides settings in which the value relevance of the contracts is arguably
assessed, based on foreign GAAP numbers, or as if the contracts are based on foreign
GAAP. For example, cross-border firms in United States are required to provide U.S. GAAP
accounting numbers in addition to their local GAAP. As Ndubizu (2001) notes, U.S. investors
assess the value relevance of home GAAP-based contracts using the mindset of U.S. GAAP.
As Barth, Clinch, and Shibano (1999) report, U.S. investors do not possess expertise in the
local GAAP of cross-border firms. The lack of expertise suggests that U.S. investors value
non-U. S. GAAP-based contracts according to their understanding of the differences between
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U.S. and home GAAP. If the differences between non-U. S. and U.S. GAAP are significant,
then U.S. investors' assessment of the non-U. S. GAAP-based contracts using the U.S. GAAP
mindset increases the spuriousness in contract valuation. We refer to this spuriousness as
assessment noise. ' Therefore, value-maximizing managers have less incentive to cross-border
list if assessment noise is significant."
Assessment noise arises when foreign investors interpret a local GAAP as if it were the
GAAP of their own country. For example, the London Stock Exchange does not require cross-
border firms to comply with U.K. GAAP. However, if U.K. investors interpret the local GAAP
accounting numbers of cross-border firms as if they were based on U.K. GAAP, then
assessment noise is likely to occur. This noise increases as the differences between local and
foreign GAAP or as misinterpretations of local GAAP increase. However, the requirement by
the U.S. SEC for cross-border firms to comply with the U.S. GAAP creates in the minds of U.S.
investors the belief that the non-U. S. GAAP-based contracts of cross-listed firms are based on
U.S. GAAP. Such a mindset would augment assessment noise if cross-border contracts are
based on local GAAP, which are different from the U.S. GAAP.
We predict and find that our empirical proxy for assessment noise is inversely related to
cross-border listings in U.S. and London Stock Exchanges. This finding arises from a joint
test of our hypothesis and proxy for assessment noise. The use of a dummy variable to proxy
for assessment noise creates a potential bias against our hypothesis.
We examine also the extent to which cross-border listings by firms on U.S. and London
Stock Exchanges are conditioned on the quality of investors' protection in their home
countries (measured by the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement).
Investor protection in the home country has both valuation and listing requirement effects on
cross-border listing. For example, investors are likely to rationally discount the value of all
firms in the presence of poor investor protection. However, domestic investors cannot
perfectly discount the cross-sectional variations in investor protection at home because of
' Beaver, McAnnally, and Stinson (1997) and Collins, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1994) note that
assessment noise is value irrelevant. Assessment noise arises because of the operational dissimilarity between
local and foreign GAAPs while determining the value relevance of local GAAP-based contracts. This noise is
more significant if the foreign GAAP is perceived by foreign investors to be more stringent than the local GAAP.
The noise is less significant if it perceived by foreign investors to be similar or less stringent than the local GAAP.
" Other explanations of cross-border listing include the investor-recognition hypothesis, the segmentation
hypothesis, and the liquidity hypothesis. These explanations are based on the assumptions that firms are able to
reduce their cost of equity through cross-border listing. Investor-recognition hypothesis suggests that by cross-
border listing a firm can increase its investor base and visibility both at home and on the foreign stock exchange
and consequently its cost of capital (Alexander, Eun, & Janakiramanan, 1988; Baker, Nofsinger, & Weaver, 1999;
Errunza & Miller. 1998; Foerster & Karolyi, 1993, 1998; Lau. Diltz, & Apilado, 1994; Miller, 1999; Serra, 1997).
Market segmentation arises fi"om barriers to capital flow (such as ownership restrictions, regulatory environment,
and information barriers) and increases the risk premiums of fums in the segmented market (see Stulz, 1981). As
suggested by Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977), cross-border listing can overcome some of the barriers
through risk sharing and reduction of the expected return of the cross-border-listed stock. The liquidity hypothesis
suggests that a liquidity-risk premium is often imposed on firms that are listed on stock markets with poor
liquidity. Therefore, by cross-border listing on a foreign stock exchange with superior liquidity services, firms
domiciled in poor liquidity capital markets are able to reduce their liquidity-risk premiums and expected returns.
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information asymmetry. This imperfection often results in the undervaluation of firms capable
of offering a relatively stronger investor protection in the home country. These firms have
valuation incentives to cross-border list on more efficient foreign stock exchanges where
investors enjoy stronger legal protection. We describe this phenomenon as the valuation effect.
This valuation effect increases cross-border listing by firms with the potential to offer a
stronger than usual investor protection compared to other firms in a weak investor-protection
country. On the other hand, firms that offer weaker investor protection than usual in their home
country are overvalued relative to "stronger investor-protection" firms because of market
imperfections and economy-wide discounting of stock market values. Therefore, the firms
with "weaker investor protection" have less ability and incentive to cross-border list on
foreign stock exchanges that demand "stronger investor protection."
One main reason that investors provide funds to firms is to receive voting rights in exchange
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). If managers violate investors' rights, then the investors have the
right to appeal to the courts to enforce their rights. The differences in investor protection
around the world stems from the differences in the nature of legal obligations that managers
owe to investors and the differences in how courts interpret and enforce these obligations. The
lack of legal protection for investors discourages ownership in public shares, which in turn
reduces stock value. The results of weak investor protection attenuate the firms' ability to
comply with the cross-border-listing requirements, particularly in the United States. For
example, the NYSE requires foreign firms to have at least $100 million market value and 2.5
million public shares to qualify for cross-border listings. The stringency of cross-border-listing
requirements is heightened in a country with weak investor protection, because the situation
reduces the number of public shares on issue and their market value. Therefore, weak investor
protection decreases cross-border listing and we refer to this effect ofweak investor protecdon
on cross-border listings as the "listing requirement effect."
Because weak investor protection at home can increase cross-border listing via valuation
effect and decrease it via listing effect, the net effect of weak investor protection at home on
cross-border listing is an interesting empirical issue. Our results suggest that the valuation and
listing requirement effects are countervailing.
The remainder of our article is organized as follows. Section 2 relates this study to the
relevant literature. Section 3 describes our sample-selection procedure, data, and variables
measurement. Section 4 reports our results and Section 5 concludes the article.
2. Relevant literature
2.1. Contracts assessment noise
Contracts are an essential element of the so-called contractual view of the firm developed
by Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Fama and Jensen (1983). The essence of
the contractual view is that a firm's valuation is based on its contracts. A firm's contracts are
determined by the contracting parties' culture with respect to risk aversion, business practices,
and institutional climates (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). These contracts are translated into assets.
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liabilities, and equities using the home-country GAAP. As Ball et al. (2000) note, in the home
markets, contracting with stakeholders is based on local GAAP numbers. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) report that incentive contracts around the world are generally based on the home
GAAP measure of performance. Therefore, a cross-border firm's contracts and its home
GAAP are a function of the same cultural and institutional environments (Ball et al., 2000;
Radebaugh& Gray, 1997).
The extant literature on international accounting reports that the legal and business
practices of countries are appropriate bases for classifying accounting practices of countries
into similar and dissimilar clusters (Mueller, 1967; Nobes, 1984; Radebaugh & Gray, 1977).
These studies report that countries that have similar legal and business practices also have
similar accounting practices. Gray (1988) and Salter and Niswander (1995) extend the
literature and find that countries with similar cultures appear to have similar accounting
practices. Taken together, the studies demonstrate that culture and institutional environments
are important determinants of accounting practices. When home-country GAAP and
contracts of firms are determined by a common set of forces, the home-country GAAP
becomes a robust measure of contract value. For example, the interpretation of debt-equity
ratios of Japanese firms cannot be done outside the keiretsu culture that underlies Japanese
contracts and GAAP. Also, measuring Japanese firms' debt-equity ratio using U.S. or U.K.
GAAP is at best a misleading analysis because the foreign GAAP derives fi-om a different
set of environmental and cultural forces. The use of a foreign GAAP mindset to interpret
accounting numbers of a Japanese firm creates a false impression that the underlying
contracts are based on the foreign GAAP and that the keiretsu culture is not an important
factor in assessing the value of Japanese contracts. An assessment noise exists if investors
resident in the United States interpret a Japanese firm's debt-equity ratio differently from
investors resident in Japan. The Japanese numbers and their interpretations reflect the
cultural and institutional components of the debt-equity ratios not captured with the mindset
of foreign GAAP. Therefore, assessment noise appears to occur when foreign GAAP are not
reflecting the cultural and institutional components of the home GAAP-based contracts.
The Japanese keiretsu is an interlocking credit and ownership relation among stakeholders
in business settings. For example, the relation between Japanese manufacturers and their
suppliers, banks, and trading companies results in short-term debt that is really long term,
long-term debt that is in effect equity, and large accounts receivable that are long-term loans
to customers (Radebaugh & Gray, 1997). Reporting these transactions using U.S. GAAP is
unlikely to capture the cultural context in which the contracts were cast. We refer to this
inadequacy of the U.S. GAAP in the valuation of non-U. S. firms as an assessment noise.
The Japanese GAAP require conformity between financial and tax reporting (Ali & Hwang,
2000). This conformity is not required in the United States. The GAAP tax conformity provides
incentives to reduce taxes by reporting lower profits. The likelihood of an assessment noise
increases if GAAP and tax rules are closely aligned in Japan and loosely connected in the
United States. In this setting, the income tax expense or payable reported under Japanese GAAP
has more robust cash flows than the same number reported under U.S. GAAP. Reporting lower
profits systematically undermines the value relevance of Japanese numbers (Ali & Hwang,
2000). If U.S. investors assess the value relevance of a Japanese firm without considering the
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cultural context in which the firm operates, then an assessment noise is likely to arise. The noise
captures errors in the valuation ofthe Japanese firm by U.S. investors using the mindset ofU.S.
GAAP instead of Japanese GAAP.
The sensitivity of pay-to-performance measures based on the home GAAP is another
source of assessment noise (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Typically, incentive contracts are based
on performance measures that are highly correlated with the quality of managers' decisions.
The contracts are influenced by managers' risk aversion. For example, pay-performance
measurement sensitivity may not be efficient for risk-averse executives. The level of risk
managers are willing to take depends on the home-country culture. Hofstede (1980) points
out that the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and
ambiguity is an important element of culture. Strong uncertainty-avoidance societies maintain
rigid rules and behavior and are intolerant of deviant behavior. Therefore, managers in strong
uncertainty-avoidance societies are more risk-averse relative to managers in other societies.
Because of the connection between risk and culture, incentive contracts are likely to vary
among countries with systematic differences in the degree to which members of the society
feel uncomfortable with uncertainty. We presume that a rational manager in a strong
uncertainty-avoidance society has incentive to minimize the risk inherent in pay-perform-
ance contracts. By engaging in managerial self-dealing, a manager might reduce the
sensitivity of pay-performance measures in the incentive contract. Therefore, managerial
self-dealing is likely to be high when uncertainty avoidance is high and managers have pay-
performance measures in incentives contracts.
Given the self-dealing opportunities induced by the high uncertainty avoidance, U.S.
investors' assessment of the value relevance of the home GAAP-based incentive contracts of
firms cross-border listed on U.S. stock exchanges is likely to include an assessment noise.
This noise increases to the extent that the culture underlying the incentive contracts is not
reflected in the assessment. Typically, the impact of the underlying culture in the valuation of
the cross-border-listed firm is captured more by the firm's home GAAP than by foreign
GAAP (Ndubizu, 2001).
Ali and Hwang (2000) find that accounting numbers have lower value relevance in the
bank-oriented financial system relative to the market system because contracting is based on
insider communication (access to company information), while accounting numbers are based
on the GAAP. The investor uses GAAP information to assess the value relevance of contracts
based on a different information set. Therefore, lower value relevance appears to occur when
contracts are based on insider company information and investors' assessments are based on
GAAP. We refer to this lower value relevance as a by-product of an assessment noise. This
noise is not expected in a market-oriented financial system in which home GAAP provide the
basis for both firm contracts and investor assessments.
Ali and Hwang (2000) find systematic differences in the value relevance of public
accounting numbers if the degree of tax GAAP conformity, external audit services, and
primary purpose of financial reporting are different between the U.S. and the home GAAP
regimes. For example, they find that value relevance is lower when tax rules significantly
influence financial reporting, external audit services are low, and GAAP are designed to satisfy
regulatory and government needs in the home country. Because these conditions do not exist in
G.A. Ndubizu. R.S.O. Wallace / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 397-420 403
the United States, investors are likely to spuriously assess the value relevance of the home-
country contracts using U.S. GAAP mindsets. Therefore, lower value relevance appears to
occur when assessment noise is high. The poor valuation reduces the incentive to cross-border
list equities.
Foreign investors, using foreign GAAP mindsets, assess the value relevance of cross-
border firms' contracts spuriously because the local GAAP underlying the contracts are
ignored in the assessment. The level of spuriousness increases with the differences between
the foreign and local GAAP. The differences increase costs of endowing foreign investors
with expertise in local GAAP. Barth et al. (1999) report that foreign investors do not possess
expertise in the local GAAP of cross-border firms, but can become experts in local GAAP at a
cost that decreases as GAAP harmonization across the countries increases. Therefore, lack of
harmonization increases spuriousness in assessing the value of local GAAP-based contracts
using foreign GAAP. We refer to this spuriousness in determining the value of local GAAP-
based contracts as assessment noise, which is value irrelevant. For example, Ndubizu (2001)
notes that if debt agreement is based on a local GAAP debt-equity ratio of 5, then assessment
of debt-default risk based on a foreign GAAP debt-equity ratio of 35 is likely to undermine
value relevance of the contract. The value relevance of local GAAP debt contracts assessed
with the mindsets of foreign GAAP is likely to have assessment noise in spite of the
stringency of foreign financial reporting rules. For example, the keiretsu in Japan operates in a
bank-oriented system that increases debt-equity ratio (Radebaugh & Gray, 1997). Because
the keiretsu enables a more effective control of firms in the system compared to the inability
of banks to control their borrowers in the market-oriented system (Ali & Hwang, 2000), debt-
default risk is low in Japan despite a high debt-to-equity ratio. Consequently, foreign
investors of a Japanese firm are likely to spuriously assess the firm's contracts if the roles
of the keiretsu and/or the Japanese financial system are not considered in the assessment.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that managers and investors sign a contract that specifies
what the manager does with the funds and how profits are divided between him and investors.
Significant differences between foreign and local GAAP's profit for cross-border firms often
lead to multiple interpretations of the contract and limit investors' ability to legally enforce
the contract. Ball et al. (2000) view accounting income as a common pie to be divided among
contracting parties. The value of the pie is determined based on local GAAP. If cross-border-
listing forces foreign investors to determine the value of the pie based on foreign GAAP, then
the spuriousness in valuing the contracts is likely because foreign GAAP does not reflect the
implications of the underlying culture and institution on valuation.
Firms consider the benefits and costs of cross-border listings before the decision to list.
Karolyi (1996), Saudagaran (1988), and Saudagaran and Biddle (1992) provide examples of
benefits and costs associated with cross-border listings. One potential cost is the valuation
irrelevance of assessment noise. We expect assessment noise to decrease value and cross-
border listings.
While the differences between local and foreign GAAP are an obvious cause of assessment
noise, the same problem also arises if the local GAAP are interpreted as if they were foreign
GAAP. For example, London and most European stock exchanges do not require cross-border
firms to comply with GAAP other than their home GAAP. The free flow of local GAAP
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financial statements across European stock markets would not attenuate assessment noise if
foreign investors interpret local GAAP's financial statements (contracts) as if they were based
on the GAAP of their own countries. This tendency would create the potential for multiple
interpretations of contracts, which would make contract enforcement by an outside court
difficult. Therefore, assessment noise increases with the extent of misinterpretation of local
GAAP. We view assessment noise as a determinant of cross-border-listing behavior of firms
because if foreign investors believe that the foreign GAAP are more stringent than most local
GAAP (that is, ifthey believe that a firm would have reported a worse performance had it used
foreign GAAP instead of local GAAP), they would undervalue the firms that do not prepare
Based on
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in a host Stock
Exchange
Country
Home Country
Contracts of
Cross-Listed
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Based on
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Exchange
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1
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+ denotes similarity between home and foreign GAAPs and/or home and foreign
underlying forces (culture and institutional climates) for GAAP and contracts.
- denotes dissimilarity between home and foreign GAAPs and/or home and foreign
underlying forces (culture and institutional climates) for GAAP and contracts.
Fig. 1. Relation between assessment noise and home GAAP and contracts of cross-listed finns.
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their financial statements using foreign GAAP, leading to assessment noise. Consequently, the
belief by U.S. investors that U.S. GAAP accounting is more stringent than non-U. S. GAAP
accounting would not benefit a non-U.S. reporting firm. In short, as Saudagaran (1988) and
Saudagaran and Biddle (1992) observe, it is more costly for firms domiciled in countries with
less stringent reporting requirements relative to the United States and the United Kingdom to
cross-border list on the stock exchanges of those countries. Therefore, assessment noise would
decrease the incentive of managers of non-U.S. firms to cross-border list on U.S. stock
exchanges. Consequently, we hypothesize that high assessment noise in a foreign country
decreases the incentive for firms to cross-border list on the stock exchanges of that foreign
country. The preceding discussion is encapsulated in Fig. 1
.
2.2. Investor protection
External financing is a contract between the firm as a legal entity and the investors, that gives
investors a say in how the firm is governed. The most important legal right shareholders have is
the right to vote (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This right is violated more flagrantly in countries
with weaker legal protections for investors. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that
Russian managers sometimes threaten employee-shareholders with layoffs unless the employ-
ees vote with management. According to Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1995), investor
protection in Italy is so undeveloped that it substantially retards the flow of funds to firms. In
less-developed and transitional economies, investor protection is practically nonexistent
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In Russia, poor investor protection leads to substantial diversion
of assets by managers and the virtual absence of extemal funds to firms (Boycko, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 1995). Investors need strong legal protection before they would be willing to invest in
privately owned firms, including legal restrictions on managerial self-dealing, outright theft,
and excessive compensation. Legal restrictions on managers constrain their actions by requiring
them to consult with their board of directors before making major decisions.
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
provide evidence that weak investor protection reduces the funds investors are willing to put
up ex ante to finance the firm. Consistent with this view, we expect weak investor protection to
decrease the value of all firms in a country and the number of public shares held by investors
(Bartov & Bodnar, 1996; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; La Porta et al., 1997). This decrease in
the value of all firms is arguably a more severe problem for firms with relatively higher levels
of investor protection. Cross-sectional variation in investor protection exists among firms in
each country. As suggested earlier, information asymmetry prevents domestic investors fi^om
differentiating between firms with strong and weak investor protection. Investor protection is
both a countrywide and firm-specific construct. At the firm level, investor protection is a
ftinction ofa firm's corporate governance, as well as the listing requirements and regulations in
the foreign market in which a firm's shares trade. Firms can elect to provide stronger investor
protection by implementing corporate-govemance mechanisms and shareholder rights that
"override" the norms of their home markets. Providing stronger investor protection than the
norm is costly for firms because they cannot credibly signal the fact that they provide stronger
investor protection than other firms at home. Therefore, local investors indiscriminately
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discount all domestic firms as a way of protecting themselves. Because of this imperfection,
firms with stronger investor protection and ability to meet the stringent cross-border-listing
requirements for foreign investor protection have incentives to cross-border list on U.S. or
London stock exchanges to maximize their market value." We refer to this increase in cross-
border listing as the valuation effect ofweak investor protection at home. While weak investor
protection at home is an obvious cause of the valuation effect, the same problem also arises
from smallness (inefficiency) of home capital markets (La Porta et al., 1997; Saudagaran,
1988). We controlled for capital market size with total equity market capitalization scaled by
gross domestic product in each country.
Weak investor protection at home challenges a firm's ability to comply with cross-border-
listing requirements, particularly in the United States. Because weak investor protection at
home decreases stock value and home investors' willingness to provide funds, we expect
difficulty in meeting cross-border-listing requirements. We refer to this effect of weak
investor protection at home as the listing requirement effect. Our investor protection
hypothesis is in two parts as follows:
(a) a valuation effect that increases the incentive for cross-border listing and
(b) a listing requirement effect that decreases the opportunity for cross-border listing.
The listing requirement and the valuation effects are presumed to occur jointly and move in
opposite directions. If the valuation effect dominates, then weak investor protection increases
cross-border listing. If neither effect dominates, then weak investor protection will not
produce a statistical significant coefficient in the cross-border-listing function. The lack of a
significant coefficient may signal that differences in legal investor protection around the
world are not important in cross-border listing. This perspective is highly unlikely because
evidence in the literature suggests that investor protection affects capital market developments
(La Porta et al, 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Which effect dominates is an important
empirical issue that we address in this article.
3. Sample selection and variable measurement
3.1. Sample selection
The number of foreign firms that are cross-listed on major stock exchanges outside their
home countries was obtained from the Foreign Company Offerings and Listings in the U.S.
Securities Markets (Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], 1994). The SEC document
^ In addition, Karolyi (1996) reported that the largest contingent of cross-border listing exists on the London
Stock Exchange, which comprised 54% of London's average daily turnover of $5.4 billion (see "Four-Year Surge
in ADR and GDR Issues," Financial Times. November 10, 1994). The next largest contingent of cross-border
listing exists on the U.S. national stock exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ). We do not investigate other
levels of cross-border listing in the United States such as OTC, Pink Sheets, and 144A filings.
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contains (1) the name of firms that cross-border listed from each home country and (2) the
foreign exchanges in which a firm is cross-border hsted. The SEC document provides data on
cross-border Hsting as of December 31, 1994. Over 80% of cross-border listings reported on
the SEC document are cross-listed on the U.S. national stock exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ,
and Amex) and the London Stock Exchange."^ Adhikari and Tondkar (1992), Biddle and
Saudagaran (1989), and Saudagaran and Biddle (1995) idendfy U.S. and London Stock
Exchanges as having the most stringent financial reporting regimes." We concentrate our
analysis on these two major markets in which assessment noise is expected to be significant
for countries that have distinctly different local GAAP. This choice is consistent with our
assumption that firms with a philosophy of strong investor protection that are domiciled in a
weak investor-protection country have economic incentives to cross-border list in more
efficient markets to maximize their market values. The analysis of cross-border listings on the
London market used only non-U.K. and non-U. S. firms that cross-listed on the London Stock
Exchange and that do not report to the SEC. When we included firms with listings on both the
U.K. and U.S. exchanges, the results are qualitatively similar to our reported resuhs.
Firms that cross-border listed on foreign stock exchanges and from countries not
included in Doupnik and Salter's (1993) international financial reporting classes are
eliminated from our sample. This allows us to use Doupnik and Salter's classification
of countries into international financial reporting clusters to identify cross-border listings
likely to produce high and low assessment noise as defined in this article. Countries that
share a financial reporting cluster with the United States or the United Kingdom are
presumed to have relatively less assessment noise compared to countries that belong to any
of the other Doupnik and Salter's intemational financial reporting clusters. For example,
firms that cross-border listed on U.S. stock exchanges and belonged to the U.S. financial
reporting cluster (U.S.-C2) based on Doupnik and Salter are classified into the low-
assessment-noise group, while all other cross-border-listed firms are classified into the
high-assessment-noise group. The low-assessment-noise firms have local GAAP that
belonged to the same intemational financial reporting cluster as the United States, while
high-assessment-noise firms belonged to a different accounting cluster. Our proxy for
assessment noise ignores the variations in financial reporting practices within the high or
low groups. This lumping together of seemingly similar countries creates a potential bias
against our hypothesis.
Similarly, firms that belonged to the U.K. financial reporting cluster were denoted as low-
assessment-noise firms, while other cross-border listings in the London market were
classified into the high-assessment-noise group. The assessment noise in the U.K. setting
arises fi^om misinterpreting local GAAP-based contracts as if they were based on U.K. GAAP.
Biddle and Saudagaran (1992) conclude that stringent disclosure requirements of foreign stock exchanges
inhibit more cross-border listings.
^ Including Canadian firms in the regression would bias our results in favor of low-assessment-noise firms
because the majority of cross-listed firms in the U.S. category are Canadian (296 out of 596). The common factors
between the United States and Canada are far greater than just GAAP similarities. Thus, their incentive for cross-
border listing on the U.S. stock exchanges might have come from similarities between the two countries other than
similar GAAP and the geographical proximity of the two countries.
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Table 1
Sample firms, country of origin, and reporting clusters
Countries of Number of firms cross-border
incorporation listed in U.S. exchanges 1994"
Number of fums cross-border Reporting
listed in London exchange 1994*' clusters'^
Australia 21
Canada 296
Hong Kong
India
2
Ireland 10
Israel 51
Kenya
Malaysia
New Zealand 4
Nigeria
Pakistan
Singapore
South Africa
1
1
Sri Lanka
Thailand
United Kingdom 62
Zimbabwe
Argentina 10
Belgium
Brazil 1
Chile 15
Colombia 1
Egypt
France 9
Greece
Italy
Jordan
13
Mexico 27
Netherlands 15
Peru 1
Philippines
Portugal
3
2
Spain
Uruguay
Venezuela
8
2
Germany
Japan
Switzerland
2
19
1
Taiwan
Denmark 4
Finland 3
Norway
Sweden
5
7
43 596
4
13
1
6
56
1
1
7
1
1
80
1
3
1
1
5
9
10
23
1
3
4
4
3
12
251
CI -UK
C2-US
Cl-UK
Cl-UK
Cl-UK
C2-US
Cl-UK
Cl-UK
Cl-UK
Cl-UK
Cl-UK
Cl-UK
Cl-UK
Cl-UK
C6-Arb.
Cl-UK
Cl-UK
C4-Latin
C5-Euro
C4-Latin
C4-Latin
C4-Latin
C6-Arb.
C5-Euro
C4-Latin
C5-Euro
C6-Arb.
C4-Latin
Cl-UK
C4-Latin
Cl-UK
C5-Euro
C5-Euro
C4-Latin
C2-US
C8-German
C9-Japan
C5-Euro
Cl-UK
C7-Nordic
C7-Nordic
C7-Nordic
C7-Nordic
' 1994 cross-border listing data were obtained from Foreign Company Offerings and Listings in the U.S.
Securities Markets prepared by the Division of Corporate Finance, U.S. SEC (1994).
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Table 1 {continued)
Original sample Total sample
U.S. exchange London exchange
Total foreign firms listed 657 326 983
Firms eliminated for lack of data 61 75 136
Final sample of firms 596 251 847
^ U.S. firms and other foreign fums that report to the SEC and cross-border listed on London Exchange were
excluded from the reported results.
^ The financial reporting cluster (FRC) for each country was based on Doupnik and Salter (1993).
Of the 657 non-U.S. firms that cross-border listed on U.S. stock exchanges, 61 firms were
eliminated because they are not included in Doupnik and Salter's (1993) study. The final
sample of 596 firms fi"om 43 countries and their financial reporting clusters are presented in
Table 1 (column 2). The 296 Canadian firms in this sample were not included in the
regression analysis of firms that cross-border listed on the U.S. stock exchanges because of
their potential to swamp the results.^
The second subsample consists of non-SEC reporting firms that cross-border listed on the
London Stock Exchange. By the end of December 1994, there were 326 such firms and 75 of
these firms are from countries not included in Doupnik and Salter (1993). The final sample of
251 firms that cross-border listed on the London Stock Exchange and their financial reporting
clusters are presented in Table 1 (column 3).
Our choice of a 1994 database in this study needs some explanation. The basis for
classifying countries into clusters is Doupnik and Salter's (1993) study. This study is based on
Nobes' (1983, 1984) judgmental classification schema. However, Nobes (1998) has criticized
his 1983 and 1984 classifications for irrelevance in modem times, given the improvement in
the intemational drive toward harmonization (that is, since 1995). For example, several
European firms have started using the U.S. GAAP and/or L\SC (now L\SB) GAAP as the
basis for their financial reports since 1995. Therefore, our database matches well with the
basis we used to identify high and low assessment noise.
3.2. Variables measurement
The variables used in this study are defined in Table 2. The variables are classified
into three groups: (1) assessment noise variable, (2) investor-protection variables, and (3)
control variable. Low assessment noise is coded 2, while high assessment noise is coded
1. An alternative coding of 1 and is also used and the results are qualitatively similar.
An additional alternative measure of assessment noise is used and the results are qualitatively similar to those
reported in Tables 4-6. The alternative approach combined U.S. and U.K. financial reporting groups into a
microfinancial reporting group (Nobes, 1983, 1984). Cross-border listing from a microgroup into U.S. or London
stock exchanges is classified as low assessment noise, while other cross-border listings are denoted as high
assessment noise.
\
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Table 2
Variable definition and measurement
Variable definitions
LAW Assessment of the law and order tradition in each country based on a scale from to 10,
with lower scores for less tradition for law and order. Source: International Country Risk
Guide and La Porta et al. (1997).
OSV One, if the company law or commercial code of each home country requires that ordinary
common shares have one vote per share, and zero otherwise. Source: Company Law or
Commercial Code of each country and La Porta et al. (1997).
EMS The 1994 equity market capitalization for each country (measured in dollars) scaled by
gross domestic product. Source: Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (IPC, 1998).
MRC Two, if home-country financial reporting cluster (FRCs) is the same (similar) to the
foreign stock exchange in which they are cross-listed (low assessment noise); one
otherwise. When an alternative coding of MRC as 1 and was used, the results were
qualitafively similar. Source: Doupnik and Salter (1993).
LUS Number of companies that cross-border listed on the U.S. national stock exchanges as of
December 31, 1994, scaled by the number of companies listed on the home country's
domesfic stock market. Sources: SEC (1994) and Emerging Stock Markets Factbook
(IPC, 1998).
LUK Number of firms that cross-border listed on the London Stock Exchanges as of
December 31, 1994, divided by number of listed domestic companies in the home
country. The data are obtained fi^om the SEC (1994) and the Emerging Stock Markets
Factbook (IPC, 1998).
LUSUK Pooling LUS and LUK together. The data represent the proportion of firms fi^om each
home country that cross-border listed on U.S. and London Stock Exchanges.
The assessment noise variable is denoted as MRC in Tables 2-67 The eight financial
reporting clusters identified in Doupnik and Salter's (1993) study and used in the study
(excluding C3) are reported in Table 1 (e.g., C1[U.K.], C2[U.S.], C4[Latin], C5[Europe],
C6[Hybrid], C7[Nordic], C8[German], and C9[Japan]), including the number of compa-
nies from each reporting cluster that cross-border lists on U.S. and London Stock
Exchanges.
Two variables are used as proxies for investor legal protection in each home country: ( 1
)
law and (2) one-share-one-vote (OSV). The law variable captures the overall quality of legal
rules and their enforcement in each country, including country risk. The legal protection for
equity holders was captured in terms of the existence of one-share-one-vote right. As Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) note, the principal difference in investor protection around the world stems
from the difference in the right of shareholders to vote on important corporate matters and on
how courts interpret and enforce that right. These variables were, respectively, denoted as
' However, as a reviewer observed, our proxies for investor legal protection (LAW and OSU) are country
specific (all firms in a country have the same legal protection), although our hypothesis regarding the movement of
firms with relatively higher legal protection across national borders is based on firm-level legal protection. Note,
however, that our sample firms are those that have crossed the borders of their home countries. So, we have
eliminated those firms that are probably not capable of offering a relatively higher level of legal protection than
those at home. The relationships among firms that cross borders and firms that do not are factored into our proxies
LUS, LUK, and LUSUK, described in Table 2.
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LAW and OSV in Table 2. The variables were measured in a manner consistent with La Porta
etal. (1997).^
As Lee (1987) reports, stock-market capitalization is related positively to the value of
equities. The home country with a small stock market is more likely to provide little or no
facility for the efficient valuation of equities. Consequently, firms in such countries have
greater incentive to cross-border list equities in more efficient stock exchanges. We measured
the size of the home capital market with the equity-market capitalization scaled by the gross
domestic product (see Table 2) denoted as EMS. This variable was used to control for the
potential effect of home capital market size on cross-border listings.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation
Panels A and B of Table 3 present the sample mean, standard deviation, and maximum and
minimum values for the dependent variables (LUS for U.S. exchange and LUK for London
Stock Exchange), independent variables (MRC, LAW, and OSV), and control (EMS) variable.
The table reveals considerable dispersion in the values of the variables, as represented by the
minimum and maximum values, and the standard deviation. The table also reveals a wide
range of variation in the movement fi*om the home-country stock market to foreign stock
markets, as measured by the dependent variable (number of cross-border listing of equities
scaled by number of firms listed in the home-country market).
Also noteworthy is the proportion of firms fi^om high or low-assessment-noise countries
that cross-border listed on U.S. and London Stock Exchanges. Twelve percent of firms fi^om
low-assessment-noise countries and 2% of firms fi*om high-assessment-noise countries cross-
border listed on the U.S. market. A similar result is noted for the London Stock Exchange,
with 8% and 0.8%, respectively, of firms fi"om low- and high-assessment-noise countries
cross-border listed on the market. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that the low
assessment noise augments cross-border-listing incentives.
Panels C and D of Table 3 provide Pearson (upper diagonal) and Spearman (lower
diagonal) correlations between variables used for the U.S. and London Stock Exchange
analyses, respectively. These correlation coefficients indicate the degree to which variation
in one variable is related to variation in another. It is quite interesting that independent
variables MRC and LAW, in U.S. analyses, are statistically related to the dependent
variable (LUS) at the .01 level. We report similar bivariate correlation for the London
market in panel D, except that independent variable EMS also is significantly related to the
dependent variable (LUK). This result arguably suggests that the movement in cross-border
listing on U.S. and London Stock Exchanges is related to changes in the independent
^ The WLS method rids an equation of heteroskedasticity by dividing it through by a function of the
proportionality factor Z and then reestimating the equation with ordinary least squares.
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Table 3
Summary statistics for the sample
(A) Descriptive statistics>; U.S. e.xchanges
Variables n Mean Maximum Minimum S.D.
LUS 43 0.0264 0.2476 0.0600 0.0473
MRC 43 1.0900 2.0000 1.0000 0.2900
LAW 43 6.9159 10.0000 1.9000 2.6779
osv 43 0.2300 1.0000 0.0000 0.4200
EMS 43 0.9962 4.4025 0.0217 1.0371
Low assessment 3 0.1214 Of the firms listed in those countries where firms
countries that cross-border listed on U.S. stock exchanges
are domiciled.
High assessment 40 0.0236 Of the firms listed in those countries where firms
coimtries that cross-border listed on U.S. stock exchanges
are domiciled.
(B) Descriptive statistics: London exchange
Variables N Mean Maximum Minimum S.D.
LUK 42 0.0282 0.7000 0.0000 0.1086
MRC 42 1.2900 2.0000 1.0000 0.4600
LAW 42 6.8774 10.0000 1.9000 2.6972
OSV 42 0.2300 1.0000 0.0000 0.4300
EMS 42 0.9391 4.4025 0.0217 1.0533
Low-assessment 26 0.0812 Of the firms listed in those countries where firms
countries that cross-border listed on the London Stock
Exchange are domiciled.
High-assessment 16 0.0084 Of the firms listed in those countries where firms
countries that cross-border listed on the London Stock
Exchange are domiciled.
Panel C: Correlation analysis: U.S. exchange
LUS MRC LAW OSV EMS
LUS
MRC
LAW
OSV
EMS
.409 .428 -.218 -.108
(.006)*** (.004)*** (.155) (.489)
.416 .105 -.171 -.090
(.009)*** (.496) (.266) (.564)
.400 .126 -.134 .208
(.007)*** (.417) (.385) (.180)
-.231 -.171 -.168 .358
(.131) (.266) (.276) (.018)**
.170 .006 .403 .106
(.276) (.967) (.007)*** (.497)
Panel D: Correlation analysis: London exchange
LUK MRC LAW OSV EMS
LUK .301
(.051)**
.486
(.003)***
-.131
(.407)
-.011
(.945)
I
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Table 3 (continued)
Panel D: Correlation analysis: London exchange
LUK MRC LAW OSV EMS
MRC .310 .025 .141 .506
(.045)** (.873) (.372) (.001)***
LAW .547 .018 -.128 .194
(.000)*** (.912) (.415) (.224)
OSV -.267 .141 -.159 .379
(.087)* (.372) (.309) (.015)**
EMS .322 .386 .399 .125
(.040)** (.013)*** (.010)*** (.437)
Upper diagonal = Pearson; lower diagonal = Spearman.
Correlation coefficients/Prob>|/?| under //q: Rho = 0/A^.
P values for two-tailed tests are provided in the parentheses.
*Significant at the .10 level.
** Significant at the .05 level.
***Significant at the .01 level.
variables, in particular, assessment noise (MRC) and legal rules and their enforcement
(LAW).
Significant correlation coefficients among independent variables are noted. As such, we
presented regression results for the fiill models as well as the reduced models that excluded
one of the correlated independent variables.
4.2. Regression results
The regression analyses were performed after carefully addressing two statistical prob-
lems: multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. The latter problem was addressed in three
sequences: first, the variables were scaled in a way that avoided heteroskedasticity.
Dependent variables (number of cross-border-listed firms) were deflated with the number
of firms that listed on the home market. This reformulation deflates the effect of capital
market size (in terms of number of firms) on the movement to cross-list on foreign markets.
A similar transformation was made for the control variable EMS. Gross domestic product
was used to scale this variable. Second, following the redefinition of variables above, the
weighted least squares (WLS), a form of generalized least squares, was used to estimate the
models' coefficients. Studenmund and Cassidy (1992) suggest this approach. Finally, we
performed White's (1980) test of heteroskedasticity. This test looks for a chi-square value
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of slope coefficients. In all estimations, our
model's chi-square value is less than the critical chi-square value, suggesting that the null
hypothesis of homoskedasticity cannot be rejected. This result indicates that our variable
reformulations and choice of regression method are appropriate statistical remedies for
heteroskedasticity.
The multicollinearity problem, as discussed earlier, was remedied by dropping one of the
correlated variables in the full model. However, the deletion of a multicollinear variable that
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Table 4
Weighted regression of number of firms cross-border listed on U.S. national stock exchanges
Models Bu 5, Bz B, B, Adjusted R-
1 Full - .0543 .0592 .0032 -.0119 - .0034 .14
(-1.66)* (2.50)*** (1.015) (-0.66) (- 0.46)
2 Removed B^ - .0566 .0599 .0030 -.0147 .16
(-1.82)* (2.59)*** (1.21) (-0.92)
3 Removed B\ - .0608 .0612 .0037 - .0053 .15
(-1.95)* (2.62)*** (1.37) (-0.79)
4 Removed By + B, - .0656
(-2.23)**
.0634
(2.78)***
.0032
(1.33)
.16
LUS = Bo + 5i X MRC + fi. x LAW + ^3 x OSV + ^4 x EMS + e
Dependent variable is the number of firms fi"om each non-Canadian and non-U. S. country that cross-border listed
on the U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) deflated by the number of firms in the home-country
stock market. The t statistics for one-tailed tests are noted in parentheses.
EMS = control variable.
*Significant at the .1 level.
** Significant at the .05 level.
***Significant at the .01 level.
theoretically belongs in the model is fairly dangerous because it can lead to specification bias
(Studenmund & Cassidy, 1992). We, therefore, estimated both the reduced and the full
models. The general conclusions from all four models are consistent.
4.3. Cross-border listings on U.S. exchanges
Table 4 reports the results fi-om the WLS regression of cross-border listings of equities on
assessment noise, investor protection and home capital market size for non-Canadian and
non-U. S. firms listed on the exchanges. The adjusted R" for the four models reported in the
table range from .14 to .16. Model 1 is the fiill model that includes all independent and
control variables. Models 2, 3, and 4 are reduced models that excluded multicollinear
variables. With and without exclusion of multicollinear variables, the coefficient estimates
and the general conclusion appear to be consistent. This suggests that the models' estimation
technique is the best linear unbiased estimator when multicollinearity exists. Thus, while the
effect of multicollinearity is to increase the variance of the estimated coefficients, our
estimates still have the property of minimum variance.
The results in Table 4 show that cross-border listings on U.S. stock exchanges are
conditioned on the assessment noise. The assessment noise (MRC) variable represents the
spuriousness in investors' valuation of cross-border firms' local GAAP-based contracts using
the U.S. GAAP mindset. The coefficient of MRC represents cross-border listings on U.S.
stock exchanges gained by having low assessment noise. Therefore, cross-border listing on
U.S. stock exchanges decreases with the extent of assessment noise.
See Pearce and Reiter (1985) and Studenmund and Cassidy (1992) for more discussion of multicollinearity.
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The results show that assessment noise (MRC) has a positive coefficient and is significantly
related to cross-border listing in the U.S. market at the .01 level. This suggests that low
assessment noise increases cross-border listings. Similar results are reported for Models 1 to 4
in Table 4, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious threat. This result is consistent with
the strength of the bivariate relationship between cross-border listings on U.S. exchanges and
assessment noise reported in Table 3 (panel C). We find positive and significant bivariate
association at the .01 level. The coefficients of the constant terms are statistically significant in
all four models. This represents the value of cross-border listing when all the independent
variables, the control variable, and the error term are equal to 0.
The coefficients on investor protection variables (LAW or OSV) are not statistically
significant at the .05 level. This result suggests that the valuation and listing requirement
effects cancel out in our empirical setting. Consequently, neither the valuation effect nor
the listing requirement effect dominates cross-border listing of equities in U.S. markets.
This finding suggests that firms are equally concemed about the listing-requirement and
the valuation effects of poor investor protection on cross-border listings. An alternative
interpretation of the lack of significant coefficients is that investor protection around the
world is not an important determinant of stock market development around the world.
This perspective is not consistent with extant literature. Therefore, our prediction that the
listing and valuation effects are countervailing appears to be a more plausible
explanation.
4.4. Cross-listing on the London Exchange
Table 5 reports the results from the WLS regression of cross-border listings on assessment
noise, investor protection, and home capital market size for the London Stock Exchange. The
Table 5
Weighted regression of number of firms cross-border listed on London stock exchanges
Models Bo 5, B2 By B, Adjusted R~
1 Full - .0632 .0541 .0029 -.0177 .0008 .07
(-2.41)** (2.43)** (1.29) (-1.11) (0.08)
2 Removed B^ -.0591 .0496 .0031 -.0168 .09
(-2.35)** (2.40)** (1.38) (-1.08)
3 Removed By -.0571 .0480 .0027 - .0009 .07
(-2.22)** (2.22)** (1.16) (0.09)
4 Relmoved By + Bj, - .0538
(-2.18)**
.0445
(2.20)**
.0028
(1.25)
.09
LUK = 5o + 5, X MRC + 5. x LAW + By x OSV + ^4 x EMS + e
Dependent variable is the number of firms fi^om each non-U. S. country that cross-border listed on the London
Stock Exchange deflated by the number of firms in the home-country stock market. The / statistics for one-tailed
tests are noted in parentheses.
EMS = control variable.
**Significant at the .05 level.
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adjusted Rr for Models 1-4 are .07, .09, .07, and .09, respectively. The coefficients on MRC
(assessment noise) for Models 1-4, range from .0445 to .0541, which are statistically
significant at the P value of .05 or better. These findings suggest that, on average, additional
cross-border listings could be achieved when home countries have low assessment noise.
These findings support our hypothesis that firms tend to cross-border list on an exchange with
similar financial reporting rules to attenuate the valuation implications of high assessment
noise. The results are similar to those earlier reported for the U.S. stock exchanges. These two
results make a rather consistent case that cross-border listings decrease with the extent of
assessment noise. GAAP harmonization across the countries is an obvious way to reduce
assessment noise. Therefore, our results suggest that GAAP harmonization is an important
element in global capital market developments.
4.5. Additional test
To get asymptotic efficiency through pooling the data, we combined cross-border listings
on U.S. and London Stock Exchanges in an analysis because, as Studenmund and Cassidy
(1992) note, as the sample size gets larger, the estimator is consistent and has the smallest
variance of all the consistent estimators. We provide additional regression results on the
combined sample in Table 6.
The additional regression results are consistent with the results reported in Tables 4 and 5,
respectively, for U.S. and London Stock Exchanges. The coefficients on MRC are positive
and statistically significant at a P value of .05 or better, in all four models. These findings
suggest an inverse relationship between the movements of foreign equities into U.S. and
London Stock Exchanges and the assessment noise across GAAP. The likelihood of low
assessment noise creates valuation incentives for firms to cross-border list on the two major
Table 6
Weighted regression of number of firms cross-border listed on U.S. and London Stock Exchanges
Models Bo 5i B2 By B4 Adjusted R'
1 Full - .0548 .0531 .0034 - .0220 .0022 .07
(-2.01)** (2.43)** (1.35) (- 1.34) (0.22)
2 Removed B^ -.0519 .0489 .0039 - .0208 .07
(- 1.97)** (2.38)** (1.58) (-1.29)
3 Removed ^3 - .0569 .0515 .0036 .0008 .06
(-2.08)** (2.35)** (1.41) (0.07)
4 Removed By + Bj, -.0539
(-2.04)**
.0474
(2.30)**
.0039
(1.59)
.07
LUSUK = 5„ + 5| X MRC + 5. x LAW + By x OSV + .^4 x EMS + e
Dependent variable is the number of firms fi-om each non-U. S. and non-U. K. country to cross-border listed on the
U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) and the London Stock Exchange deflated by the number of
firms in the home-country stock market. The / statistics for one-tailed tests are noted in parentheses.
EMS = control variable.
**Significant at the .05 level.
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global Stock exchanges. Therefore, our results hold for alternative stock exchanges,
regulatory regimes, and pooling of research data to gain asymptotic efficiency.
5. Conclusion
We have documented a statistically significant negative association between assessment
noise and cross-border listing of equities on U.S. and London stock markets. The results
support our hypothesis that firms tend to list on the stock exchanges of countries that have
GAAP that are similar to their home country to attenuate the valuation implication of high
assessment noise. This noise arises if the value relevance of local GAAP-based contracts is
assessed with the mindset of foreign GAAP that are distinctly different and resuhs in what we
described in this article, as an "assessment noise," and considered to be value irrelevant. This
noise increases with the extent of the differences between local and foreign GAAP. Therefore,
GAAP harmonization across the countries would attenuate assessment noise and increase
cross-border listings. Our results lead us to conclude that the harmonization of financial
reporting is important in the development of the global capital market, particularly, if
assessment noise decreases with the extent of GAAP harmonization across the countries.
We identified two effects of weak investor protection in the home country on cross-border
listing of equities: the valuation effect and the listing requirement effect. These effects are the
byproducts of the impact of weak investor protection on investment. Consistent with extant
literature, we argued that weak investor protection reduces trading liquidity and stock value.
The economy-wide undervaluation of equity stocks creates incentives for local firms that have
stronger investor protection to cross-border list equity. We described this effect ofweak investor
protection as the valuation effect, which is expected to result in increased cross-border listings.
Weak trading liquidity, on the other hand, makes it unlikely that firms would meet the
listing requirements of major global stock exchanges. These listing requirements include
having (1) an appropriate corporate governance or mechanism to protect investors in the
home countries, (2) the minimum number of public shares, and (3) minimum market value of
public shares. As investor protection decreases, the ability of firms to meet the cross-border
listing requirements is reduced. This phenomenon makes cross-border listing of equities less
likely for many firms.
Both the valuation and the listing requirement effects occur jointly and move the cross-
border listing of equities in an opposite direction. The lack of significant results reported for
investor protection in the home country has two plausible interpretations. First, the results
could indicate that investor protection is not an important determinant of cross-border listing.
This interpretation is highly unlikely in light of extensive evidence in the literature on the
importance of investor protection in capital market developments (La Porta et al., 1997;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The second interpretation is that the valuation and listing
requirement effects cancel out, bringing about a lack of significant coefficient estimates.
This interpretation is consistent with the hypothesis that investor protection is an important
determinant of cross-border listings. However, more research is needed, particularly at the
firm level (such as from the demand for capital and for market presence) to separate the two
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effects of poor investor protection, especially because we used countrywide proxies for
investor legal protection.
Although the results of our study add to our understanding of how harmonization can
create economic value, our study has several limitations. First, the results of our analysis of
investor protection in the home countries of cross-listed firms are intriguing but less
satisfying because we are unable to separate out the two countervailing effects (valuation
and listing requirements) and so do not provide specific prescriptions. Our suggestion that
the two effects cancel out because their coefficients are not significant statistically should be
treated with caution. The results may arise from an error in the measurement of the two
variables.
Second, we used the proportion of firms from each country that cross-border listed on the
U.S. or U.K. stock exchanges as the dependent variable in our WLS regressions instead of all
publicly traded firms from each sample country. In short, our analysis does not model cross-
border-listing decisions of all publicly traded firms in our sample countries as a frinction of
their firm- and country-specific factors. This is an area for future investigation.
Finally, our choice of the 1994 database has implications for our conclusion. For example,
our conclusions relate to financial reporting patterns up to 1994, not after. The results should,
therefore, be treated as tentative—the study is exploratory; it is a first cut at empirical tests
that we hope would generate useful follow-up research.
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1. Introduction
The work of Nduzibu and Wallace (2002) is an ambitious attempt to provide evidence on
whether cultural, institutional, economic, and contracting differences affect investors'
evaluation of accounting numbers. Policy makers often assume that the quality of financial
reports is determined by the quality of the accounting standards to which they conform. For
example, one of SEC's criteria for acceptance of IAS was whether lAS's application
resulted in transparency full disclosure, and comparability. As Pownall and Schipper ( 1 999,
p. 262) point out, these are qualities of accounting reports rather than of standards
themselves, and the SEC's wording presumes a causal link between the standards and
accounting reports prepared under those standards. Taken to the extreme, the SEC's
perspective implies that requiring foreign firms to present U.S. GAAP numbers is all that
is needed to enable U.S. investors to assess foreign firms' financials on an equal footing
with those of U.S. firms.
The issue that Nduzibu and Wallace (2002) address is also pertinent to the issue of
harmonization. Pownall and Schipper (1999, p. 274) express (in the context of acceptance of
IAS) this point well:
The issue to be settled by policy makers is whether applying a single set of rules (IAS)
to events/transactions in both common law and code law countries will in fact lead to
comparable financial reports—this will not be the case if the economic and institutional
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differences between common law and code law countries induce underiying substantive
differences between transactions that appear to be similar in the two types of countries,
and thus will be accounted for similarly under IAS. In this situation, the noncompar-
ability will be due to accounting for dissimilar events/transactions as if they were
similar.
Nduzibu and Wallace (2002) hypothesize that the greater the differences in the nature of
contracts, the greater the risk of spurious evaluation of accounting numbers (which they call
"assessment noise"). Convincing evidence of the existence of assessment noise would indeed
be a contribution to the accounting literature. As often happens with papers that address
ambitious research questions, however, Nduzibu and Wallace fall short of providing such
evidence.
In addition, the paper also seeks to disentangle the valuation (signaling benefit to firms
of listing in countries with more stringent requirements) and listing effects (difficulty of
complying with those stringent requirements). Below, I discuss the paper's research
design and findings and offer thoughts on possible improvements to the research design.
2. Research questions and hypotheses
As mentioned above, I find the existence of assessment noise both plausible and
interesting. Nduzibu and Wallace (2002) provide some examples of assessment noise that
are helpful. The examples, however, do raise questions. Nduzibu and Wallace argue that
GAAP-tax conformity in Japan affects fiiture cash flows. This suggests that one reason
for the existence of assessment noise is different levels of persistence of eamings.
Eamings persistence could differ even among firms within the same country; therefore, it
would be useful to provide evidence on whether these differences among firms across
different countries are greater than these differences among firms within the same
country.
However, I do not understand the difference between the valuation and listing effects.
Because valuation effects are the benefit of signaling and the listing effect is a cost of
signaling, I do not see how the two can be separated—the higher the cost of signaling, the
fewer the number of firms that would find it profitable to incur those costs, and hence the
higher are its benefits. Moreover, signaling will occur only if benefits exceed costs.
3. Research design
Nduzibu and Wallace (2002) perform cross-sectional regressions in which each country
constitutes one observation. A limitation of this approach is that the sample size is small.
They omit Canada as a special case (because many Canadian firms cross list on U.S.
exchanges), which is reasonable. The dependent variable, which seeks to measure the effect
of assessment noise, is the proportion of firms in each country cross listing on U.S. exchanges
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(and in a separate regression, on the London exchange). I discuss Nduzibu and Wallace's
dependent and independent variables below.
3.1. Dependent variable
The dependent variable of Nduzibu and Wallace (2002) is the proportion of publicly listed
firms from each country that cross list in the United Kingdom or United States. Thus, they
implicitly assume that if assessment noise is low, then more firms from any given country will
cross list on foreign exchanges, which is reasonable. Studies consistently find that increased
liquidity is an important reason for firms to cross list (see Karolyi, 1996). If assessment noise is
high, then foreign investors will refrain from investing in securities and trading them (because
they will perceive that they are at an information disadvantage). However, Nduzibu and
Wallace provide an alternative explanation for the relation—that assessment noise is valuation
irrelevant and this is a cost of cross listing.
3.2. Independent variable
Their independent variable for assessment noise is a dummy that takes value two or
one depending on whether the cross-listing firm is domiciled in a country whose
accounting standards are or are not in the same cluster as that of the foreign country
in which it is cross listing. This assumes that contracts, economic factors, etc., are
correlated with accounting clusters. While this is plausible, they provide no direct
evidence that this is true. Moreover, accounting clusters are likely correlated with other
factors that also affect the cross-listing decision. For example, countries in the same
accounting cluster are likely to have greater trade relations, and previous studies
(Saudagaran, 1988) find that the percentage of foreign sales is a determinant of cross
listing. These factors need to be controlled for.
Besides, it is more common to use zero and one as values of the dummy variable, but all
coefficients except the intercept are identical with the approach of Nduzibu and Wallace
(2002) so the results are unaffected.
They have two proxies for valuation and listing effects: the law and order tradition in each
country and whether firms are required to follow the one-share-one-vote principle.
3.3. Control variables
The only control variable that Nduzibu and Wallace (2002) use is the market
capitalization (variables related to the listing and valuation effects can also be interpreted
as controls the assessment noise). This assumes that concerns about assessment noise
(and possibly the listing and valuation effects) are the only factors that affect firms'
decisions to cross list. Previous studies find that sales and the ratio of overseas to local
sales also affect the decision to cross list. In addition, language and cultural relations are
also likely to affect the cross-listing decision. The lack of control for these other factors
is a limitation of Nduzibu and Wallace's study.
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4. Results and interpretation «
Nduzibu and Wallace (2002) find that the accounting cluster dummy is significant, i.e.,
proportionately, more firms fi^om countries in the same accounting cluster as a foreign
country (United States or United Kingdom) are likely to cross list there. There are two
issues with this conclusion. One, as I pointed out, accounting clusters are possibly
correlated with other variables that affect firms' decision to cross list. Second, fi"om the
descriptive statistics in Table 1, it appears that a few countries are highly influential in
driving the result. Israel is in the U.S. accounting cluster, and 51 Israeli firms cross list in
the United States. Nduzibu and Wallace do not report the proportion of firms fi-om these
countries, but it is also likely to be high. For cross listing on U.K. exchanges. South Afiica
(80) and Ireland (56) have the highest numbers of firms and both are in the U.K.
accounting cluster.
They find insignificant coefficients on the law and order tradition and dummy for the one-
share-one-vote principle and interpret this result as indicating that the valuation and listing
effects cancel each other instead of one dominating the other. Apart fi^om the difficulty of
disentangling these effects, even in theory, there is the additional problem that insignificance
could be caused by either lack of a relationship or by noise. Nduzibu and Wallace (2002)
argue that noise is an unlikely explanation because of the findings in previous studies that
investor protection is an important determinant of stock market development around the
world. However, it is not clear that investor protection is an important determinant of cross
listing, and the same observation applies to regressions using each country as one
observation.
5. Concluding comments
An altemative research design is to use each firm as an observation and condition on the
decision to cross list. That is, let the sample contain all firms that have cross listed on foreign
exchanges and let the dependent variable be whether the destination country is in the same
accounting cluster or not. Because the most common cross-listing destinations are the United
States and United Kingdom, the sample would then have to be restricted to firms in the U.S.
and U.K. accounting clusters (because decisions of firms in countries belonging to other
accounting clusters are not diagnostic with respect to the hypothesis). Conditioning on the
decision to cross list would control for some omitted variables (such as the need for financing
that could affect the decision to cross list). Moreover, the United States and United Kingdom
use the same language so that too does not confound the results. However, this approach too
suffers fi"om the problem that firms might choose their cross-listing destination based on trade
and cultural relations among countries.
Along the same lines, Reese and Weisbach (2001) provide evidence on the signaling effect
by examining firms' decision to undertake Level 1 versus Level 2 American Depositary
Receipts (ADR) programs. Level 1 ADRs are listed on the OTC Bulletin Board and have
minimal SEC compliance requirements. Level 2 ADRs are listed on NYSE, AMEX, or
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NASDAQ and have higher comphance requirements, including reconciHation of home
country fmancials with U.S. GAAP on form 20-F.
In summary, Nduzibu and Wallace (2002) address an interesting research question, but the
issues I discussed above limit the usefulness of their contribution.
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We would like to thank Kallapur (2003) for taking time to provide valuable and
constructive perspectives on our paper (Ndubizu & Wallace, 2003). He has added a
significant contribution to the field of cross-border listing of equities on U.S. and U.K. stock
markets that we hope will not be overlooked because of its location as an appendage to our
paper. He has provided us with additional insights as well as suggestions for possible
extension for future research. Kallapur has engaged in an interactive dialogue with our paper
by applying exceptional focus to some (though not all) of the ideas in our paper. He
contemplated the meanings behind some of them and reflected upon the issues that we have
not addressed and wondered why they were omitted. We however believe that some of his
reflections suggest an insufficient rumination over some of the text he finds troublesome.
While he agrees that our research is timely and addresses an interesting question that is
pertinent to the issue of harmonization, he raises several concerns with our paper, which we
discuss below.
While admitting that our assessment noise construct is both plausible and interesting,
Kallapur (2003) suggests that we do not provide sufficient evidence for the existence of
assessment noise, which is the main thrust of our paper. Kallapur also suggests that one
reason for the existence of assessment noise is the difference in the earnings persistence of
firms and points out that earnings persistence could also differ among firms within the same
country and we agree. He therefore suggests that we should have provided evidence on
whether the differences in earnings persistence among firms across different countries are
greater than similar differences among firms within the same country. However, our definition
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of "assessment noise" refers to the consequence of investors using the mindset of U.S.
GAAP to interpret financial statements prepared by cross-border firms, not to the persistence
of the earnings of cross-border firms. We beheve that we have provided sufficient examples
to enable a reader to understand the meaning of our assessment noise construct. Assessment
noise arises when investors use a wrong premise to interpret financial statements of cross-
border-listed companies. We suggest that foreign investors, using the mindsets of their home
GAAP, would spuriously assess the value relevance of cross-border firms' contracts because
they often ignore the GAAP of the countries in which the cross-border firms are domiciled.
The level of spuriousness would increase with the differences between foreign and home
GAAPs. The differences would increase the costs of endowing foreign investors with
expertise in the GAAP of other countries. As Barth, Clinch, and Shibano (1999) suggest,
foreign investors who do not possess expertise in local GAAP of cross-border firms can
become experts in local GAAP at a cost that decreases with the increase of GAAP
harmonization across countries.
Kallapur (2003) also suggests that we failed to sufficiently disentangle valuation effects
(which he describes as providing signaling benefits to firms listing in countries with more
stringent requirements) from listing effects (which he describes as the cost of signaling arising
from the difficulty of complying with those stringent requirements). We view this attempt to
make sense of our use of the investor protection construct as misleading. Both valuation
effects and listing effects are reactions of firms to the investor protection in their countries.
Firms' reactions to the investor protection in their countries are viewed in our paper as a
function of their corporate governance and their ability to comply with the listing require-
ments and regulations in the foreign market in which their shares are to be traded. We suggest
in our paper that only a few firms in a country with weak investor protection can cross-border
list because of valuation effects. These are firms that are in a position to provide stronger
investor protection by implementing corporate governance and shareholder rights that are
superior to the norms in their home markets. We also suggest that such a provision is costly
for those firms because they cannot credibly signal the fact that they are providing stronger
investor protection than other firms at home. We explain, in footnote 3, why firms with
relatively stronger investor protection are valued higher on foreign stock exchanges than on
home stock exchanges. Our explanation recognizes that cross-sectional variation in firm-
specific investor protection exists within each country. This is because information asym-
metry prevents domestic investor from differentiating between sfrong and weak investor
protection firms. Therefore, investor protection is both a countrywide and firm-specific
construct. Using the countrywide construct, we suggest that weak investor protection affects
the liquidity of a local stock market and the ability of local firms to raise equity capital at a
level sufficient to provide entree of their shares into the foreign stock market—this is what we
describe in our paper as the listing effect and this decreases the opportunity for cross-border
listing by firms. On the other hand, valuation effect refers to the finn-specific characteristics
that increase the incentive for cross-border listing.
Kallapur (2003) also expresses concern over our use of a small sample size. This is
inevitable. Any study, like our own, making use of macrolevel social units of analysis, such as
communities, nation-states, or countries, is confronted with a major obstacle—the relatively
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limited number of cases that can be treated. Our paper reports on a comparative investigation
of cross-border listing data from 43 countries partitioned into several clusters, which yield as
great variation as possible in cultural, social, economic, and political contexts. If the
relationships between firms' behavior and their orientation toward cross-border listing are
similar in these different contexts, then the factors that differentiate between the contexts can
be regarded as irrelevant to the relationships. As a resuh, we used the comparative strategy
known as the "most different systems design" (Przeworski & Tenne, 1970). If, on the other
hand, the relationships should vary between the different contexts, further analysis of the
country differences may clarify the causes of the different relationships.
Kallapur (2003) also suggests that we should have used an alternative research design in
which each firm is an observation instead of each country. In our study, we consider investors
as central and presume that their skills and world views have a substantial impact on the
behaviors of firms that want their equities to be traded on foreign stock exchanges. We
believe that macrocollectivities and institutions (investor protection and assessment noise)
derive their sustenance from the investors they embrace. Therefore, we expect that any
behavior at the microlevel (i.e., at the firm level) would find expression in the aggregated
dynamics that give shape and directions to global movement and migration of firms' equities.
In our study, we tested macroeconomic and macrolegal indicators, not microlevel or
individual firm indicators. On this basis, Kallapur's questions about our neglect of firm-
specific characteristics seem irrelevant. The main hypothesis we tested is that firms' intent on
cross-border listing tends to adopt the financial reporting values of the host stock market as an
instrumental response to facilitate social integration. Our hypothesis suggests that firms from
the same cluster as the host stock exchange would find it easier to cross-border list on that
stock exchange than firms from a different cluster, although host stock exchanges often
express the desire for firms from all clusters to cross-border list on their exchanges. Our
partitioning of the selected countries into clusters permits us to "forget," to a certain degree,
those contextual variables that would make comparison difficult. We sought the most stable
and invariant factors amid a profusion of forms and events—so we looked more for
similarities than for differences within clusters.
Kallapur (2003) also questions our failure to control for other factors that are likely to
affect cross-border-listing decisions by firms (such as firm-specific factors like trade relations,
percentage of sales that is foreign, and country-specific factors like language and cultural
relations). In the preceding text, we explained that our interest is on countrywide factors, not
firm-specific factors. This leaves us with the need to explain why national culture and
language are not factored into our study. There are several reasons for these omissions. First,
our countrywide factors of financial-reporting clusters and investor protection are "cultures
writ large." They consist of common objective elements such as language, history, religion,
customs, and institutions and, by their subjective self-identification, of people and firms.
Second, these constructs and their proxies are better empirical indicants of the contexts in
which firms that cross-border list are domiciled than the national culture indexes, such as
those of Hofstede (1980) that are outdated and freat multicultural contexts as monocultural.
Take for example, the case of Israel, which is a young immigrant society. The bulk of its
Jewish population is made up of immigrants. The immigrants originate from many parts of
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the world and represent some of the major cultural zones. Nearly one half migrated from
Moslem countries in the Middle East (e.g., Iraq, Yemen, and Iran) and North Africa
(Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia). Many are from Eastern and Central Europe, including
ex-communist countries that belong to Orthodox countries (e.g., Poland and Hungary). Many
arrived from Protestant countries (e.g., German and Holland), southern Catholic countries
(e.g., France and Italy), or English-speaking countries (e.g.. United Kingdom and the United
States). Although they share a common ethnic identity, their historical background and
cultural heterogeneity and the recency of their settlement suggest that the Israeli society
cannot be assigned to any specific cultural zone. Another example is South Africa, with a
highly heterogeneous population—Blacks, Whites, Indians, and Coloreds—each with its own
unique cultural orientations and all gradually moving toward cultural convergence given the
intense ongoing restructuring of the political, social, and economic spheres of the South
African society.
Third, cross-national comparison would neither guarantee the validity of our induced
conclusions, nor will the context of the compared countries be sufficiently similar to permit us
to consider as null the influence of the environment—we are not in a position to validly
exclude from our conclusion those contextual variables that cannot be kept constant. What we
seek is not a paralyzing perfection, but the most satisfying approximation to it.
Finally, Kallapur (2003) suggests that a few countries are highly influential in driving our
results because the number of firms indicated in our Table 1 as cross-border listing from Israel
on U.S. stock exchanges (51) and from South Afiica (80) and Ireland (56) on London stock
exchange seems large relative to those for other countries. Kallapur 's suggestion that firms
from these countries may swamp our analysis has arisen because we did not report the
proportion of firms from each of the 43 countries in our study. When the number of firms that
cross-border list are converted into proportion of publicly listed firms in each country, the
numbers become fractions and this translation removes the apparent skewness of the
distribution of the number of firms that cross-border listed from each country. On the
transladon, the proportion of publicly listed firms that cross-border list on U.S. stock
exchanges from Israel is less than 4%. The figures for South Aftica and Ireland on the
London stock exchange are 2% and 3.5%, respectively.
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Abstract
This study differs from prior audit-pricing studies as ( 1 ) it focuses on the issue of price competition
in the (small) private client segment of the audit market and (2) addresses the questions of whether and
how the audit-pricing model changed in that market between 1989 and 1997. Given the significant
increases in market concentration and two big audit firm mergers in that period, we try to assess
whether price competition (market power) has increased (decreased) or decreased (increased). We use
Belgian data on privately owned companies from 1989 and 1997 for our analyses. We find that audit
fees are significantly associated with the incumbent auditor's market share both in 1989 and 1997. Our
results are in line with prior studies on public client samples and hence do not support prior
assumptions that there are no price premia charged by large auditors in the small client segment of the
audit market. As to the evolution of audit pricing in the private client segment of the Belgian audit
market between 1989 and 1997, we find that the impact of various audit fee determinants changed
significantly and report evidence supportive of increased price competition.
© 2003 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Many studies have addressed audit-pricing issues in the past. Early audit-pricing research
was inspired by concerns about price competition in the audit market as a result of the high
levels of supplier concentration. The question whether audit markets are price competitive
remained valid in the nineties, especially as the consolidation trend between the big
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international accounting firms had continued. The vast majority of audit-pricing studies
focuses on the pubUc client segment of the audit market and reports evidence consistent with
price competition in that market. Price premia are reported for Big 8/6 firms, but these are
explained as evidence supportive of quality-differentiated services rather than arguments
against price competition.
This study differs from prior studies and contributes to audit-pricing research in at least
two respects. First, we focus on the question of price competition in the (small) private client
segment of the audit market. In prior studies, one often assumes that price competition
prevails in the small client segment of the audit market because of its low concentration (see,
for example, Simunic, 1980). However, to our knowledge, this assumption has never been
directly tested. Second, given the significant increases in market concentration and mergers'
of two big audit firms in the late eighties, we address the question whether and how the audit-
pricing model changed in that market during the last decade of the former millennium. The
mergers and the increase in concentration may have changed the market position and power
of the players in the audit market, and there is a general concern that the degree of
competition may have dropped. However, audit practitioners typically claim that the
increased concentration has increased rather than decreased price competition. Prior audit-
pricing studies based on samples of public clients indeed report evidence that is supportive of
increased price competition. Menon and Williams (2001) report flat (and not increased) audit
fees during the nineties. Pearson and Trompeter (1994) report a negative association between
audit fees and the level of supplier concentration. The validity of the latter study is however
limited, as only the insurance industry was included in the sample. Furthermore, the sample
only covered a relatively short time period in which concentration ratios exhibited only
limited variability. In our study, we report a significant increase in concentration in the
Belgian audit market between 1989 and 1997. We then assess whether the audit-pricing
model changed over that time period and whether detected changes are consistent with
increased price competition or increased market power.
We use Belgian data from 1989 and 1997 for our analyses. The vast majority of the clients
in the Belgian audit market are privately owned companies with an average size (namely
about two billion Belgian francs or 50 million euro) that is small compared to other
industrialized countries. We chose to adopt these 2 years because 1989 data are still
unaffected by the two megamergers that took place in that year, and 1997 data should
already fully incorporate their effect. We propose a new surrogate to assess market
concentration based on personnel cost data per audit firm. To this end, we collected all
financial statements submitted by Belgian audit firms to the Belgian National Bank in those 2
years. We adopt a measure proposed in the literature of industrial organization (see Parker,
1991) to assess whether supplier concentration is significant in the Belgian audit market and
find that this is not the case, both in 1989 and 1997. We do however find that the increase in
concentration between 1989 and 1997 is significant.
' Those mergers were between Deloitte Haskins and Sells and Touche Ross into Deloitte and Touche, and
between Arthur Young and Ernst and Whinney into Ernst and Young.
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To address our research questions, namely, whether (1) audit pricing is competitive in the
private chent segment of the Belgian audit market and (2) the audit-pricing model changed
between 1989 and 1997, we had to collect audit fee information through surveys, as fees are
not publicly disclosed in Belgium. We find that audit fees are significantly associated with the
incumbent auditor's market share both in 1989 and 1997. Our resuhs are in line with prior
studies on public client samples and hence do not support prior assumptions that there are no
price premia charged in the small (nonconcentrated) client segment of the audit market. We
also find evidence supportive of an increase in price competition in 1997 compared to 1989.
In particular, we tested whether the impact of various audit fee determinants changed
significantly between 1989 and 1997.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a
literature review. In Section 3, we describe those characteristics of the Belgian audit
environment that are relevant to this study. We also provide evidence on supplier concen-
tration in the Belgian audit market and assess its significance. We then specify our research
questions in Section 4. In Section 5, we define the audit fee model that we will adopt and
describe our research design. We then discuss our sample selection procedures and the main
results of our analysis in Section 6. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 7.
2. Literature review
2.1. Audit market concentration studies
Ample empirical evidence has been published on audit market concentration.^ These
studies were inspired by concerns about the possible anticompetitive effect of the presence of
a few dominant players (i.e., the Big 8/6 accounting firms) in the audit market and the
mergers between some of the Big 8 firms. Early studies stem fi-om the public client segment
of the U.S. audit market and include Dopuch and Simunic (1980); Rhode, Whitsell, and
Kelsey (1974); Schiff and Fried (1976), and Zeff and Fossum (1967). Concentration ratios
reported in these studies range (depending on the surrogate used) from about 65-70% for the
CR4 to as high as 95-98% for the CR8. Several studies questioned the contention that high
market concentration was the result of lack of competition and report (sometimes weak)
evidence supportive of price competition (see, for example, Campbell & McNiel, 1985;
Danos & Eichenseher, 1986; Dopuch & Simunic, 1980).
The megamergers between some of the largest Big 8 firms in 1989 were a reason why
audit market concentration studies have continued in the nineties. Again, there was a great
concern that possible monopoly power and/or loss of objectivity and independence would
result where only a few firms dominated the audit market. Minyard and Tabor (1991) and
Tonge and Wootton (1991) examined the proforma impact of the Big 8 mergers of 1989. Both
" We refer to Table 2 for a selected overview of the level of the concentration ratios reported in prior research.
Note that this table only includes evidence between 1988 and 1997, as this is relevant to the period analyzed in this
paper.
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Studies predicted that the mergers would have httle impact on competition and could actually
increase competition in the audit industry. Wootton, Tonge, and Wolk (1994) even indicate
that although those mergers resulted in increased concentration ratios, the analysis suggests
that the industry is becoming better balanced in competition within the group of big audit
firms. An important consequence is also the much bigger gap between the first tier audit firms
and the other (smaller) audit firms in the market.
As to European evidence, audit market concentration studies were performed in various
national audit markets (see, for example, Beattie & Feamley, 1994; Buijink & Maijoor, 1993;
Christiansen & Loft, 1992; Corona Romero, Garcia Benau, Ruiz Barbadillo, & Vico
Martinez, 1995; Loft & Sjofors, 1993; Marten, 1996; Moizer & Turley, 1987; Pong, 1999;
Weets & Jegers, 1997). Although the level of market concentration differs between European
countries, an increase in the eighties and nineties is apparent in most countries. Interesting is
that some studies report a significant difference in Big 6 market shares depending on the
client segment. For example. Pong (1999) reports for the UK market that the Big 6 market
share ranged fi*om about 50% in the small-size client segment to 98% in the largest client
segment of the UK audit market. As to Belgium, Weets and Jegers (1997) report that
concentration ratios are lower than in most other industrialized countries, but also that there is
an increasing trend in Big 8/6 market shares in the Belgian audit market during the 1980s and
1990s. A further discussion of audit market concentration in Belgium as compared to other
countries follows in the next section (see also Tables 1 and 2).
2.2. Audit fee studies
Based on the empirical evidence of high supplier concentration in the audit market, early
audit fee research was mainly inspired by concerns about price competition in the audit
market. In his seminal paper, Simunic (1980) proposed a model of audit pricing to test for
competition in the U.S. audit industry. He assumed that price competition prevails in the
small auditee market segment because of the lower supplier concentration in this segment, but
that the large auditee market may not be competitive because of Big 8 concentration. By
comparing pricing in the two market segments, Simunic draws conclusions about competition
in the audit market. From the results of his study, the hypothesis that the audit market is
competitive could not be rejected, as no significant premia were found for Big 8 firms in the
large client segment of the market. Many subsequent studies adopted a similar approach to
study audit pricing (see, for example, Defond, Francis, & Wong, 2000; Ettredge & Greenberg,
1990; Francis, 1984; Francis & Simon, 1987; Lee, 1996; Palmrose, 1986a, 1986b; Pong &
Whittington, 1994). Unlike Simunic, most studies report a significant Big 8/6 audit fee
premium and explain this finding by product differentiation by the Big 8/6 and not as a result
of Big 8/6 market power. The different findings, as to the Big 8/6 premia, are explained by
size differences in the client samples under investigation.
Later, audit fee studies (see, for example, Craswell, Francis, & Taylor, 1995; Deis &
Giroux, 1996; Defond et al., 2000; Pearson & Trompeter, 1994) were mainly concerned with
specific determinants of audit fees, such as the effect of auditor switching, auditor concen-
tration, and auditor industry specialization.
M. Willekens, C. Achmadi / The International Journal of Accounting 38 (2003) 431-455 435
Fees studies have also been done outside the United States. For example, Craswell et al.
(1995), Francis (1984), and Francis and Stokes (1986) report evidence on the Australian
market; Chan, Ezzamel, and Gwilliam (1993), Pong and Whittington (1994), and Taffler and
Ramalinggam (1982) on the UK market; Firth (1985) on the New Zealand market; Anderson
and Zeghal (1994) on the Canadian market; and Chung and Daryl Lindsay (1988), Defond et
al. (2000), Gul (1999), and Lee (1996) on the Hong Kong market. Overall, we can conclude
that (1) a fairly robust audit fee model seems to explain 50-70% of audit fee variations across
the world, including auditee size, client complexity, and riskiness as explanatory variables;
and (2) significant price premia for Big 5/6 firms are observed worldwide. Note that almost
all prior audit fee studies used samples of public clients.
2.3. Long-term trends in audit fees
In a recent study, Menon and Williams (2001) report evidence on long-term trends in audit
fees in the U.S. audit market. They find that fees increased in the 1980s but stayed flat in the
1990s. In particular, a significant increase in fees is noted in 1988, which the authors attribute
to an expansion of audit effort as a response to the issuance of the expectations-gap standards.
The evidence also indicates a short-term but not a long-term effect of the Big 8 mergers in
1989 on audit pricing. Some changes in the audit fee model over the sample period (1980-
1997) are also documented. For example, the magnitude of the coefficients for accounts
receivable and inventory has declined, which can be attributed to audit productivity
improvements. Important to note is that the sample in the study was restricted to clients of
Big 6 firms that voluntarily disclosed audit fees in the period 1980-1997. This implies that
no evidence is obtained on the non-Big 6 client segment of the market or on the privately held
firm segment of the audit market.
2.4. Audit pricing and supplier concentration
Although both audit fee and supplier concentration studies were inspired by concerns
about competition in the audit market as a result of increased supplier concentration, both
literatures have developed quite separately and the relationship between supplier concen-
tration and audit pricing has hardly been tested directly. An exception is the study by
Pearson and Trompeter (1994). They investigate the effect of supplier concentration on
audit fees for the life and health insurance and property and casualty insurance industries in
the United States over a 4-year period (namely, 1983-1986). They found that concentration
is negatively associated with fees, suggesting that higher levels of concentration be related
to higher levels of price competition. This finding is interesting as it does not confirm with
prior concerns that supplier concentration may increase market power of Big 8/6 firms and
hence affect audit pricing in a positive way. There are however two limitations to this
study. First, as only two U.S. industries are examined, the external validity of the study
may be limited. Second, the sample period covers a relatively short time period during
which the concentration ratios exhibited only limited variability in each industry. In our
study, we try to address some of these limitations and investigate (for the private client
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Table 1
Supplier concentration ratios in the Belgian audit market 1989-1997
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997
Panel A: CR 4
Personnel cost per audit firm''
No. of qualified professionals per audit firm''
No. of qualified professionals per audit firm
(WJ 1997)^
Client sales (WJ 1997)^
Square root of client sales (WJ 1 997)*^
Total assets (WJ 1997)'
Number of clients (WJ 1997)'
47% 63%
22% 27%
21% 22% 31% 28% 28% 26% 26% n.a.
41% 43% 52% 53% 56% 56% n.a. n.a.
19% 19% 23% 21% 23% 24% n.a. n.a.
45% 48% 57% 58% 60% 61% n.a. n.a.
33% 34% 39% 40% 42% 42% n.a.
Panel B: CR 6
Personnel cost per audit firm^
No. of qualified professionals per audit firm''
No. of qualified professionals per audit firm
(WJ 1997)"'
Client sales (WJ 1997)'
Square root of client sales (WJ 1997)'
Total assets (WJ 1997)'
Number of clients (WJ 1997)'
Panel C: CR 8
Personnel cost per audit firm^
No. of qualified professionals per audit firm''
No. of qualified professionals per audit firm
(WJ 1997)^^
Client sales (WJ 1997)'
Square root of client sales (WJ 1997)'
Total assets (WJ 1997)'
Number of clients (WJ 1997)'
60% 77%
27% 32%
25% 27% 35% 33% 33% 31% 31% n.a.
53% 54% 64% 66% 69% 70% n.a. n.a.
25% 26% 30% 29% 31% 31% n.a. n.a.
56% 61% 69% 71% 74% 74% n.a. n.a.
43% 45% 53% 54% 56% 56% n.a. n.a.
68% 80%
30% 36%
29% 31% 38% 36% 36% 35% 34% n.a.
59% 62% 69% 70% 73% 75% n.a. n.a.
30% 31% 34% 33% 35% 36% n.a. n.a.
65% 71% 76% 77% 80% 81% n.a. n.a.
51% 53% 58% 60% 62% 62% n.a.
Panel D: Herfindahl index (HHI)
Personnel cost per audit firm''
No. of qualified professionals per audit firm''
No. of qualified professionals per audit firm
(WJ 1997)''
Client sales (WJ 1997)'
Square root of client sales (WJ 1997)'
Total assets (WJ 1997)'
Number of clients (WJ 1997)'
.0768 .1184
.0175 .0228
.0170 .0190 .3000 .0250 .0250 .0230 .0210 n.a.
.0590 .0620 .0840 .0860 .0920 .0940 n.a. n.a.
.0180 .0190 .0220 .0210 .0220 .0230 n.a. n.a.
.0710 .0800 .1080 .1140 .1160 .1180 n.a. n.a.
.0410 .0430 .0540 .0560 .0590 .0600 n.a. n.a.
" The concentration ratios based on personnel cost are based on all financial statements submitted by audit
firms to the Belgian National Bank.
'' The concentration ratios based on the number of qualified professionals are based on the membership lists of
the Belgian Institute of auditors (IBR/IRE). Per audit firm, we traced the number of members that are associated
with it. Note that the total population is included.
' The concentration ratios in Weets and Jegers (1997) were calculated using the financial statements of the
1300 largest Belgian companies that were publicly available over the period 1989-1994.
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Table 2
Evidence on concentration ratios in European countries
BASIS: CR4 CR6 CR8 HHI
No. of qualified professionals per audit firm
Netherlands 1 990, entire population
—
Buijink and Maijoor (1993)
Belgium 1990, entire population
—
Weets and Jegers (1997)
Client sales
United States 1988, NYSE—Tonge and Wootton (1991)
Denmark 1990, Copenhagen Stock Exchange
—
Christiansen and Loft (1992)
Germany 1990, 200 public clients—Marten (1996)
Germany 1993, 200 public clients—Marten (1996)
Belgium 1990, 1300 largest clients—
Weets and Jegers (1997)
Belgium 1993, 1300 largest clients
—
Weets and Jegers (1997)
Square root of client sales
United States 1991, NYSE AMEX OTC—
Wootton et al. (1994)
Germany 1990, 200 public clients—Marten (1996)
Germany 1993, 200 public clients—Marten (1996)
Denmark 1990, Copenhagen Stock Exchange
Loft and Sjofors (1993)
Sweden 1990, Stockholm Stock Exchange
—
Loft and Sjofors (1993)
Belgium 1990, 1300 largest clients
Weets and Jegers (1997)
Belgium 1993, 1300 largest clients—
Weets and Jegers (1997)
Number of clients
United States 1988, NYSE AMEX OTC—
Wootton et al. (1994)
United States 1991, NYSE AMEX OTC—
Wootton et al. (1994)
Spain 1988, 250 large nonfinancial clients
Corona Romero et al. (1995)
Spain 1993, 250 large nonfinancial clients
Corona Romero et al. (1995)
UK + Ireland 1989, Public and USM clients—
Beattie and Feamley (1994)
UK + Ireland 1991, Public and USM clients—
Beattie and Feamley (1994)
Belgium 1989, 1300 largest clients—Weets and Jegers (1997)
Belgium 1991, 1300 largest clients—Weets and Jegers (1997)
Belgium 1993, 1300 largest clients—Weets and Jegers (1997)
59%
22%
56%
69%
27%
69%
97%
31%
73%
.09
.019
72% 99% n.a. n.a.
71% n.a. 80% n.a.
60% 72% n.a. .18
77% 90% n.a. .20
43% 54% 62% .0620
.0920
65% 75% n.a. .18
69% 80% n.a. .18
26% n.a. 36% n.a.
20% n.a. 29% n.a.
19% 26% 31% .0190
23% 31% 35% .0220
52% 83% n.a. n.a.
65% 89% n.a. n.a.
84% 92% 95% n.a.
73% 85% n.a. .19
45% n.a. 68% n.a.
59% n.a. 79% n.a.
33% 43% 51% .0410
39% 53% 58% .0540
42% 56% 62% .0590
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segment of the audit market) whether the audit-pricing model changed over a period (i.e.,
1989 and 1997) in which two mergers between Big 8 firms occurred and concentration in
the audit market increased significantly.
3. The Belgian audit market
S.l. Audit demand, supply, and production regulations in Belgium
Audit demand, supply, and production are heavily regulated in Belgium. In this subsection,
we discuss regulations that may affect the competitiveness of the Belgian audit market.
Unlike the situation in the United States, demand for audit services is not voluntary for many
privately held companies in Belgium. The Act of 21 February 1985 prescribes that both
public and private limited-liability companies of a certain size are required to have their
annual financial statements audited by a licensed statutory auditor. These size criteria^ are not
all that large, which implies that many relatively small companies are legally required to
appoint a statutory auditor. We believe that one consequence is that actual demand is larger
than what it would be if it were fi^ee and solely based on economic motivations. Demand
regulation for privately held firms probably also has an impact on auditor choice decisions.
As there may be little or no need for auditing based on economic grounds, relatively small
private companies with few agency problems may opt for the cheapest audit possible in order
to fulfill legal requirements. This may explain why the seller concentration ratios are smaller
in Belgium than in other legal environments (see next subsection). As large audit firms tend
to be more expensive, small companies will not acquire services fi^om these audit firms.
Audit supply is also regulated in Belgium. Meuwissen and Maijoor (1997) reviewed and
compared audit supply regulations that can be expected to have a direct impact on competition
in three national audit markets, namely, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. They
conclude that Belgium and Germany are less liberal than the Netherlands in terms of audit
market regulations, and that therefore the Belgian and German audit markets can be expected to
be less competitive than the Dutch. We will give a short overview of various aspects of audit
supply that are regulated in Belgium and which may affect competition in the Belgian audit
market. First, there is a limitation as to who can offer the statutory audit service.'^ Since the Act
of2 1 February 1 985, only members ofthe IRE/IBR are entitled to conduct statutory audits. This
implies that the amount of potential suppliers of statutory audits is much smaller in Belgium
^ Limited-liability companies are required to appoint a statutory auditor if (1) they have more than 100
employees; or (2) they hit two of the following size thresholds: (a) total assets > 3, 125,000 euro, (b) turnover
>6,250,000 euro, and (3) number of employees >50.
In general, the Belgian accounting and auditing profession is organized in two main professional bodies: the
"Institut des Reviseurs d'Entreprises'V'Instituut der Bedrijfsrevisoren" (IRE/lBR, Institute of Auditors) and the
"Institut des Experts Comptables et conseils fiscaux'V'Instituut der Accountants en Belastingconsulenten" (lEC/
lAB, Institute of Chartered Accountants and Fiscal Advisors). Since 1985, only members of the IRE/IBR can offer
statutory audit services.
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compared to countries where such a restriction does not exist/"' Second, the admission to the
audit profession is regulated through the Royal Decree of 13 October 1987/' Third, there are
some regulations with respect to the auditor's appointment. These include prohibition of
solicitation and restrictions on advertising. Note that advertising rules have become less
stringent in the nineties, but solicitation is still forbidden. Only factual and objective advertising
on a local scale is permitted. Furthermore, statutory auditors are formally appointed by the
general assembly of shareholders for a period of 3 years. Fourth, the code ofprofessional ethics
is incorporated in the law by the Royal Decree of 10 January 1994. The most important part in
the code of ethics concerns auditor independence. Interesting to note is that the Belgian
independence rules prohibit auditors to be employed outside the auditing profession.^ Finally, it
is relevant to note that only since the early nineties, big intemational accounting firms begun to
operate under their own brand name in Belgium. Before, they operated through local partner-
ships because the use of intemational brand names was forbidden.
As to audit production, there are also regulations that may affect the Belgian audit market.
Auditing standards obviously affect the production of audit services; and in Belgium, they are
set by the Belgian Institute of Auditors (IBR/IRE). Of further relevance is that the Institute of
Auditors also has a legal role in monitoring the competitive structure of the Belgian audit
market by monitoring the pricing practices of its members. It is believed that fierce price
competition would have a negative impact on auditor performance and audit quality, and
therefore every auditor who is a member of the Institute is required to report to the Institute
the number of hours spent on all engagements and the corresponding audit fees charged. The
Institute then reviews the adequacy of the audit fees charged and the audit hours worked by
Belgian auditors to safeguard audit quality.
3.2. Evidence on supplier concentration in the Belgian audit market: 1989-1997
Supplier concentration in the Belgian audit market is best measured using audit fee data.
As in many other countries, however, audit fee data are not publicly available in Belgium;
therefore, we report audit market concentration data based on various surrogates.*^ Table 1
^ In the Netherlands, for example, both certified accountants (Accountant-Administratie consulenten) and
registered auditors (register accountants) are allowed to perform a statutory audit.
^ The formal entry requirements include the following: (1) various admission requirements (such as, for
example, holding Belgian nationality, having a university degree, etc.), (2) pass an entrance examination, (3) go
through a period of practical traineeship of at least 3 years, and (4) pass a final examination.
Various other specific independence rules are prescribed, including prohibitions as to (1) managerial
positions in the client firm, (2) personal relationships with the client, (3) financial interests in the client company,
(4) provision of nonaudit services to a client firm, and (5) inappropriate dependence on the audit fee of a particular
client.
^ Moizer and Turley (1987) evaluate possible surrogates for audit fee to assess the best variables to calculate
audit market concentration and found that client sales and the square root of client sales provide, respectively,
consistent overestimates and underestimates of concentrafion measures based upon audit fees. Note that Tomczyk
and Read (1989) used audit fees to calculate audit market concentration for the 28 largest audit firms in the United
States and report that their results are consistently lower than those in prior studies that used proxies to calculate
concentration measures.
440 M Willekens, C. Achmadi / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 431-455
includes CR4, CR6, CR8 ratios, and the Herfindahl index for the Belgian audit market and is
based on the results from a study by Weets and Jegers (1997)^ for the years 1989 through
1994/1995 and our own assessments for the years 1989 and 1997 as these years are relevant
to the empirical analysis further in our study. We believe that our own assessments are
particularly relevant as they are based on auditor data instead of client data. The surrogates we
used are (1) the number of qualified professionals per audit firm (as in Weets & Jegers, 1997)
and (2) the personnel cost per audit firm as reported in the financial statements of the audit
firm. To assess the concentration ratios based on the second surrogate, we had to collect all
financial statements submitted by Belgian audit firms to the Belgian National Bank for the
years 1989 and 1997. From those financial statements, we obtained the personnel cost and
used it to compute the respective concentration ratios (CR4, CR6, CR8, and HHI). Since only
limited liability companies that hit certain size thresholds have to submit financial statements
to the Belgian National Bank, our sample did not include the smallest audit suppliers in
Belgium. '° From studying Table 1, it is clear that market concentration gradually increased
between 1989 and 1997.
Table 2 provides an overview of concentration ratios in several European countries and the
United States based on various surrogates. From Table 2, we see that supplier concentration is
much smaller in Belgium than in many other countries, such as the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, the United States, Germany, and Spain. Only Denmark and Sweden have
concentration ratios comparable to the low levels reported for Belgium. One needs to keep
in mind though that most measures in other countries were based on samples of public firms,
whereas the Belgian measures were based on the 1300 largest (also nonpublic) firms.''
Another interesting feature from both Tables 1 and 2 is that supplier concentration tends to
increase in all countries during the nineties (including Belgium).
A qualitative interpretation of the size of concentration ratios per se does not provide
strong evidence. Therefore, we execute some further tests in seeking answers to the following
two questions: first, was supplier concentration in the Belgian audit market significant, both
in 1989 and 1997? And second, is the increase in supplier concentration between 1989 and
1 997 significant? To answer the first question, we use a method suggested in the Industrial
' Weets and Jegers ( 1 997) use proxies that are typically used in the hterature: clients sales, square root of chent
sales, number of clients, and total assets (clients). They also include a ratio based on the number of qualified
professionals per audit firm.
'" In 1989, there were (1) 739 auditors—members of the Institute of Auditors of which 542 (that is 73%)
belonged to an audit firm and (2) 120 audit firms of which 60 (that is 50%) submitted their financial statements to
the Belgian National Bank. In 1997, there were (1) 958 auditors—members of the Institute of Auditors of which
768 (that is 80%) belonged to an audit firm and (2) 276 audit firms of which 212 (that is 77%) submitted their
financial statements to the Belgian Nafional Bank.
'
' However, a sound comparison is possible between the Dutch and Belgian market for the concentration ratios
based on the number of qualified professionals per audit firm as the entire population was used to compute the
measure in both countries. This shows that the Belgian audit market is by far less concentrated than the Dutch.
Thus, even though regulations are stricter in Belgium, there is less supplier concentration. One explanation for this
finding is that regulation tends to protect the small audit supplier against the large audit supplier, and therefore the
concentration ratios are smaller in Belgium where (especially) supplier regulation is more pronounced than in the
Netherlands.
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Table 3
Significance tests of concentration ratios (after Parker, 199P)
Personnel cost Number of qualified professionals
1989 1997 1989 1997
Actual
value
Critical
value*
Actual
value
Critical
value*
Actual
value
Critical
value*
Actual
value
Critical
value*
CR4 47.22% 55.15% 62.69% 67.12% 21.65% 42.50% 26.93% 48.44%
CR6 59.75% 67.83% 77.36% 80.09% 26.66% 58.40% 32.25% 62.31%,
CR8 67.99% 77.20% 80.42% 88.65% 30.31% 68.04% 35.70% 71.69%
For a full technical representation, refer to Parker (1991).
^ CR„ is characterized by the following cumulative distribution ftanction (the variable names are adapted to
those used in this paper):
Pr[CR„<CR*] = J^(-l)'-'-(/CR* - nf^'Qj
r
Where A^= the total number of firms in the market excluding negligible firms (in this paper, they are those with
market share less than 0.5%); « = number of the n largest audit firms in the market; CR*= critical concentration
ratio of the n largest firms at level of significance a (below this level, concentration is not significant);
1 — a = PrlCR„ < CR*J;7 = index of the summation over the range of «/CR*<y < TV^ for integer values of7
^J -
riS-ic-\(j _ „)"-' {N
-j)\{j - n)\n\
* The critical values are calculated at a = 5%.
Organization literature by Parker (1991) to interpret how severely concentrated a market is.
The basic idea of the method is to test whether a particular concentration ratio is significantly
larger than a benchmark ratio that is being generated by a purely random allocation of market
shares.'" We computed such benchmark ratios based on the "personnel cost" and "number of
qualified professionals" surrogates for both 1989 and 1997. The results of our application of
the Parker method are reported in Table 3 and indicate that the CR4, CR6, and CR8 in our
study are individually not significant (at/7<5%) both for 1989 and 1997, as they are below
the computed critical values. This evidence is supportive of our prior conclusion that the
Belgian audit market is not concentrated.
As to the change in the respective concentration ratio numbers (CR4, CR6, and CR8)
between 1989 and 1997, we considered the change in the average aggregate market share of
the biggest audit firms; that is, the Big 8 in 1989 and the Big 6 in 1997. We then tested
whether this change is significant by the t test of mean differences (where the null hypothesis
is that there is no change in the average market share and the alternative hypothesis is that
there is significant increase). As there may be a concern about the normality of the data, we
also executed a Wilcoxon rank sum test. We found that the t tests on both types of
concentration ratios were significant with p values less than 5%, as were the Wilcoxon
tests. '^ Overall, we can conclude that although the concentration ratios per se were not
'^ For a full technical discussion of the method, see Parker (1991).
'^ One exception was the result for the concentration ratio based on number of qualified professionals that has
a p value of 6%.
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significant in 1989 or 1997, we have evidence that the increase in supplier concentration in
the Belgian audit market between 1989 and 1997 was significant.
4. Research questions on audit pricing
The evidence on supplier concentration presented above raises at least two interesting
research questions about audit pricing in the private client segment of the Belgian audit
market. First, given the lower concentration ratios in that market segment, do large audit
suppliers (in terms of market share) charge audit fee premia as is the case in the market
segment for publicly held firms? Second, given the significant increase in supplier concen-
tration and two megamergers between Big 8 firms, did the audit-pricing model change
between 1989 and 1997?
To answer the first question, we will test whether market power (proxied by auditor market
share) has an impact on audit pricing, both in 1989 and 1997 (that is, before and after the
megamergers that happened in 1989). Most oligopoly theories predict a positive relationship
between price and seller concentration (see, for example, Weiss, 1989). It is argued that in a
market with a few dominant players, the likelihood of collusion and price leadership is larger.
However, the evidence from prior audit fee research suggests that (1) high concentration may
allow market leaders to develop expertise-related economies of scale that allow them to
maintain relatively low fees (Danos & Eichenseher, 1982, 1986; Defond et al., 2000), and (2)
fee premia charged by Big 8/6 firms result from product differentiation rather than market
power (Francis, 1984; Francis & Simon, 1987; Lee, 1996; Pahnrose, 1986a, 1986b). In the
context of our study of the private client segment of the audit market, it is reasonable to
expect that large audit firms experience more competition from local and national auditors
than they do in the public client segment. Hence, given the relatively low concentration ratios
in the Belgian audit market, we only expect a significant price premium should there be
product differentiation by large audit firms. Our first research question is stated below:
RQl: Is there a significant positive association between auditor market share and audit
pricing in the private client segment of the audit market, ceteris paribus? And is this the case
in both 1989 and 1997?
The second question we try to address is whether the significant increase in seller
concentration from 1989 until 1997 and the mergers of the Big 8 into the Big 6 had any
impact on the audit-pricing model. We chose 1989 as our first observation year because it was
the last year that pricing practices could not be affected by the two mergers. We opted for
1 997 as our second observation year since it left enough time after the mergers so that a new
"equilibrium" pricing model could be established. Note that the time interval between our
two observation years has to be sufficiently long as there is a fixed auditor tenure period of 3
years in Belgium. Also, pricing evidence in Menon and Williams (2001) for the public client
segment of the U.S. audit market indicates that mergers first have an increasing effect on
pricing that disappears (into a status quo) after a few years.
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To the extent that the increase in market concentration led to an increase in market
power of the largest audit firms, we may expect an increase in audit fees charged by these
firms, ceteris paribus. However, the mergers may not necessarily have led to less
competition and higher prices. Tonge and Wootton (1991), for example, state that the
merger of the smaller Big 8 firms may have had the effect that they have become more
competitive with the larger Big 8 firms. Further, the same may hold for mergers of non-Big
6 firms with Big 6 firms. Hence, two opposite hypotheses with respect to audit pricing
before and after the mergers are likely: an "increased market power hypothesis" and an
"increased competition hypothesis." According to the market power hypothesis, the
increase in individual market shares of large auditors and the related increase in audit
market concentration between 1989 and 1997 is associated with significant audit price
increases between 1989 and 1997. According to the increased competition hypothesis, the
increase in individual market shares of large auditors and the related increase in audit
market concentration between 1989 and 1997 has no impact on audit pricing between 1989
and 1997 or would be associated with significant price decreases between 1989 and 1997.
To find out which of these two hypotheses is empirically supported, we will need to
address the following research questions:
RQ2: Has audit pricing become more competitive between 1989 and 1997? How did the
impact of auditor market share and other significant determinants in the audit-pricing model
change between 1989 and 1997?
5. Audit fee model and research method
5.7. The audit fee model
To examine the effect of the market power of audit firms on audit pricing, we adopt an audit
fee model (see Eq. (1)) that is consistent with prior audit fee research (see, for example,
Simunic, 1980, and subsequent studies) and that has proven to be robust over time and
countries.
LNFEE = a + i?l POWER + ^2 LNASSET + ^53 SUB + )94 QUICK
+ ^55 LTD + ^6 LOSS + ^1 RECINV + ^8 SWITCH + fi9 L\UD
+ P9 MANUF + /?10 TRADE ( 1
)
where Dependent variables: LNFEE = natural log of audit fee; Independent variables:
POWER = auditor market share proxy; LNASSET = natural log of total assets (client);
SUBS = square root of the number of operating locations; QUICK = quick ratio; LTD = long-
term debt divided by equity; LOSS = indicator variable ( 1 = experienced loss in the last 2 years,
otherwise); RECINV = (account receivables + inventory)/total assets; SWITCH = indicator
variable ( 1 = engage in auditor switch within the last 2 years, otherwise); lAUD = indicator
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variable (1 = there is an internal auditor in the company, otherwise); MANUF = indicator
variable (1 = industrial sector, otherwise); TRADE = indicator variable (1 = trade sector,
otherwise).
As in other studies, we define the dependent variable as the natural log of the audit fee. As
to the independent variables, we include POWER, the auditor's market share, as our test
variable and a number of independent variables to control for cross-sectional differences in
factors that affect audit fees. Consistent with prior research, these control variables contain an
auditee size variable, a complexity variable, risk variables, and some other variables that have
proven to be significant fee determinants in prior studies. In particular, LNASSET (the natural
log of total assets) is the client size variable, and SUBS (the square root of the number of
company operating locations) is our complexity variable. Our risk variables include the
following: QUICK, the quick ratio; LTD, the ratio of long-term debt-to-equity; LOSS, an
indicator variable to assess whether the client reported a loss during the last 2 years or not;
and RECINV, the ratio of the sum of receivables and inventory to total assets. Other control
variables that we included are the following: SWITCH, to control for a possible low-balling
effect on audit fees in case of a first-year audit engagement; lAUD to control for the existence
of internal audits; and two industry variables, MANUF and TRADE, to capture possible
industry effects on the audit fee. For an overview of the predicted signs on coefficients of all
independent variables, we refer to Table 5. These signs are consistent with expectations and
findings in prior studies.
5.2. Research method
To address RQl, whether market power affected audit pricing in the private client segment
of the audit market in 1989 and 1997, we ran the regression model in Eq. (1) separately for
our respective samples of 1989 and 1997 data. For each period, we then assessed the sign of
the coefficient on our test variable POWER. We defined POWER as the incumbent auditor's
market share, measured by a proxy based on that auditor's personnel cost relative to the
whole audit market, that is:
Incumbent audit firm's personnel cost as reported in its financial statements
POWER = ~
Sum of personnel cost reported by all audit firms in the audit market
Audit firm personnel cost data were collected for both 1989 and 1997. Note that, unlike prior
studies, we did not define market power by the Big 8/6 variable to capture the impact of
auditor size on audit fees but include an assessment of the incumbent auditor's market share
as it enables us to assess the impact of an individual auditor's market power on fees instead of
the impact of (the market power of) a group of auditors (i.e.. Big 8/6). However, our
sensitivity tests include an audit fee model that contains the Big 8/6 variable instead of the
POWER variable, as well as a model that contains an alternative market share proxy based on
the number of qualified professionals per audit firms (see the section on "sensitivity
checks").
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To answer RQ2, that is whether the audit-pricing model in 1997 is different from that in
1989 and whether the impact of market power and other fee determinants on pricing has
changed, we ran the following regression model:
LNFEE - ao + a^ YEAR + fiX POWER + j?2 YEAR x POWER
+ i53 LNASSET + ^54 YEAR x LNASSET + j?5 SUB + j56 YEAR
X SUB + ^7 QUICK + j98 YEAR x QUICK + ^9 LTD
+ ^10 YEAR X LTD + ^1 1 LOSS + ^512 YEAR x LOSS
+ ^513 RECINV + iS14 YEAR x RECINV + ^15 SWITCH
+ ^516 YEAR X SWITCH + )517 lAUD + j?18 YEAR x lAUD
+ j519 MANUF + ^20 YEAR x MANUF + j?l TRADE + ^ YEAR
x TRADE (2)
We included an indicator variable for whether the observations relate to 1989 (YEAR = 0)
or 1997 (YEAR=1). The coefficient on YEAR represents the intercept shift between the
1989 and 1997 fee model. We also included interaction terms for each of the explanatory
variables with YEAR; the coefficients on these represent the slope shifts between these years.
The t tests on the coefficients of these interaction terms indicate whether or not the change of
a parameter in the fee model between 1989 and 1997 was significant.
6. Sample selection and results
6.1. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
As audit fee data are not publicly available in Belgium, we needed to collect our 1989
and 1997 data by sending questionnaires to audit clients. In 1991, we constructed a data
base of audit fee data based on a questionnaire sent to a random sample of 300 privately
owned Belgian firms. The aim was to gain information for the year 1989 on the statutory
auditor that had been appointed, the audit fee that had been paid, and other nonpublicly
available information that is necessary to estimate the audit fee model specified in Eq.
(1) (such as the number of operating locations, the number of subsidiaries, number of
years of auditor tenure, and the presence of an internal audit function). In 1999, we
collected more fee data for the year 1997 and randomly selected 600 privately held
Belgian firms, asking the same (and some additional) questions. We received, respec-
tively, 81 and 128 responses to the 1989 and 1997 questionnaires. We completed our
data set with financial statement information from the CD-ROM of the Belgian National
Bank. Finally, we deleted observations with missing values, public companies, and
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extreme outliers from both samples and retained, respectively, 48 and 71 useful
observation sets for 1989 and 1997.
Since we are comparing data from two different time periods, we needed to make price-
level adjustments in order to exclude price-level effects from our analysis. Therefore, we
express all continuous variables in our 1997 data set in 1989 prices. To that end, we used the
production price index as reported by the Financieel Economische Tijd, the leading Belgian
economic journal.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for both samples (« 1939 = 48; ^1997 = 71) and the
population (A'^i997 = 8344)'^ from which the samples are drawn. The average audit fee (in
1989 prices) was 495 thousands Belgian franks (BEF)'^ in 1989 and 342 thousands BEF in
1997 (adjusted to 1989 prices). In our 1989 data set, 39.6% were Big 8 clients, and 46.5% of
1997 clients were audited by a Big 6 auditor. This increase is consistent with the increase in
seller concenfration in the Belgian audit market reported above. The average sizes of the
client companies in both samples are, respectively, 881 million and 525 million BEF for 1989
and 1997. The 1997 sample thus includes smaller firms on average. As to the financial health
of the companies in our sample, the differences between the two sample years are not large
for QUICK and LOSS, but the 1997 sample includes, on average, companies with higher
leverage than the 1989 sample. The percentage of companies with an internal audit depart-
ment is larger for the 1997 sample. As to RECINV, there is a difference between the two
samples, with a larger ratio in 1989.
6.2. Results of the audit fee regression model for 1989 and 1997 (RQl)
To answer the question whether there is a significant positive association between auditor
market share and audit pricing in the Belgian audit market and whether this is the case both in
1989 and 1997, we discuss the results of the regressions we ran on our 1989 and 1997
samples. These results are reported in columns 3 through 5 of Table 5.
The audit fee model as specified in Eq. (1) was highly significant both in 1989 and 1997
(/?<.0001 for both years); it explained 71% of variation in audit fees in 1989 and 81% in
1997. No mulficoUinearity nor heteroscedasticity problems were identified (a correlation
matrix of independent variables for both years is provided in Appendix A).
From Table 5, it is also clear that our test variable, POWER, is positive and highly
significant both in 1989 and 1997 (p=.0012 and .0001, respectively). This implies that
audit firms were able to charge higher audit fees the larger their market share, ceteris
paribus. Our test does not indicate whether this is due to market power or product
differentiation. Since we are analyzing the private client segment of the audit market,
which is characterized by relatively small concentration ratios, one would expect that
competition would preempt audit firms from charging price premia unless for differ-
'^ This population is the group of Belgian companies that is legally required to appoint a statutory auditor. We
could only assess this for 1997, as the data for 1989 were not available.
" In 1989, USD 1 = BEF 37 and in 1997 USD 1 = BEF 33.
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics on the test and control variables for the regression analysis
Panel A 1989 A^=48
Categorical variables (proportion ofdummy = 1)
SWITCH .2500
LOSS .2292
lAUD .2917
MANUF .7500
TRADE .2083
BIG 8 .3958
Continuous variables
Mean S.D. Min Median Max
POWER 0.0409 0.0472 0.0003 0.0175 0.1725
FEE(IOOO) 495 457 41 368 2000
In(FEE) 5.8033 0.9401 3.7197 5.9065 7.6009
ASSETS (1000) 881,632 1,165,702 100,315 486,333 7,142,069
In(ASSETS) 13.1855 0.9672 11.5161 13.0945 15.7815
Sqr(SUBS) 1.3548 0.6172 1.0000 1.0000 3.4641
QUICK 1.0877 0.5859 0.3800 0.9350 3.1000
LTD 0.2705 0.6042 - 2.6349 0.1681 2.0729
RECINV 0.5898 0.1915 0.1576 0.5776 0.9537
Panel B 1997a A^=71
Categorical variables (proportion ofdummy = 1)
SWITCH .3662
LOSS .2394
lAUD .3521
MANUF .3944
TRADE .3239
BIG 6 .4648
Continuous variables
Mean S.D. Min Median Max Market mean
POWER 0.0735 0.0815 0.0000 0.0161 0.2043
FEE (1000) 342 314 18 209 1668
In(FEE) 5.4655 0.8857 2.9096 5.3401 7.4195
ASSETS (1000) 525,802 916,623 2,413 238,669 4,809,935 1,666,775
In(ASSETS) 12.2069 1.4817 7.7888 12.3828 15.3862 12.7457
Sqr(SUBS) 3.5807 4.3878 1.0000 1.4142 14.1421
QUICK 1.1296 0.6846 0.0200 1.0100 3.2300 1.2641
LTD 0.4177 0.7763 -0.3624 0.0289 4.2497 1.0025
RECINV 0.3713 0.1995 0.0000 0.3585 0.8411 0.6212
All 1997 observations were deflated into 1989 prices.
entiated products. However, somewhat remarkable is that the impact of POWER on the
audit fee decreased between 1989 and 1997, a period in which supplier concentration
increased significantly in Belgium. The coefficient on POWER dropped from 7.9716 to
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4.3461. This implies that an increase in POWER by 1% resulted in an audit fee increase
of 8.30% in 1989 but only 4.44% in 1997. Apparently, the increase in seller concen-
tration did not lead to an increased impact of POWER on fees, which indicates that
competition between audit firms increased rather than decreased between 1989 and 1997.
This result is consistent with prior research findings in the public client segment (see, for
example, Wootton et al., 1994) that increased market concentration increases rather than
decreases competition between audit firms.
As to the control variables in the model, in 1989, LNASSETS and SWITCH were
significant at/7<.01, and QUICK and SUBS at/?<.05. In 1997, LNASSETS, SUBS, and
QUICK are significant at;?<.01, MANUF at/7<.05, and SWITCH and QUICK at;7<.05.
Prior studies in the public client segment of the audit market have reported evidence
supportive of low balling, with a significant negative coefficient on auditor-switching
variables. Competition among audit suppliers has been put forward as the explanation for
the low-balling phenomenon. An interesting result of this study is that we find a positive sign
of the coefficient on SWITCH (both in 1989 and 1997; however, only significant in 1989).
This result remains robust across aUemative fee models that we ran (see fiirther under
"sensitivity checks") and may indicate a lack of competition in the Belgian audit market,
especially in 1989. Obviously, initial audit engagements require more effort and hence are
more costly to perform. With little competition, audit firms are able to price the additional
initial engagement costs through to their new clients, which explain the positive coefficient on
the SWITCH variable. The fact that the positive coefficient drops fi"om .7051 to .1983
between 1989 and 1997 and loses some significance adds more evidence to our finding that
competition in the audit market increased by 1997 and that the ability to price initial
engagement costs through decreased.
6.5. Changes in the audit fee model between 1989 and 1997 (RQ2)
Columns 9, 10, and 11 of Table 5 present the results on the interaction terms as
specified in Eq. (2) and thus on the significance of the impact of the various explanatory
variables on audit pricing. The results strongly suggest that audit pricing has become
more competitive between 1989 and 1997. First, the impact of POWER on audit pricing
has decreased in a significant way (/?=.0839).This implies that market power through
market share has a smaller impact on audit pricing. Second, the positive impact of
switching on audit pricing dropped significantly (/?=.0348). In other words, the premia
auditors that are able to charge for new clients have decreased significantly, and pricing
on initial audit engagements became more competitive in 1997 than in 1989. Note that as
to the change of impact of the other audit fee determinants between 1989 and 1997, we
found significant results at/?<.01 for QUICK, j9<.05 for SUBS, andp<.\0 for lAUD. It
is remarkable that the coefficient on QUICK significantly increased fi'om — .3614 to
.2471 in 1997. This can be interpreted as an indication that audit firms have become
more risk taking in 1997 and are even granting price discounts to client firms that are
less liquid. Further, the positive impact of complexity (SUBS) on audit pricing dropped
from .3765 to .0366. This result suggests that audit firms have become more efficient in
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auditing complex firms. Finally, since the impact of lAUD in itself is not significant in
both years, its change may not be important.
6.4. Sensitivity tests
We performed the following sensitivity checks to test the robustness of our results: We
reran our fee models both for 1989 and 1997 using different proxies for POWER, and
accordingly we reran the interaction model in Eq. (2). We tested two alternative POWER
measures. First, an alternative assessment of auditor market share based on the number of
qualified professionals per audit firm; and second, the traditional Big 8/6 variable. We find
robust results both for the 1989 and 1997 pricing models, as the significance of the
coefficients of the various fee determinants was not affected. The results fi"om the interaction
model also remain robust.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze supplier concentration and pricing in the private client segment of
the Belgian audit market in the period 1989-1997. Audit market concentration in Belgium in
1989 and 1997 is lower compared to most other industrialized countries. Concentration per se
is not significant in both observation years, but there is a significant increase in concentration
between 1989 and 1997.
Given our assessments of market concentration for 1989 and 1997 and the changes that
took place in the audit environment during that period, we then investigated audit pricing in
the private client segment of the Belgian audit market and the changes therein between 1989
and 1997. Unlike prior studies, which focused on the large (public) client segment of the audit
market and assume that pricing in the small client segment is competitive (see Simunic,
1980), we tried to assess whether (1) indeed pricing is competitive in the smaller (and private)
client segment of the audit market (both in 1989 and 1997), and (2) whether the increase in
market concentration between 1989 and 1997 resulted in more or less price competition. We
found that audit pricing is significantly associated with the incumbent auditor's market share
(and thus to some extent his market power). This result is similar to prior results on pricing in
the public client segment of the audit market and differs from the general expectation
(assumption) that no price premium would be associated with auditor size in the small
(auditee) client segment of the market. However, it is not clear whether this finding implies
that there is a lack of price competition in the market or whether the price premium is due to
product differentiation.
We also report some interesting results as to the change in the pricing model between
1989 and 1997. The evidence strongly suggests that price competition increased between
1989 and 1997. First, we find that the impact of POWER (the auditor's market share) on
pricing decreased significantly between 1989 and 1997. Second, we find a significant
change in the impact of the SWITCH variable on pricing consistent with an increase in
price competition in the audit market for initial engagements. Unlike prior studies, we
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find a positive, significant coefficient for the SWITCH variable in 1989, which is a clear
indication that the audit market was not very competitive at that time. By 1997, the
results show a nonsignificant and much smaller positive coefficient on SWITCH. Overall,
our results are consistent with prior findings in the public client segment of the audit
market: that increased concentration does not necessarily lead to decreased price
competition but rather to increased price competition (see, for example, Pearson &
Trompeter, 1994).
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Willekens and Achmadi (2003) document an increase in audit supplier concentration
within a sample of 300 privately owned Belgian firms in 1989 versus 1997 as well as
interyear changes in the strength of association between several predictor variables (e.g.,
auditee quick ratios) and audit fees. They also speculate on how Belgian audit market
institutions and regulations likely affect both audit supplier concentration and determinants of
audit pricing. While Willekens and Achmadi provide a set of stimulating empirical
observations, readers should consider several issues when attempting to assess their article's
overall message. I use the remainder of this discussion to describe four key issues.
1. Is there an unexpected increase in audit supplier concentration?
The article correctly observes that customary measures of audit supplier concentration are
significantly higher in 1997 than in 1989. The article also correctly observes that audit
supplier concentration is not remarkably high in 1989 or 1997. A puzzling issue that the
article does not address is whether the increase in concentration is greater than one would
expect after a merger between large audit suppliers. If the research question were whether
audit supplier concentration nominally increases when two "big «" firms merge so that
afterwards there are "« — 1 " big firms, the question would have little a priori tension. A more
interesting question would be whether, as a result of increased market(ing) power, the « — 1
big firms penetrate a disproportionately greater share of the audit market than historically
penetrated by n big firms. This question would call for a "difference of a difference" test
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Statistic, namely a comparison of the difference between 1989 actual and critical values to the
difference between 1997 actual and critical values. Inspection of Table 3 suggests that there is
no discemable difference-of-difference measure. Thus, the concentration ratios appear to
provide little evidence that the remaining n — 1 big firms collectively enjoyed a dispropor-
tionate increase in marketing power.
2. Why either "increased market power" or "increased competition?"
Given the research design, Willekens and Achmadi have difficulty discerning whether two
(or more) explanations, such as market power and competition, are simultaneously operative.
Theoretically, increases in market power and competition are not inherently contradictory and
regression coefficients simply pick up composite or "net" effects. These composite effects
could stem from one explanation being operative but not the other or from both explanations
being operative. Readers should be aware that even nonsignificant coefficients could obtain in
a regression as a result of two strong, economically meaningful effects that offset one another.
Perhaps more important, there is another altemative to consider. The article precludes
contemplation of this other altemative by asking readers to presume audit suppliers compete
mostly on cost and that audits are commodities. Audit suppliers, however, also can compete
on quality. Audit reports are not the only deliverable associated with audit services. In a U.S.
statutory financial-statement audit, auditors traditionally have identified control weaknesses
and suggested improvements. More recently, financial-statement auditors at several of the big
4 have started using a strategic systems perspective to evaluate and communicate with
auditees about auditee business risks and key business processes (Bell, Marrs, Solomon, &
Thomas, 1997; Bell, Peecher, & Solomon, 2002). It is not surprising, then, that privately
owned U.S. auditees endogenously demand audit services and realize a reduction in
transaction costs as a result (Blackwell, Noland, & Winters, 1998). It also is conceptually
reasonable to conclude that, at least under some circumstances, the endogenous demand for
audit services exceeds the exogenous demand (Klein, 1997).
Despite the article's assumption that exogenous demand exceeds endogenous demand (p.
9), it does not provide convincing arguments to conclude that this would be the case for its
sample of privately held Belgian auditees. These auditees likely derive transaction-cost
reductions as a result of being audited. Further, the extent of transaction cost reduction likely
is larger when audit suppliers have a stronger reputation for competence. As increased
competence is one of the stated reasons for accounting firm mega-mergers, some pooling of
expertise arguably occurs. Thus, even if fees were to increase in 1997 versus 1989, some of
the increase could have been attributable to higher quality audits in addition to explanations
such as greater market power.
'
' The article reports that audit suppHers must report audit hours and audit fees to the Belgian Institute of
Auditors (IBR/IRE), a regulatory organization. Presumably, that organization has the ability to provide data about
average audit fees per hour that would be useful to conducting future research in this area to address questions
about audit supplier effort and technologies.
I
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3. Why 1989 versus 1997?
While the data acquisition efforts of the authors are laudable, many intervening factors
occurred during the years between 1989 and 1997 (e.g., use of "big /?" brand name).
Consequently, any causal attributions for observed differences in the relative significance of
predictor variables of audit fees in 1989 versus 1997 are tenuous. Further, the article justifies
the choice of 1989 and 1997 by arguing that a "sufficiently long" observation period is
required to allow for post-merger equilibration (p. 14), but it provides few reasons as to why 8
years would be too short, too long, or just right. In fact, as the article notes (p. 14), prior
empirical-archival research suggests that the influence of audit-firm mergers may disappear
after a few years (Menon & Williams, 2001). If that were true for the Belgian audit market
(and the article is silent on this issue), the extent to which any merger would differentially
affect the 1989 and 1997 observations would be minimal.
Thus, the research design does not enable one to develop expectations about changes in
coefficients of predictor variables for audit prices between its two observation years. To
ascertain whether the differences between the 1989 and 1997 regressions (see Table 5) are
particularly remarkable, it would be interesting to know what type of differences occur
between randomly drawn pairs of years."
4. Nonaudit fees?
The article does not discuss the extent to which there is variation in the amounts of
nonaudit service fees paid to auditors in its sample of Belgian auditees. To the extent that
variation in nonaudit fees exists across audit suppliers, fixation on audit fees alone may be
incomplete (see, e.g., Ashbaugh, Lafond, & Mayhew, 2003). Thus, the omission of nonaudit
fees is notable and, even if nonaudit fees are invariant or negligible for the article's sample of
firms, nonaudit fees would be a reasonable control variable to consider including in future
studies.
5. Concluding remarks
Herein, I have identified issues related to whether audit supplier concentration really
underwent an unexpected increase from 1989 to 1997, whether such an increase in
concentration may also increase the quality of audits (not just auditor power), whether it
makes sense to focus on 1989 versus 1997, and whether nonaudit fees ought to have been a
control variable. Despite these limitations, the stimulating observations provided by Wil-
" It is noteworthy that the paper is silent about the extent to which its two samples (/7 = 300 for 1989 and
« = 600 for 1997) contain the same auditee firms. It would be a significant improvement to match on firms for an
entire sample, but it also would be good to have a control variable for whether a given auditee firm were included
in both 1989 and 1997.
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lekens and Achmadi (2003) deserve readers' careful consideration. These limitations also
represent opportunities for future research. It may be profitable to acquire new data from the
Belgian audit-services market to further pursue these authors' research questions.
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Peecher (2003) identifies a number of relevant issues relating to "whether audit-supplier
concentration really underwent an unexpected increase from 1989 to 1997, whether such an
increase in concentration may also increase the quality of audits (not just auditor power),
whether it makes sense to focus on 1989 versus 1997, and whether nonaudit fees ought to
have been a control variable."
1. Yes, there is an unexpected increase in audit supplier concentration
According to Peecher (2003), a more interesting question than those addressed in the paper
through Table 3 is whether—after a merger—"the n-1 Big firms penetrate a disproportion-
ately greater share of the audit market than historically penetrated by n Big firms." Although
Peecher claims that "this question calls for a 'difference of a difference' test statistic, namely
a comparison of the difference between 1989 actual and critical values to the difference
between 1997 actual and critical values," we believe that we did actually address this
question on p. 6 of the paper. We report the results of ? tests of differences between Big 8 and
Big 6 concentration between 1989 and 1997, together with Wilcoxon tests, and find evidence
supportive of a significant increase in market share by the Big8/6:
"...we considered the change in the average aggregate market share of the biggest
audit firms: that is, the Big 8 in 1989 and the Big 6 in 1997. We then tested whether
this change is significant by the t-test of mean differences. .
., we also executed a
Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We found that the t-tests on both types of concentration ratios
* Tel/fax: +32-16-32-69-32.
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were significant with p-values less than 5 percent, as were the Wilcoxon tests"
(Willekens & Achmadi, 2003, p. 12).
Note that the evidence provided in Table 3 is also supportive of this. From Table 3 it is
clear that—based on personnel costs as an audit-fee proxy ^—the eight largest audit firms
(or the Big 8) penetrated 67.99 percent (CR8) of the market in 1989, which is 9.21 percent
smaller than the critical-concentration value for 1989. By 1997 the Big 8 merged into the
Big 6, and the six largest audit firms in Belgium (or the Big 6) by then penetrated 77.36
percent (CR6) of the market, which is only 2.73 percent smaller than the critical
concentration value for 1997. Thus, Big 8/6 market share had increased by 9.37 percent
points (or an increase of 13.78 percent) between 1989 and 1997, whereas the critical
concentration value only increased by 2.89 percent points between 1989 and 1997—or by
3.74 percent.
2. The evidence may be supportive of competition through quality, but tliis does not
change our conclusion
Peecher (2003) further argues that, given our research design, we have "difficulty
discerning whether two (or more) explanations, such as market power and competition, are
simultaneously operative" and that our analysis could pick up composite net effects of such
explanations. It is indeed true that POWER picks up a composite net effect of market power
and price competition and—if not properly controlled for—also other factors that POWER
may be correlated with. However, given:
1. the specification of Research Question 2 in the paper ^; and,
2. accordingly, the specification of the audit-fee model in Equation 2 (p. 17), including a
YEAR dummy interaction variable to capture changes in the audit- pricing model;
3. the significant increase in Big 8/6 concentration between 1989 and 1997 (see p. 12, t tests
of mean differences and Wilcoxon tests), suggesting an increase in Big 6 market power;
4. the significant drop in the coefficient on the POWER variable in the 1 997 audit fee-model
(see Table 5); as well as
5. the significant drop in the coefficient on the SWITCH variable, suggesting that pricing of
initial engagements also decreased by 1997;
we are confident that the net effect captured is evidence of increased price competition
between 1989 and 1997.
More challenging—indeed—is Peecher's (2003) suggestion of a third element that could
have been at work, namely competition through increased audit-quality differentiation. Audit
The results are similar for the other market-share proxy used in the paper.
"
"Has audit pricing become more competitive between 1989 and 1997? How did the impact of auditor market
share and other significant determinants in the audit-pricing model change between 1989 and 1997?" (Willekens
& Achmadi, 2003, p. 14).
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quality is a broad and vague concept, typically proxied by auditor size in the literature
(DeAngelo, 1981). If differentiation on audit quality indeed changed between 1989 and 1997,
and this change is significantly correlated with the POWER variable, then the change in the
coefficient of the POWER variable would capture a quality effect as well. However, this is
only true if no control variables for quality differentiation were included in the model. Let's
first assume that no such control variable was included in our model (note, by the way, that
this would be consistent with ample prior research that captures audit quality empirically
through an auditor-size variable). Would that actually harm our conclusion? No, as we'd still
be able to conclude from the significant drop of the coefficient on POWER in 1997 that the
net effect of all three factors (power, price, and quality) is in favor of increased price
competition (see also argumentation above).
^
However, we do accept the challenge to look for audit-quality proxies, other than auditor
size, so that we can control for quality shifts. As mentioned by Peecher (2003), quality
differentiation traditionally occurs through suggestions for improvement of internal con-
trols, and, more recently, also through evaluation and communication of business risks and
processes. As our analysis relates to privately owned Belgian companies that are rather
small by U.S. standards (the average total assets figure for our sample companies is about
20 million Euro), we will focus on the (more traditional) internal control dimension of
quality differentiation. Clearly, one of the control variables included in the audit fee model
tested in the paper is associated with a client's internal control system, namely LAUD (i.e.,
presence of an internal audit department in the client firm). A reasonable conjecture is that
many of our sample companies do not have very well developed internal control systems,
given their size and ownership characteristics. We therefore believe that lAUD is a good
proxy for the presence of a reasonably developed internal control system,"* and, therefore,
also for the likelihood that an auditor will perform control tests and thus be able to provide
additional quality through advice on improvement of the system. Note that not much advice
can be supplied in the absence of control testing. In terms of our audit-pricing analysis, a
positive coefficient on LAUD would then suggest that additional advice on internal control
improvements is valued in the market. It is worth noting that our analysis in Table 5 shows
that lAUD had a negative coefficient in 1989, but a positive one in 1997, and that this
change was significant. This is consistent with Peecher 's suggestion that audit quality may
have changed over the period 1989-1997.
3. Why 1989 versus 1997 makes sense
Given very profound changes in the audit environment during the 1990s, we believed that
is was necessary to address audit pricing in a dynamic way, and not just replicate prior audit-
fees studies. Our choice of 1989 and 1997 was the result of common sense and pragmatism.
Note that prior audit-fee studies (e.g., seminal work by Simunic, 1980) looked at the net effects of various
factors to draw conclusions about the degree of competition in the audit market.
^ Note that monitoring is one of the components of internal control according to the COSO model (1992).
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indeed (1) 1989 is the last year of audit-pricing data before the Big 8 became the Big 6; (2)
1997 was the last year before the Big 6 became the Big 5; and (3) prior evidence suggests that
a sufficiently long observation period is required to allow for postmerger equilibration. So
1989-1997 seemed a rational choice, given that audit fee and some other data (such as, e.g.,
lAUD) are not publicly available but were collected manually. Peecher's (2003) suggestion to
ascertain the validity of our results by testing them against randomly drawn pairs of years is
—
although appealing in concept—economically prohibitive. It is, however, a good suggestion
for audit fee research in environments where fee data are publicly available, such as the UK
and New Zealand.
4. About management advisory services
Finally, Peecher (2003) suggests that a variable should have been included in the model to
control for nonaudit fees paid to the incumbent auditor. This is indeed a very valid point,
especially when sample firms are public and large, and the size of the nonaudit fees take huge
proportions. But, since the firms in our sample are privately owned and reasonably small
(average total assets amounts to 20 million Euro), the amount of advisory services purchased
from audit firms is not very significant. One type of service that is acquired by our sample
firms is tax consulting. However, in the Belgian market of small, closely held firms, most tax
services are purchased from accountants and tax consultants. Note that accountants and tax
consultants are not allowed to perform statutory audits in Belgium. Only members of the
Institute of Auditors are certified to do so.^
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Abstract
This study investigates the link between corporate board features and corporate performance for
a sample of 286 publicly traded firms from South Africa (84 firms), Sweden (94 firms), and the
UK (108 firms). Corporate board features considered are board composition, inside director
ownership, duality and board size. In contrast to prior literature, performance is defined as the
efficiency of value added (VA) rather than in financial terms. Further, the analysis examines the
association between board features and efficiency of VA and each of the firm's physical capital
(PC) and intellectual capital (IC), respectively. Finally, the present study analyzes the association
between board features and corporate performance conjointly. Comparable to general findings from
studies using U.S. data, the empirical analysis as a whole did not discem consistent significant link
between the four board features and corporate performance across the three nations. However,
individual board features are found to influence corporate performance in isolated cases. Overall,
results provide evidence that even under different sociopolitical and economic conditions,
governance needs vary across firms. Consequently, these findings do not lend support to the notion
that uniform board structures should be mandated.
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1. Introduction '
Corporate governance concerns in publicly listed firms with diffuse ownership are well
known and long established (i.e., Berle & Means, 1932; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2001;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Financial scandals in various nations during the 1980s reignited
debate—that continues to the present—on the most appropriate mechanisms for making
corporate management more accountable to shareholders and other relevant stakeholders
(Demirag, Sudarsanam, & Wright, 2000). Boards of directors have been at the epicentre of
this debate (Bhagat & Black, 1999; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). Members of boards of
directors have been extensively criticized for being complacent in their monitoring role, and/
or relinquishing control to corporate managers who pursue their own self-interests (Dahon,
Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). Also, boards of directors are accused of being remiss in
their accountability to stakeholders (Coffey & Wang, 1998). Because poor corporate
performance is viewed to be a major by-product of an ineffective board of directors, various
corporate governance reform advocates frequently argue appropriate changes to its' compo-
sition, structure and ownership configuration' will enhance both corporate governance and
corporate performance.
The association between board features and corporate performance has frequently been
questioned, both in conceptual (i.e., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mace, 1972; Molz, 1995) and
empirical studies (i.e.. Daily & Dalton, 1994; Kesner, 1988; Kosnik, 1987). In this study we
provide an intemational comparative analysis of the association between board features and
corporate performance drawing on data (hand collected) from 284 publicly listed firms from
South Afiica (SA) (« = 84), Sweden (« = 94) and the UK («= 108). Earlier studies (i.e.. La
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 1998) clearly indicate that key elements of the corporate governance environment
—
such as the legal system and capital markets—vary across national boundaries. An intema-
tional comparative analysis is, therefore, warranted since prior empirical research findings are
generally derived using data solely from the United States (Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998).
Corporate governance guidelines published during the 1990s and early 2000s, however,
often emphasized the concept of value added (henceforth denoted as f^) as a primary
objective of a firm's board of directors. However, prior studies generally define corporate
performance in financial terms with a small number applying societal level concepts (i.e.,
corporate social and environmental responsibility (Frankforter, Berman, & Jones, 2000). In a
departure from prior research, the present study empirically examines the association between
board features and corporate performance, with performance defined as the efficiency of VA
' For the purposes of the present paper, board composition refers to the make-up of the board such as the
number of directors and mix of inside and outside directors. The phrase board structure is utiUzed to designate
particular structural characteristics that may include presence or absence of a standing committee and whether a
single individual or two separate people undertake the roles of CEO and Chairperson of the board. Finally, board
ownership configuration relates to the ownership levels of the board. This may include such features as the
percentage of outstanding shares owned by inside or outside directors and presence or absence of a block holder
on the board.
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by a firm's total resource base (hereafter TVAE). Also, recognizing that a firm's resource base
consists of physical capital (PC) and intellectual capital (IC), we conjecture that the different
properties underlying PC and IC resources will lead corporate management to adopt
dissimilar approaches to the use and application of each type of resource base. The influence
of board features on corporate performance could then depend on the firm's mix ofPC and IC
resources. A unique feature of the present study, therefore, is extending the analysis to test for
the association between board features and (1) efficiency of VA by a firm's PC—resources
(hereafter TVAPC) and (2) efficiency ofVA by a firm's IC—resources (hereafter TVAIC). We
use the Value Added Intellectual Capital (VAIC) methodology (i.e., Pulic, 1998) to develop
proxies for TVAE, TVAPC, and TVAIC."
Finally, much of the extant literature generally examines the association between single
board features and corporate performance. Vafeas and Theodorou (1998, p. 403) suggest that
attempts to establish the existence of such association without controlling for the influence of
other corporate governance characteristics may "lead to spurious relationships and misguided
conclusions." This study attempts to mitigate this concern.
SA, Sweden and the UK were selected for this study for several key reasons. First, during
the 1990s and early 2000s corporate govemance was a major issue for all three. New
corporate govemance guidelines and regulations were published in SA {King Report I, 1994;
King Report II, 2002,), Sweden (Corporate governance policy, 1993, 2001) and the UK
(Cadbury Report, 1992; Tumball Report, 1998) during this period. The goal was to enhance
corporate monitoring and performance through the proper employment of more effective
board features. It is important, therefore, to investigate the possible impact of such
recommendations on corporate performance. Second, there is also a common historical link
between corporate govemance guidelines and regulations published in the three nations since
1992; specifically, the Cadbury Report (1992) has commonly been used as the initial point of
reference in the construction of corporate govemance guidelines and regulations. Third, an
understanding and familiarity with the concept of IC is another reason for concentrating on
SA, Sweden and the UK. Swedish firms, for example, are the acknowledged 'forefathers' in
the development of the concept of IC and its recognition as a distinctive discipline (Bontis,
1998, 2000). Since the mid-1990s IC has established a strong and growing presence in both
the SA and the UK business and political environment (Mouritsen, Larsen, & Bukh, 2001;
Williams, 2001). Fourth, the concept of VA features prominently in each nation's social,
scholarly, and business environments (Stainbank, 1997; Van Staden, 1999). For example, at
the time of the present study, SA firms voluntarily provided more value-added statements
than any other nation while the vast bulk of academic research on this concept emerged from
the UK (Van Staden, 2000). Finally, the developed capital market and financial reporting
environments in SA, Sweden, and the UK have enabled collection of relevant data from a
relatively sizeable number of economically significant firms in each nation. Whilst there are
Whilst the empirical results and discussion reported in the present study primarily focus on proxies
developed in line with the VAIC methodology, a comparison with findings using traditional market- and
accounting-based measures of corporate performance is also provided in the Results section.
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dissimilarities among these three nations, such as in the legal system and state of economic
development, this should not have an adverse effect on this study. The remainder of this paper
is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview the corporate govemance environ-
ment in SA, Sweden and the UK. A discussion of the potential influence of board features on
the efficiency of VA by a firm's combined resources and that by the major resource elements
of a firm—PC and IC^—follows. Testable hypotheses are also developed in this section. An
outline of the research design and descriptive statistics related to the sample data is then
presented in Section 4. Empirical results are then reported. In the concluding section, ideas for
future research are discussed.
2. Overview of corporate governance in South Africa, Sweden and United Kingdom
There is presently a lack of consensus on a precise definition of corporate govemance. For
the purposes of the present study, corporate govemance is viewed to encompass the
dimensions of law, regulation and suitable voluntary corporate practice that enables the
"corporation to attract financial and human capital, perform efficiently, and thereby
perpetuate itself by generating long-term economic value for its shareholders, while
respecting the interests of stakeholders and society as a whole" (Gregory, 2001a, p. 1).
Given key dimensions, such as the legal order and regulatory environment vary between
countries, studying corporate govemance practices across national boundaries is of interest.
Table 1 is a summary of major features of the corporate govemance system and factors
influencing practices in SA, Sweden and the UK.
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), argue that the legal order is a key institutional determinant of
the development of corporate govemance practices and of understanding of related enforce-
ment regulations. In the UK, Common law—based on precedents established by courts—is
the primary source of legal principles and mles, while statutory law forms the cornerstone of
legal principles and mles in Sweden. Conversely, legal principles and mles in SA are dually
influenced by the major codification practices of Roman-Germanic (Dutch) law and case law
of the Common law legal system. Also, the extent of shareholder and creditor rights may
influence corporate govemance practices (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Shareholder rights in
SA and the UK are quite comparable, although levels are slightly lower in Sweden. Creditor
rights are lowest in Sweden and highest in the UK (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). In sum,
corporate management and boards of directors of UK firms are more likely than SA or
Sweden to face greater pressure to ensure achieving appropriate corporate govemance
practices and standards. This difference is likely due to greater protection and enforceability
of shareholder rights and creditor rights.
The quality of a nation's accounting profession and standards and the resulting financial
transparency are other measures of corporate govemance effectiveness. According to La Porta
et al. (1997, 1998), the quality of accoundng standards is highest in Sweden and lowest in
SA. This implies financial transparency is likely to be more extensive amongst Swedish firms
followed by those in the UK and SA. Prior research suggests ownership stmcture influences
corporate govemance practices. For example, ownership diffusion can extrapolate managerial
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opportunism while block holdings may enhance (or impede) the monitoring of corporate
management (Frankforter et al., 2000). The level of ownership amongst firms is most diffused
in the UK with SA having the highest concentration of ownership.
Unlike Companies Acts and related regulations in SA, in Sweden and the UK, specific
guidelines designed to formally institutionalize corporate governance practices were published
during the 1990s and early 2000s. It is argued that compliance with these guidelines may
depend in part on ( 1 ) the agency issuing the guidelines, (2) whether guidelines were appended to
any institutional requirements and (3) disclosure requirements. In Sweden, guidelines were
developed by private agencies not supported or appended to the requirements of a major
institutional body (such as the stock exchange) and compliance is purely voluntary. The
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), a private body, also strongly supported the development
of guidelines in SA with recommendations of the King Report I {\99A) and II (2002) appended
to the listing requirements of the JSE. Also, debtor firms are required to disclose the extent of
compliance with King Report I (1994) and II (2002) guidelines. In the UK, development of
recent guidelines were initiated by major institutional bodies such as the London Stock
Exchange (1998) and Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. As in SA,
UK guidelines—condensed into the Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and
Code of Best Practice (1998)—are appended to the listing requirements of the London Stock
Exchange. Also, UK firms are required to disclose their compliance with these guidelines.
Various recommendations arising from these reports cover issues relevant to the present
study. These include the objective of the board, board size, board composition and leadership
structure. In respect to the objective of the board, Swedish and UK guidelines emphasize the
main duty of the board is to promote shareholders' interests and maximize shareholder value.
Guidelines in SA also acknowledge a board's responsibility to shareholders but the overall
objective stresses the need for boards to act in the interests of a wider range of stakeholders.
Of the three nations included in the present study, only Swedish guidelines make direct
recommendations on the size of the board. Conversely, guidelines in all three nations express
a preference for the board of directors to contain an appropriate balance of executive and
nonexecutive (affiliated and independent) directors. Swedish guidelines, however, express
greater need for nonexecutive director representation in particular as firm size increases.
Finally, guidelines in each nation place heavy emphasis on the segregation of the positions of
chief executive officer (CEO) and Chairperson to minimize duality related conflicts.^
3. Prior literature, theory and hypothesis development
Generally, the majority of empirical studies examining corporate performance links have
defmed corporate performance primarily within financial terms and used either financial
accounting or market-based measures as proxies for corporate performance. Few studies seek
' Duality refers to the situation when an executive holds both the position of chief executive officer (CEO) and
Chairperson of the board.
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to analyze the association between board features and corporate performance within the
context of VA (i.e., Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). The
concept of VA (also referred to as wealth creation)"* is increasingly viewed as the primary
objective of a firm more so than financial performance. Clarkson (1994, p. 21), for example,
states that the "purpose of the firm is to create wealth or value for its stakeholders by
converting their stakes into goods and services." Some corporate governance advocates
highlight the potential association between board features and VA. Blair (1995, p. 322) argues
that it is critical for VA "to enhance the voice of and provide ownership-like incentives to
those participants in the firm who contribute or control critical, specialized inputs and to align
the interests of these critical stakeholders with the interests of outside, passive shareholders
and other related stakeholders." The voice of key participants, for instance, could be
enhanced through suitable representation on the board of directors. In the case of executive
directors, ownership incentives may help align their interests with shareholders and other
important stakeholders.
Prior research indicates corporate managers are generally risk-averse due to their depend-
ence on the firm for their immediate livelihood (Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). With a
preference for reducing uncertainty, corporate managers are likely to support policies and
strategies related to PC than IC resources because they are better able to directly control the
former (Mahnke, 1997). This condition arises because ownership in PC resources is attributed
to shareholders who then pass responsibility for their use to corporate management.
Consequently, control of IC resources may not be within the direct power of a corporate
manager. Without direct control, corporate managers have less ability to apply ex ante
monitoring criteria and cannot as easily make adjustments on a continuous basis to reduce
uncertainties (Mahnke, 1997). Another personal characteristic of corporate managers is their
myopic nature (Vanes & Theodorou, 1998). From a time horizon perspective, VA generated
fi-om PC resources is likely to take less time than VA generated from IC resources. IC
resources cannot be purchased via business transactions and require lengthy periods of
development and refinement offering few guarantees of becoming operational (Mahnke,
1997). Under enormous pressure to produce immediate results, "short terms" may lead
corporate managers to avoid investing in IC resources.
A review of the literature indicates four major board features—representation or composi-
tions (proportion of outside directors and board size), structure (duality) and ownership
(percentage of inside ownership)—often thought to influence corporate performance. The
following subsections reviews the theoretical and empirical literature related to these four boards
features in developing hypotheses relevant to an association with TVAE, TVAPC and TVAIC.
3.1. Proportion of outside directors on a firm's board of directors
The proposition that outside directors are instrumental in guiding a firm's performance is
supported by several theoretical perspectives (including agency theory, resource-dependence j
'^ Formally, VA was defined as the wealth created (or contributed) by the firm through the utilization of its key
productive resources (Suojanen, 1954; Van Staden, 1998).
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theory and stakeholder theory) and has been the central emphasis of various recent corporate
governance guideline publications (e.g., Cadbury Report, 1992; King Report I, 1994). From a
stakeholder perspective, stakeholder orientations are likely to be more diversified amongst
outside directors relative to inside directors (Young, Stedham, & Beekun, 2000). Also,
outside directors are often hired to assist in managing a firm's various stakeholders (Johnson
& Greening, 1999; Pfeffer, 1973). Finally, as Wang and Dewhirst (1992, p. 120) state,
"outside directors have a very strong stakeholder orientation, and recognize that their
responsibility encompasses more than shareholders and are very conscious about the needs
and expectations of the various constituencies of their firms." Outside directors also have
vested interest in fiilfilling their responsibilities; they need to protect their "reputation-
capital" so as to enhance future directorship opportunities. In contrast, inside directors have
strong self-interest orientations as they rely on the firm for their immediate livelihood
(Johnson et al., 1993; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
While the above reasoning appears compelling, the empirical results of association
between the proportion of outside directors and corporate performance are mixed. Rosenstein
and Wyatt (1990, 1997) find positive excess returns following the announcement of the
appointment of an outside director, which is supported by Byrd and Hickman (1992); Mayers,
Shivdasani, Smith (1997) and Weisbach (1988). There is a suggestion that these findings are
due to sample selection, which is conditioned to events potentially requiring good decision-
making, a major function of outside directors (Frankforter et al., 2000). In contrast, large
cross-sectional studies fail to indicate any relationship (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Hermalin
& Weisbach, 1991). Finally, other empirical findings show that inside directors, rather then
outside directors, are essential to corporate performance (i.e., Cochran et al., 1985; Kesner et
al., 1986; Singh & Harianto, 1989). Despite conflicting empirical results, it is important in the
current environment to analyze the association between the proportion of outside directors
and corporate performance in settings other than that of the United States, and using other
concepts of performance. Therefore, consistent with the stakeholder perspective, we propose
the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis la: There is a positive association between the proportion of outside directors to
total directors of publicly listed firms in SA, Sweden, and UK and TVAE.
Hypothesis lb: There is a positive association between the proportion of outside directors to
total directors of publicly listed firms in SA, Sweden, and UK and TVAPC.
Hypothesis Ic: There is a positive association between the proportion of outside directors to
total directors of publicly listed firms in SA, Sweden, and UK and TVAIC.
3.2. Ownership concentration of inside directors of a firm's board of directors
Inside directors form a significant stakeholder group contributing critical specialized
inputs. Under the stakeholder fi^amework the provision of ownership-like incentives to inside
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directors helps align perceptions with the interests of other stakeholder groups. Zahra, Oviatt,
and Minyard (1993) suggest ownership gives greater motivation to inside directors to develop
better strategies allowing for effective resource allocation to the different stakeholders of a
firm. Hansen and Hill (1991) argue that ownership incentive realignment motivates inside
directors to forgo short-term returns for long-term projects and strategies. Johnson and
Greening (1999, p. 570), further state that ownership inspires inside directors to "maintain or
improve product quality and innovation through increased R&D spending." Finally,
Finkelstein (1992) argues that ownership empowers inside directors, enabling them to
generate new business incentives and strategies, increase innovation and enable the firm to
adapt more quickly to a changing environment.
As with the case of outside directors the empirical evidence on inside directors is mixed.
Some studies have reported no association (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Leech & Leahy, 1991;
Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). In contrast, the empirical findings of McConnell and Servaes
(1990) and Conyon and Leech (1994) report a positive relationship. Alternatively, the
empirical findings of Morck et al. (1988) imply an elliptical relationship. That is, as inside
directors' ownership increased to approximately 5% of total outstanding shares, corporate
performance improved. For ownership levels between 5% and 25% there was a decline whilst
ownership above 25% again showed improved corporate performance. Given these incon-
sistent results, based largely on US data, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive association between the percentage of inside directors'
ownership of publicly listed firms in SA, Sweden and UK and TVAE.
Hypothesis 2b: There is a positive association between the percentage of inside directors'
ownership of publicly listed firms in SA, Sweden and UK and TVAPC.
Hypothesis 2c: There is a positive association between the percentage of inside directors'
ownership of publicly listed firms in SA, Sweden and UK and TVAIC.
5.3. Leadership structure (duality)
The impact of duality on corporate performance is of interest to advocates of various
schools of thought (i.e., Dalton & Kesner, 1985; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Patton & Baker,
1987). From a stakeholder perception, duality seriously impedes the overall stakeholder
orientation of members of the board. Sonnenfeld (1981), for example, argues that executives
acting as both CEO and Chairperson are biased in their stakeholder orientations toward
corporate management. That is, the joint CEO/Chairperson is likely to support the imple-
mentation of policies benefiting corporate management at the expense of other stakeholders
(Ford & McLaughlin, 1984). Also, both the positions of CEO and Chairperson are posifions
of considerable power. Combining them enables the joint CEO/Chairperson to establish
greater strategic influence and power that may intimidate other directors. Consequently, other
board members may be reluctant to support strategies and policies contrary to the interests of
corporate management for fear of incurring the disapproval of their leader (Mallette & Fowler,
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1992). Dividing the positions of CEO and Chairperson of the Board disperses power and
authority, thereby enhancing the board of directors' abihty to effectively implement decisions
addressing the interests of a more diverse set of stakeholders (Wang & Dewhirst, 1992).
Finally, eliminating duality enhances the board's information-processing capacities by
enabling more key people to be involved in the decision-making process (Sanders and
Carpenter, 1998).
Empirical research offers limited inconclusive findings on duality. Rechner and Dalton
(1991) and Pi and Timme (1993), for example, find firms separating the two roles
consistently outperformed counterparts that combined the two positions. Brickley, Coles,
and Jarrell (1997) and Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) find contradictory results, however, to
further investigate the aforementioned association the following hypotheses are formed based
on the foregoing arguments:
Hypothesis 3a: There is a negative association between the same director jointly holding the
roles of CEO and Chairperson of publicly listed firms in SA, Sweden, and UK and TVAE.
Hypothesis 3b: There is a negative association between the same director jointly holding the
roles of CEO and Chairperson of publicly listed firms in SA, Sweden, and UK and TVAPC.
Hypothesis 3c: There is a negadve association between the same director jointly holding the
roles of CEO and Chairperson of publicly listed firms in SA, Sweden, and UK and TVAIC.
3.4. Size of the board of directors
While there are suggestions for finding an association between board size and corporate
performance (i.e., Alexander, Fennell, & Halpem, 1993; Kidwell & Bennett, 1993; Provan,
1980), no consensus exist, as to the direction of this association. Advocates of the
stakeholder perspective generally support a positive association. A larger board allows
greater balance, thereby, promoting more effective decision making while increasing
harmony between a firm's stakeholders. Finally, a larger board enhances information-
processing capabilities and the quality of advice given to corporate management (Zahra and
Pearce, 1989).
Alternatively, agency theorists generally argue for smaller boards reasoning that as size
increases control and monitoring functions are impaired (Dalton et al., 1999; Judge &
Zeithaml, 1992). Agency theory advocates also argue that larger board size increases the
opportunity for manipulation by corporate management. For example, Jensen (1993, p. 865)
state that when "boards get beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to function
effectively and are easier for the CEO to control." Finally, some suggest larger board size
leads to less participation and cohesion among members, thus, diminishing the ability to
achieve a consensus on control decisions (Evans and Dion, 1991; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).
Empirical analysis has failed to resolve the theoretical debate surrounding the
association between board size and corporate performance. Burt (1980), and Bazerman
and Schoorman (1983), for example, state that larger boards are able to establish far
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greater interlocks with stakeholders processing resources vital to the firm. These
affiliations enable firms to operate more effectively. Similarly, Chaganti et al. (1985)
find that the boards of firms filing for Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy protection are smaller in
size than a matched sample of nonfailing firms. They concluded that larger board size is
more effective in preventing corporate failure than is the case for smaller boards.
Conversely, Yermack (1996) shows that higher market evaluation, as well as higher
returns on assets and returns on sales, are associated with firms having smaller boards.
Yermack (1996) concludes that any benefits associated with large board size are under-
mined by poor communication and decision-making processes. Given the inconsistent
empirical results, fiirther investigation of board size and corporate performance links is
required. Based on the foregoing arguments it is hypothesized that.
Hypothesis 4a: There is a positive association between the number of members of the board
of directors of publicly hsted firms in SA, Sweden, and UK and TVAE.
Hypothesis 4b: There is a positive association between the number of members of the board
of directors of publicly listed firms in SA, Sweden, and UK and TVAPC.
Hypothesis 4c: There is a positive association between the number of members of the board
of directors publicly listed firms in SA, Sweden, and UK and TVAIC.
4. Research method
4.1. Measure of dependent variables
The Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (VAIC) methodology developed by Pulic
(1998) forms the measurement basis for the three dependent variables in the present study.
VAIC is an analytical procedure designed to enable management, shareholders and other
relevant stakeholders to effectively monitor and evaluate the efficiency of VA by a firm's
total resources as well as each major resource component. Formally, VAIC is a composite
sum of three indicators formally termed (1) Capital Employed Efficiency (CEE)
—
indicator of VA efficiency of capital employed; (2) Human Capital Efficiency (HCE)
indicator of VA efficiency of human capital; and (3) Structural Capital Efficiency (SCE)
indicator of VA efficiency of structural capital. Eq. (1) formalizes the VAIC relationship
algebraically:
VAIC, = CEE, + HCE/ + SCE, ( 1
)
Where VAIC, = VA intellectual coefficient for company /; CEE, = VA capital
employed coefficient for company /; HCE,— human capital coefficient for company i\
and SCE, = structural capital VA for company /.
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Pulic (1998), States that the higher the VAIC coefficient, the better the efficiency ofVA by
a firm's total resources. The first step in calculating CEE, HCE and SCE is to determine a
firm's total VA. This calculation is defined by the following relationship^:
VA/ = /, + DP, + A + Ti + M, + Ri (2)
Where VA for firm i computed as the sum of interest expenses (/,); depreciation
expenses (DP,); dividends (Z),); corporate taxes (T,); equity of minority shareholders in net
income of subsidiaries (M,); and profits retained for the year {R,).
Pulic (1998) also states that CEE is:
CEE, = VA,/CE/ (3)
Where CEE, = capital employed efficiency coefficient for company /; VA, = VA for firm
/ (see formal definition above); and CE, = book value of the net assets for firm /.
Consistent with views of Edvinsson (1997) and Pulic (1998); Sveiby (2001) argues total
salary and wage costs are an indicator of a firm's human capital (HC). HCE, therefore, is
calculated as:
HCE, = VA,/HC, (4)
Where HCE, = human capital efficiency coefficient for company z; VA, = VA for firm /
(see formal definition above); and HC, = total investment salary and wage for firm i.
To calculate SCE, it is first necessary to determine the value of a firm's structural capital
(SC) which Pulic (1998) proposes as:
SCy = VA, - HC/ (5)
Where SC/ = structural capital for company z; VA/ = VA for firm z (see formal definition
above); and HC/ = total salary and wage costs for firm z.
Pulic (1998) argues there is a proportionate inverse relationship between HC and SC.
Consequently, Pulic (1998) proposes calculating SCE as:
SCE, = SC,/VA/ (6)
Where SCE/ = structural capital efficiency coefficient for company z; SC/ = structural
capital for company z; and VA/ = VA for firm z (see formal definition above).
^ Prior research has defined VA by the following algebraic equation: Rev - B + Inv =W +1 +
DP + D + T +M + R [Eq. (7a)] or S-B + Inv-DP =W + I + DP + D + T +M + R [Eq. (7b)]. W refers to total salary
and wage expense. Eq. (7a) is commonly referred to as the gross VA and Eq. (7b) is termed the net VA. Theoretical
arguments have been forwarded supporting both approaches. Empirical research indicates both methods have been
used in practice. Pulic (1998) argues that because of the central active role human resources plays in the value
creation process, labour costs (wages expense) should not be included in VA computations. This view is consistent
with the opinions of other IC experts (Edvinsson, 1997; Sveiby, 2000).
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For this study, VAIC scores are a proxy for TVAE; CEE scores proxy for TVAPC; and the
sum of HCE and SCE scores proxy for TVAIC. Appendix A presents a formal illustration of
the calculation of each dependent variable using the VAIC methodology.
Apart from encompassing the concept of VA and enabling one to decipher the VA
efficiency of a firm's PC and IC resources, several other major reasons underscore the use of
the VAIC methodology. First, VAIC provides a standardized and consistent basis of measure
(Pulic & Bomemann, 1999), and thereby, enables the effective conduct of an international
comparative analysis. Alternative IC measures are limited (Roos, Roos, Dragonetti, &
Edvinsson, 1997; Sullivan, 2000) and the ability to apply alternative IC measures consistently
across a large and diversified sample for comparative analysis is diminished.
Second, all data used in the VAIC calculation are based on audited information; therefore,
the calculations can be considered objective and verifiable (Pulic, 1998, 2000). Other IC
measures have been criticized due to subjectivity in measurement and difficulty in verifica-
tion (Sveiby, 2000; Williams, 2001). Third, VAIC is a straightforward technique that
enhances cognitive understanding and enables ease of calculation by various internal and
external stakeholders (Schneider, 1999). Finally, the VAIC methodology is receiving more
attention in research and application (see, e.g., Bomemann and Franzen, 1998; Nova Kreditna
banka Maribor, 2000; Williams, 2001).
4.2. Proxy measures for independent variables and control factors
In addition to the four independent variables, five control factors (profitability, leverage,
dividend yield, industry type, and firm size) are included in all the multiple regression analysis.
Standard proxies, identified from a review of the literature (i.e.. Daily & Dalton, 1994; Mallette
& Fowler, 1992; Oviatt, 1988; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Young et al, 2000) are used to
measure the independent variables and control factors in this study. Each proxy is formally
defined below, plus the expected directional relationship with the dependent variables:
1. Percentage of outside directors on the board (PerOutDir): number of directors on the
board, not directly employed with or have professional ties with the firm, as a percentage
of total board size
—
positive relationship with dependent variable;
2. Percentage ofoutstanding shares owned by inside directors (PerlnsOwn): ratio of number
of outstanding common shares held by directors to the total number of outstanding
common shares of the firm
—
positive direction with dependent variable;
3. Leadership structure of the board (Duality): dummy variable with firms having the same
individual acting as the CEO and chairperson of the board being scored a one, otherwise a
zero—negative relationship with dependent variable;
4. Board size (Board Size): number of directors serving on the board—negative relationship
with dependent variable;
5. Profitability (ROA): ratio of the net income (less preference dividends) divided by total
assets as reported in the 1998 annual report
—
positive relationship to dependent variable;
6. Leverage (Leverage): total debt divided by total shareholders' equity as reported in each
firm's annual report—negative relationship to dependent variable;
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7. Dividend yield (Dividend y/e/^):—percentage of cash dividends paid during 1998 divided
by total shareholders' equity
—
positive relationship to dependent variable;
8. R&D sensitivity (Industry Type): dummy variable with firm's determined to be R&D
intensive^ coded a one (1), otherwise coded a zero (0) (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Wruck,
1993)
—
positive relationship to dependent variable; and
9. Firm Size (Size of the Firm): natural log of annual sales as reported in each firm's annual
report
—
positive relationship to dependent variable.
4.3. Sample data
Data were hand-collected from 1998 fiscal year annual reports'' of publicly traded firms
listed on the Johannesburg (SA), Stockholm (Sweden) and London (UK) stock exchanges.
Consistent with prior research, financial and utility sector firms were excluded (Firth, Lohne,
Ropstad, & Sjo, 1996; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). Various techniques—direct contact,
database, and website searches—were used to collect the final useable sample of 286 (84 in
SA; 94 in Sweden; and 108 in UK) annual reports.^
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables and control
factors for the sample as a whole (Panel A) and by nation (SA—Panel B; Sweden—Panel C;
and UK—Panel D). Descriptive statistics related to the independent variables indicate that
board structures vary among SA, Sweden, and UK. The average (median) percentage ofoutside
directors (PerOutDir) is 51.91% (52.79%) in SA, 78.29% (81.46%) in Sweden and 48.50%
(42.57%) in UK. Compared to the United States, the proportion of outside directors is lower in
SA and UK but higher in Sweden. Average PerlnsOwn in SA, Sweden, and UK is 9.70%,
1.75%, and 6.42%, respectively Median values (2.98%—SA; 0.05%—Sweden; and 0.1 1%—
UK) indicate, however, that PerlnsOwn values are heavily skewed to the right. PerOwnlns in
SA, Sweden, and UK are generally lower than that reported for US firms. Duality is most
prominent in SA (61 .43% with same CEO/Chairperson) closely followed by the UK (53.70%).
These proportions are similar to the United States (i.e., Roa & Lee-Sing, 1995; Klein, 1998,
2002). Comparatively, Swedish firms (20.64%) show a greater propensity to segregate the two
roles of the Chairperson and CEO. Finally, average Board size in SA (13.02) is moderately
higher than in the United States, but is comparable in both Sweden (9.28) and UK (9.54).
Overall, firms in the sample have reasonably high ROA values. Average Leverage levels
are also relatively similar. Comparatively, UK firms generally paid more dividends per unit
of shareholders equity than firms in SA and Sweden. Across the entire sample, approx-
imately three out of five firms were coded "R&D Intensive", with Sweden having the
A firm was defined as being R&D sensitive if it separately disclosed the amount of R&D expense in their
annual report.
^ In SA and Sweden the 1998 fiscal year was generally from 1/1/1998 to 31/12/1998 whilst in UK it was from
1/4/1998 - 31/3/1999. The time difference is not considered detrimental to the results of this study as no
significant events occurred that may have unduly influenced the findings.
Nonresponse tests were conducted to determine if there were any significant differences between companies
from the original 240 companies selected that were included in the final survey to those excluded. Statistical tests
showed no significant variations. Consequently, it was concluded there was no significant nonresponse bias.
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highest proportion of "R&D Intensive" firms whilst SA has the lowest proportion. Finally,
average sales turnover was highest amongst UK firms followed by Sweden.
The efficiency of total VA of a firm's combined resource base is, on average highest in UK
followed by SA. In SA and Sweden, IC is the most significant resource base contributing to
the efficiency of VA, whilst in the UK it is PC. Relative to prior VAIC studies^ for the same
period as this study: SA values are comparable, Swedish values generally lower and UK
slightly higher. Univariate analysis tests (independent Student t test and Mann-Whitney U
test)^° indicate that the national TVAE, TVAPC, and TVAIC means in Sweden were
significantly lower than national means in SA and UK. Differences between national means
for TVAE, TVAPC, and TVAIC in SA and UK, however, are not statistically significant.
5. Results
5.1. Correlation analysis
Pearson correlations reported in Table 3 do not exceed .340. Also the variance inflation factor
(VIF) values (calculated with every muhiple regression model performed) not exceed 3.00. All
VIF values are substantially below the critical value of 10.00 (Netter et al., 1989). Based on
Pearson correlations and VIF values, multicollinearity does not appear to be a serious concern' '
.
5.2. Tests of la, 2a, 3a and 4a
Table 4 presents the results of three multiple regression models with TVAE as the
dependent variable. Each regression model is statistically significant (P<.01) with the UK
sample firms (see Table 4, Panel C) explaining the highest proportions of variation in
TVAE (40.3%) and SA sample firms (see Table 4, Panel A) explaining the lowest (26.2%).
The coefficients on Duality are statistically significant and negative in all three regressions
in Table 4 (P<.05). Amongst the other three independent variables, coefficients were only
moderately statistically significant in two isolated cases. First, the coefficient for PerOutDir
is positive and statistically significant (P<.10) in the regression for SA sample firms only
(see Table 4, Panel A). Second, the coefficient for PerlnsOwn is positive and statistically
significant (P<. 10) in the regression for the Swedish sample firms only (see Table 4, Panel
^ Pulic (2000), for example, studied 30 firms randomly selected from the FTE-250. The average VAIC score
for these firms in 1998 was 4.712. The average VAIC score of 70 publicly traded frrms from Austria for 1997 was
3.981. From a sample of 42 banks from Croatia the average VAIC score was approximately 4.90.
"^ Tests not reported in body of paper for brevity. Results can be obtained from the authors.
'
' To ftirther test for multicollinearity, a series of multiple regression models were performed whereby a single
independent variable or control factor was excluded from one model but subsequently included in the remainder.
The purpose of these regression models was to determine if the exclusion of an independent variable or control
factor altered the significance and directional sign on the coefficients of the remaining independent variables and
control factors. Findings from these regressions show no significant changes; thus providing fiarther support that
multicollinearity was not a concern.
482 C.-A. Ho, S.M. Williams / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 465-491
^ >
^ 5
i^
>
o fs ino cN mo o —
—
' o o
I
0'* —O lO -Tf (NO — O r^
—
^
d o o
O *n ro in OO >n On <N mO fN —' O O
—'dodo
I I
CO CO
w u
^§
^ > "=
— f— CO
^ -c T?
o
C i- D
a.
"*-
__
^ (u ci
• S ^ o
-T3 O J2
o >n 00 >0 '^ ON C3 So <N o '^ (T) o
q o o o o o _^ *
— d d d d d
-T3 ^
1 1 o M
s
_3
O -^ >n m in OS t^ 13 >O 1^ ^ 00 t^ fN fN > tu
q d
o
d
o
d
o
d
1
O
d
O
d
1 bX)
[1h
>
>
c
.2
CS < M
o r- m fN r<^ fN o fN o
Cu
o
o O o fN O ro O <ti _a>q rsi o —
1
fN
-o
"u
_^ d d d d d d d ^' 1/1
1 1 1 1 1
_w u
«
3 3 s
_o c3 o
"3 H ^
o a\ _, so '* ^^ ^ „^ CN OJ 1/3o 00 Ov •n '^ •—
<
m m r<l B 3q o fN o o o fN m « Cd d d d d
1
d d d C/5 «2
—
E(N ^-1 (N r<^ «—
1
^H * •—
«
^— H ^ rt
—
«
•—
1
^^ fN o o (^ fN 00
S
c«
Os q <^ ^ fN r-~; 00 ON g
— — fN — —
•
fN —
•
—
'
fN T3U [/3 'c^
c ^^ 3
2
4J 1) 1
o
D.
2i
"3
-o
c 1
5
"5
9
c
>
O
3Q
N
s
O
CQ
<
o
a:
OX)
m
>
-a
c
>
5
3
n
O
uN
>
>
•c
>
a
a
a
c
>
C.-A. Ho, S.M. Williams / The International Journal ofAccounting 38 (2003) 465-491 483
Table 4
Multiple regression of the entire sample and VAIC
General model TVAE i=a,+a, , PerOutDiri + a,. PerlnsOwn — a,3 Dualityi+a.,4 Board Sizej+
x,5 ROA, - x,(. LeveragCj + a,7 Dividend Yield, + y.jii Industiy TypCj—oiiq Size ofthe Firmj + e,
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C:
SA firms Sweden UK firms
only (/7=84) firms only
(/7=94)
only
(«=108)
Multiple R 0.585 0.667 0.673
R Square 0.342 0.445 0.453
Adjusted R Square 0.262 0.385 0.403
Standard Error 2.077 2.702 7.189
ANOVA: 14.814 7.482 9.024
F Statistic (Sig.) (0.000a) (0.000a) (0.000a)
t statistic P value t statistic P value t stafistic P value
Intercept 2.484 0.015iS 2.825 0.006a 1.229 0.222
PerOutDir 1.808 0.0757 -1.196 0.235 0.635 0.527
PerlnsOwn -0.546 0.586 1.792 0.0747 0.352 0.725
Duality -2.650 O.OlOi? -2.606 0.011^ -2.314 0.023^
Board Size -1.554 0.124 -1.086 0.280 1.597 0.113
ROA 0.009 0.993 0.479 0.633 0.074 0.942
Leverage -2.767 0.007a -2.237 0.028jS -2.778 0.007a
Dividend Yield -0.517 0.606 -0.452 0.652 6.313 0.000a
Industiy Type -0.354 0.723 2.794 0.006a 1.620 0.109
Size of the Firm 1.005 0.318 -0.301 0.764 -0.025 0.980
Where: a = significant 1% confidence level; j? = significant 5% confidence level; 7=significant 10% confidence
level. TVAE,— Value Added Coefficient Index score for company z for 1998 financial year; PerOutDiri =ratio #
directors not directly employed with or having professional ties to firm to total board size as reported in 1 998 annual
report of company /; PerlnsOn'ni = ratio of # outstanding common shares held by inside directors to total #
outstanding common shares of frnn at end 1998 financial year for company /; Duality, = dummy variable-fums with
same individual acting as CEO and Chairperson as reported in 1998 annual report of company / coded one,
otherwise zero; Board Size,: directors serving on the board of company z at the end of 1998; ROA: ratio of a firm's
operating net income to average total assets for 1997 and 1998 for company z; Leverage,: average of total debt
divided by total shareholders' equity as reported in each firm's 1997 and 1998 annual report for company z;
Dividend Yield,: average of total debt divided by total shareholders' equity as reported in each fum's 1997 and 1998
annual report for company z; Industiy Typef. dummy variable with company z determined to be R&D intensive
coded a one (1 ), otherwise coded a zero (0); Size ofthefirm,:—natural log of annual sales as reported in each firm's
1998 annual report for company z; Xn^^ = coefficients of variables 1 thru 9; and e, = residual term.
C). Overall, and across the three countries, the empirical results presented in Table 4
support only Hypothesis 3a whilst Hypothesis 4a is rejected.
5.3. Tests of lb, 2b, 3b, and 4b
Three regressions reported in Table 5 with TVAPC as the dependent variable are all
statistically significant (P<.00\). The regression including only SA sample firms explains
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the highest level of variation in the dependent variable (see Table 5, Panel A). The regression
including only Swedish firms explains the least (see Table 5, Panel B). Coefficients represent-
ing the four independent variables are only statistically significant in two cases. First, the
coefficient for PerOutDir is positive and statistically significant {P<.0\) in the regression
including SA sample firms only (see Table 5, Panel A). Second, the coefficient representing
Board size in the regression including UK sample firms only (see Table 5, Panel C) is positive
and is moderately statistically significant (/'<.10). Based on findings reported in Table 5,
Hypotheses 2b and 3b are rejected.
5.4. Tests of Ic, 2c, 3c, and 4c
Table 6 presents results of multiple regression analysis with TVAIC as the dependent
variable. All regression models are statistically significant (P < .01). The regression comprising
only SA sample firms (see Table 6, Panel A) explained the highest variation (38.6%) in TVAIC.
Conversely, the regression comprising only UK sample firms (see Table 6, Panel C) explained
the least variation (30.4%). Consistent with Hypothesis 3c, the findings show that the
coefficients for Duality are negative and statistically significant (P<.05, Panels A and B;
Table 5
Multiple regression of the entire sample and TVAPC
General model : TVAPCra&oi 1 PerOutDir/ +a,2 PerlnsOwn / —a, ^Duality/ +(X/4 Board Size/+
a,5 ROA,
-oi,e Leverage/ +^i-i Dividend Yield/ +a,^ Industiy Type/ — a,9 Size ofthe Finn/ + e,
Panel A: SA Panel B: Panel C:
firms only Sweden UK firms
(«=84) firms only
(77=94)
only (/7=108)
Multiple R 0.661 0.415 0.653
R Square 0.479 0.273 0.427
Adjusted R Square 0.427 0.184 0.374
Standard Etror 1.596 0.793 7.296
ANOVA: F 14.830 7.797 8.106
Statistic (Sig.) (0.000a) (0.000a) (0.000a)
t statistic P value t statistic P value / statistic P value
Intercept 1.403 0.165 -0.168 0.867 -1.426 0.157
PerOutDir 3.456 0.001a -0.202 0.840 0.376 0.708
PerlnsOwn -0.322 0.748 1.039 0.302 0.351 0.726
Duality -1.357 0.179 -0.049 0.961 -0.231 0.818
Board Size 1.448 0.152 -0.270 0.788 1.722 O.O887
ROA 4.956 0.000a 1.488 0.141 1.789 0.0777
Leverage -5.095 0.000a -3.199 0.002a -1.031 0.305
Dividend yield 0.608 0.545 -0.324 0.746 2.673 0.009a
Industry type 0.103 0.919 6.192 0.000a -0.491 0.625
Size of the firm -4.872 0.000a -0.478 0.634 -1.937 0.0567
Where: TVAPC=VA efficiency of company, from its PC for 1998. Other independent variables and control factors
are defined in Table 4.
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Table 6
Multiple regression of the entire sample and TVAIC
General model TVAlC,-a;+3(/
,
PerOutDir, + a,_^ PerlnsOwn i —on.jDuality-j + oc 4 Board Sizej +
a,5 ROA,
-a,rt Leveragei+ a, 7 Dividend Yield, + a, s IndustfT Type, -- a,y Size ofthe Firm/ +e,
Panel A: SA Panel B: Panel C: UK
firms only Sweden firms only
(«=84) firms only
(/7=94)
(/7=108)
Multiple R 0.673 0.646 0.602
R Square 0.452 0.418 0.363
Adjusted R Square 0.386 0.355 0.304
Standard Enor 1.403 2.582 0.965
ANOVA: 6.795 6.697 6.202
F Statistic (Sig.) (0.000a) (0.000a) (0.000a)
t statistic P value / statistic P value / statistic P value
Intercept -1.609 0.112 0.553 0.582 -1.290 0.200
PerOutDir 0.254 0.801 1.236 0.220 1.563 0.121
PerlnsOwn -1.175 0.244 2.628 0.010/? 0.029 0.977
Duality -2.380 0.020i? -2.127 0.036^ -1.890 0.0627
Board size -0.654 0.515 1.054 0.295 1.119 0.266
ROA -2.960 0.004a 1.358 0.178 1.368 0.175
Leverage -1.700 0.0937 2.499 0.014^ 0.488 0.627
Dividend yield -1.458 0.149 -0.154 0.878 0.222 0.825
Industry type -0.226 0.822 0.466 0.643 -0.546 0.586
Size of the firm -4.054 0.000a -2.777 0.007a -3.713 0.000a
Where: TVAIC=VA efficiency of company, fi-om its IC (human capital and structural capital) for 1998; that is,
HCE + SCE. Other independent variables and control factors are defined in Table 4.
P< .10, Panel C). Findings reported in Table 6 Panel C (regression containing only Swedish
firms) show the coefficient for PerlnsOwn is positive and statistically significant (P<.0\,
Table 6, Panel B). Coefficients representing Per/w^OwM in the remaining two regressions (Table
6, Panels A and C), however, are not statistically significant. The results in Table 6 indicate no
relationship between TVAIC and PerOutDir, consequently. Hypothesis Ic is rejected. Finally,
coefficients for Board size in the three regressions reported in Table 6 were negative and
statistically insignificant; thus. Hypothesis 4c is rejected.
6. Concluding remarks and future research initiatives
The general purpose of this study is to provide an international comparative analysis of the
association between four board features and corporate performance. These four board features
are (1) proportion of outside directors, (2) percentage of inside directors' ownership, (3)
duality, and (4) size of the board. In contrast to the bulk of prior research, the present study
defines corporate performance within the concept of VA. Further, rather than considering VA
within a holistic perspective, the present study examines the association between board
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features and efficiency of VA by the two major elements of a firm's resource base—namely
PC and IC resources. Overall, empirical findings fail to show an unconditional link between
board features and corporate performance across any of the three nations included in the
present study. This result is consistent with prior empirical research utilizing U.S. data (i.e.,
Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Brickley et al., 1997; Klein, 1998). No specific board feature is
associated with corporate performance. Rather, results show some significant associations
between individual board features and individual measures of corporate performance in one
narion or the other, but not consistently across all three.
While the present study builds on an international setting, further research may address
the impact of the introduction of codes or best practice guides of corporate governance
on the efficiency of VA efficiency by a firm's PC and IC over time. Results of that type
of research could then be compared with findings fi-om studies of board feature-
corporate performance links for nations that have not implemented codes or best practice
guides of corporate governance. Other research could evaluate the links between board
features and the VA by a firm's key resource bases with respect to corporate decisions
that allow managerial opportunism such as the adoption of anti-takeover devices or the
adopdon of CEO evaluation processes. Finally, other research could utilize alternative
theoretical frameworks—such as resource-dependence theory or institutional theory—to
investigate possible links among other board features, corporate governance mechanisms,
and corporate performance.
Overall, this study makes three unique contributions. First, it provides the first large-
scale evidence about the absence of systematic association between board features
(composition, structure, and ownership) and corporate performance, which is defined as
the efficiency of value added by a firm's resources. In addition, the present study fiirther
advances the analysis to determine if board features influence the efficiency of value
added by a firm's two major resource base
—
(1) PC resources and (2) IC resources.
Second, the study also contributes by conducting an international comparative analysis of
board feature-corporate performance links in nations offering similar but diverse socio-
political, economic and corporate governance environments. In particular, the present
study provides evidence of associations between board features and corporate perform-
ance in nations—namely SA and Sweden
—
previously ignored in the literature. Finally,
the present study provides one of the first attempts to capture the concept of IC. This is
an important advance given the increasing significance of this concept and the growing
disparity between a firm's book value and market value. Application of the VAIC
methodology will assist in developing future research initiatives using these alternative
measures to better meet the business environment of the information age.
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Appendix A. Steps in Calculating VAIC for the Dependent Variables
Summary of basic information for company /
Interest Expense (/,)=$2 14,700,000
Depreciation expense (DP,)=$228,200,000
Dividends (A)=$284,900,000
Corporate taxation (r,)=$555,300,000
Equity of minority shareholders in net income of subsidiaries (M,)=$286,200,000
Profits retained for the year (/?,)=$47 1,500,000
Book value of net assets (C£,)=$3,978, 100,000
Salaries and wages (//C,)=$ 1,749,700,000
Required Equation in Calculation Computation
VA, = /, + DP, + Z), + T, + M, + R, (Eq. (2)) VA=$2 14,000,000 + $228,200,000 +$284,900,000 + $555,
300,000 + $286,200,000 + $471,500,000 =$2,040,100,000
CEE, = VA,/CA, (Eq. (3)) CEE, = 2,040,100,000/3,978,100,000 = 0.513
HCE, = VA,/HC, (Eq. (4)) HCE, = 2,040,100,000/1,748,700,000= 1.167
Part (a): SC, = VA,-HC, (Eq. (5)) SQ = 2,040, 100,000 - 1,748,700,000 = 291,400,000
Part (b): SCE, = SC,AA., (Eq. (6)) SCE, = 29 1,400,000/2,040, 100,000 = 0.1 43
VAIC, = CEE, + HCE, + SCE, (Eq. (1)) VAIQ = 0.513 + 1.167 + 0.143 = 1.823
TVAE, = VAIC/ TVAE, = 1.823
TVAIQ = HCE, + SCE, TVAIC,= 1.167 + 0.143 = 1.310
TVAPC, = CEE, TVAPQ = 0.513
Where: VA, = VA for firm i during the 1998 fiscal year is computed as the sum of interest expenses (/,);
depreciation expenses (DP,); dividends (D,); corporate taxes {T,); equity of minority shareholders in net income of
subsidiaries (M,); and profits retained for the year (/?,); HC, = total salary and wage costs for firm i as reported in
the 1998 annual report; CE/ = book value of the total shareholders equity for firm / as reported in the 1998 annual
report; VAIC/ =VA intellectual coefficient for company i for 1998 fiscal year; CEE, = capital employed efficiency
coefficient for company / for 1998 fiscal year; HCE, = human capital efficiency coefficient for company / for 1998
fiscal year; SCE, = structural capital efficiency coefficient for company i for 1998 fiscal year; TVAE,= total VA
efficiency of company / for 1998 fiscal year from its entire resource base; TVAIC,= total VA efficiency of
company /' for 1998 fiscal year from its entire IC resource base; and TVAPC,= total VA efficiency of company /
for 1998 fiscal year from its PC resource base.
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1. Introduction
The Ho and Williams (2003) (henceforth H&W) paper provides descriptive evidence on
the association between corporate performance and board characteristics using a sample of
publicly traded firms listed on the Johannesburg, Stockholm, and London stock exchanges.
Unlike prior research using U.S. data, H&W define corporate performance in terms of
"value-added" (VA) measures. H&W summarize their findings by stating that "at best board
features—corporate performance links are relatively weak (or non-existent) across different
domestic settings and contrasting corporate governance environments."
Given that prior research using U.S. data is unable to document a relationship between
board characteristics and firm performance cross sectionally, one can certainly ask several
questions: Why are H&W studying a variable (e.g., board size) that does not seem to
matter? In other words, why is it important to document a link between board characteristics
and performance outside the United States? A related question pertains to the extent to
which the H&W paper addresses an important accounting issue related to corporate
governance.
I think the relevance of board in influencing corporate performance is potentially
interesting. To the extent that accounting researchers have a comparative advantage in
measuring corporate performance, documenting an association between board features and
* Tel.: +1-573-882-3474; fax: +1-573-882-2437.
E-mail address: khuranai@missouri.edu (I.K. Khurana).
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corporate performance is of interest. My comments are intended to focus on the difficulties of
drawing any inferences based on the empirical tests conducted by H&W. Given my concerns
about the paper with respect to hypotheses development, research design, measurement of
empirical proxies, and sample selection, it is not clear (to me) what can be learned from testing
the association between corporate performance and board characteristics in the intemational
setting studied by H&W. The remainder of this discussion focuses on my concerns.
2. Hypotheses development
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) note that there is an absence of a formal theory linking
board influence on corporate performance and that much of the empirical work in the area is
based on intuition. H&W paper is descriptive and does not attempt to develop a formal model
linking board influence on corporate performance. In my view, developing and documenting
the charmels through which board influences corporate performance is a worthwhile area for
ftiture research (see Bushman & Smith, 2001).
In this version of the paper, H&W tabulate and discuss major corporate governance
characteristics and guidelines in the three sample countries covered by this study. Never-
theless, I still find the institutional information to be insufficient for me to decide whether the
hypotheses developed in the U.S. context can be reliably transplanted in a different context
(such as Sweden).
3. Research design
Fig. 1 from Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) illustrates the joint endogeneity problem
plaguing work on board of directors. Given that firm performance is a result of the actions of
previous directors and that firm performance itself potentially influences the choice of
subsequent directors, endogeneity problem is pervasive in studies linking board features to
firm performance. Like many other prior empirical works, this paper does not consider the
endogeneity issue.
Furthermore, H&W do not specifically describe the fime period over which firm perform-
ance is measured. I assume that the authors examine contemporaneous association between
annual firm performance measures and board features. If board features influence board
actions, and board actions influence future firm performance, then empirical tests conducted
to link contemporaneous corporate performance and board features suffer ft-om a mismatch
problem.
3.1. Dependent variable
Several issues relating to the measures of dependent variable are worth noting. First, H&W
use the VA intellectual coefficient methodology developed by Ante Pulic to derive measures
of firm performance. There is no discussion in the paper whether companies in actual practice
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Equation 4
Board Characteristic
Equation 3
Firm Performance
Fig. 1. The joint endogeneity problem plaguing work on boards of directors (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003, p. 12).
have adopted the VA intellectual coefficient for performance measurement and/or incentive
compensation. Similarly, it is not clear (to me) whether these measures have gained
acceptance among academics. The citations of Antle Pulic's work are listed as being available
on the Internet. The concern here is about the reliability of the metrics and their acceptance in
academia.
Second, H&W allude to the measures of dependent variable as a tool "to evaluate the
efficiency of value-added." It is not clear why absolute as opposed to relative (industry-
adjusted) measures of firm performance are appropriate for empirical analysis. Finally, if one
substitutes Eqs. (3), (4), and (5) into Eq. (1), then the value-added intellectual coefficient
(TVAE) for an individual firm is:
TVAE = [VA/book value of net assets]
-I- [VA/total salaries and wage costs]
+ [(VA — total salaries and wage costs)/VA]
The above equation suggests that VA is counted more than once in calculating TVAE. This
double counting calls into question the validity of the firm performance measures used in the
paper. It would be informative to know the correlations between TVAE and its components.
Given the problems with the measures, the onus is on H&W to build a stronger case of
why VA measures are more appropriate than the traditional measures of corporate perform-
ance. In Appendix B, H&W report results of regressions where the dependent variables are
market to book ratio and accounting return on assets. Again, the results based on the
association between these traditional measures of corporate performance and board character-
istics are weak. An alternative firm performance metric to consider is annual stock returns.
5.2. Test variables
The construct that is attempted to be captured by the test variables is board independence.
The four proxies used to capture the construct are percentage of outside directors to total
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directors, percentage of outstanding shares owned by insider directors, representation of the
chief executive officer as the chairperson of the board, and number of directors serving on the
board. To the extent that board independence does not manifest itself in the four proxies used
in this study, there is a construct vahdity threat. It may also be worthwhile to conduct a factor
analysis using the four proxies to identify common factors, if any, and retaining factors
identified as significant in the multivariate tests.
3.3. Sample selection
I was struck by the fact that while the initial sample consisted of all publicly traded firms
listed on the Johannesburg, Stockholm, and London stock exchanges, the final sample
consisted of 286 sample firms from three countries. Footnote 9 alludes to original 240
companies, a final survey, and nonresponse bias test. It would be useful to discuss how the
original 240 companies were selected and the trade-offs involved in making this research
design choice. Also, a sample reconciliation indicating reasons for deletions would be useful.
4. Policy implications
H&W make several statements about the implications of their results for uniformly
mandated governance structures. For example, in the abstract, they state that their evidence
"refutes the notion that uniform board structures be mandated." Similarly, in the conclusions
section, they state that their findings "raise further doubts about propositions by some
corporate governance reformists to mandate board features through law." It is not clear to me
how the findings reported in this paper can be generalized to a regulatory regime where
uniformly mandated governance structures are in force. Results reported in the paper are
based on current regulatory regime. In a uniformly mandated govemance structure, incentives
of the board of directors may differ significantly. As a result, it is inappropriate to draw policy
implications based on the findings of H&W to uniformly mandated govemance structure.
5. Conclusions
H&W attempt to document an association between board characteristics and corporate
performance in an international setting outside the United States. Clearly, the role of boards as
a corporate govemance mechanism is important to investors, regulators, users, and producers
of financial statements. Despite the importance of this area, I believe that the paper does not
provide credible evidence on the linkages between board features and corporate performance.
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1. Introduction
Acceptance of intellectual capital as a major resource does not alleviate measurement
problems. In our paper, we sought to broaden the scope of present intellectual capital research
into the fields of accounting and corporate governance. Professor Inder K. Khurana and other
conference participants raise some interest points regarding our paper. We seek to specifically
address those raised by Professor Khurana and to provide further insights into the
contribution of this paper.
2. VAIC as an acceptable method
The methodology underlying the proxy measurement of the dependent variable receives
some comment in Khurana's (2003) discussion. In part, we feel the comments of Khurana
stem fi^om a lack of familiarity with this approach rather than knowledge that the method-
ology is unaccepted. The pioneer of VAIC works for a relatively small institution called the
Austrian Intellectual Capital Research Center (AICRC). Second, the primary objective of
AICRC (including Ante Pulic) is the promotion and development of intellectual capital and
its measurement in German-speaking nations and Eastem European nations. Finally, efforts to
promote VAIC have been concentrated in the field of intellectual capital/knowledge manage-
ment rather than the accounting or finance disciplines.
Our article does provide specific reference to the commercial use of VAIC by the Nova
Kreditna banka Maribor (2001). We are also aware of the use of—and interest—in VAIC by
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Other commercial enterprises.' Apart from its application at the firm level, the Chamber of
Economy in Croatia utilized the VAIC methodology in measuring the performance of
Croatian firms, and the Croatian economy at national and regional levels (International
Business Efficiency Consulting, 2002). Also, earlier research by Williams (2001) was
described by Bontis (2001, p. 181)—a leading expert on intellectual capital—as "an elegant
extension of the pioneering work" of Pulic (1998). Generally, amongst academics in the
intellectual capital discipline the work of Ante Pulic in developing the VAIC is recognized as
groundbreaking (Bontis & Nikitopoulos, 2001).
3. Need for board structure-corporate performance link research
Within the social sciences the test of significance has virtually become the single quintes-
sential method for establishing inferences (see, e.g., Johnstone, 1986; Lindsay, 1995; Tomkins
& Groves, 1983). Indeed, Gigerenzer et al. (1989) argue that the test of significance is often
regarded as the sine qua non of the scientific method. The excessive focus on this methodo-
logical criterion of adequacy may unduly impede the quest of scientific research and may lead
readers to ignore the key issues (see, e.g., Christie, 1990; Hubbard & Armstrong, 1994).
As reported in our paper—and by Khurana (2003)—the tests of significance were generally
insignificant. However, we argue that this is not necessarily evidence of no relationship.
Lindsay (1994, p. 34) remarked researchers in the social sciences "display a positive result
orientation whereby there is a tendency to equate scientific significance with statistical
significance." Further, it has been argued results producing negative results are sometimes
perceived to be a signal of poor and adequate research design (Gigerenzer et al., 1989).
4. Sample selection
Khurana (2003) suggests there is a weakness in our study related to the sample selection.
We do not consider this a weakness of the research method. We are thankfiil to Professor
Khurana, however, for drawing our attention to this possible cavity in our paper." Our initial
sample comprised all firms listed on the Johannesburg, Stockholm and London stock
exchanges at the end of 1998. As all data for our study was hand-collected financial and
practical limitations limited the number of firms we sought to collect data from. It was
decided to randomly select 120 firms (see footnote 2 for a fiirther clarification) from each
Confidentially precludes us from mentioning other firms directly.
When we started developing our study, we initially decided to randomly select 80 firms from each stock
exchange. Based on suggestions from several colleagues that reviewed the research design we decided to expand
the selection to 120 from each stock exchange rather than the original 80 (240 in total). The increase in numbers to
randomly select was due to concerns about an inability to collect sufficient data. When writing our paper we
regretftjlly wrote 240 in footnote IX rather than the intended 360. Given the reply of Professor Khurana referring
to footnote IX whilst mentioning 240 firms we have not made adjustment to our earlier paper so as not to cause
confusion.
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Stock exchange excluding financial and utility sector firms, and foreign incorporated firms.
From the randomly selected firms a total for a total of 314 (99 in South Afi-ica, 102 in
Sweden and 113 in UK) annual reports were collected. Of the collected annual reports data
on board structure characteristics could not be determined for 2 1 firms (9 in South Africa, 5
in Sweden and 3 in UK). In addition, financial data were incomplete for 8 firms (4 in South
Africa, 3 in Sweden and 1 in UK). Firms for which board structure and financial data were
missing were excluded from the study. Finally, two firms ft^om South Africa were also
identified as subsidiaries of foreign muhinationals whilst one firm from the UK was found to
be actually incorporated in France. These 3 firms were also excluded from the study.
5. Theory development and research design
Khurana (2003) raises concems regarding the lack of a formal theoretical framework.
Generally speaking, we do not feel the endogeneity problem is unique to our study. Rather,
they are weaknesses of this body of literature in general.
Khurana (2003) also writes that he cannot determine whether hypotheses developed within
the context of the United States can be applied to the domestic settings. Indeed, effect of
culture and differences is an area worthy of study.
6. Time period
We did consider the potential for a "mismatch problem" raised by Khurana (2003).
Various reasons, however, prompted us to follow a contemporaneous approach. For example,
there is no overwhelming theoretical or empirical justification in the literature for the use of a
lagged approach as opposed to a contemporaneous research design. Also, due to a concern at
not being able to collect data from a sufficiently large sample (particularly in South Africa
and Sweden) we decided to focus on data drawn from a single data source rather than having
to seek two documents from the same firm. Finally, we felt that across the specific time period
for this study board structure would have been relatively stable. A general review of the data
provides some anecdotal evidence for this conjecture. Also, we conducted some limited
empirical tests using a sample of firms where board membership is constant during the 1998
fiscal year. Empirical findings did not indicate any significant variation from results in our
paper. Overall, we do not perceive there is a serious "mismatch problem" with our study.
7. Policy implications
The final issue fi-om Khurana's (2003) discussion that we wish to reply to relates to the
policy implications. We agree that we might have extended the inferences made and wish to
thank Professor Khurana for his comments.
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We welcome the comment of Nobes (2003) as a significant contribution both to the
knowledge and understanding and to the debate itself We accept the evidential points that he
makes, without departing from our original prognostication regarding future developments.
Readers, and eventually history, will reach their own conclusions.
There are two points that we wish to make related to the list of agreed dramatic proposals.
First, the fact that they are agreed to by standard setters does not necessarily imply that they
will receive similar levels of support across the spectrum of national systems. Second, and
much more important in the context of the original Alexander and Archer (2000) argument,
the point is not, as Nobes states, that these conclusions are now part of a consensus of ASA
standard setters, rather these conclusions are now part of a consensus of standard setters,
period. Nobes' codicil actually points in this direction. All three authors seem to agree that
ASA, while of important historical interest, is in diagnostic terms an outdated notion. This
does not seem inconsistent with our original proposition that "the notion of Anglo Saxon
cooperation" may lack "future explanatory power" (p. 555).
Within a "group," there will usually, as Nobes says, be differences, sometimes significant
and sometimes minor. We believe that Nobes significantly underplays the issue of the
preparer override of an accounting standard. He accepts, as he has confirmed to us (letter of
18th January, 2002), that this is likely to be a bone of contention between members of the
lASB, with Leisenring and supporters (U.S. background) firmly opposed to the "override"
provisions in the existing IAS 1, and Tweedie and Whittington (U.K. background) equally
firm in support of them. However, he does not seem to accept that this difference has quite
fundamental implications for the whole approach to standard setting and its enforcement.
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-121-414-8027; fax: +44-121-414-6678.
E-mail address: d.j.a.alexanderfSjbham.ac.uk (D. Alexander).
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FASB standards are significantly more detailed and prescriptive than either U.K. ASB
standards or existing lASs (except perhaps the dreaded IAS 39). This is because ASB and
lASC/B standards aim to be principle based and to leave room for the exercise of professional
accounting judgment in applying the principle on which the standard is based. FASB
standards are more prescriptive and rule based because the litigious environment in the
United States calls for this. In such an envirormient, "I followed the rules" is a better defence
than "I used my judgment." It is not at all clear to us which of these two approaches the new
lASB will follow. The issue is certainly fiindamental. Whether you take the view that ASA no
longer exists or that we are all ASA now, the fact remains that the Brits and the Yanks, for
solid historical and contextual reasons, are on opposite sides on this matter.
Readers will note that we have commented on, and influenced, the Nobes paper and should
be aware that he has also made helpful suggestions on the text of this reply. This has been a
constructive debate amongst fiiends.
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